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ABSTRACT
J. Paul de B. Taillon
"International Co-operation in the Employment of Elite 
Military Forces to Counter-Terrorism: The British and
American Experience With Special Reference to Their 
Respective Experiences in the Evolution of Low-Intensity 
Operations."
This thesis examines the employment of elite military 
forces in low-intensity and counter-terrorist operations, and 
in particular, placing the principal emphasis on the aspect 
of international co-operation in the latter. The experiences 
of Great Britain and the United States in such operations are 
the main elements of the discussion, reflecting their heavy 
involvement in such operations. However, to analyze the 
experiences of those two countries out of context would be 
difficult and would distort the perceptions of the problems 
and desiderata as they evolved historically. Therefore, a 
survey of contemporary international terrorism, and the 
reaction to it, is also incorporated within the body of this 
paper.
The British and American sections of the thesis begin by 
addressing their respective military experiences in the wider 
realm of low-intensity operations before dealing specifically 
with modern counter-terrorism. Equally necessary, for a 
balanced perspective, is the inclusion of the Israeli and 
West German experience in counter-terrorism? this is briefly 
addressed in two short case studies on Entebbe and Mogadishu. 
The main Anglo-American focus of the study gives primary
importance to the development and doctrine for the employment 
of special forces, as well as an analysis of more recent 
low-intensity and counter-terrorism operations, such as the 
1980 Iranian embassy siege in London and the failure that 
same year of the American hostage rescue attempt in Tehran. 
At this point this thesis attempts to identify and highlight 
those key aspects of co-operation at an international level 
which have, at least in part, been the sine qua non of 
successful counter-terrorist operations in the past and seem 
to be destined to remain so in the future.
While it will be shown that international co-operation is 
essential in the areas of intelligence, exchanges and 
attachments between counter-terrorist forces,
'forward-basing' in relevant countries, as well as the 
acquisition of secure internal and external communications, 
it will also be argued, nonetheless, that the historical 
experience and state interest of different countries makes 
such co-operation more difficult than might appear at first 
sight. All of these, however, are impossible without the 
political will on the part of potential co-operating 
governments to undertake such initiatives. Particularly when 
one considers the very delicate nature of elite 
counter-terrorist force employment and the potential for 
embarrassment which is inherent in their activities and, 
therefore, cannot always be taken for granted.
The findings of this study suggest that such co-operation can 
indeed provide significant advantages when low-intensity 
operations call for a response including 'the final option' 
—  the employment of elite counter-terrorist forces. Also 
clear from this analysis is that the greatest progress in
such international co-operation is likely to come from joint 
activities by countries having a similarly heightened sense 
of the threat which also implies that they share a common 
Sociology* in their view of these historical developments.
INTRODUCTION
This thesis proposes to demonstrate that terrorism in its 
current form has resulted in government and military 
reactions which, when successful, are often so because of the 
high degree of co-operation with other countries. In
addition it appears from this research that elite forces, 
organized, armed, trained and structured for the 
counter-terrorist role can be, in such circumstances as the 
hostage-takings and aircraft hijackings included here, the 
most effective arm of such governments in dealing with 
terrorism. In this regard an overview of the development of 
terrorism is included, particularly its late 
twentieth-century expression in aerial-hijacking and
hostage-taking. Accompanying this is a definitional section 
as well as a look at governmental reactions to the
phenomenon.
A second chapter addresses the spread of terrorism onto the 
international scene and the ways governments have reacted to 
this type of warfare. That is to say warfare by which the 
weak wage a ruthless war against the strong. In order to 
underscore the international aspects of this response to 
terrorism two short case studies are included. Also 
discussed in detail are the experiences of Great Britain and 
the United States in low-intensity conflict up to their most 
recent and notable counter-terrorist operations.
Terrorism is not a specific phenomenon: it is a part of a
continuum embracing low-intensity conflict, subversion and 
guerrilla warfare tactics to acts of spectacular violence
designed to make a political rather than a military point. 
Similarly, counter-terrorist operations are also a part of a 
continuum and are employed appropriately and concomitantly 
as required by the authorities to meet each of these 
eventualities. Furthermore, the employment of elite military 
forces is a political decision and depends upon, for the most 
part, the appropriateness of their use within the national 
and international context.
Based on these extended studies of British and American 
involvement in low-intensity conflict —  particularly the 
terrorist dimension —  the following conclusions are drawn: 
the importance of intelligence gathering and dissemination, 
the creation and organization and training of 
counter-terrorist forces, the requirement for forward-basing 
of these forces during international incidents, and the 
nature of the pre-crisis co-operation between the countries 
concerned are stark necessities if a counter-terrorist action 
is to be successful on the contemporary scene. All the 
issues identified above, including the technical and 
operational aspects of the problem, fit within an all 
encompassing factor of inter-governmental co-operation in the 
struggle against terrorist activity. The problem of 
maintaining the national will to co-operate in the face of 
all political costs lies behind the failure to advance in 
what might be considered full security co-operation.
Elite forces may then epitomize the national resolve to 
combat terrorism. This does not mean, however, that 
governments will consider the terrorist threat so serious 
that they would risk open co-operation with regimes with 
which they feel they have little in common. It is not even
certain that given the risks incurred by states in attempting 
to combat terrorism, that they will co-operate with their 
allies. However, in the end, it is the national will of 
governments to assist their friends and allies that has 
occasioned a number of successful counter-terrorist 
operations executed by elite military forces.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter I - AN OVERVIEW OF TERRORISM 
Section I
Section II 
Section III 
Section IV
- The Use of Terrorism for Political 
Objectives
- An Historical Perspective on 
Terrorism
- The Pre-1972 Response to 
Terrorism
- The Nature of Current Terrorist 
Activities and Governmental 
Response
Chapter II - INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF COUNTER-TERRORISM
Section I
Section II
- Terrorism as an International 
Phenomenon in Recent History
- The Counter-Terrorist Reaction
Chapter III - THE ROLE OF ELITE FORCES IN COUNTER TERRORISM 
THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE
Section I 
Section II
Section III
- An Historical Perspective
- Historical Overview of British 
Special Forces
- 'Operation NIMROD' The Iranian 
Embassy Siege —  London 30 April- 
5 May 1980
Chapter IV - THE ROLE OF ELITE FORCES IN COUNTER TERRORISM 
THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
Section I 
Section II
Section III
- An Historical Perspective
- Historical Overview of US Special 
Forces
- 'Operation EAGLE CLAW' - Delta's 
Raid Into Iran
Chapter V - FINAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
CONCLUSIONS
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
APPENDIX I 
APPENDIX II
APPENDIX III 
APPENDIX IV
_ tOperation NIMROD'
- International Terrorists Incidents, 
1990
- The Pattern of Revolutionary Warfare
- Graphs
PAGE
1
11
20
52
61
66
138
179
205
229
270
304
332
361
365
CHAPTER I
AN OVERVIEW OF TERRORISM 
Section I
The Use of Terrorism for Political Objectives
Man has always had to frighten adversaries, whether they were 
animals or other human beings. To survive, he tried to 
instill the fear of pain or death in his enemies. Extreme 
fear, or terror, has probably always been a feature of human 
existence. Throughout recorded history, terror has been 
used, first by individuals, then by groups and even, in some 
cases by entire societies to impose individual or collective 
wills on powerless, helpless or irresolute groups.
In a sense, the development of terrorism paralleled social 
change. Developments in social and political cohesion 
engendered the seeming requirement to impose fear not just on 
one's fellows, but also on other groups. Terrorism has thus 
evolved as mankind has progressed.
Although contemporary observers tend to see the post-1967 
period as an "age of terrorism," close scrutiny reveals that 
this is a parochial historical view of the phenomenon for 
historical study is filled with examples of terrorist acts.
As society has changed, terror has been used in different 
ways and at different levels. The development of 
nationalism, the modern state system, and particularly the 
vulnerable economic and social structures common to the late 
20th century, have permitted the organized imposition of
terror in ways which differ radically from those available to 
early man in his relations with his neighbours and his 
predatory animal opponents.
The nature and complexity of this issue is reflected in the
many definitions for terror and terrorism, moreover it is
difficult to define in a nominalist way. Therefore, a
totally acceptable, all-encompassing definition evades us
still. It is always intended, often well-planned, and coldly
executed. It has been said that, "One has to look at modern
terrorism, contemporary terrorism, as a new type, new mode,
new form of warfare."1 Despite this apparent new look, it is
really "one of the oldest techniques of psychological 
2warfare." One expert, Paul Wilkinson, suggests:
Terror, to state a truism, is a subjective 
experience: we all have different 'thresholds' of
extreme fear and tend to be more easily terrified 
by certain experiences, images and threats than by 
others. It is the interplay of these subjective 
factors and individual irrational, and often 
unconscious, responses that makes the state of 
terror, extreme fear or dread a peculiarly 
difficult concept for empirical social scientists 
to handle. It has been the tendency recently in 
the social sciences to shy away from the study of 
phenomena that are extremely difficult to define 
and almost impossible to measure. Furthermore the 
concepts of terror and terrorism have obviously - 
very strong evaluative and emotive connotations.
Violence today encompasses a broad panorama of real and
potential threats emanating from many areas of the globe and
linked to a variety of causes.
1 . .Global Television - Interview of Yonah Alexander,
"Special Report: International Terrorism: Past, Present,
Future," 15 March, 1981. Trancript.
2Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism And The Liberal State. (First 
Edition), p. 49.
3Ibid, pp. 47-48.
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This paper is concerned with that aspect of terror which is 
politically motivated. Such systematic terrorism, 
orchestrated by cells, groups or states, employs death and 
destruction or the threat of them to achieve political aims. 
In contemporary terms, it is considered a mode of 
psychological or low-intensity warfare.
The simplicity and low cost of terrorism is both attractive
and frightening. As Paul Wilkinson puts it:
A primary target for terrorisation is selected; 
the objective, or message to be conveyed, is 
determined; and credibility is established by 
convincing the target that the threat can actually 
be carried out. The victim or victims of the 
actual act of terrorist violence may or may not be 
the primary target, and the effects of relatively
small amounts of violence will tend to be quite
disproportionate in terms of the number of people 
terrorised: in the words of an ancient Chinese
proverb, 'Kill one, frighten ten thousand.'
In accomplishing their mission, the terrorists hope that the
national and international media will exaggerate the
terrorist threat or act and multiply the effect of a solitary
outrage, while at the same time publicizing the terrorist
cause. Terrorists prefer to have many people witness their
activities on behalf of the cause rather than have many
5people dead or suffering due to it.
Role of the Media
To comprehend fully the nature of modern terrorism, one must 
be cognizant of the role of the mass media (i.e., television,
4Ibid, p. 49. This is actually a saying of Sun Tzu.
5Ibid.
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radio, movies, newspapers and magazines). As underlined by
Hilde L. Mosse in her paper "The Media and Terrorism,":
Violence has entered their homes, glorified and 
in profusion, via the mass media. This has 
contributed mightily to the implicit acceptance of 
violence as a means of getting things done.
Television is probably the single most powerful medium. It 
makes communication between people almost instantaneous, and 
allows individuals, from diverse nationalities to partake of 
the world's cultural and intellectual life. Television has
thus been said to be "potentially the single most important
. . . 7antiviolence device." Consciousness of violence through the
media, particularly television, has been pervasive in the
social development of young people growing up during the
brutal and turbulent decades of the 1960s, 70s and 80s. The
Middle-East Wars, Vietnam, Northern Ireland, insurrection,
invasions, revolution and street crime became a part of the
daily diet for these generations. For this audience:
Violence is very effective in fact and in fiction. 
It attracts attention and therefore viewers faster 
and more predictably than any other theme. Fast, 
gory, brutal action is much easier to write about 
and to portray than the complicated subtleties of 
genuine and humane human relationships. To kill 
someone settles a conflict quickly. It takes time, 
careful reasoning, and emotional restraint to solve 
it nonviolently.
By definition terrorism uses violence, either expressed or 
implied. However, in doing so, it finds an unwitting ally in 
the press which, while carrying out its task of reporting the 
news, publicizes the deeds of terrorists and propagates their
g
Hilde L. Mosse, "The Media and Terrorism," in Marius H. 
Livingston, (ed) et al., International Terrorism In The 
Contemporary World, p. 282.
7Ibid., p. 283.
8Ibid., p. 284.
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cause. Because terrorist activities make news in an age of 
mass communication, the agents of the media serve the needs 
of the terrorists while they answer the demands of the 
citizens to be informed. At the same time it also gives the 
terrorists the upper hand in employing fear as 'the' 
psychological warfare weapon. However, the media could deny, 
or at least lessen, the impact of terrorist violence by how 
they report the incident and in doing so decrease the 
prospects and impact of this type of warfare.
The Future
It is probably safe to assume that this form of conflict will
persist through to the next century particularly as societies
become more vulnerable to this type of violence. Yonah
Alexander has expressed the following problem:
What is particularly disturbing is the fact that 
the advances of science and technology are slowly 
turning the entire modern society into a potential 
victim of terrorism, with no immunity for the 
noncombatant segment of the world population or for 
those nations and peoples who have no direct 
connection to particular conflicts or to specific 
grievances that motivate acts of violence.
Clearly, the globalization of the brutalization of 
modern violence makes it abundantly clear that we 
have entered a new Age of terrorism with all its 
frightening ramifications.
In general terms, terrorism can thrive wherever there exist
grievances stemming from apparent injustice. This can
include the complete lack of, or simply inadequate,
participation in the political process, poverty, prejudice,
or other forms of oppression. Where these grievances are not
addressed, popular dissatisfaction will almost certainly
spawn disorder and, eventually even terrorism. This 'centre
9 . . .Neil C. Livingstone, The War Against Terrorism, p. xi.
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of gravity,1 in Clausewitzian terms, for terrorism, would be 
more easily addressed if such grievances were resolved rather 
than simply dealt with through heavy-handed oppression, which 
can itself engender terrorist activities. This is, of 
course, extremely difficult because of differing views on the 
grievances and their legitimacy, entrenched interests, and 
issues outside of, but related to, the problems which result 
in a particular terrorist manifestation.
Societies with minimal political activities and the most 
injustice are often the most free from contemporary 
terrorism? perhaps this is because repression can be highly 
effective. Although in democratic nations, citizens may 
voice ideas across the spectrum and bring grievances to the 
surface, we must also be aware that we, as humans, are not 
perfect and in turn neither are our institutions. Therefore,
the problems of a whole society may be reduced but never
10 . . .  totally erased. In that light, it is well to accept that:
However democratic a society, however near to 
perfection the social institutions, there will 
always be disaffected and alienated people claiming 
that the present state of affairs is intolerable 
and there will be aggressive people more-interested 
in violence than in liberty and justice.
Typology of Terrorism
Wilkinson has divided political terrorism into three types: 
revolutionary, sub-revolutionary, and repressive. He defines 
revolutionary terrorism as the employment of systematic 
tactics of terrorist violence with the aim of bringing about
10Walter Laqueur, Terrorism, p. 265.
11Ibid., p. 266.
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political revolution. He characterizes revolutionary
terrorism as having several distinct traits: that it is
always a group phenomenon no matter how small that group may
be? that the revolution and the employment of terror in its
promotion are incorporated within some sort of ideology? that
the organization has leaders who motivate the members to
pursue a revolutionary ideology? and that it develops
12"alternative institutional structures."
Further, a more accurate assessment of politically motivated
terrorism should incorporate the following features: that it
is integral to a revolutionary strategy? that it employs
socially and politically unacceptable violence in pursuit of
its aims? that there is a pattern of symbolic or
representative selection of targets? and that lastly the
orchestrators of these activities aspire to achieve a
psychological effect, thereby forcing an adjustment in
13political behaviour on the target audience.
Wilkinson has further classified his definition of 
revolutionary terrorism into the following seven subtypes:
(i) Organisations of pure terror (in which 
terrorism is the exclusive weapon),
(ii) revolutionary and national/liberationist 
parties and movements in which terror is employed 
as an auxiliary weapon,
(iii) guerilla terrorism - rural and urban,
(iv) insurrectionary terrorism - normally 
short-term terror in the course of a revolutionary 
rising,
12Wilkinson, op. cit., p. 56.
13M.C. Hutchinson, "The Concept of Revolutionary 
Terrorism," Journal of Conflict Resolution. 1973, 6(3), 
p. 385.
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(v) the revolutionary Reign of Terror - often 
directed at classes and racial and religious 
minorities,
(vi) propaganda of the deed, when this form of 
terror is motivated by long-term revolutionary 
objectives and
(vii) international terrorism (that is terrorism 
committed outside the borders of one or all of the 
parties to the political conflict), where it is 
motivated by revolutionary objectives.
Wilkinson defines his second type, sub-revolutionary
terrorism, as violence employed "for political motives other
15than revolution or governmental repression." He 
differentiates revolutionary from sub-revolutionary terrorism 
by suggesting that the former demands total change, while the 
latter aspires to achieve more limited or selected aims, as 
for example, making the government change its stated policy.
The third type, repressive terrorism, he defines as "the
systematic use of terroristic acts of violence for the
purposes of suppressing, putting down, quelling, or
restraining certain groups, individuals or forms of behaviour
16deemed to be undesirable by the oppressor." This form of 
terrorism requires the services of an effective secret police 
force and an efficient intelligence service, both of which 
may be perceived by outsiders and themselves as elite. These
14 . . .Paul Wilkinson, Political Terrorism, p. 38. (It
should also be underlined that acts orchestrated by two 
terrorist parties against each other would also be considered 
as terrorism.)
16Ibid., p. 40.
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organizations are directed against any opposition, as was the
17Shah of Iranfs infamous SAVAK.
Wilkinson finally defines, for himself, that terrorism is:
...the systematic use of murder and destruction, 
and the threat of murder and destruction in order 
to terrorise individuals, groups, communities or 
governments into conceding to the terrorists1 
political demands.
Terrorism is separated from other types of violence by the
. . . 19political context of the act and its shock value. It is
this psychological aspect which is often most disconcerting, 
rather than the act. While there are other typologies 
developed by other commentators on terrorism and despite the 
ambiguities and inadequacies noted above, the Wilkinson 
framework is used in this paper because of its clear 
definitions.
There are nonetheless some shortcomings in these definitions.
Assuming that a series of individual acts can only be
considered to be terrorist tactics if they are systematic,
and acknowledging "that terrorism may be used by both
20insurgents and incumbent regimes," Grant Wardlaw defines
political terrorism as:
...the use, or threat of use, of violence 
by an individual or a group, whether acting for or 
in opposition to established authority, when such 
action is designed to create extreme anxiety and/or 
fear-inducing effects in a target group larger than 
the immediate victims with the purpose of coercing
17 .Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne, The Dictionary Of
Espionage, p. 195.
18Wilkinson, Political Terrorism, op. cit., p. 49.
19 . . .Grant Wardlaw, Political Terrorism: Theory, tactics.
and counter-measures, p. 16.
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that group into acceding to the political demands 
of the perpetrators.
In conclusion, terrorism is seldom mindless or irrational.
To those who employ this tactic, it remains a logical means 
to an end. To the uninformed, terrorist acts may seem 
random, harming persons and interests that may seem of little 
importance to the cause. However, the aim of instilling fear 
for coercive purposes is achieved. The following section 
provides a brief history of political violence in order to 
trace the development of terrorism today.
21Ibid.
-  11 -  
Section II
An Historical Perspective on Terrorism
To fully appreciate the implications of terrorism today it is
appropriate, at this juncture, to review and assess terrorism
within the context of history. Wardlaw argues:
Part of the solution to the question of whether 
or not contemporary terrorism poses a unique threat 
to social order lies in an appraisal of its degree 
of continuity with previous manifestations of 
political terrorism.
It is not possible in this study to produce a complete
history of terrorism. However, in order to place
contemporary terrorist activities in a proper perspective, it
is germane to identify some of the major historical
benchmarks of terrorism.
Walter Laqueur has written that the term terrorism was 
defined in the 1798 supplement of the Dictionnaire de
2 3l'Academie Frangaise as a "systeme, rdgime de la terreur." 
From that moment on this word has been, and continues to be, 
employed to describe a spectrum of violent activities, many 
of which are not encompassed within the dictionary 
definition. Although the word terrorism is, in historical 
terms, relatively new, Laqueur argues that this form of 
political violence can be seen much earlier in history in the
22Ibid., p. 18.
23 . .Laqueur, op. cit., p. 16. It is possibly no accident
that the book includes the first definition of ideology.
activities of a movement known as the Sicarii, operating at 
the time of the Zealot movement in Palestine in the period 
66-73 A.D.24
Probably the most notable 'terrorist group1 of early times
was the Assassins who surfaced in Persia in the eleventh
century, only to be smashed by the Mongols two centuries
later. Contemporary political analysts have compared recent
terrorist groups to the Assassins. The group's first leader,
Hassan Sibai, understood:
...early on that his group was too small to 
confront the enemy in open battle but that a 
planned, systematic, long-term campaign of terror 
carried out by a small, disciplined5force could be 
a most effective political weapon.
An historical study would reveal the existence of other
isolated organizations which employed terrorism. However,
observers believe that the usefulness of the systematic
deployment of political violence was not fully appreciated
2 6until the French Revolution and the rise of nationalism in
Europe. Laqueur writes of this phenomenon:
Systematic terrorism begins in the second half of 
the nineteenth century and there were several quite 
distinct categories of it from the very beginning. 
The Russian revolutionaries.... Radical nationalist 
groups such as the Irish, Macedonians, Serbs or 
Armenians used terrorist methods in their struggle 
for autonomy or national independence. Lastly, 
there was the anarchist 'propaganda by the deed', 
mainly during the 1890s in France, Italy, Spain and 
the United States.
24Ibid., p. 18. See also S.G.F. Brandon, "The Zealots: 
the ancient Jewish Resistance against Rome," in Michael 
Elliot-Bateman (ed), The Fourth Dimension of Warfare. Volume 
1: Intelligence. Subversion. Resistance.
25Ibid., p. 19.
2 6Wardlaw, op. cit., p. 18.
27Laqueur, op. cit., p. 22.
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His view suggests that terrorism, in all its manifestations, 
has a common and quite recent origin associated with the twin 
movements of democracy and nationalism. Adherents to both 
increasingly found political or national subordination 
unacceptable. They insisted that these conditions be 
improved and were not reluctant to employ violence if there
seemed to be little prospect that their demands would be
. 28 met.
Although it was active only from 1878 to 1881, the Russian
Narodnaya Volya was one of the most important of the
formative terrorist groups. This organization was
responsible for the evolution of a sophisticated terrorist
campaign against the Czarist authorities. According to one
of Narodnaya Volya's foremost thinkers:
Terrorism ... was an altogether new fighting 
method, far more 'cost effective' than an 
old-fashioned revolutionary mass struggle. Despite 
insignificant forces, it would still be possible to 
concentrate every effort upon the overthrow of 
tyranny. Since there was no limit to human 
inventiveness, it was virtually impossible for2the 
tyrants to provide safeguards against attacks.
Already, one can see the emergence of organized terrorists
employing violence as a psychological weapon. However, for
many, terrorism was simply a better ethical choice than
initiatives which aimed at a mass insurrectional movement.
Gerasim Romanenko, a Russian proponent of the terrorist
approach perceived terrorism as a moral alternative. He
argued that:
...terrorism was not only effective, it was 
humanitarian. It cost infinitely fewer victims 
than a mass struggle; in a popular revolution the 
best were killed while the real villains looked on
O Q
Ibid., pp. 22-23.
29Ibid., p. 50.
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from the sidelines. The blows of terrorism were 
directed against the main culprits? a few innocent 
people might suffer, but this was inevitable in 
warfare.
The terrorism orchestrated by the Narodnaya Volya was
markedly different from the activities of their
contemporaries, the Anarchists. "Anarchist terror was
characteristically an individual activity whereas Russian
31terrorism was a directed campaign." In short, the 
Narodnaya Volya sponsored discriminate acts of terrorism.
Russian terrorism fell with the early demise of the Narodnaya 
Volya. It was another twenty years before major violence 
began again, with the assassination in 1902 of the Minister 
of the Interior, Dmitrii Sergevich Sipyagin by the political 
offspring of the Narodnaya Volya - the Social Revolutionary 
Party. Laqueur states that terrorism, in Russian 
revolutionary thinking "was not intended to replace the mass
struggle; on the contrary it would strengthen and supplement
32 .the revolutionisation of the masses." It is from this idea
of the role of terrorism as an adjunct or a stage of the
revolutionary process where contemporary analysts have noted
strong comparisons with the modern practitioners of
terrorism. It should be underlined, however, that once
terrorist acts become a part of a revolutionary process all
discrimination is lost.
Russian terrorism in the early 1900s was more favourably 
received by the masses than had been the activities of the
30Ibid., p. 51.
31Wardlaw, op. cit., p. 19.
32Laqueur, op. cit., p. 55.
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Narodnaya Volya, which had only succeeded in acquiring
supporters from the middle and upper-class intelligentsia.
Revolutionary parties continued to be at odds regarding the
various ethical, operational and utilitarian aspects of
33terrorism for some time.
Several noteworthy political trends appeared in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in Russia. The two 
most prominent, the related theories of anarchism and 
nihilism were elaborated perhaps most completely in the 
writings of Mikhail Bakunin and Sergei Nechaev. With the 
publication of the former's Revolutionary Catechism in 1871, 
the characteristics of an anarchist revolution and an 
anarchist revolutionary were defined. This document begins 
with a list of rules for organization and defines the 
revolutionary as a nameless soldier absorbed by a single 
all-consuming aim - that of revolution. He is void of any
human feelings, hard on himself and others, and revolution
. . . 34becomes his only "pleasure, gratification and reward." To
achieve his aim, this true revolutionary was to penetrate all
aspects of society, even the bureaucracy, secret police and
the Church. In the end the Catechism argued for total
revolution? all "institutions, social structures,
civilisation and morality were to be destroyed, root and
35 . . .branch." In short it called for the complete annihilation
of the existing order.
33Wardlaw, op. cit., p. 19.
34Laqueur, op. cit., p. 43.
35Ibid., p. 44.
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Bakunin is probably best known for the concept of propaganda
of the deed' which insists that revolutionaries must plan and
execute violent acts as "individual revolutionary
statements." These would be essentially practical
demonstrations, which once executed could not be ignored and
3 6would ideally stir the minds of the masses.
Anarchist attacks, particularly in the last decades of the
nineteenth century, received extraordinary notoriety, thereby
allowing their perpetrators to proclaim the positive virtues
of violence. A perception of an international anarchist
conspiracy was generated and while this movement was,
initially, non-existent internationally, anarchist methods
and thinking frequently influenced future foreign 
37terrorists. The acts of these pre-1914 anarchists and
terrorists and the resulting publicity foreshadow today's
controversy regarding the ends and means of terrorism,
particularly in discussions of the differences between
politically-motivated violence and ordinary criminal
activities. In fact, examples exist throughout recent
history where terrorism has become synonymous, at least in
3 8the general public's mind, with criminal acts.
The modern world is dominated by trends and influences which 
had their birth in the massive revolutionary changes of the 
period from 1914 to 1945. In this period, the political 
structure of the world was completely changed. The
3 6Wardlaw, op. cit., p. 21.
37Ibid., p. 22.
38Ibid.
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continental great powers saw their power positions decline 
while two peripheral powers, the United States and the Soviet 
Union, emerged as super-powers.
The destruction of the strength of, and the confidence in, 
the great imperial powers created a political vacuum in the 
Third World, and spawned frequent and sometimes ferocious 
conflict amongst those vying to succeed the imperial powers. 
Economic dislocation and rapid change accompanying these 
political revolutions brought about a new political order 
which arose during the initial four decades of European 
decline, and the subsequent four decades of restructuring of 
the international system. This loose bi-polar world has set 
the stage for the development of modern terrorism.
The nineteenth-century phenomena of democracy and 
nationalism, mentioned earlier as essential elements of the 
emergence of modern terrorism, have been exported mutatis 
mutandis to the Third World. Nationalism in particular has 
been accepted wholeheartedly by at least the governments, if 
not by all the segments of the successor regimes to the 
European empires. Questions of religion, frontiers, status, 
recognition of separate existence, irredentism, tribal or 
related differences, all have contributed to the vast 
difficulties in creating viable states in the Third World. 
Incorporating these states into an international system which 
is itself far from stable creates further difficulties. Many 
individuals and groups committed to a nationalist or 
separatist objective, such as the Israeli independence 
movement or the Palestine Liberation Organization, see that
- 18 -
the employment of limited force or low level revolutionary
39violence is required to achieve their aim.
The strength of anti-colonialist sentiment has increased.
Since 1945, a much more sympathetic attitude has developed
towards 'liberation1 forces. As Kupperman and Trent argue,
this trend connected easily with "the writings of Mao,
Guevara, Frantz [sic] Fanon, and Carlos Marighella [which]
illustrate strategy, foster a quasi-religious faith that
40history is on the side of the oppressed." This situation 
has emerged during a period of a growing awareness of the 
interdependence of nations and the promotion of a wide 
spectrum of international organizations which are predicated 
upon this ideal.
A striking example of nationalist objectives and serious 
political grievances which were not being addressed by the 
international community, and the employment of a concerted 
terrorist campaign aimed at resolving these problems is that 
of the Palestine Liberation Organization. Without discussing 
the legitimacy of the movement or its aims, it is clear that 
the employment of terrorist methods, widely decried and 
denounced by much of the world community, has been effective. 
Certainly the acceptance of Yasser Arafat as the spokesman of 
the Palestinian people by the UN General Assembly meeting in 
1974, indicated that the use of terrorist tactics did not 
itself detract from widespread acceptance of the legitimacy
39Robert H. Kupperman and Darrell M. Trent, Terrorism: 
Threat. Reality. Response, p. 19.
40Ibid., p. 20.
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of a cause. In particular, the tactics of terrorism employed 
by the PLO forced international attention to the Palestinian 
issue; attention that this cause may otherwise have not 
received on an international scale.
-  20 -  
Section III 
The Pre-1972 Response to Terrorism
The late 1960s witnessed a most dramatic evolution in 
terrorism. For the most part, governments experiencing the 
effects of terrorism did not know how to deal effectively 
with this type of violence. Furthermore, government leaders 
and their bureaucracies viewed this activity as just a 
passing phenomenon. They hoped, somewhat naively, that it 
would go away quickly. The following section will show how 
governments attempted to address this problem and how 
effective their measures were.
This violent trend had been spurred on, according to some
41analysts, by three major developments. The dramatic
Israeli victory during the 1967 Six-Day War brought home to
many Palestinians that their Arab allies either would not or
could not assist them in achieving Palestinian political
goals. This initiated the 1968 wave of 35 Palestinian
orchestrated hijackings of commercial airlines, the
terrorists seeking either the release of prisoners or 
42ransom. The second notable occurrence was the killing of
/'
the Latin American guerrilla leader Ernesto Che Guerra.
The last and probably the most memorable event was the 
Vietnam War and, in particular, the unleashing of American 
domestic anti-war elements which manifested themselves in 
numerous student groups that "began to probe the cracks in
41Peter St. John, "Analysis and response of a decade of 
terrorism," International Perspectives. (September/October, 
1981), p. 3.
42Ibid.
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American society with some well-aimed terrorist blows at the 
system."43
Air Hijackings
The late 1960s also experienced a growing number of airline
'skyjackings1 to Cuba particularly among aircraft crossing
the southern United States. The problem by 1968 had become:
*
...so epidemic that one airline servicing Miami and 
other Southern cities in the U.S. has decided to 
equip pilots with approach charts for Havana's Jose 
Marti Airport and written instructions on dealing 
with hijackers. ("Do as they say").
A typical skyjacking of the day was the incident involving
National Airlines Flight 1064 from Los Angeles to Miami.
After a stopover in Houston, a Cuban identifying himself as
R. Hernandez, seized a stewardess, using a gun and an object
wrapped in a handkerchief which was believed to be a grenade.
45"Fidel ordered me back to Havana, dead or alive,"
Hernandez reportedly said in Spanish. The pilot convinced 
the hijacker that the aircraft required a fuel stop at New 
Orleans before attempting the flight to Cuba. The New 
Orleans police believed that they could not attempt the 
recovery of the aircraft without risking the lives of the 
crew and passengers. The flight continued to Havana where 
Hernandez revealed that his hand grenade was in reality a 
bottle of Old Spice aftershave lotion. Cuban authorities 
apprehended Hernandez and released the crew to return the
43Ibid.
44"Aviation: The Skyjackers," Time. 26 July, 1968,
p. 29. 
45Ibid., p. 30.
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DC-8 to Miami. A DC-6, chartered by the US government
returned the passengers to the US. On reflection, it was
apparent to all observers that "nothing has been done thus
46far to try to thwart skyjackers."
An earlier outbreak of similar skyjackings in 1961 had seen
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) permitting airline
crews to be armed. This action was generally opposed by both
the airlines and the pilots themselves. It was argued that a
47side trip to Cuba was "preferable to a mid-air gun battle."
The simple solution of locking the cockpit cabin during
flight operations was also considered but it was not
effective as the terrorist (or hijacker) could still take a
stewardess hostage and thereby give orders to the crew over
48the aircraft's intercom system.
By the late 1960s the suggestion of searching each passenger
49was rejected as both "time-consuming and unsettling."
However, a detection device was being readied for 
demonstration by an aerospace manufacturer. This device, 
which used sensitive magnetic film, would alert security 
personnel to the presence of metal objects. The aviation 
industry had for many years sought such a device "capable of 
detecting metal objects as passengers pass through terminals 
and also distinguishing, for example, between an alarm clock
46Ibid.
47Ibid.
48Ibid.
49Ibid.
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50and a revolver.” While this endeavour continued, the
airlines, in conjunction with the US State Department began
to advertise the fact that anyone who wanted to travel to
Cuba could purchase a ticket on one of the regular DC-7
flights that fly from Miami to Havana to bring back 
51refugees. These special government flights are discussed 
later.
Hijackers at this time were simply viewed "as *nuts and
bolters,1 but in addition to the borderline psychopaths there
have been fugitives from justice, exhibitionist hippies, and
several Cubans who may have been Castro agents hitching a 
52ride home." Cuba, although granting asylum to those
responsible for hijacks, reportedly "never let on whether
they regard the hijackings as a welcome embarrassment for the
53U.S. or a simple nuisance for Cuba."
The character of the hijacking phenomenon took a dramatic and 
qualitative change when in 1968, EL AL Flight 426, from 
London via Rome to Tel Aviv, was seized just after leaving 
Rome by three well-dressed Arab passengers. Brandishing 
pistols and hand grenades, they entered the cockpit, 
assaulted the co-pilot and ordered Captain Oded Abarbanell to 
change course for Algiers. This time the political aims of 
the hijackers were obvious:
50"Airlines VS. Skyjackers," Newsweek. 22 July, 1968,
p. 13.
51Ibid.
52"Aviation: The Skyjackers," Time, op. cit., p. 30.
53Ibid.
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...this was no ordinary case of skyjacking 
and...the Palestinians who commandeered the plane 
were interested not in a free ride to Algeria but 
in humiliating the Israeli Government.
It was reported that one of the hijackers moved up and down
the airline's aisle speaking of his dedication to the cause.
"'I have no father or mother - they were killed in the
six-day war,' he shouted. 'I don't care if I'm blown into
55small pieces with the rest of you.'"
The Boeing 707 was impounded upon reaching Algier's
Dar-el-Beida Airport and the next day all non-Israeli
passengers were released by the hijackers and flown on to
Paris. However, the crew of ten and 12 Israeli passengers
were held. The hijackers were identified as members of the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). The
PFLP had been competing with other Arab terrorist groups for
political power, support and money, and this was an occasion
"to score a publicity coup. More important yet, the PFLP
wanted to exchange the Israeli passengers for some of its
56guerrillas who had been captured by Israel." The Israeli
government immediately appealed to the United Nations and
international air organizations to obtain the release of its
plane, passengers and crew. It was reported:
It may take a while. Algeria formally declared 
war on Israel a year ago and rejected the 
cease-fire that ended the six-day Arab-Israeli 
conflict. Because El A1 carried military cargo in
54"Mideast: Coup m  the Sky," Newsweek. 5 August, 1968,
p. 41.
55Ibid., p. 42.
56Ibid.
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the war, Algeria considers it a paramilitary 
organization.
At this juncture it was safe to assume that if Israeli
diplomacy failed, Tel Aviv would likely retaliate directly
against Algeria. This action might have taken the form of
5 8"punitive raids to redress alleged Arab wrongdoing." It was
further noted:
Air Algdrie flights call regularly at Cairo, 
which is not far from Israeli airspace. It would 
be a relatively simple matter for Israeli 
fighter-interceptors to force one to_land at Tel 
Aviv for use as a bargaining weapon.
Now that hijacking as a means for trips to Cuba and monetary
gain gave way to politically-motivated hostage-taking on air
carriers, several nations sought ways to establish an air
crimes convention. One of the more important international
agreements was the Tokyo Convention, formulated with the aim
of establishing a continuity of jurisdiction over crimes
committed on air carriers in international services.
Although this convention had been drawn up in Tokyo in 1963,
by 1968 it had been signed by only 29 nations including the
United States. Twelve ratifications were required before the
treaty could be put into effect. Yet, even after a full five
years had elapsed, only six nations had deposited their
60ratification, so the treaty was still not in force.
57"Algeria: Skyway Robbery," Time. 2 August, 1968,
p. 52.
58Ibid.
59Ibid.
60Laurence Doty, "Air Crimes Convention Supported 
Heavily," Aviation Week and Space Technology. 18 November, 
1968, p. 60. The nations that had ratified the agreement as 
of November 1968 were the Republic of China, Denmark, Norway, 
the Philippines, Portugal and Sweden.
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Nonetheless, it established an international agreement among 
those nations which had ratified it. It acknowledged that 
the country in which an aircraft is legally registered is
"competent to exercise jurisdiction over offenses committed
61aboard it when in international or overseas flight."
Although not establishing any single countryfs exclusive 
jurisdiction, the convention permits the exercise of 
concurrent jurisdiction by concerned nations. However, the 
acceptance of one's claim to shared jurisdiction is dependent 
upon the degree of national interest in the incident. The 
convention further noted that a contracting country, although 
not the state of registration, may attempt to foil a criminal 
act in flight when the:
- Offense has effect on the territory of 
such a state.
- Offense has been committed by or against a 
national or permanent resident of the state.
- Offense is against the security of the state.
- Offense consists of a breach of any rules 
relating to the flight of aircraft in force 
in the state.
- Exercise of jurisdiction is necessary to ensure 
the obligation of the state under other 
multilateral agreements.
The convention further acknowledges the authority of the
chief pilot or captain, and that he "may take 'reasonable'
measures... to protect the safety of the aircraft, maintain
discipline onboard or to deliver the offender to the proper 
63authorities." This convention enables the captain to turn 
over to the authorities of a signatory to the agreement 
anyone who he believes has perpetrated an offence as defined
61Ibid.
62Ibid.
63Ibid.
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by the laws of his country. Further, any "Offenses committed
in an aircraft will be treated as if they had occurred in the
64state of registration of the aircraft." In short the Tokyo 
Convention on offences and certain other acts committed on 
board aircraft required contracting states:
(i) to make every effort to restore control
of the aircraft to its lawful commander and,
(ii) to make every effort to ensure the prompt 
onward passage or return of the hijacked 
aircraft together witluits crew, 
passengers and cargo.
By late 1968 the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA),
concerned by the rash of airline hijackings to Cuba, began
urging the US government to take action to halt such
offences. This forced the State Department to look for ways
in which alleged hijackers could be returned for prosecution
in the United States. ALPA, during their biennial meeting of
November, 1968 decided to send messages to both President
Johnson and the Transportation Secretary, Alan S. Boyd asking
66for governmental action to stop aerial hijackings.
However, a State Department spokesman said that they were
"pursuing all possible angles to meet this hijacking problem,
but we are not in a position to talk about what is being 
67done." Due to the strained political situation in the late 
1960s between Cuba and the United States, all regular 
diplomatic contact was maintained through the Swiss legation
64Ibid.
65 .Wilkinson, Terrorism And The Liberal State, op. cit.,
p. 220.
6 6Harold D. Watkins, "Air Transport: Federal Action in 
Hijackings Urged," Aviation Week and Space Technology. 2 
December, 1968, p. 24.
67Ibid.
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in Havana. This complicated the use of diplomatic channels
68and made any attempts to extradite extremely difficult.
Indeed, according to some American sources, the climate of
relations during this period between Cuba and the US had
actually worsened as a result of "the diversions, which the
69Cuban government has no particular desire to stop."
A new approach was made by the State Department in July of
1968 when it offered free transportation to anyone wanting to
70go to Cuba from the United States. This could be viewed as
a pre-emptive move on behalf of the government to deal with
this issue. However, this initiative did not address the
problem as both the airline carriers and the US government
expressed "a general state of helplessness in devising any
clearcut preventative for the forcible seizure of an airliner
71m  flight that does not endanger everyone onboard." 
Nevertheless the airline industry looked for an antidote. It 
was then concentrating its anti-hijacking effort upon 
detection equipment in the hope of apprehending potential 
hijackers before they boarded. However, the detection 
equipment available during this period was not fully 
developed and did not perform satisfactorily. The airlines 
were worried that these detection devices would jeopardize 
passenger relations. In resignation, one airline
68Ibid.
69Ibid.
78Ibid.
71Ibid.
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representative said that "compliance with the hijacker is
72about the only thing we've been able to come up with."
The FAA began a Sky Marshal programme by hiring 1,500 customs
security officers to provide security on the nation's
aircraft and prevent, forcibly if necessary, hijackers from
seizing aircraft. The airlines themselves were concerned
about high-altitude shootouts and asked that the Sky Marshal
programme be abandoned. As with many other responses to
aircraft hijackings the oft-held view of this initiative was
that, "the number of FAA personnel available is so small in
relation to the number of flights ...that the program is
73relatively meaningless."
By the end of 1968 it was apparent that both the US
Government and the major airlines had no solution for the
74problem of aerial hijacking. Most of the methods focussed
on dealing with the hijacker himself while the aircraft was
airborne. Some of the proposals consisted of "shooting him,
gassing him, isolating him, locking him off from the pilot,
even dropping him through a trapdoor into the baggage 
75compartment." Inevitably it was felt that any attempt at 
disarming or neutralizing the air pirate would result in the 
use of a weapon, which could have disastrous results in 
mid-flight. One suggestion was the "squirting [of] a nerve
72Ibid., p. 25.
73Ibid.
74"The Search For A Way To Stop 'Skyjacking,'" U.S. News 
and World Report. 30 December, 1968, p. 34.
75Ibid.
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7 6gas at the hijacker in hopes of paralyzing him." Experts
noted, however, the risk to passengers and crew if the gas 
were to enter the aircraft's air circulating system.
The standing order of the day to airline personnel as quoted
from United Air Line President George E. Keck was: "Do what
77the man with the gun says, fuel supplies permitting." This
order remained, even though the airlines still sought
preventive measures. In particular, they concentrated on
finding a way of detecting weapons being carried by the
potential sky pirates. However, no satisfactory technical
breakthrough was obtained at this time. Although airline
crew members were permitted to carry weapons, few did. Thus,
it appears that by the end of 1968, airline officials and
those in government both hoped that hijacking would turn out
78to be just "a passing fad." In addition, each continued to 
feel that responsibility for dealing with this 'fad' belonged 
to the other.
The International Federation of Air Line Pilots Association 
(IFALPA) drafted a resolution to boycott those countries 
which failed to release seized aircraft within 48 hours.
This resolution, if adopted, would have had little effect as 
the Cuban government had been punctilious in returning both
76Ibid.
77Ibid.
78Ibid.
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the aircraft and their passengers with no more than an
79overnight delay.
Again, the FAA regularly sent "Sky Marshals" along randomly-
selected flights heading to Miami. It soon became apparent
that there was little a law enforcement officer "could do to
prevent plane piracy without increasing the already
8 0considerable danger to all on board." Further it was 
readily recognized that the costs of assigning marshals on
81board many hundreds of daily flights would be exhorbitant.
Meanwhile, metal detectors, costing around $1,000.00 (1969)
each, were viewed by air carriers as too expensive even
though the cost of a hijacking to the airline was
approximately $8,550.00. Moreover the airlines were
reluctant to spend the necessary sums to search properly
every passenger boarding those aircraft that could possibly 
82be skyjacked. The air carriers were apparently sensitive
to the possibility of lawsuits should a passenger be
8 3unjustifiably searched. This view would only delay the 
institution of effective airport security procedures as we 
know them today.
79"What Can Be Done About Skyjacking?," 31 January,
1969, p. 20.
80Ibid.
81Ibid.
82Ibid.
8 3"Hijack Detector Tested by FAA," Aviation Week and 
Space Technology. 22 September, 1969, p. 53.
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The FAA were, by September of 1969, cautiously optimistic
that, with airline personnel tasked to observe passenger
behaviour, and the use of ferrous metal detectors to detect
. 8 4weapons, would-be hijackers could be foiled. The US 
governments Justice Department informed FAA officials that 
the employment of both techniques would "provide adequate 
legal grounds for asking to search a suspicious passenger who 
is carrying sufficient ferrous metal to trigger the magnetic 
detection equipment.”85
The procedure was to have airline-passenger boarding-agents
check for individuals whose general appearance and overall
8 6behavior resembled that of the profile of a hijacker.
Those people would then undergo a metal detector test. If
the test proved positive, the passenger would undergo a more
thorough search. An FAA spokesman stated that this was not
an infallible method. Nonetheless, it was somewhat of a
positive move and did not seem to greatly trouble the public.
A well-publicized experiment, conducted in nine cities, using
this combination of observation and detector devices, was
87benignly received.
At the same time, the United States' State Department was 
formulating a presentation to the United Nations calling for 
the strengthening of the procedures for extradition of 
hijackers. Although the Tokyo Convention dealt with
84Ibid.
85Ibid.
86Ibid.
87Ibid.
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hijacking, it did not call for extradition. Moreover neither
88the United States nor Cuba had ratified this agreement.
In mid-January, 1969, a Federal court in Brooklyn issued an
arrest order for the hijackers of an Eastern Airlines DC-8
seized earlier that month. Although there was little hope of
prosecution, the federal judicial system signalled that
89action would be taken against hijackers. This was
predicated on a 1961 US law that imposed prison sentences of
up to 20 years, and in some cases the death sentence, for
aircraft seizure. As one airline attorney argued, "one
arrest followed by full conviction might solve the whole 
90problem." The reality was that the majority of hijackers, 
at this time, did find political asylum.
Although Knut Hammarskjold, the International Air Transport
Association Director-General, contacted the Cuban authorities
regarding the issue of airline hijacks, it was reported that,
because so few states had experienced this potentially
disastrous phenomenon, chances were slim that the UN could
91assist in resolving the problem at that time.
By February, 1969, "frustration over high-flying hijackers
92had risen well past the fever point." Further, "An air of 
desperation hung over the ...meeting of the International Air
88"Airlines, Government Accelerate Efforts at Hijacking 
Prevention," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 27 January, 
1969, p. 33.
89Ibid.
90Ibid.
91Ibid.
92 "Skyjacking: Holding Pattern," Newsweek. 17 February,
1969, p. 34.
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9 3Transport Association." As one very concerned IATA 
official reportedly announced, "Anything that can be done to
deter hijacking without inconvenience or risk will be a good
94 . .thing." This sentiment carried through to special hearings
organized on behalf of the US House Interstate and Foreign
Commerce Committee. There, James G. Brown, a once hijacked
pilot employed by National Airlines, noted that the aircraft-
seizure phenomenon "is a tragedy waiting for some place to 
95happen." Concurrently, the FAA confirmed that "no new
methods of detecting concealed weapons were currently
96feasible on a day-to-day basis." A spokesman for the US
State Department could:
...offer little more than veiled reports of 
diplomatic efforts aimed at seeing if Fidel Castro 
might eventually accede to proposed international 
agreements requiring the extradition of 
skyjackers —  be they political refugees or g7 
psychopaths acting out some inscrutable fantasy.
The pirating of a Trans World Airlines aircraft, Flight 840,
by members of the Che Guevara Commando unit of the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) led by Lel£a Ali
Khaled in August of 1969, was an ominous change in the tone
of hijacking. Hitherto it had been the preserve of homesick
exiles or deranged psychopaths. Now, it appeared that
skyjacking had become a tool to help attain political, rather
than personal, aims. It presented the:
Serious possibility that a major international 
political crisis could be triggered by the 
hijacking of aircraft ...underscoring the
93Ibid.
94Ibid.
95Ibid.
96Ibid.
97Ibid.
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vulnerability o|8commercial transports in global 
air operations.
This action was described as follows:
Shortly after takeoff, a woman and a man forced 
their way into the cockpit brandishing a knife and 
hand grenade and told the pilot, Capt. Dean Carter, 
to divert to Tel Aviv. The two hijackers were 
later identified as Arabs, Lelia Ali Khaled, 23, 
and Salim Issawi, 30. They had flown from Beirut 
to Rome the day before the hijacking.
Miss Khaled appeared to be familiar with cockpit 
procedures, according to the TWA crew, and had even 
calculated the fuel consumption of the 707. When 
the aircraft reached Tel Aviv, she ordered Carter 
to an altitude of 12,000 ft. and radioed propaganda 
messages to the Tel Aviv tower. As she was moving 
around the cockpit, the crew noticed that she had a 
map and a typewritten operations plan. The map 
showed a line drawn from Tel Aviv to Damascus.
The saga of TWA Flight 840 revealed the growing 
sophistication of some terrorists and demonstrated their 
efficiency and technical competence. In the wake of this 
hijacking, IATA continued to argue that it is the 
responsibility of governments to stop aircraft hijacking and 
more importantly, that tough laws are necessary to deter 
future aircraft hijackings.100 Unfortunately there appears 
to be, at this time, a definite lack of international will to 
undertake the required action.
The fall of 1969 saw the voluntary return of six Americans to 
stand trial for diverting aircraft to Cuba. This act was 
hailed in an editorial as the "first glimmers of hope on the
98"IFALPA Mounts Anti-Hijack Drive," Aviation Week and 
Space Technology. 8 September, 1969, p. 22.
99**Ibid.
100ibid.
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101otherwise dark horizon of air piracy.” These individuals,
who had been in Cuba for six months or more preferred to
undergo trial in the United States than continue to live in
102 . .Cuba. It was hoped that the publicity regarding the
trials would deter those who might consider hijacking an
aircraft as an easy means of leaving their personal
troubles.103
Meanwhile other countries soon developed sterner measures to
combat hijacking than did the Americans. After two Ethiopian
airliners were hijacked, plain clothes security personnel
were assigned to scheduled flights. Ignoring the basic rule
put in place by most other airlines, "do not attempt to argue 
. . 104with a hijacker," the Ethiopians employed a rapid
counter-violence response to foil a hijack attempt. On an
Ethiopian airliner flying from Madrid to Addis Ababa, two
armed men ordered the pilot to head for Aden. The three
Ethiopian security officers on board quickly intervened. One
hijacker, a 19-year old Yemeni student, was tackled by a
security officer and killed by his own gun in the ensuing
struggle. His Senegalese companion was despatched with a
knife. Both terrorists, identified as members of an
Ethiopian separatist group, were pronounced to be "the first
105would-be hijackers to be slain in mid-air."
101 . . .  . .Robert Hotz, "More on Hijacking," Aviation Week and
Space Technology. 10 November, 1969, p. 11.
102ibid.
103ibid.
104 . ."Death to Hijackers," Newsweek, 22 December, 1969,
p. 50.
105Xbid.
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In September, 1970, a crisis of a new kind captured the
world's attention when PFLP commandos declared a terrorist
war on the West. They orchestrated a triple-hijack
operation. The capture of a Swissair DC-8, a Trans World
Airline (TWA) 707 and a Pan-American 747, their passengers
and crew, was described as "political extortion on a grand
and unprecedented scale —  a gross, new horror in a century
106already horrified by the enormity of its atrocities." On
12 September, the three aircraft were blown up where they had
landed at Dawson Field in Jordan. Although the terrorists
sought vengeance against Israel, the 'war' affected the
hostages —  unarmed men, women and children. The action was
107condemned in the UN by U. Thant as "savage and inhuman," 
while in Washington, President Nixon denounced the seizure 
and announced that security personnel would be on board a 
majority of American overseas flights. The President further 
recommended that all nations "take joint action to suspend 
airline services with those countries which refuse to punish 
or extradite hijackers involved in international 
blackmail."108
On 11 September, President Nixon demanded that the problem of 
air piracy must be addressed rapidly and described the 
implementation of a series of measures to counter this 
threat.109
106"The Hijack War," Newsweek. 21 September, 1970, p.
20.
107Ibid., p. 21. 
108ibid.
109 "Terror Attacks On Air Travel —  What Can Be Done," 
U.S. News and World Report. 21 September, 1970, p. 17.
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1) The employment of armed guards on both domestic and 
international flights assessed as susceptible to 
hijacking.
2) Wider usage by U.S. airlines of electronic and 
other surveillance devices at international 
airports.
3) Emphasis on research into new methods of detecting 
weapons and explosives. The installation of x-ray 
machines and metal detectors in airports.
4) Urge other countries to boycott nations that 
refuse to punish or extradite hijackers. The 
President emphasized that countries are responsible 
for American lives and property, ifQhijacked 
aircraft land in their territory.
At the same time President Nixon was considering other 
proposals such as:
1) A quarantine area to search outgoing passengers.
2) Prohibiting all carry on luggage thereby removing 
a means of taking onboard weapons and explosive 
devices.
3) The employment of 'project managers' to review 
passenger lists and inspect passengers.
4) The placing of a delay on all airline ticket sales 
several days after the reservations are-made to 
check the background of the passengers.
These steps resulted from a sober assessment of the new
direction of terrorism inherent in the PFLP hijackings. The
assessment was that this:
...latest round of air piracy involved far more 
than 'crackpot' individual hijackings such as 
marked [the previous] diversion of plans to 
Castro's Cuba. This was a form of international 
warfare that, unless halted, threatened to hit 
civilians of all lands.
Historically, the seizure of a country's nationals and their
property had often brought about armed intervention by great,
and even not-so-great, powers. Now, however, the ^
110ibid.
illA Ibid., p. 18. 
112Ibid.
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Historically, the seizure of a country*s nationals and their 
property had often ^ brought about armed intervention by great,
/  X
and even not^o-great, powers. Now^/fiowever, the
international community was paralyzed by the threat that any
retaliatory action could witness the murder of the 
113hostages. The PFLP thus demonstrated the potential use of
classic terror tactics vis-a-vis the US and other nations 
through this triple-hijack operation.
The spate of anti-hijack measures was shown to be a knee jerk
reaction of dubious value, "halfhearted, hobbled by fears of
inconveniencing passengers and the high cost of protective 
114forces." Yet, more importantly, there was little
co-ordinated international co-operation.
One aspect of the PFLP hijack operation in particular caused 
concern for American intelligence, as it was reported that 
"secret NATO documents" were on board the Pan American 747 
which was hijacked and later blown up. The CIA subsequently 
issued a directive that all their couriers carrying 
classified documents must travel on US Armed Forces 
aircraft.115
By September, 1970, the profile of a hijacker had broadened 
to include Arab commandos who were described as "highly 
trained, disciplined people, armed with the best weapons for
113ibid .
114Ibid., p. 19. See also "Overseas: Guards,
Detectors, Searches," U.S. News and World Report. 21 
September, 1970, p. 19.
115"Washington Whispers," U.S. News and World Report. 28 
September, 1970, p. 8.
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116the job.” What the world was seeing now was the evolution 
of a virtually professional terrorist.
In January, 1971, representatives of 74 nations and eight
international organizations met in Washington to "exchange
information on ways to eliminate aerial hijacking and 
117piracy.” This forum, organized under the auspices of the
FAA, drew representatives from major air carrier nations
including those of the Warsaw Pact, who attended as 
118observers. Discussion covered many topics, including both
ground and inflight security, intelligence exchanges on
likely hijackers, and recent developments in metal detectors,
119as well as more technical prevention systems. The
conference provided the following conclusions:
1) That the employment of sky marshals will likely 
decrease as metal detectors and other screening 
devices become more effective.
2) There was no indication of concern by the 
representatives regarding passenger disapproval of 
the screening systems.
3) Officials noted that the arrangements for the 
passage of intelligence should continue under the 
auspices of Interpol and IATA rather than 
constructing new organizations for this task.
4) Carl Maisch the air transport security director 
of the FAA noted that 259 arrests were made since 
September 1971 and mostly through the use of the 
screening system in place.
116"When Armed Guards Ride Your Plane...," U.S. News and 
World Report. 28 September, 1970, p. 23.
117 . . . .  . ."Conference Exchanges Anti-Hijacking Data," Aviation
Week and Space Technology. 18 January, 1971, p. 19.
118Ibid. These included the U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, 
Poland and Hungary.
119ibid.
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5) One representative from the United Kingdom 
revealed that progress has been made in^lje 
training of dogs to uncover explosives.
Meanwhile, by mid-January, IFALPA began to pressure
121governments to ratify The Hague and Tokyo Conventions. By
April, those initiatives, called 'T-Plus1, incorporated a
large number of pressure tactics involving pilot action and
122raising passenger awareness of the risks involved.
Although the machinery of national and international law
responded very slowly to skyjacking, airlines acknowledged
the complexities of dealing with hijackers and began to deal
with them. For example on 2 July, 1971, a Braniff flight was
commandeered just after departing from Mexico City. Although
this was the first pirating of one of that company*s
aircraft, "such an event has [had] been included in its
123emergency operations plans.”
In support of this operation, Braniff management set up 
command posts with the appropriate communication links 
including satellite relay. This command set-up was 
paralleled by emergency operations centres (EOC) in the State 
Department, FAA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
120ibid.
121The Hague Convention for the Suppression of the 
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft required contracting states to 
extradite apprehended hijackers to their country of origin or 
to prosecute them under the judicial code of the recipient 
state. Significant clauses were included allowing political 
offense exceptions to the requirement of extradition.
122 . . . . .  . . ."Pilots Spur Anti-Hijacking Drive," Aviation Week and
Space Technology. 18 January, 1971, p. 19.
123 . . ."Command Posts Manned by Key Braniff Officials During
Hijack," Aviation Week and Space Technology. 12 July, 1971,
p. 20.
Throughout this situation, the FAA monitored all air-ground 
communications and received situation reports from the 
Braniff EOC. The flight ended after 43 hours in Buenos 
Aires, with no casualties. The hijacker, Robert Lee Jackson, 
a US Navy deserter, wanted the flight to continue to Algeria, 
however, Argentine authorities would not allow the aircraft 
to be refuelled, and they surrounded it with police.
What is important about this incident is that an airline
which had never experienced an act of aerial piracy, reacted
efficiently and effectively in co-ordination with United
States federal agencies. Just after the Braniff flight was
hijacked, the Chairman of the airline, Harding Lawrence, and
the airline president, Edward Acker:
...had set up a command post in Braniff*s 
administrative headquarters, in direct 
communication with the airline's operations and 
control center at its Love Field maintenance base 
here, which was headed by vice president - flight 
operations Herman Rumsey. The two posts were 
connected with open lines to Washington and, as the 
flight progressed from San Antonio to Monterrey, 
Mexico, Lima, Peru, Rio de Janeiro and Buenos 
Aires, to these cities. Braniff personnel in the 
airport control towers.relayed running accounts of 
the scene to Dallas.
Nor did this communications net cease there. The ability of
Braniff Airlines to respond to Jackson's requirement was most
impressive, particularly when he demanded that $100,000.00 in
cash be delivered to Monterrey. The chairman, Harding
Lawrence, reportedly:
...approved the transaction and financial personnel 
contacted Braniff's Dallas bank. It arranged to 
have a Monterrey bank provide the money to the 
airline's local sales manager. The money arrived
124ibid .
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at the airport within 15 min. of the airplane's 
landing and was handed over to Jackson.
From this incident one could conclude that airlines, from 
necessity, were rapidly preparing to confront, nationally or 
internationally, any skyjacking situation, to ensure the 
safety of the aircraft crew and passengers by use of the most 
effective means available. Governmental response, with few 
exceptions, seemed ponderous in comparison.
Counter-Violence: The First American Hijacker Dies
Although governments were slow to react to the hijacking 
menace, by 1971 the FBI began employing counter-violence 
techniques. On 23 July of that year, Richard Allen Obergfell 
of New York City boarded TWA Flight 335 at New York's La 
Guardia Airport. Just after departure, Obergfell grabbed 
flight attendant Idie Concepcion. Drawing a pistol, he 
forced her to the cockpit and ordered Captain Albert Hawes 
to fly to Milan, Italy. Hawes responded that the 727 
jetliner did not have the range to fly to Milan. However, an 
arrangement was made to land in La Guardia, where Obergfell 
would board another aircraft which would carry him to Italy. 
At La Guardia, the passengers were released and Obergfell 
demanded a car to take his flight-attendant hostage and 
himself to Kennedy International Airport. He commandeered a 
maintenance truck and was escorted to the international 
airport. A fully fueled Boeing 707 was prepared, as were two 
FBI snipers armed with .308 Norma Magnum rifles with 
telescopic sights.
125Ibid.
- 44 -
The marksmen were ordered: "If you get an opportunity for a
12 6clean shot, take it." As Obergfell was moving towards the 
boarding ladder, holding his hostage so close that she 
accidentally stepped on his foot, he momentarily moved back 
from her. One of the snipers, FBI agent Kenneth Lovin, fired 
immediately. He had been tracking his target from behind a 
blast shield just 75 yards away. Obergfell dropped but was 
attempting to reach his pistol when a second round was fired, 
killing him. Some observers wondered about the acceptability 
of such actions, particularly as the hostage might have been 
killed had the agent missed his man. An FBI spokesman argued
that it was "a calculated risk, but we felt it had to be
127 . . .taken." Obergfell was the first hijacker to die
128attempting to seize an American aircraft.
Despite this success, the Americans continued to search for
other technology as a means of pre-empting aerial hijacking.
Reports indicated growing interest in controlling the
skyjacking dilemma. Major US airports were reported to be:
...protected by electronic 'magnetometers,1 and 
1,200 specially trained 'sky marshals' were riding 
shotgun aboard the nation's airliners - with the12g 
number scheduled to rise to 1,500 by year's end.
The Assistant Secretary of Transportation for Safety and
Consumer Affairs, Lieutenant General (retired) Benjamin O.
Davis, stated:
12 6"Skyjacking: Death at the Terminal," Time. 2 August
1971, p. 18.
127"Skyjacking: 'A Calculated Risk,"' Newsweek, 2
August, 1971, p. 24.
128"Skyjacking: Death...," Time, op. cit., p. 18.
129 "Progress In War On Skyjackers," U.S. News and World 
Report. 9 August, 1971, p. 25.
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There has been a distinct turnabout in the 
hijacking situation. We have stopped being 
1patsies.1 The Government and the airlines have 
adopted an attitude of resistance —  not 
recklessness, but a.willingness to act when the 
opportunity arises.
Sky Marshals, during this period, were under instructions to
overpower a hijacker whenever possible, and, if necessary,
131shoot to kill. In concert with the Sky Marshal programme,
refined computer assisted weapons-detection devices were
being tested and were reported to be addressing a major
132concern in America's anti-hijack effort.
This new American policy of firm resistance to hijackers was
intended to reduce the number of aircraft seizures. At the
same time, Israel's El A1 Airlines were tightening their
anti-hijack procedures, which became known as being "the most
stringent security procedures in the history of commercial
133air transport." Furthermore El A1 was known to be
providing security assistance and advice to other airlines
134flying into Tel Aviv. It was because of two sabotage
attempts, when explosives were discovered hidden in baggage, 
and of reports from Israeli intelligence, that El A1 enhanced 
its security procedures. These measures included the 
searching of all baggage, a regulation requiring that 
passengers sign a statement acknowledging the contents of 
their baggage, and the addition of more ground agents and Sky
130ibid.
131ibid.
132ibid.
133 "El A1 Stresses Terrorist Security, Advises Other 
Airlines in Tel Aviv," Aviation Week and Space Technology. 13 
September, 1971, p. 26.
134ibid.
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135Marshals. Such stringent measures did result in some
13 6delays in schedule. Similar measures, however, are still
in existence today, notwithstanding the high cost and delay.
The US, the UK and the USSR finally ratified the Tokyo
137Convention in the autumn of 1971, indicating the growing
momentum, particularly in US government circles, to find a
legal means to deal effectively with sky piracy. As
governments attempted to manoeuvre national and international
anti-hijack policies into place, it was reported that:
Skyjacking poses a painful dilemma for 
lawmen: should they give in to the skyjacker's
demands and allow him to escape unchallenged, or 
should they try to stop him^ thereby endangering 
the lives of all on board.
This dilemma was illustrated in the October, 1971 seizure of 
a charter flight bound for the Bahamas from Nashville, 
Tennessee. When the aircraft landed in Jacksonville,
Florida, an FBI agent ordered the pilot, Brent Downs, to cut 
his engines. He was also told that he would receive no fuel. 
After a desperate debate, the co-pilot, Randall Crump, 
climbed out of the aircraft to negotiate further with the 
agents. Moments later, the tires and one of the engines were 
peppered with bullets. The hijacker, George M. Giffe, 
responded by shooting Downs, then his own wife, and then 
himself.
X  kj XVa •
136ibid.
137The [U.S.] Department of State Bulletin, "U.S. 
Deposits Ratification of Hijacking Convention," The [U.S.] 
Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LXV, No. 1684, 4 October, 
1971, p. 371.
138"Skyjacking: The Deadly Dilemma," Newsweek, 1
November, 1971, p. 21.
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One conclusion was that "it is by no means clear that the
139agents* actions constituted a blunder." However, as one
law official pointed out, "Suppose this guy had taken the
plane off and crashed it, killing everybody? Then the FBI
140would have been roasted for doing nothing." This moral 
dilemma for all security and law enforcement agencies, as 
well as governments, remains stubbornly with us to this day.
The effectiveness of maintaining onboard Sky Marshals was
brought into question in November 1971, when an American
Airlines 747 outbound from John F. Kennedy Airport for San
Juan was hijacked by Angel Lugo and ordered to head for Cuba.
Amongst the 221 passengers and 16 crew members there were
three US Sky Marshals and an FBI agent travelling on
vacation. This flight became known as "the first successful
141snatching of a plane protected by the flying watchdogs."
One of the Sky Marshals noticed a disturbed look on a 
stewardess's face and contacted the aircraft captain over the 
intercom asking if he should intervene. After conferring 
with both the captain and the other Sky Marshals it was 
determined that no one should do anything which would 
endanger those on board, as there was a distinct possibility 
of gun play. The aircraft landed safely at Jose Marti 
Airport. This incident, not surprisingly, raised doubts as 
to the effectiveness of the 1,400-man Sky Marshal Programme 
which cost about $37.7 million a year. On any given day,
139ibid. 
140ibid.
141"Skyjacking: Take Me Along," Newsweek. 8 November,
1971, pp. 47-48.
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two-thirds of these officers were in the air, mostly on
domestic flights on the East Coast and some select
142international routes. Following this incident a
controversy ensued as the marshals complained:
...that the airlines are generally lax in their 
security measures. (According to the Federal 
Aviation Administration, American Airlines had not 
bothered to turn on a metal detector which would 
have shown that hijacker Lugo was unarmed.) The 
airlines reply that screening procedures take too 
much time and irritate passengers.
As far as the general utility of the Sky Marshal Programme
was concerned, Captain O.R. Salmela said, on behalf of the
aerial police force, "It didn't work this time, but I always
144like to have them with me." Experience had shown that
since the programme began, "there have been no
guerrilla-style hijackings and no airliner piracy has ended
145in a disaster."
The frustrations with aerial piracy continued until the end 
of 1971 with probably the most notable action taken by Costa 
Rica's President, Jose Figueres Ferrer. After finishing a 
speech in the town of Puriscal, approximately 20 miles from 
San Jos6, the President was informed that three gunmen had 
hijacked a Nicaraguan BAC 1-11 aircraft with 46 passengers 
and crew on board. This airplane had just landed at the San 
Jose airport. The President was requested to authorize 
either the refueling of the aircraft so that it could 
continue its flight to Havana, or to provide another aircraft
142Ibid., p. 48. 
143Ibid.
144Ibid.
145Ibid.
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for the trip. The President immediately started for the
airport and gave instructions over his car radio for
146"terrorizing the terrorists.” The aircraft was to be
surrounded by armed guardsmen, the runway blocked and the
aircraft's tires deflated. "Boys, this is war!," he
147reportedly shouted into his radio.
By the time the President arrived, one of the passengers had
been shot and the hijackers were identified as members of the
Nicaraguan National Liberation Front. The three skyjackers
released the passengers, but held the crew as hostages. One
stewardess reportedly pleaded, "For the love of God, let us
148go to Cuba! Otherwise, they'll kill us." The
President's action was immediate. He ordered tear gas 
forced into the aircraft's ventilating system. He then 
ordered an assault team to attack the aircraft. This action 
resulted in the death of one gunman. The other two members
surrendered and the whole crew was evacuated without
. . 149injury.
It was reported that the President had, during this incident,
fought "with his own guards, who were trying to wrestle a
submachine gun away from him in order to keep him from
150getting hurt in any shootout." In the end, although 
"Figueres did not get to fire a single shot, he was pleased
146 . . . ."Costa Rica: Terrorizing Terrorists," Time. 27
December, 1971, p. 24.
147Ibid.
148Ibid.
149Ibid.
150Ibid.
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151with his performance.” Such examples of personal courage
in the face of terrorist demands, although slightly 
comic-opera in style, continue to be rare.
In retrospect, the pre-1972 governmental response to
terrorist hijackings, was fraught with difficulties.
Authorities responsible for dealing with such situations did
so "without adequate information and with uncertain aid from
their governments. In spite of public indignation that
terrorists could strike with such impunity, the Western
152response was feeble and ad hoc."
By the 1970s, centres of responsibility within Western 
governments and their national airlines were at odds. Each 
felt that the responsibility for dealing with this 'passing 
fad1- belonged to the other. However, airline pilots and 
their associations continued to press air carriers, 
governments and the UN to institute appropriate regulations, 
procedures, fines and penalties to pre-empt the hijack 
problem.
The early hopes of a purely technical solution through the
use of profiles, metal detectors and the posting of ground
and air security personnel had, and may continue to have,
153some deterrent effect. However, it has not, to date,
provided anything like a 100 percent solution to the 
hijacking problem. Israel appears to have led the way, and
151ibid.
152St. John, op. cit., p. 4.
153See Jon Craig and Mark Hosenball, "US agents to 
patrol airports in Britain," The Times. 14 May, 1989.
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arguably continues to do so, by instituting probably the most
stringent airline security procedures in existence. This is
a direct result of the very great threat facing Israel and El
Al, which makes rigorous security the most important aspect
of their operations. El Al backs its security procedures
with the latest information drawn from Israeli police and
intelligence agencies. In this regard it is the "acquisition
of timely and accurate intelligence forwarded to consumers,
such as airlines, that represents the first line of defence
154against terrorist activities, aerial or otherwise.” For
the most part this lesson appears to have been ignored in the
West, where it was replaced with "a law enforcement knee-jerk 
155reaction.”
The 1970s and 80s saw governments and their bureaucracies 
slowly turned to confront the terrorist dilemma. This was, 
for the most part, done in isolation by the various 
departments and agencies rather than through a concerted 
national and international effort. As national and 
international concern over the hijacking issue grew, this 
initial lethargic, piece-meal response would change.
154 .Interview with a Canadian Security Intelligence 
Service officer, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, 8 February, 1986.
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Section IV
The Nature of Current Terrorist Activities 
and Governmental Response
Brian Jenkins, an authority on political violence, has said
156that terrorism has become "institutionalized." In
addition there is a "loose but global 'infrastructure'" that
helps to sustain terrorism worldwide. This in turn has
produced what has been described as "a semipermanent
157subculture of terrorism." On that note, the purpose of
this section is to explore the recent and more notable 
terrorist activities of the last five years and then review 
how governments could aim at further reducing the threat 
through a specturm of initiatives.
Although there have been some victories in the war on 
terrorism, the "level of international terrorist activity 
worldwide in 1987 rose by more than 7 percent over 1986, or
1 C Q
832 incidents compared with 774." The trend was toward
large-scale indiscriminate violence so as to produce the
156David Gelman and Rich Thomas, "Banality and Terror," 
Newsweek. 6 January, 1986, p. 60.
157ibid.
158U.S. Department of State, Patterns Of Global 
Terrorism: 1987. (August 1988), p. 1. The most recent
edition? U.S. Department of State, Patterns Of Global 
Terrorism: 1990. (April, 1991), p. iii, notes that "The
continuing decline in the number of international terrorist 
incidents during 1990 is encouraging. From a peak of 856 in 
1988, the number of incidents decreased to 455 in 1990. Even 
more encouraging are the increasing counterterrorist 
cooperation among governments and our numerous successes in 
bringing the rule of law to bear on terrorists."
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159maximum effect, particularly in casualties. In short,
"the bigger the better," has been for the most part the rule 
as shown by the aerial destruction of the Air India flight in 
June, 1985, the Pan Am Flight 103 in December, 1988, the UTA 
Flight 772 over Niger in September, 1989 and the recent
bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Argentina in March, 1992
160which reportedly killed 20 and wounded 250. Jenkins notes
that terrorists "may feel compelled to escalate their 
violence in order to keep public attention... or to recover
coercive power lost as governments have become more resistant
161to their demands." The nature of terrorist groups and
their activities seems to be changing. They have:
...set out to distinguish themselves in the busy 
arena of international banditry, terrorist 
incidents seem to become more random, more 
arbitrary in their targets, less connected to any 
identifiable cause.
As we, the audience, become accustomed to the frequency of
violent action, terrorists will, in all likelihood, escalate
their operations in the hopes of achieving their political
aims. In that case, terrorism, as Jenkins has pointed out,
"will become an accepted fact of contemporary life —
commonplace, ordinary, banal, and therefore somehow
'tolerable1."163
159Gelman and Thomas, op. cit., p. 60.
160"Islamic group claims bombing," The Toronto Star. 19
March, 1992. 
161
:Ibid.
Gelman and Thomas, op. cit., p. 60.
162.
163ibid .
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The late 1970s and the 1980s witnessed a series of notorious
terrorist actions. The seizure of American hostages in Iran
(1979) , the Iranian Embassy seige in London (1980) , the US
Marine bombing in Beirut (1983), a series of aerial
hijackings including the bombing of the Air India 747, the
Achille Lauro incident, the brutal terrorist attacks in
Vienna and Rome, and the bombing of the Pan Am flight over 
164Scotland are the most notable examples. In this regard
two approaches to modern terrorism have come into play:
Some experts see terrorism as the lower end of 
the warfare spectrum, a form of low-intensity, 
unconventional aggression. Others, however, 
believe that referring to it as war rather than 
criminal activity lends dignity to terrorists and 
places their acts in the-context of accepted 
international behaviour.
War or not, by the spring of 1986 the United States
government was frustrated by its inability to cope with the
violent actions orchestrated against its interests and those
of its allies. This pent up frustration was vented at one of
the perceived orchestrators —  Libya. In April, 1986,
President Reagan ordered a series of aerial bombings against
Libyan facilities believed to train and support terrorists.
This action was, according to US reports, executed only after
numerous warnings went unheeded, and attempts to counter
terrorism through economic and political sanctions were found
THE LOCKERBIE CRASH: Syria Linked To Bomb", The
Ottawa Sunday Sun. 19 April, 1992. This article notes "The 
bomb that blew up a Pan Am jet ... may have been aimed at six 
CIA employees and arranged by a Syrian terrorist, not the two 
Libyans currently accused in the blast and being protected by 
Libyan leader Moammar Khadafy...."
165 .U.S. Government Printing Office, Public Report Of The
Vice President's Task Force On Combatting Terrorism.
(February, 1986), p. 1.
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166to be unsuccessful. It was only then that the US Sixth
Fleet was ordered into action with the purpose of striking a
blow against Libya, which the Reagan Administration had
167threatened to execute many times before.
As George Church suggests, the "Libyan leader may not be the
world*s most effective governmental inciter of terrorist
168murder," particularly when one compares Libya to the other
sponsors of terrorist violence such as Iran and Syria. It is
common knowledge, however, that "Gaddafi has been the most
open supplier of money, weapons, training and refuge to
169terrorist groups around the world." This act was, for 
some, a strong signal underlining that the United States 
would act unilaterally and militarily under certain 
circumstances.
This initiative was embarked upon due to, in part,
frustration. President Reagan had argued for, and had
applied, economic sanctions on Libya. He attempted to
persuade his European allies to do the same, with the hope of
politically and economically isolating the 'mad dog of the
Middle East.1 Neither action brought about the desired
170effect on Libya. Furthermore, the US gleaned from 
electronic eavesdropping that Gaddafi had "ordered Libyan 
agents and their Palestinian supporters to 'cause maximum
166George J. Church, "Targeting Gaddafi," Time. 21 
April, 1986, p. 22.
167ibid.
168Ibid., p. 23.
169Ibid.
170Ibid., p. 22.
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171casualties to U.S. citizens and other Western people.'" A
US intelligence official reported that one message "which was
sent from Tripoli and uses Gaddafi's authority, outlines
172operational plans for more than ten terror attacks." In
turn, the mood of the American people during this time was 
reflected in the words of George Schultz who reportedly said, 
"We have taken enough punishment and beating. We have to 
act.-173
The Libyan case touches on a significant lesson. In the
attack on Libya, the United States demonstrated that when
pushed it will employ military force in retaliation. But the
retaliation must be taken in context. The reality is that
Libya holds no place on the list of Middle East countries
important to American political interests nor is Libya
involved in the Middle East peace process. The very fact
that Libya was targetted proved to other terrorist supporting
countries, such as Iran and Syria, that nations important to
American strategic or political interests would not likely be
victims of military retaliation. In short, Libya simply did
not matter as the country has no real allies in the Arab
world. In contrast, the Syrians, who were accused of bombing
the United States Marine Corps Headquarters in Beirut in
1741983, killing 241 troops and wounding a hundred more,
171Ibid., p. 24.
173Ibid., p. 25.
174 . . . . ."Arens Says Syrians Bombed Marines' Building in
Lebanon," The New York Times. 31 October, 1983. It should be
underlined that Arens is not an unbiased observer and it has
since become apparent that Syria and Iran assisted the
orchestrators of the bombing of the United States Marine
Corps barracks, however, as noted above both went unpunished.
suffered no such retaliation. The contrast may well be due 
solely to the strategic importance which Syria has in the 
Middle East, and the American need to work with Syria to 
secure a lasting peace in this volatile region.
The use of American military forces demonstrated a national
will to deal with the, at that time, growing phenomenon of
international terrorism:
A decade ago, the world experienced an average 
of 10 incidents of terrorist violence per week —  
assassinations, bombings, air hijackings, 
kidnappings, maimings or attacks on_facilities. 
The average now: Nearly 10 a day.
The 1986 Public Report of the Vice President's Task Force on
Combatting Terrorism noted:
During the past decade, terrorists have attacked 
U.S. officials or installations abroad 
approximately once every 17 days. In the past 17 
years, terrorists have killed as many U.S. 
diplomats as were killed in the previous 180 years.
In 1982, a total of 57 attacks were directed 
against U.S. military personnel, resulting in two 
deaths. In 1983, even more incidents occurred 
(65), and 241 deaths resulted from one incident.
In that bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in 
Beirut, the United States lost nearly as many 
servicemen as the British lost in the entire 
Falklands campaign.
America was, to some, acquiring something akin to a 'seige
mentality'.
In the wake of America's attack on Libya the debate continued 
as to how nations could, on an individual basis, as well as 
in concert, upgrade their defences against terrorist action. 
Suggestions from political, civil, military, law enforcement
175"The Rise of World Terrorism," U.S. News and World 
Report, 8 July, 1985, p. 27.
176U.S. Government Printing Office, The Public Report, 
op. cit., pp. 4-5.
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and lay sources spanned the spectrum of passive and active
measures. These included enhancing airport and airline
security, expanding the intelligence role, hardening targets,
improving international co-operation, employing diplomatic
pressure on countries that countenance terrorism, forming and
using rescue teams, eliminating safe havens, and using
government sanctioned executive action and commando
operations. As to the morality of the employment of
'directed violence', Livingstone, a noted authority on these
issues, has argued:
...such a policy is far more justifiable than 
the indiscriminate retaliatory bombing of refugee 
camps and1Y|llages since only the guilty are 
punished.
There are no simple solutions to terrorism. Its
manifestations pose a complicated, dynamic and multi-faceted
problem to governments. Therefore, the design and
implementation of national and international policies to
provide an all-encompassing strategy remains a monumental
and, for the most part, uncompleted endeavour. For those
nations facing the challenge of terrorism, the United States
has formulated a series of strategies that have been
implemented or are being studied. Livingstone and Arnold
have identified, in their thorough work on terrorism, the
following key activities for improving national response
capabilities:
Improving physical security.
Train U.S. diplomatic and military personnel 
in personal security habits and to appreciate the 
terrorist threat.
Working closely with other governments to ensure 
that they meet their responsibilities for the
177 . .Livingstone, op. cit., p. 175.
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protection of U.S. diplomatic and military 
personnel and facilities abroad.
Providing security to foreign diplomats and 
dignitaries in the United States.
Training foreign government officials in 
security and antiterrorist programs.
Working closely with other governments to collect, 
assess, and share intelligence.
Improving the legal framework to enable better 
investigation and prosecution for terrorist 
offenses.
Improving the framework for international 
cooperation to deal with terrorism.
Increasing and sharing antiterrorism technology.
Exposing the involvement of states in sponsoring 
or carrying out acts of terrorism in every possible 
forum.
Cooperating with other countries to persuade or 
force terrorism-sponsoring states to end such 
activities.
Using force in a judicious manner to prevent or 
respond to terrorist attacks and to deter future 
attacks.
Searching for appropriate ways of solving 17g 
legitimate grievances by non-violent means.
Livingstone and Arnold go on to emphasize that there are
long-term political implications too complex and likely quite
difficult to address. They argue that although:
...the component elements, or options, of the 
overall strategy seem simple, their application and 
implementation are far more difficult. Each 
depends on the existence or creation of certain 
instrumentalities, structures, and agreements or 
understandings, for without creating the means to 
realize its objectives, any strategy, however well 
conceived, is reduced to bluster and hot air, and 
any country that embraces such a strategy runs the 
risk of being perceived as a paper tiger in-tfte 
event a situation arises where it must act.
178Neil C. Livingstone and Terrell E. Arnold, (eds) 
Fighting Back: Winning The War Against Terrorism, p. 230.
These authors also incorporate some less savoury options
which are highly debatable for democratic governments. They
leave no doubt as to the flexibility which decision-makers
must bring to the choice of responses to meet the terrorist
challenge and argue that:
Everything must be considered a potential option 
by policymakers...even if some of the possible 
tools, like assassination, must necessarily be 
discarded as inappropriate or prohibited at the 
present time.
The following chapter will study several examples of 
terrorist activities faced by Western governments in recent 
history, and will further explore the range of responses to 
which they have so far resorted.
180Ibid., p. 231.
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CHAPTER II
INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF COUNTER-TERRORISM
Section I
Terrorism as an International Phenomenon 
in Recent History
Although it is well known that terrorist activities have been
an integral part of conventional and guerrilla warfare, the
type of political violence that we are experiencing today is
in reality a relatively new phenomenon. It should be
considered "a distinct and significant new mode of armed 
181conflict." In fact many analysts argue that since recent
terrorist activity began increasing in the late 1960s, we
have entered a new age of conflict. It has been stated:
...terrorism represents a cheap and effective 
method of warfare against more powerful adversaries 
whose arsenals and weapons are of little comfort 
against small bands of marauding proxy forces armed 
with the latest technologies, imagination, and 
stealth. Today international terrorists and their 
patrons are, in effect, at war....
The twentieth-century theories of guerrilla warfare,
including the 'people's war' concepts fathered by Mao,
combined with the turbulent political environment of the era
following World War II, the advent of mass communications and
the explosion of technology have been key determinants in
183producing the new terrorism we know today. For the most
part, our technologically oriented age has thrust this type
of violence upon us. Jenkins argues:
Developments in the technological environment 
have made international terrorism possible. Modern 
jet travel provides worldwide mobility? terrorists
181Brian Michael Jenkins, News Modes of Conflict, p.8.
182Neil C. Livingstone and Terrell E. Arnold, (eds), 
Fighting Back: Winning The War Against Terrorism, p.l.
183Jenkins, op. cit., p. 9.
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can now strike on any continent. Radio, 
television, and communications satellites provide 
almost instantaneous access to a global audience. 
Weapons and explosives are widely available.
Modern industrial society presents many vulnerable 
targets, from airliners to nuclear reactors. Once 
the utility of terrorist tactics was demonstrated, 
terrorism became an imitative mpdf of behavior, 
spreading throughout the world.
Nations have become more aware of the high costs of
conventional and nuclear warfare and the resulting impact of
such activities on their societies. Terrorists, however,
have few such restrictions:
In contrast to the increased constraints on 
governments in the conduct of war, terrorists have 
adopted the concept of total warfare —  they 
recognize no civilian noncombatants. Terrorists 
may attack anything, anywhere, anytime. Over the 
past 15 years, the spectrum of terrorist targets 
has expanded to include diplomats, embassies, 
airliners, airline offices, tourist agencies, 
tourists, hotels, airports, trains, train stations, 
reactors, refineries, restaurants, pubs, churches, 
temples, synagogues, nuns, priests, the Pope, 
schools, students, and nurseries. This widening of 
the range of "legitimate” targets and the resultant 
narrowing of the category of innocent bystanders 
parallels and extends the twentieth century concept 
of total war:...
The two world wars, Korea and Vietnam reflect the industrial 
and later the nuclear underpinnings of our global society. 
World Wars I and II were the wars of mass production in which 
superiority in forces and equipment prevailed. Korea was the 
reflection of the strategy of confrontation and limited war, 
while Vietnam demonstrated to all concerned the frustration 
of a super-power, technologically superior, engaging an enemy 
in a low-intensity war, winning militarily perhaps, but 
losing politically. Today major forms of international
184ibid. 
185ibid.
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'warfare' are low-intensity conflict and terrorism. This is
easy to comprehend when one considers that a large:
...portion of the economy is now devoted to the 
creation, collection, retrieval, transfer, and 
dissemination of information) and political power 
increasingly rests on the ability to create or 
control information. Terrorists are primitive 
psychological warriors in an information war. 
Terrorism reflects the current age-pg instant 
communications and rapid mobility.
Jenkins underlines that the success of terrorism has much to
do with the perception of a nation's capability to deal with
such crises, proposing that:
Public perceptions of government standing and 
competence in combatting terrorism are based not on 
overall performance, but rather on performance in a 
few dramatic hostage incidents, where the 
government, of course, suffers disadvantages from 
the outset. The public sees the government only in 
crisis, demonstrably unable to provide security for 
its citizens, sometimes yielding to terrorists to 
save lives, unable to bring its enemies to justice. 
A rescue attempt that succeeds adds immeasurably to 
a nation's image of military prowess-8_An attempt 
that fails does incalculable damage.
Many statistics exist to quantify the activities, numbers,
types, locations and targets of international terrorists. It
was reported in 1986 that:
...incidents of terrorism —  those involving 
citizens or territory of more than one country —  
have doubled in number since 1975, to slightly over 
800 last year....
Many commentators agree that terrorist violence is, and will 
likely remain, an integral part of international relations. 
As Scotland Yard's counter-terrorist specialist George
186Ibid., p. 10.
187Ibid.
188Charles Hanley, "International Terrorism: Global
order shaken by wanton war," The Ottawa Citizen. 19 April, 
1986.
Churchill-Coleman stated, "Terrorism is with us now, whether 
you like it or not. You've got to adjust your way of life to 
that."189
The prognosis becomes even more frightening as terrorists
seek out softer targets. This is because international
police and security agencies will, for the most part,
strengthen the defences of consulates, embassies and
residences, and will provide other forms of personal security
for the more likely terrorist targets. Therefore, terrorist
attacks will probably become more indiscriminate. The
bombing campaign in Paris during the summer of 1986, aimed at
government buildings, restaurants and cafes, and the bombings
in London during the spring of 1992 of commuter train
stations and the financial district, are examples of what we
may expect. Other examples of indiscriminate terrorism are
the strikes at airports such as those in December, 1985, at
190Rome and Vienna. Furthermore, targets abound in highly
developed industrialized societies and analysts anticipate
that terrorist groups will begin targetting vital points such
as "computer systems, power grids and other key links of
191industrial societies."
Future terrorist operations will, in all probability, be 
conducted by the traditional groups belonging to militant
189ibid.
190ibid.
191ibid.
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192 . • •Palestinian, Islamic, anti-Turkish Armenians, Sikh, Irish,
Colombian leftists, Italian right-wing, and scores of other
groups. Less advertised terrorist groups such as the Tamil
separatists and militant black muslim groups may attempt to
launch themselves onto the world stage. Some of these groups
are acquiring advanced technical skills, particularly in the
employment of remote controlled explosive devices. The IRA
and the anti-west Shiite Moslems are bomb experts
acknowledged by some as having "bombs of power unparalleled
. . . . 193for a non-military organization.1
With such relative newcomers to the global scene as the
Sikhs, Tamils and Black Muslim groups, the war against
terrorism will likely broaden to incorporate other factions
who seek what they call justice through terror tactics. In
summary, the future will likely witness the continuation of
194terrorist violence , a new targetting methodology and the 
advent of new groups. The following section discusses 
methods that might assist countries to deal with terrorism.
192See "Arafat warns of strife: PLO chief invokes
spectre of hijacking," The Globe and Mail. Toronto, 28 May,
1991. The article states that, "Arafat has warned of an 
escalation of violence in the occupied territories and of 
renewed plane hijackings if no progress is made on the 
Palestinian issue."
193Hanley, op. cit.
194See Carey French, "Terrorist threat growing : Just 
when you thought it safe," The Globe and Mail. 11 February,
1992. The article states, "The world is becoming a more 
dangerous place to do business, but cutbacks in media 
coverage may be masking the threat to the entrepreneur, a 
US-based terrorism watcher warns." Of note the article 
complains "that the 'media threshold is now so high that most 
terrorist acts don't meet it,'." Moreover, "People are being 
lulled into a false sense of security that terrorism has gone 
away.... In reality, the hard, cold evidence demonstrates it 
hasn't gone away."
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SECTION II 
The Counter-Terrorist Reaction 
The Sovereignty Issue and Counter-Measures
A major concern for countries involved in counter-terrorist
activities centres on the problems posed by national
sovereignty and legal considerations, particularly as in the
latter case any counter-terrorist activity, at least in the
democracies, must be subject to the law of the land. The
nature of the application of law clearly varies, along with
the responsibility for its enforcement, from country to
country. In Norway, for example, counter-teror^ist activity
is strictly and explicitly a matter for police, not the
military. In contrast, Great Britain has employed not only
the police and intelligence services but also military units
to wage an undeclared war against terrorists. In 1988 an
11-man jury ruled that the shootings of three IRA terrorists
'on active service1 in Gibraltar in March 1988 by members of
the Special Air Service (SAS) were lawful. The jurists:
...decided that the soldiers had gunned them down, 
believing the IRA unit had planted a car bomb to 
blow up the Royal Anglian Regiment band during the 
weekly changing of the guard.
As can be fully appreciated, such international
counter-terrorist actions by elite counter-terrorist units
are highly controversial. Due to the prickly nature of this
issue, countries prefer to stay away from it rather than
seeking solutions which might appear to erode their
195 . ."SAS killings m  Gibraltar ruled lawful," The
Manchester Guardian. 9 October, 1988.
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sovereignty. Sophisticated terrorists fully appreciate the
conflicts evolving from jurisdictional and sovereignty issues
and have taken operational advantage of them on the domestic
and international level, particularly in the Third World,
where nationalism and anti-colonialist sentiment thrives.
This trend continues, and any initiative to address
sovereignty concerns and enhance co-operative
counter-terrorist actions, particularly in the employment of
military and police, dissipates quickly once a terrorist
196incident is over.
Countries do not wish to be seen as having international 
death squads wandering the world in search of terrorists. 
Therefore, states such as Britain, which maintain 
counter-terrorist forces, must also maintain a high degree of 
control over their activities. Any deployment of 
counter-terrorist forces abroad must be perceived to be a 
co-ordinated effort with the host country, as in the West 
German rescue of hostages in Mogadishu, or to have the 
sanction of the government targetted by terrorists, as in the 
Special Air Service (SAS) attack on the Iranian Embassy in 
London in 1980. Otherwise it must be viewed as a 
humanitarian issue, as was the Israeli rescue of hostages in 
Entebbe and the ill-fated American mission into Iran. By 
casting the operation in such a light it is possible to 
diminish the problems which surround the issue of 
sovereignty.
196 . .Paul Wilkinson, "Trends in international terrorism
and the American response," in Lawrence Freedman, et al.,
Terrorism And International Order, p. 49.
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Terrorism is becoming increasingly international at least in 
the sense that as more countries develop their national 
capabilities to deal with them, the terrorists will seek out 
states sympathetic to their cause, such as Syria, or look for
less sophisticated countries which they can use as a base.
Such migration of terrorism increases the number of 
sovereignty hurdles which must be overcome. For the West, it 
remains a complicated and emotional issue. As Paul Wilkinson 
points out:
...even those Western states which have been major 
targets of terrorism and have an obvious common
interest in combating it have been slow to agree
[to] a collective approach. None of the 
international organizations, even NATO, has proved 
an easily acceptable framework in the sensitive 
areas of internal security, law and order. 
Traditionally governments have taken the view that 
here they must retain sovereign control. Western 
politicians and judiciaries are as chauvinistic in 
this respect as other states, despite the many 
moral and legal values they-jiave in common with 
fellow Western governments.
Counter-Measures Against Terrorism
In times of crisis such as the Achille Lauro incident or the
saga of TWA Flight 847 in June of 1985, the immediate
attention of the governments involved is focussed solely upon
freeing the hostages. Then, they tend "to fall back in 
198exhaustion." Concerned governments must create the
ongoing capability to deal with such outrages, and the 
capability must be in place before the crisis emerges.
197Ibid., pp. 48-49.
198Mark Whitaker, et al., "Ten Ways to Fight Terrorism," 
Newsweek. 1 July, 1985, p. 26. The employment of a popular 
weekly in this portion is done to underline the widespread 
understanding and concern regarding the problem of terrorism 
as well as to indicate the possible responses forwarded to 
address this issue.
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Governments must realize there is no panacea? that no
security agency can forestall every risk. Therefore, to
combat terrorism, any concerned leadership:
...must take advantage of the breathing spells 
between terrorist attacks to invent stronger ways 
to protect itself. None of the available 
countermeasures is guaranteed to succeed; few of 
them are easy, and some involve moral and polij^gal 
adjustments that are sure to be controversial.
Some of the counter-measures advocated by various analysts 
were noted by Mark Whitaker, et al., in an article for 
Newsweek. They included the following:
1) Putting pressure on national governments to ensure 
that their airports are safe. For example, Athens 
and Beirut are two airports internationally 
acknowledged as having poor security? therefore 
international airlines associations such as the 
International Air Transport Association (IATA) 
could be made responsible for reviewing 
security operations and recommending changes as 
deemed necessary. More drastic national or 
international measures could be adopted, if 
required, such as halting all air traffic and 
imposing financial and legal penalties on those 
airlines which continue to use airports considered 
insecure.
2) Installing effective scanners, detectors and 
management techniques. In concert with advanced 
technical measures, the physical checking of
199ibid.
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baggage, passengers (with no exceptions) and the 
use of 'sniffer' dogs, as done by El Al, will be 
required. In future we may see the elimination of 
carry-on luggage. One IATA director has already 
argued "that it may eventually be necessary to keep 
everyone except passengers with tickets out of 
terminal buildings."200 Such measures, including 
the employment of competent security personnel, 
would deter many potential aerial terrorists.
3) Government agencies must consider the protective
hardening of targets such as embassies, residences
and government offices. The destruction of the
United States Marine Corps barracks in Beirut
resulted in the American government order to
enhance security at diplomatic posts throughout the
world. Secretary of State George Schultz asked in
1985 for some $236 million in order to improve
security at the State Department and at 13 other
201establishments overseas. This request included
computerized control booths, barriers, rewards for
information, bodyguards and security dogs. The use
of a comprehensive identification system for
employees, and bomb and weapon detection equipment
202must also be considered.
200Ibid., p. 27.
201Ibid.
202Ibid.
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4) The expansion and co-ordination of a well-organized
intelligence gathering apparatus "is the only way
in which Western nations can confront terrorists
203and pre-empt their activities.” Winning the
intelligence battle is vital if countries hope to 
reduce terrorist activity. The thwarting of 
Palestinian attacks in the 1970s by Israel and the 
United States, through the intelligence penetration 
of the Palestine Liberation Organization, remains 
an outstanding example of international 
co-operation, showing all security and intelligence 
agencies what can be achieved.204
The infiltration of terrorist organizations is
vitally important. A country must formulate a game
plan to focus its intelligence efforts against
terrorists, and to establish what government bodies
are primarily responsible for counter-terrorist
205intelligence gathering. Livingstone and Arnold
have emphasized that timely and accurate 
information has enabled;
...security officials to move diplomats and other 
targets out of range, to warn other government 
officials of plots against them, and to expose the 
intentions of various terrorist groups to friendly 
governments. Not only can a well-developed 
intelligence capability provide authorities with 
advance information about an upcoming terrorist 
operation, permitting them to take steps to avert 
the incident or at least minimize the damage, but 
it also aids them in tracking down suspected
203Interview with a Canadian Security Intelligence 
Service officer, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, 27 July, 1986.
204Whitaker, et al., op. cit., p. 27.
205 . .Livingstone and Arnold, op. cit., p. 232.
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terrorists and identifying support from patron 
states.
5) Officials responsible for a nation*s crisis-
management function should be identified, formed
into teams and given the opportunity to 
207practice, so that in the event of a terrorist 
attack, command and control measures can be 
implemented immediately. Officials, diplomats, 
civil servants, police and military personnel can 
be fully aware, ahead of time, of their duties and 
responsibilities. The benefits of such an approach 
were demonstrated in the 1980 Iranian Embassy siege 
in London. The decisions were made by the Home 
Secretary, Mr. William Whitelaw, who acted as 
chairman of the Cabinet Office Briefing Room 
(COBR), the government's crisis committee. The 
committee included representatives from the Foreign 
Office, the Ministry of Defence, Scotland Yard and 
the security and intelligence (MI5) branch. COBR 
was assisted by specialist advisors. It was noted 
that:
COBRA did not go into the operation 'cold'. 
Everybody knew what they had to do and where to 
assemble when the codeword was given. This 
expertise came from the realisation that such an 
incident was likely to happen and the team had
206Ibid., pp. 231-232.
207Stephen Bindman, "Mock terrorist attack set to roll 
near border," The Ottawa Citizen. 7 June, 1989. This article 
states that "Canada and the United States will stage the 
largest-ever test of their ability to respond to a terrorist 
attack in a mock hostage-taking somewhere along the border 
later this month."
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its own 'wargames' to prepare for the
In contrast, the United States appears to have
209"more of a machismo attitude." According to
Robert Kupperman, the prevailing feeling is
"that we don't need to prepare in that way for
210managing a crisis." And in admiration of the 
British experience, Kupperman argues that "We have 
to get a regular program of crisis gaming going, 
and we have to make sure that at least
211cabinet-level people are involved in it."
It has been put forward:
If U.S. officials had done more advance 
planning in the Iranian situation, they might have 
reached different conclusions about Carter's rescue 
raid. Soon after the seizure of the U.S. diplomats 
in Teheran, the Israeli army war-gamed possible 
rescue operations.
There is no evidence that the United States 
operationally consulted with the Israelis to 
solicit advice or assistance, or for that matter 
any other allied country in their ill-fated Iranian 
adventure. Notwithstanding, lessons from both the 
British and American experiences can benefit those 
governments willing to learn from them and may 
assist in the safe release of hostages in future 
rescue operations.
conducjgg
event.
208Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne, Terror! The West 
Fights Back, p. 39.
209Whitaker, et al., op. cit., p. 28.
210ibid.
211ibid.
212ibid.
- 74 -
6) The improvement of international co-operation to
combat international terrorist activities is known
to be "crucial to any effective effort to control
213and suppress terrorism." Once Fidel Castro
undertook to extradite hijackers to the United
States for legal proceedings, the hijack
phenomenon, with Cuba as a destination, diminished.
The adherence to international agreements and the
suspension of air services to nations suspected of
harbouring or supporting terrorism, might assist in
a co-ordinated approach to countering terrorism.
One critical area where greater international
co-operation could assist is in the sharing of
intelligence. This could also include aiding
friendly nations in training their intelligence,
security, police and military forces in the various
aspects of counter-terrorism. Such co-operation
may in the future include the possibility of
creating "a multinational commando force that could
be thrown into action in future terrorist 
214emergencies." Such co-operation would likely
further enhance the effectiveness of those 
countries which now combat political violence on 
national and international levels.
7) Experience in negotiating with terrorists since 
the 1970s underlines:
213 . .Livingstone and Arnold, op. cit., p. 237.
214 "Global Force Proposed to Fight Terrorist Threat," 
The Sunday Star. Toronto, 27 April, 1986. See also Carey 
French, "Talking a tough line on terrorism," The Globe and 
Mail, Toronto, 14 May, 1988 .
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...the importance of choosing the right 
negotiator-ideally someone who speaks the 
terrorists* language, understands their 
history and culture, is street-smart but also 
a good listener.
Other noteworthy negotiation aims focus on
acquiring concessions, developing a trusting
relationship with the terrorists, and attempting to
216deprive the terrorists of rest. Sadly, the
terrorists themselves have rapidly assimilated
these strategies and have evolved their own
counters, such as taking along an extra gunman to
keep negotiators off balance, as happened in
Flight 847 between Beirut and Algiers. It is,
therefore, vitally important that the negotiators
be flexible and have the authority to develop means
to overcome these terrorist ploys. Officials
should understand that they must avoid declaring:
... publicly that they will not make concessions 
to terrorists.... Such statements may sound 
principled and tough-minded, but they constrain 
efforts to carry out the bargaining that inevitably 
takes place with hostage-takers.
As one analyst has said "The fact is that any
government will negotiate, if not directly, then
indirectly.»218
215Whitaker, et al., op. cit., p. 28.
2X6Ibid. See also Rod Nordland, et al., "Were the Deals 
Worth It?," Newsweek. 16 December, 1991, p. 38.
218Ibid. It should be noted that a moral case for not 
negotiating can be made, but the real issue is that 
governments must be pragmatic and, therefore, they will 
bargain with the aim of winning the negotiation. Moreover, 
although not negotiating with terrorists, for many countries 
is stated government policy; government officials, as well as 
politicians and diplomats soon discover that this 'official 
policy' is in fact, seldom honoured.
The release in December, 1991 of a number of 
American and British hostages is proof that 
governments will directly or indirectly negotiate 
with terrorists for the safe release of their 
citizens.
For national leaders, ensuring the safety 
of the hostages should be of paramount importance. 
However, the negotiations that occur during a 
hostage crisis should not rule out "the option of a 
rescue mission [as this] keeps terrorists guessing
- and may encourage them to make concessions more
219 . . .quickly." The employment of elite military or
police formations in hostage rescue attempts must
be feasible. Since deployment to the crisis area
must be rapid, special operations units could be
based close to areas with a high potential for
terrorist activities i.e., the Middle East and
Europe. These bases should have extensive training
facilities, be reasonably private and maintained in
secure surroundings. More information regarding
the use of 'final option forces' will be discussed
in later chapters.
Western nations should seek agreements on ways of 
identifying and penalizing states which harbour or 
assist international terrorists. The economic 
influence of the Western states for instance could 
be brought to bear in fighting terrorist violence,
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through economic sanctions and other means such as 
the cessation of aerial traffic to those countries 
identified as sponsor nations.220
10) Prior to the 'successful' attack by American
aircraft against selected Libyan targets in 1985,
the threat of precision reprisals such as bombings
221 . . . .  and assassination was viewed with a jaundiced
eye. Threats of retaliation that aren't
expeditiously carried out lead to the perception
that the target nation is impotent. This apparent
weakness encourages others to consider terrorism as
an effective way to wage war. Although the option
of retaliation creates many problems, it is one
avenue that must remain open. As a deterrent
measure, it may have limited effect, but it does
sometimes demonstrate, as in the Libyan case, that
the target sometimes fights back, thereby conveying
a crucial message in the war against terrorists and
the nations which support them.
The Western governments recognize that as long as terrorists 
operate they can not defeat them totally, particularly since 
the foundations of much terrorist activity are embedded in 
deep-seated, highly emotional political grievances. Further,
220 . . .Neil C. Livingstone, The War Against Terrorism, pp.
164-165.
221 "U.S. Army seeks OK to kill terrorists," The Gazette. 
Montreal, 11 April, 1989. According to this article "'Using 
military force against terrorists' to protect U.S. citizens 
or the national security of the United States is a legitimate 
exercise of the international legal right of self-defence and 
does not constitute assassination,' the army's legal opinion 
concludes."
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political violence will likely continue until these 
grievances are satisfactorily addressed. As democratic 
states place a premium on freedom, they will continue to 
remain vulnerable to such low-intensity violence.
In conclusion, the West will likely have little option but to 
be prepared to continue to experience terrorist violence well 
into the future. Therefore, the West may be required to 
orchestrate all possible means to defeat terrorism —  
ensuring that they are employed with cautious forethought, 
and that there is no illusion as to their (limited) effect.
The 'Final Option' - The Justifiability of Elite 
Counter-Terrorist Teams
This section focusses on the experiences of the Israeli and 
West German governments which developed and deployed elite 
military counter-terrorist teams in response, partly, to the 
frustrations of employing a series of so-called "non-force” 
methods against terrorists, Livingstone writes the 
following:
Western governments have employed a variety of 
nonforce strategies in their efforts to resist 
terrorism, including diplomacy, negotiation, 
concessions, and cooptation. Occasionally such 
methods have worked, but more often than not they 
have failed or only provided a temporary 
prophylaxis to an endemic problem. It is widely 
recognized that, under most circumstances, making 
concessions to terrorists only invites further acts 
of terrorism. This fact, combined with the failure 
of the UN to take concerted action to develop 
effective remedies to the problem of international 
terrorism, has resulted in a growing tendency on 
the part of national governments to resort to 
unilateral military action against terrorism in the 
belief that, if it is not possible to make
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terrorists answerable to-the law, then they must be 
answerable to the gun.
The employment of military options under certain
circumstances is arguably justifiable under Article 51 of the
United Nations Charter. This article confirms that nations
have the right to self defence in the face of armed attack.
Therefore, if one argues that terrorism constitutes an armed
assault, every government has the inherent right to use
. . . 223military force as a defence against that assault.
The Requirement for the Elite Counter-Terrorist Soldier
It is apparent from recent twentieth-century history in 
Western countries, that the responsibility for combatting 
terrorism has been, for the most part, that of law 
enforcement authorities. On occasion, array units were tasked 
and, for the most part, were found to be operationally 
wanting in strategy, methodology and structure. Conventional 
military forces and tactics have not met the challenge of 
terrorism:
Not only are contemporary weapons and tactics far 
too destructive to be employed in heavily populated 
urban regions, but also the deployment of large 
numbers of soldiers against terrorists simply
222 . .Livingstone, op. cit., p. 176.
223Ibid. See Edmund Jan Osmanczyk, The Encyclopedia of 
The United Nations and International Agreements, p. 838. 
Article 51 states "Nothing in the present Charter shall 
impair the inherent right of individual or collective 
self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of 
the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken 
measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this 
right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the 
Security Council and shall not in any way affect the 
authority and responsibility of the Security Council under 
the present Charter to take at any time such action as it 
deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international 
peace and security."
increases the number of targets at which they can 
strike. 24
General George Grivas, the famous Cypriot terrorist leader,
noted that the level of terrorist operations is much lower
than that of conventional military operations.
Counter-terrorist operations demand specially adapted and
trained soldiers, tactics and strategy. He noted the:
...only hope of finding us was to play cat and 
mouse: to use tiny, expertly trained groups, who
could work with cunning and patjggce and strike 
rapidly when we least expected.
In short, one must use those same weapons and tactics
  jL
belonging to the terrorists' inventory —  psychology,
stealth, speed, surprise and cunning against the terrorists
themselves. This type of military operation demands a
different type of soldier, namely one who can develop a broad
spectrum of skills.
Counterterrorism demands highly trained and 
motivated commandos, operating in small groups; 
skilled in electronics, communications, 
demolitions, marksmanship, deception, silent 
killing; ang familiar with terrorist tactics and 
behavior.
One will return to this point in later chapters.
It should be underlined that two countries in particular were 
noted for their skill and audacious employment of 
counter-terrorist forces in the mid 1970s. Israel and West 
Germany are interesting examples, the former has extensive 
experience in commando and special operations and maintains a 
rather large corporate memory on military operations, since
224ibid.
225Robert Taber, The War Of The Flea: Guerrilla Warfare
Theory And Practice, p. 118.
2 2 6Livingstone, op. cit., p. 176
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1948, across the spectrum of warfare especially in 
low-intensity conflict and terrorism. West Germany, on the 
other hand, represents the other extreme having little 
experience in * real world* special or counter-terrorist 
operations during this period. Notwithstanding, Colonel 
Wegener of the West German GSG9 took the opportunity to 
study, observe and solicit the experiences of other countries 
thereby making them his own. While it is quite obvious that 
he drew much knowledge and skill from his own training, it is 
also quite apparent that his foreign training and 
attachments, as shall be seen, gave him the opportunity to 
gain operational experience and more importantly the ability 
to call upon the assistance of friendly or allied forces when 
required.
It is upon these two operations at Entebbe and Mogadishu that 
this paper shall embark, underlining the close international 
co-operation and assistance that West Germany and Israel 
obtained throughout the course of these actions. It is the 
aim of this section to not only highlight the close 
co-operative effort of a number of countries to assist in 
these governmental responses but, concomitantly, to point out 
the various types of assistance that was forthcoming from the 
international community.
Entebbe and Mogadishu: Lessons in Successful Hostage-Rescue
An examination of two successful hostage-rescue incidents of 
the 1970s, at Entebbe and Mogadishu, highlight some of the 
key factors that may determine success or failure in this 
type of * surgical operation'. These include contingency 
planning, preparation and co-ordination of the rescue forces,
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overall command, control and communication, the assembling of 
the intelligence picture (C3I), and, in particular, 
international collaboration. As this paper shall reveal, 
neither of these missions could have been successful without 
considerable international co-operation.
Although the degree of co-operation may vary due to the
locations of the incident and various political
considerations in the countries involved, Western countries
have continued to assist each other even though they have
experienced the normal ups and downs of relations between
states. Many of these countries have developed elite
counter-terrorist forces of some description and these units
have been used to train similar organizations in other
countries. The United States, Israel, West Germany, Great
227Britain and France have assisted each other in developing 
anti-terrorist techniques. These include cross-training in 
weapons and tactics, demolitions, as well as insertion and 
extraction methods. Such skills are, in turn, incorporated 
into the training of units in collaborating countries. The 
advantages accruing from such co-operation are heightened by 
personnel exchanges. As will be shown, personnel from these 
counter-terrorist forces have travelled to the sites of 
terrorist incidents to advise, assist and even participate
227Francefs counter-terrorist force 'Groupement 
d 'Intervention de la Gendarmerie nationale1 (GIGN) is not 
covered in this text. It is, however, considered to be a 
highly professional unit and belongs to the Gendarmerie 
Nationale. Its most famous action was the February, 1976 
rescue of 30 children who were being held hostage by members 
of the Somali Coast Liberation Front (FLCS). For further 
information see Leroy Thompson, The Rescuers: The World's
Top Anti-Terrorist Units, pp. 70-78 and Christopher Dobson 
and Ronald Payne, Terror; The West Fights Back, pp. 138-148.
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with their foreign counterparts in domestic and foreign 
counter-terrorist operations.
Entebbe Rescue
The Entebbe rescue, code-named 'THUNDERBOLT* and later
renamed 'Operation JONATHAN', was described by the historian
Richard Deacon, as:
...an astonishing epic of military adventure 
and enterprise carried out in a spirit of medieval 
buccaneering by a team trained in the arts of both 
the military and espionage.
This was indeed a daring, dangerous mission. The lives of
103 hostages hung in the balance. However, this operation
probably could not have succeeded had it not been for the
assistance given Israel's intelligence and military agencies
by several friendly governments. The co-operation given
spanned the spectrum from moral support to having a foreign
para-military representative actually present with the
Israeli rescue force. Without this co-operation, the rescue
attempt might well have failed. Worse still, Israel may have
had to succumb to the terrorists' demands. Today, Operation
THUNDERBOLT represents a fine example of the international
efforts which can assist in a counter-terrorism mission. The
following extended narrative will demonstrate how
international assistance was vital, particularly at critical
junctures throughout this operation.
The incident began on 27 June, 1976, when Air France Flight 
139 from Tel Aviv to Paris was seized in mid-air by seven 
members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
228Richard Deacon, The Israeli Secret Service, p. 271.
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(PFLP) just after a scheduled stopover in Athens. According 
to one witness, two men left their seats and, brandishing 
revolvers, said, "We are revolutionaries and this airplane is
now our property. We are going to take you where we
229 . . . .  jplease." Other terrorists joined m  to assist their
comrades in seizing the aircraft. Once the task was
completed, their West German leader, later identified as
Wilfred Boese, made the following announcement:
This is the Che Guevara Brigade of the Popular 
Front of the Liberation of Palestine. I am your 
new commandant. T§4§ plane is renamed HAIFA. You 
are our prisoners.
The plane flew on to Benghazi for a brief refuelling stop.
There, one pregnant passenger, a 30-year-old British subject
was allowed to deplane.
Soon after departure from Libya, Flight 139 attempted to land
in Sudan but was refused permission. It continued its flight
to Entebbe International Airport in Uganda. On arrival in
Entebbe, the passengers and crew occupied an unused passenger 
231terminal. It was then that indications of collusion
between Idi Amin and the PFLP became apparent to some of the
hostages. One hostage, Akipa Lasker, a lawyer from Tel Aviv
later stated:
"...when we reached Uganda and got off - the plane 
we saw more Palestinians there," he recalled.
Lasked (sic) said he saw five or six of the 
latter. "They were definitely not on the flight,"
229Angus Deming, et al., "A Daring Rescue in Uganda," 
Newsweek. 12 July, 1976, p. 28.
230Edward F. Mickolus, Transnational Terrorism: A
Chronology Of Events. 1968-1979. p. 621.
231Deming, et al., op. cit., p. 29.
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he stressed. "When we got off t£g2plane we saw 
them waiting and looking at us."
The purpose of the hijacking was initially obscure. However,
the aim became quite apparent when the terrorists announced
that they sought the release of 53 Palestinians or
pro-Palestinian comrades incarcerated in Israel, Switzerland,
233West Germany, France and Kenya. The hostages taken from
the Air France flight were a mixture of Israelis and 
non-Israelis including a number of French, Greek, American, 
Canadian and New Zealand citizens.
The terrorists selected a negotiator. He was Hashi Abdullan, 
Somalia’s Ambassador to Uganda. He, in turn, requested that 
the French government name their own representative. During 
these first delicate negotiations, President Idi Amin Dada 
refused Ambassador Pierre Renard’s intervention on behalf of 
the French government. Instead Amin would negotiate directly 
with the terrorists.
By 30 June, it was apparent to some diplomatic observers that 
the Israeli government’s policy was not to yield to the 
demands of the terrorists. One country, Canada, supported 
the Israeli stance and this was greeted by one Israeli 
official:
...WITH SATISFACTION HAVING HEARD NEWS BROADCAST 
THAT CDN GOVT [CANADIAN GOVERNMENT] WOULD NOT/NOT 
BE REQUESTING GOVTS [GOVERNMENTS] OF ISRAEL, WEST 
GERMANY, SWITZERLAND. FRANCE AND KENYA TO ACCEPT 
TERRORISTS DEMANDS.
232 "When the commandos arrived...," Jerusalem Post. 5 
July, 1976.
233 "53 names on list," Jerusalem Post. 30 June, 1976.
234 "UGANDA HOSTAGE SITUATION: ISRAELI REACTION."
(Footnote Continued)
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This was a departure from previous Israeli policy. In 1969
for example, Egyptian and Syrian nationals were freed in
return for two hijacked TWA passengers held in Damascus and
for two imprisoned Israeli pilots who had been downed over 
235Egypt. As for the demands for the release of the 53
jailed comrades, Kampala Radio had announced on 29 June that
once these prisoners were freed, Air France was to:
...bring all these freedom fighters to Entebbe 
International Airport, to be exchanged with the 
hostages and the aircraft. Air France to transport 
the freedom fighters held in Israel to Entebbe 
International Airport and it should only carry the 
freedom fighters and the crew.
The PFLP, via Kampala Radio, set an 0800 deadline for
Thursday, 30 June, and stated that there would be "severe and
237 .heavy punishment," if their demands were not met. The 
same day, the hijackers released 47 non-Israeli hostages who 
were taken by an Air France 707 to Nairobi.
As events unfolded, it became clear to all concerned that 
although this began as an international incident, it was 
clearly becoming an Israeli issue. Until then, it had been 
argued that the allegedly firm Israeli commitment not to 
bargain with terrorists could be ignored. According to 
observers in Jerusalem, there were several reasons for this:
- LIVES OF NON-ISRAELI NATIONALS ARE IN 
DANGER.
- NEITHER THE PLANE NOR THE HIJACKERS ARE 
WITHIN STRIKING DISTANCE OF ISRAELI TROOPS.
(Footnote Continued)
Message Traffic. Canadian Embassy Tel Aviv to Department of 
External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada, 30 June, 1976.
235Ibid.
236Mickolus, op. cit., p. 622.
237 . . ."Chronology of Hijacking," The New York Times. 5
July, 1976.
- ISRAEL HAD NOT BEEN DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN 
NEGOTIATIONS. 238
- OTHER GOVERNMENTS ARE DIRECTLY INVOLVED.
The New York Times reported that:
Israel's policy in the past has been to refuse to 
negooti3te wi [sic - negotiate with] terrorists on 
the ground that that [sic] will lead only to 
further terrorist attempts. Senior officials 
conceded, however, that the Uganda situation faces 
Israel with an specially [sic] difficult 
dilemma.
The following day, a further 100 non-Israeli passengers were
freed. This action by the hijackers allowed intelligence
authorities to acquire vital pieces of information regarding
the terrorists, the airport, security and weapons. They
learned also that the transit lounge which held the hostages
was not wired with explosives. Moreover, the freeing of the
non-Israeli passengers mobilized Israeli public opinion.
This action helped unite Israel in an 
unexpected way, because it gave the first link 
that Jews were the target, their lives to be the 
subject of bazaar-style haggling with Israel.
During the questioning of the freed passengers by French and
Israeli intelligence personnel, President Amin emerged not as
a mediator, but as an accomplice. This was information which
strengthened Israeli feeling that Uganda was working with Dr.
241Waddieh Haddad, the terrorist chief.
The Israeli government, upon notification of the hijacking, 
had rapidly organized a crisis management team consisting of
238Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) 66, 
PARIS, AFP, "ISRAELI GOVERNMENT MEETING TO ASSESS HIJACK 
SITUATION," 1 July, 1976.
239 . . .Terence Smith, "hijackers' Orders Challenge Israel,"
The New York Times. 30 June, 1976.
240 .William Stevenson, 90 Minutes At Entebbe, p. 17. 
241ibid.
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the Prime Minister, members of the Cabinet and the chief of 
staff of the Israeli Defence Force. More importantly:
Each member of this crisis task force was 
supported by specialists: experts on the new
international network of terrorists whose attacks 
on Israel had the same ideological significance as 
bombings in Ireland? experts on antipiracy tactics? 
military, political, and diplomatic experts. They 
drew together swiftly and smoothly. This sort of 
emergency had happened before, though never on this 
scale. 42
A series of suggestions were forthcoming, including the
capture of Idi Amin while en route to Mauritius to attend a
conference of the Organization for African Unity. Some
argued that Moshe Dayan should be sent to confer with Amin.
More radical ideas included holding, and possibly killing
relatives of PFLP members, should any hostages be 
243murdered.
Two options were obvious to all concerned. The first was to 
negotiate? the second was to undertake a military action of 
some type to rescue the hostages. It was vital for the 
Israeli government to be seen to be seeking a peaceful 
resolution to the problem. On 29 June, Prime Minister Yitzak 
Rabin asked Lieutenant General Mordechai Gur, f,Do we have a 
military option?" In response Gur related that "he lacked 
adequate intelligence about the airfield layout at Entebbe, 
the number of hostages, the military and human risks. 'At
242Ibid., p. 7.
243 .Mickolus, op. cit., p. 622.
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the moment,' he replied, 'we do not have a military 
option.'1,244
Rabin called for a vote and received unanimous agreement
from his Cabinet that the Israeli government would pursue
245 . .negotiations. Notwithstanding, the Defence Minister,
246Shimon Peres, on his own initiative, began the search for
247a viable military option. The tasks of planning and
commanding an operation, should it come to that, were given 
to Brigadier General Dan Shomron, the senior paratroop and 
infantry officer of the Israel Defence Forces.
In preparing options, Shimon Peres ordered Gur to determine
if the French government would assist Israel by allowing the
latter's aircraft to use the refuelling facilities at
Djibouti. As Stevenson notes:
Nobody had to ask what he [Peres] meant. If a 
military operation became necessary ... planes must 
fly around hostile Arab terroritories, evade 
Somalia's Russian detection systems, and complete 
flights beyond the normal range of Israel's 
existing military aircraft.
Of interest during this period was the fact that Kenya held
five imprisoned Palestinian freedom fighters, three of whom
had been apprehended as they attempted to down an El Al
airliner with a Soviet-made anti-aircraft missile when
244"Rescue at Entebbe: How the Israelis Did It," The
Reader's Digest. (October, 1976), p. 46.
245ibid.
246Yeshayahu Ben-Porat, et al., Entebbe Rescue, pp.
222-223.
247 . .See Captain E. Douglas Menarchik, "Strike Against
TerrorI the Entebbe raid," Air University Review. 
(July-August, 1980), p. 70. This initiative has been 
described as an 'unstructured dual-tracked approach.'
248Stevenson, op. cit., pp. 11-13.
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249approaching the Nairobi Airport on 18 January, 1975. This
missile system and an array of other weapons had been seized
by Kenyan security personnel. The weapons used were traced 
250to Uganda. On 21 January, 1975 a man and a woman arrived
in Nairobi hoping to discover the fate of the three
terrorists. These individuals had been arrested, searched
and interrogated by both Kenyan and, in February, Israeli
intelligence. The woman was reportedly carrying orders
written in invisible ink on her stomach. These orders had
251been to attack an aircraft belonging to El Al. All five
were then sent to Israel where they were later to be put on 
trial on 6 July, 1977.252 At the time of the Entebbe 
incident, however, the PFLP hijackers openly threatened to 
take reprisals against the Kenyan government if it did not 
comply with their request to release their incarcerated 
members.
By Wednesday, 30 June, it became readily apparent from the
information gathered through the interviews of released
hostages that Amin and his army were working in concert with
the PFLP. Nevertheless, Colonel Baruch Bar-Lev, who had once
been on friendly terms with Amin, maintained close contact in
a futile attempt to relay to the Ugandan President the
gravity of the situation and to remind him of his personal
253responsibility for the hostages.
249 "Five facing secret trial over bid to down jet,” The 
Globe and Mail11. Toronto, 7 July, 1977.
250Stevenson, op. cit., p. 23.
^Ibid., P- 24.
"Five facing secret...,” op. cit.
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The terrorists extended their deadline to Thursday, 1 July. 
The Israeli government proposed a joint Israeli-French 
negotiation team to the French government. The proposal was 
accepted.
Regarding this extension Prime Minister Rabin has said that
. . 254"Thursday was critical,” due to the fact that he "had to
report that we [the Israelis] had no military option that
could be applied before the Thursday deadline set by the 
255terrorists." On Thursday, according to reporter Michael
Elkins, the Israeli government:
...decided to open negotiations for the release 
of all the hostages with a readiness to release 
prisoners. The reference being to prisoners held 
for terrorist acts in Israel whose release had been 
demanded by the hijackers and it was generally 
accepted here that there was no other alternative. 
Official sources are saying that5the government 
fully intended to negotiate....
Moreover:
"I could not resist the demand to negotiate," 
said the prime minister. "Military operations 
depended upon accurate intelligence and proof, by 
way of full dress rehearsals, that a commando 
strike could be conducted with success."
Whilst negotiations continued, planners recognized that the 
military option would require detailed intelligence for any 
chance of success. A 72-hour deadline extension, granted by 
the terrorists, was given at noon on 1 July. This gave the 
military the opportunity to amass the information needed to 
plan the rescue operation:
253Mark Stevens and Milan J. Kubic, "The Odd Couple," 
Newsweek. 26 July, 1976, p. 52.
254Stevenson, op. cit., p. 32.
256Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, "The rescue of 
hostages held in Uganda by Israeli commandos," Sunday 
Magazine, hosted by Bob Oxley and George Rich, 4 July, 1976, 
Transcript, p. 2.
257Stevenson, op. cit., p. 32.
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Prior to the extension Thursday of the deadline,
officials said, there had not been enough time to
prepare and mount an operation that had any
realistic prospect of success by midday Thursday,
when the hijackers said they would kill the
259hostages and blow up the plane.
To this day the reason that the PFLP allowed so much time is
unknown. The Israelis believed that it may have been due to
260the departure of Amin for Mauritius. The Israeli
intelligence effort continued to acquire information germane
to all aspects of the planning phase, including the compiling
of character profiles on President Amin and the terrorists.
To acquire essential information, a bold intelligence
operation was mounted involving the moving of Israeli
intelligence officers from Kenya into Uganda by aircraft and 
261
motor vehicle. Some of these intelligence officers in
Kenya established themselves in the residence of a prominent 
Israeli merchant and were later discreetly met by a series of 
senior Kenyan representatives. They included;
258 . .Terence Smith, "Israelis Say Extension of Deadline by
the Hijackers Was Crucial to Raidfs Success," The New York
Times, 6 July, 1976.
259Ibid.
260Ibid.
2 61
Stevenson, op. cit., p. 33.
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...the chief of Nairobi police, Lionel Bryn 262 
Davies, and...a gentleman named Bruce McKenzie 
who...was now a close friend of President Kenyatta. 
Later, the leader of Kenyatta*s elite General 
Service Unit, Geoffrey Karithil, put in an 
appearance. Between them, they were able to assure 
the visitors that there would be no objection to 
Israeli Air Force planes flying through Kenyan air 
space —  and that President Kenyatta would affect 
not to notice if anv~of them should be put down at 
Nairobi to refuel.
The importance of this strategically located refuelling stop
2 64cannot be overstated. Kenyan authorities offered full
assistance in this regard:
The commander of Kenyatta*s GSU strong-arm units,
..., was able to give assurances that his president 
would turn a blind eye if the GSU and Nairobi 
airport police isolated the rescue force during a 
stopover —  provided this phase of the operation 
was conducted^as a routine matter under cover of El 
A1 charters.
It should be underlined that Kenya*s assistance to Israel had
to be perceived as legal from an international viewpoint.
Therefore an opinion was sought:
Charles Njojo, Kenya*s attorney general, offered 
a legal opinion that so long as the laws governing 
international civil aviation were observed (at 
least in the eyes of Kenya's airport authority), 
facilities could not be refused.
It should be pointed out that Kenya had been the brunt of a 
series of threats from Amin, and these threats were given 
credence by Uganda's Soviet-made MIG fighters and well
262See "The McKenzie affair," Africa Magazine. July, 
1978. Mr. McKenzie was later killed in a mysterious aerial 
explosion. All aboard the light aircraft were killed.
263Richard Garrett, The Raiders: The Elite Strike
Forces that Altered the Course of War and History, pp. 
212-214.
264Stevenson, op. cit., p. 77.
265lbid.
266Ibid.
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equipped army. Ironically, thanks to Israeli military
assistance, Uganda had quite a formidable armed force for a
Third World nation. Richard Garrett states that:
Uganda had come a long way since Israeli experts 
had raised its armed forces from the slough of 
inefficiency. According to a sufficiently accurate 
estimate, they now consisted of 21,000 well-armed 
and well-trained soldiers equipped with 267 
armoured troop carriers, SAM ground-to-air 
missiles, howitzers and mortars. In addition to 
this, the Ugandan Air Force had well over fifty 
combat planes, including thirty MIG-9s and the more 
recent MIG-17s. It was thought that about half of 
the army was concentrated between Entebbe and 
Kampala (twenty-one miles away). Twenty-one of the 
fighter planes were at Entebbe airport....
Foreign intelligence assisted in the training of the assault
force. The Israeli firm, Solel Boneh, which had built the
2go
new airport terminal as part and parcel of an Israeli aid 
programme, produced in preparation for this mission, an 
Entebbe Airport replica for rehearsals. This model was 
modified through intelligence derived from the released
hostages, Israeli reconnaissance aircraft and information
2 69drawn from American satellites.
According to one official, the Israelis, during this time,
continued to negotiate in good faith "But it quickly became
270obvious that we weren't getting anywhere." Support for a 
military rescue operation became increasingly strong by 
Friday, 2 July. It was on this day that there was a dramatic 
increase in the area of international co-operation,
2 67Garrett, op. cit., pp. 211-212.
268 "Raid Reconstructed: Israelis Knew Airport," The New
York Times. 5 July, 1976.
269Stevenson, op. cit., p. 89.
270Smith, "Israelis Say Extension...," op. cit.
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particularly between Israel and the Western intelligence 
community:
From West Germany came information on Wilfried 
Bose, tentatively identified as the German who 
declared himself captain of the hijacked airbus.
From Canada came a flood of material collected by 
Guy Toupin, coordinator of security for the 1976 
Olympic Games in Montreal. Toupin had worked for 
more than a year with the police of a dozen 
countries in preparation for the Olympics. He 
recalled only too vividly the massacre of Israeli 
athletes during the 1972 Olympic Games in 
Munich.
With the assistance of the West, the vitally important
intelligence picture began to take shape. This increased the
chance for a successful military option. Particularly:
...as new information reached Israel through the 
French Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire 
(DST), Scotland Yard, the CIA and FBI, the security 
branch of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), 
and more was smuggled out of Uganda by released 
hostages and Israel's informants within "Big Daddy" 
Amin's government, commando groups were given 
photographs and identikit details to memorize.
They were to2proceed on the basis that action would 
be required.
The Israeli government, in maintaining a negotiation posture,
as well as planning a military operation, was keeping its
options open. Israel, in fact, cloaked itself with the aura
of a country desiring to negotiate. This evolved into a
273highly sophisticated strategic deception plan. In this
regard the importance of international co-operation and 
support became more apparent once the Israeli leadership 
realized the high costs of submitting to the terrorist
271Stevenson, op. cit., pp. 41-42.
272Ibid, p. 46.
273Drew Middleton, "Key to Raid's Success: Analysts
Cite Strategic and Tactical Surprise, Achieved Through 
Deception," The New York Times. 5 July, 1976.
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demands. France soon became, although Paris did not realize 
it, an integral part of the total Israeli deception plan.
The French government remained an equal negotiating partner 
up to the last minute of discussions. More importantly this 
Franco-Israeli negotiating team gave further evidence to the 
terrorists that the Israeli government was concerned only 
with achieving a peaceful settlement to this hostage crisis. 
This ruse, as shall be seen, worked.
The vital intelligence provided by the United States, France, 
West Germany, Canada and Israel allowed the military planners 
to reduce the unknowns of the mission. However, 
international co-operation did not cease there, and one could 
argue that this assistance, at a critical juncture, assured 
the success of the military option. Carroll writes that on 2 
July there:
...came three pivotal developments: the Pentagon
supplied Israel with aerial-reconnaissance and 
satellite photographs of Entebbe Airport? 
clandestine Israeli agents penetrated Entebbe and 
brought out vital information, and Kenya gave 
secret assurances that an Israeli strike force 
would be permitted to land at Nairobi to refuel and 
care for7the wounded on its return trip from 
Uganda.
Two of these three factors needed the support of foreign 
governments. Without reconnaissance and satellite 
photographs, and without the permission of the Kenyan 
government to land in Nairobi, the probability of success 
would have been greatly reduced. The satellite photographs, 
in particular, were essential as the rescue force planners 
had to know if the terrorists had obstructed the runways with 
vehicles to prevent any rescue aircraft from landing
274Raymond Carroll, "How The Israelis Pulled It Off," 
Newsweek. 19 July, 1976, pp. 43-44.
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275safely. With this information and the Kenyan agreement to
assist, an Israeli government official said, "Militarily, the
situation on the ground now looked easier than when the
276Palestinians held hostages here in Israel.”
The deception plan continued and was extremely effective.
Internationally:
...it still looked as though Israel would have to 
give in —  and the Israelis continued their 
attempts to keep up that impression. The morning 
meeting of the crisis group on July 3 was held up 
while Foreign Minister Allon kept a scheduled 
breakfast with Daniel Patrick Moynihan, former 
American ambassador to the United Nations. 'It was 
an amazing performance,1 Moynihan said later. 'I 
thought I'd be out as soon as we finished coffee, 
but Allon went on and on, as if he didn't have a 
care in the world. He told me: 'We have great
hope that the French will be able to negotiate 
something. We're waiting.' And he gave me a tour 
d'horizon that lasted an hour.
At 1400, Saturday 3 July, the Israeli crisis group met and
agreed to recommend the military option to the Cabinet. Here
again the deception had succeeded so well, with the unwitting
assistance of France, that the Cabinet members were for the
most part unaware of the military preparations that had taken 
278place. They believed that Israel was negotiating to the 
end. During this meeting, Cabinet members expressed concern 
over the possibility of casualties. The tide was turned by 
Rabin, who argued forcefully for a rescue, "even if we lost 
10 or 20 or 25 killed.”279
275 . . .Smith, "Israelis Say Extension...," op. cit.
27 6Carroll, Newsweek, op. cit., p. 44.
277ibid. 
278ibid.
279Ibid., See also Edward H. Kolcum, "Israeli Defense 
Minister Explains Tactics," Aviation Week and Space
(Footnote Continued)
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The Cabinet voted. The result was unanimous. The hostages
were to be rescued. General Gur gave the necessary orders to
the 35th Airborne Brigade, the Golani Brigade and elements of
Sayaret Matkal (better known as General Staff Intelligence
280Reconnaissance Unit ) which would comprise the strike 
force.
Great Britain was also a source of continued support and
intelligence for Israel. The British offered "the fullest
cooperation within limits set by the fact that British
281citizens were still living in Uganda.” More important, it 
was information originating from British sources that 
suggested:
...for reasons ranging from President Amin*s 
return from the African summit to the growing 
unease among some of the PLO strategists in 
Kampala, the risk had increased considerably that 
execution of hostages would begin early on Sunday 
morning. If Thunderbolt was to be launched, the 
time frame was reduced drastically. The equation 
was now simple. Risk losing 35 Israelis [estimate 
of casualties] by taking action, or face the 2g2 
possibility of 105 dead by the sin of omission.
(Footnote Continued)
Technology. 2 August, 1976, p. 25. Peres stated "From the 
very first moment it was clear that the operation would not 
be a calculated military risk but would be a comparative 
national risk. The comparative national risk [means] what 
happens if you surrender, what will the consequences be if 
you surrender.”
"The cost of surrender always exceeds the cost of a military 
risk. The food of terrorism is success. The end of 
terrorism is failure."
280See "The Guys - Israel*s anonymous heroes," The 
Ottawa Journal. 5 July, 1976. See also Max Walmer, An 
Illustrated Guide To Modern Elite Forces, pp. 24-33 and 
Samuel E. Katz, "THE ELITE: THE TRUE STORY OF ISRAEL*S
SECRET COUNTER-TERRORIST UNIT".
281Stevenson, op. cit., p. 88.
282ibid.
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With respect to the operation, the force commander,
Brigadier-General Shomron, was fully prepared. During
rehearsal, his troops had successfully completed the rescue
exercise in 55 minutes from the time the aircraft landed to
the time they were airborne again. The ground force
contingent, tasked to enter the old terminal and retrieve the
hostages, was led by the 30-year old Lieutenant Colonel
283Yonatan Netanyahu , a well respected leader, who was 
unfortunately to become the only fatal Israeli military 
casualty.
The passage of intelligence and preparations for the 
operation continued unabated, while Major General Rehavam 
Zeevi in Paris, who was responsible for negotiations, 
reported to Rabin that they were experiencing difficulties. 
Rabin requested that Zeevi continue to negotiate. Zeevi
himself was unaware that he too was an integral part of the
, . 284Israeli ruse.
Operational Planning Aspects
Entebbe is some 2500 miles from Israel. Many Israelis had 
intimate knowledge of the Ugandan Armed Forces, and other had 
acquired detailed plans of the airport and its facilities. 
Israeli informants and Mossad agents that were infiltrated 
into Uganda updated this information. The task for the 
military planning staffs was to sift the information, 
determine the facts, fit them into an operational
283See Max Hastings, YONI: Hero of Entebbe for a
biography of this officer.
284Stevenson, op. cit., p. 92.
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appreciation, and produce a suitable plan. The logical 
outcome of the 'operational appreciation,' in simple terms, 
was that troops would be clandestinely flown to Entebbe in 
order to rescue the hostages.
The Israeli planning staffs had long believed that special 
operations, such as hostage-rescue, require planners with 
experience and a flexible attitude toward unorthodox 
situations. Moreover, the skills and experience of the 
Israeli Forces gleaned over a number of years in military and 
special operations assisted greatly in the success of this
j o e
action as shall be seen. They sought opinions and
proposals from likely and unlikely sources. As Richard
Deacon states:
Israel's Army and Secret Service are not 
hamstrung by too much bureaucracy or emphasis on 
that self-destroying military myth, the divine 
right of seniority. All ranks had the opportunity 
to press plans and suggestions over the heads of 
their immediate superiors to the C-in-C.... In 
turning 'Operation Jonathan' into a practical 
proposition this was a tremendous advantage: some
excellent ideas came from minor agents in2the field 
and non-commissioned soldiers and airmen.
Israeli experience in special operations gleaned over the 
years underlined that the central problem in conducting the 
rescue was speed. How could Israeli troops execute the 
mission before the terrorists could kill any of the hostages? 
Information gleaned from the non-Israeli passengers who had
285 . . .For an insight into the background and experiences of
an Israeli officer see Ariel Sharon with David Chanoff, 
Warrior: An Autobiography.
286Deacon, op. cit., pp. 277-278. 'Operation 
THUNDERBOLT' was renamed 'Operation JONATHAN' after the 
successful rescue in the memory of Lieutenant Colonel 
Netanyahu.
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been returned to Paris gave the Israeli intelligence staffs
the opportunity to assess the situation in the Entebbe
287terminal where the passengers were held. This data was
further supplemented by satellite photographs supplied by the
United States. Although the employment of technical means
was vital, 'humint' (human intelligence sources) from agents
on the ground was also critical. Slowly the intelligence
picture became clearer, thanks to the co-operation and
intelligence from friendly nations, and the highly versatile
and productive Israeli intelligence service. Deacon states:
As a result of all this the military planners 
in Tel Aviv were able to report that, providing 
they could land at Entebbe, without arousing 
suspicion, the rescue of the-hostages would be a 
relatively simple operation.
The Israeli planners were well aware of how rapidly the
intelligence picture could change as the situation evolved,
and were most sensitive to these issues. The chief of
operations understood the need for the latest 
289intelligence. This aspect of Operation Thunderbolt 
ensured the success of the plan.
The need for the aircraft to refuel somewhere along the route 
was a major problem. The aircraft employed would be 
operating at their maximum ranges. The air fleet consisted 
of five C-130 Hercules transport aircraft and two Boeing 707 
passenger planes. On this mission, one aircraft acted as the 
long-range eyes and ears of the aerial mission. Another, a 
fuel-carrying C-130 aircraft, was to fly ahead of the rescue
287Ibid., p. 279.
288Ibid., p. 281.
289Ibid.
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force, landing at a Kenyan airbase near Mombasa, where it was
kept in reserve in case of an emergency. The difficulty for
Kenya was that, should any of the rescue aircraft land at a
Kenyan military station, the government could arguably be
held accountable for co-operating in the rescue. In
contrast, if the Israelis successfully landed at the Nairobi
runway, and if, as was the case, the formation was flying
under the appropriate civil registration, as requested by
290the Kenyan government, Nairobi could plausibly deny any 
complicity.
The assault force was to depart Israel from Ophir airbase on
3 July in four C-130s; as would a command and control Boeing
707. The use of Boeing 707s in this raid apparently tipped
off the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that there was
something in the offing. According to one source:
At noon on Friday, the American CIA...discovered 
that two IAF Boeings were parked at Lod Airport, 
swarming with fitters and painters. Different 
insignia were being painted on the planes.
[Further]... a coded cable was at that time on its 
way from Tel Aviv to the CIA in Washington : THERE
ARE INDICATIONS OF OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY IN ISRAEL, 
THOUGH IT IS DIFFICULTqTO ASSUME THAT ISRAEL WILL 
OPERATE IN UGANDA....
The 707, which carried General 'Benny' Peled and a team of
communications officers, served as the aerial command post 
292(ACP). The generals monitored the mission and maintained
290Stevenson, op. cit., p. 103.
291Ben Porat, et al., op. cit., p. 272. Both 707s were 
being painted in El Al colours.
292 . ."Israel Refining Hostage Rescue Tactics," Aviation
Week and Space Technology. 27 September, 1976, p. 17. 
According to this article "The raiding force experienced a 
complete breakdown in special communications, and Lt. Gen. 
Benjamin Peled, air force commander, was forced to use open 
radio frequencies for command and control.
(Footnote Continued)
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comrauni cat ions links with the assault force. Meanwhile, a 
second ‘medical* 707 was destined to land in Nairobi and 
await the rescue force in a secure area.
A deception plan was carefully executed to assist both the
rescue force and for the benefit of Kenya:
All four Hercules were camouflaged by civil 
registration numbers and followed the same 
commercial route. PiJots followed normal civil 
aviation procedures.
This deception provided Nairobi with a degree of ‘plausible
deniability* so they could deny any co-operative effort with
Israel in a military operation against a fellow African
state.
To avoid detection by Arab and Soviet surveillance vessels, 
the rescue force flew at extremely low altitudes. This type 
of flying demanded much from the professional skills of the 
crew:
‘There were times when we flew them [C-130s] 
like combat planes,' reported an airman. ‘We did 
everything but dogfight. We made sudden sharp 
turns to dodge the Russian-built radar pickets on 
sea and land, then had to climb fast to get over 
the mountains.'
The pathfinder aircraft, a C-130 fitted with the latest
electronic and navigational aids, led the assault force
aircraft safely to their objective. On the way in, inclement
weather forced the rescue fleet to approach Sudanese
(Footnote Continued)
Each aircraft in the raid was equipped with one VHF and two 
UHF radios with secure frequencies. All failed to function." 
The possibility of an operational compromise due to the lack 
of appropriate and effective secure communications is 
obvious.
293Stevenson, op. cit., p. 103.
294ibid.
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airspace. As the aircraft approached Lake Victoria, it
encountered a massive front of storm clouds rising to 
29513,000m. As time was of the essence, the force proceeded
directly through the front, the lead pilot fully aware that
he was solely responsible to get:
...his cargo of 86 officers and men and the 
forward command post of Major-General Dan Shomron 
with all their vehicles and equipment...gn the 
ground according to a precise timetable.
The lead aircraft landed only thirty seconds behind schedule
and, opportunely, just behind a scheduled arrival of a cargo
297aircraft. The three main tasks as described m  a
briefing by Major General Gazit were:
A) MOVE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO OLD TERMINAL
BLDG [BUILDING] TO KILL OR CAPTURE THOSE GUARDING
HOSTAGES. IDF KNE [KNEW] THAT GUARDS WERE MIX OF 
TERRORISTS (TEN OR ELEVEN) PLUS UGANDAN SOLDIERS.
B) MOVE TO NEW TERMINAL BLDG [BUILDING] AND 
CONTROL TOWER AND ENSURE NO/NO COUNTER ACTION WAS 
IMPLEMENTED FROM THERE.
C) SECURE APPROACHES TO AIRFIELD AND PREVENT ENTRY OF 
ANY OPPOSING FORCES (FROM OUTSIDE AIRPORT OR FROM
MIL [MILITARY! CAMP LOCATED WITHIN AIRPORT
PERIMETER). °
Time and speed were crucial. The post-operation briefing 
noted that task (A) was "ACCOMPLISHED WITHIN 7-8 MINS
295Ashley Brown, (ed), Strike From The Skv: Israeli
Airborne Troops, p. 73.
296ibid.
297For an interesting tactical description of the rescue 
itself see the interview of Benjamin Netanyahu, "Operation 
Jonathan: The Rescue At Entebbe," Military Review. (July
1982), pp. 2-23.
OQQ
"UGANDA HOSTAGES: ISRAELI REACTION." Message
traffic. Canadian Embassy Tel Aviv to Department of 
External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada, 5 July, 1976, p. 4.
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O Q Q
[MINUTES] OF IDF ARRIVAL." Further, in just 25 minutes,
all the Israeli hostages, with the exception of one elderly 
woman, who had been placed in an Entebbe hospital earlier, 
were freed and in an aircraft ready for departure. Twenty 
minutes later the first aircraft departed. The last aircraft 
took off 25 minutes later. All aircraft flew to Nairobi for 
refuelling and medical treatment, and then on to Israel.
Kenyan Assistance
Kenyan co-operation went beyond offering a refuelling stop
for the supposed civilian aircraft flying from Entebbe. That
country also assisted in maintaining the Israeli deception
plan. Before the arrival of the C-130s, an:
...unscheduled Boeing 707, El Al charter flight 
LY 167, landed at 11:26 p.m. local time and taxied 
to Bay 4, reserved for aircraft requiring security 
precautions. The 707 was quarantined at once by 
Kenyan GSU men and El Al staffers. The civil 
registration number on the tail was 4XBY8, which 
conflicted with the air control log that recorded 
this as Flight 169. Almost two hours later another 
707 contacted Nairobi controlnand announced itself 
as Flight 167 from Tel Aviv.
The collusion continued as Nairobi air controllers did not
query the captainfs comment that he was late due to engine
problems.301
The second 707, containing a fully equipped hospital arrived 
at 0206 hours Nairobi time and took aboard the wounded
Stevenson, op. cit., p. 134. It should be noted that 
in the post-operation briefing "GAZIT STATED THAT THE IDF 
AIRCRAFT LANDED...WITHOUT PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OR APPROVAL OF 
KENYAN GOVT." See Message traffic, op. cit., 5 July, 1976, 
p. 5.
301ibid.
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brought in by the Israeli rescue aircraft, Kenyan assistance 
to the operation became even more apparent later when people
who were badly wounded were rapidly transported to the nearby
302 . . . .hospital. As medical assistance was being administered,
the rescue aircraft refuelled in secure facilities. All the
while, released hostages were allowed to deplane and go for
food and refreshments. However, they were requested to keep
quiet about assistance given and:
...not to "make any fuss" about this hospitality, 
by officials of the East African Directorate of 
Civil Aviation who feared retaliation against their 
colleagues at Entebbe.
However, it was later reported that Ugandan soldiers
questioned four radar operators accused of not reporting the
304rescue planes that flew the Israeli commandos into Uganda.
The bodies of the four were later found in a wood.
In the post-rescue period, the mood in Nairobi was noticeably 
varied. Charles Harrison, a correspondent for The Guardian.
noted:
There*s a great deal of jubilation amongst the 
ordinary people at the humiliation which Uganda has 
suffered. At the same time there is quite a bit of 
apprehension because Kenya has been threatened from 
Uganda for quite a time and the general feeling is 
that the threats against Kenya will not be made any 
less by the humiliation which Amin has now 
suffered.
302 . .Peter Philipp, "Israelis m  Nairobi hospital,"
Jerusalem Post. 5 July, 1976.
303S^tevenson, op. cit., pp. 134-135.
304"Uganda Radar Operators Executed, Sources Say," The 
Toronto Star. 8 July, 1976.
305 . . . .Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, "Reaction to the
rescue of hostages by Israeli commandos," As It Happens.
hosted by Dick Beddoes and Allen Maitland, 5 July, 1976,
Transcript, p.2.
- 107 -
Although Israeli and Kenyan authorities denied any Kenyan
assistance, it seemed quite clear that Nairobi "provided at
3 06least tacit support for the rescue.” This became
increasingly apparent as:
News agency reports from Nairobi speak of 
Israeli agents slipping quietly into the Kenyan 
capital during the week, often staying at private 
homes rather than hotels to avoid notice. Israeli 
agents carrying walkie-talkies also patolled [sic] 
Nairobi Airport before the arrival of the Israe^Q7 
[sic] planes on the return flight from Entebbe.
The response to this publicity was noted in one diplomatic
report from Nairobi:
KENYANS WILL OBVIOUSLY BE VERY NERVOUS SINCE 
WRATH OF AMIN WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE DIRECTED AT KENYA 
WHICH PERMITTED USE OF NROBI [NAIROBI] MILITARY 
AIRPORT AT EASTLEIGH AS STAGING BASE. IN WHAT FORM 
THIS WILL COME IS DIFFICULT TO TELL BUT ...[THE] 
KENYAN ARMED FORCES, PARTICULARLY AIR FORCE, IS 
NO/NO MATCH FOR UGANDANS EITHER IN TERMS OF NUMBERS 
OR SOPHISTICATION OF EQPT. [EQUIPMENT].
Meanwhile Israeli leaders tried to avoid implicating Kenya.
Israeli leaders:
... stressed...that Israel had acted alone and 
had consulted with no outside party before deciding 
on the rescue mission.
To support Kenya against possible Ugandan reprisals in the 
post-rescue period, the United States positioned "a P3 Orion 
long-range reconnaissance aircraft, the first U.S. Air Force 
[sic - U.S. Navy] plane to be based —  however temporarily -
306Smith, "Israelis Say Extension...," op. cit.
307ibid.
3 OR
"ISRAELI RESCUE OPERATION: KAMPALA." Message
traffic. Canadian High Commission, Nairobi, Kenya, to 
Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada, 4 July, 1976,
p. 2.
309"Joy at rescue of hostages," Jerusalem Post. 5 July,
1976.
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310in Kenya.” By 19 July, 1976, Newsweek reported that
Washington had placed:
...a Navy P-3 patrol plane at Kenya's service to 
provide military reconnaissance along the Ugandan 
border. Washington ordered the frigate U.S.S.
Beary to head for the Kenyan port of Mombasa. And 
a Task Group from the U.S. Seventh Fleet —  
including the aircraft carrier Ranger —  was 
ordered to steam toward3Kenya in a third pointed 
signal of U.S. support.
These military moves initially were perceived to be a part of
America's new policy of enhancing political relationships
with moderate African states. Therefore, this large American
naval presence off East Africa and the visit of the U.S.S.
Beary were considered by US Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger as 'normal.' In reality, it was post-rescue
assistance to Kenya and it was intended as "a bold warning to
Amin not to let his post-Entebbe lust for revenge lead him 
312into war.” Amin, apparently angered by the Israeli
success, argued "that the Israelis would not have been
successful at Entebbe except for the fact that their nuclear
313hand grenades had somehow put [his]... soldiers to sleep.”
Although international co-operation had been instrumental to 
the success of the mission, most of it had been indirect.
One nation, West Germany, was more closely involved. A 
senior officer of the West German Federal Border Police,
310Stevenson, op. cit., p. 135.
311 .Milton R. Benjamin, "The Fallout From Entebbe," 
Newsweek. 19 July, 1976, p. 41.
312Ibid.
313 .Richard Steele and James Pringle, "Uganda: A m m  vs.
the World," Newsweek. 9 August, 1976, p. 36.
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314Lieutenant Colonel Ulrich Wegener was a member of the 
rescue force. He later became head of West Germany’s GSG9 
counter-terrorist force. Wegener "was ordered by the federal 
government to observe what happened because at that time
German terrorists were also involved in the actions of the
, , 315 , .
Palestinians." Wegener was well qualified for the task,
316as he had received special military training from the
United States and Israel. Richard Garrett writes that
Wegener himself was a highly professional product of
international co-operation and:
...had spent six weeks being tutored by the 
FBI in the United States, and he had also attended 
a course at the Israeli paratroop school. At the 
latter, he did so well that (or so it is said) he 
had been3j^vited to take part in an anti-hijack 
raid..••
Although West Germany had little experience in 
counter-terrorist operations in the wake of World War II, 
Wegener sought out the pertinent information and experience, 
thereby making it his own. This operational experience would 
assist him in his success at Mogadishu.
During the rescue, the force destroyed Soviet-made MIG
318aircraft belonging to the Ugandan air force. This was not
a whimsical act. It had two purposes, one more urgent than
314
"Head of German Raid Is Linked to Entebbe," The New 
York Times. 22 October, 1977.
315Rolf Tophoven, GSG9: German Response to Terrorism.
p. 76.
316Livingstone, op. cit., p. 179.
317Garrett, op. cit., p. 204.
318Walmer, op. cit., p. 32. See also "Israeli Commando 
C-130 Raid Frees 115," Aviation Week and Space Technology. 12 
July, 1976, p. 15. This article states that seven MIG-21s 
and four MIG-17s were destroyed by the Israelis.
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the other. The destruction of these aircraft ensured the 
Israelis of a return flight without fear of a Ugandan aerial 
intercept. Less urgently, but strategically as important, it 
lessened the Ugandan capability to punish Kenya for aiding 
Israel.
Israeli Post-Operations Brief
Major General Gazit, the director of military intelligence,
summoned military attaches to a conference on 4 July, 1976.
During the briefing, Gazit emphasized three factors which
affected the rescue mission; first, until Entebbe, the
Israeli authorities had dealt with terrorist hostage
incidents only within Israel or inside a friendly country.
In such cases Israel acknowledged that the local government
authorities were responsible for handling the terrorist
activities. This was not the case in Entebbe. Not only did
Israel have no diplomatic relations with Uganda, but it
became readily apparent, particularly after the initial
release of non-Israeli hostages, that there was HNO/NO CHANCE
OF COOPERATION WITH AMIN. IN FACT ALL INFO AVAILABLE
INDICATED THAT AMIN WAS COOPERATING FULLY WITH [THE]
319TERRORISTS." Second, with the release of all Gentiles,
the threat was seen to be directed against Israel. Thirdly, 
when pressed to release jailed terrorists, Israeli 
authorities were not concerned so much with the legal or 
political issues of the hostage-taking as with a situation
3 "UGANDA HOSTAGES: ISRAELI REACTION," Message
traffic, op. cit., 5 July, 1976, p. 2. See also Joshua 
Brilliant, "Gur says raiders used 'several tricks,'" 
Jerusalem Post. 5 July, 1976 and "Operation complex, not 
difficult," Jerusalem Post. 5 July, 1976.
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where Tel Aviv "IS BEING ASKED TO RELEASE POTENTIAL MURDERERS
320WHO PROBABLY WILL STRIKE AGAIN." The military option was
based on these premises. Gazit emphasized that "IF THE IDF
[Israeli Defence Force] NAD [HAD] NOT/NOT HAD VERY GOOD
INTELLIGENCE OF [THE SITUATION] IN UGANDA, GOVT [GOVERNMENT]
321WOULD NOT/NOT HAVE AUTHORIZED OPERATION."
THUNDERBOLT has been understatedly described as 'just a
routine commando raid that happened to be a bit further in 
322distance." However, had it not been for the concerted 
efforts of a number of countries, which forwarded vital 
intelligence and assisted, as Kenya did, in allowing Israeli 
aircraft a secure place to refuel and sort out the 
casualties, the historical rescue operation may not have been 
attempted. This would have left Israel no option but to give 
in to the terrorist demands.
The Mogadishu Rescue
In 1977, West Germany experienced a most difficult year in 
combatting terrorism. It was a year of some dramatic 
successes including the capture of many terrorists, some of 
whom were associated with the Rote Armee Fraktion (Red Army 
Faction). In this battle against political terrorism, 
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt was considered by many to be the 
leading figure, both domestically and internationally. In 
particular he directed measures to improve co-operation
320Ibid., p.3.
321Ibid., p.3.
322Stevenson, op. cit., p. 139.
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between the provincial and federal agencies responsible for 
combatting terrorism.
The Mogadishu incident, in connection with the kidnapping of
industrialist Hans-Martin Schleyer, was to become a watershed
323m  the history of West Germany’s fight against terrorism. 
Moreover, it underlines the co-operation given to the West 
German government by friendly countries at critical points 
during the operation. It is important to understand the 
context of this drama, one among many of the problems facing 
West Germany in 1977.
Three major terrorist incidents occurred before the Mogadishu
event which persuaded government officials and the West
German people that dramatic action was needed to win the
battle against terrorism from abroad. These were
the murder on 7 April, 1977 of Dr. Siegfried Bubeck, the
chief public prosecutor and the murder on 30 July, 1977 of
Herr Jurgen Ponto, the head of a prominent bank? and the
abduction on 5 September, 1977 of the well-known
324industrialist, Dr. Hanns-Martm Schleyer. For many, Dr.
Schleyer was not only a powerful financial figure but also a 
symbol of West Germany’s capitalist system. Schleyer was 
ambushed in his car while travelling between his Cologne home
323For a chronology of events see Documentation: On the
Events and Decisions Connected With the Kidnapping of Hans 
Martin Schlever and the Hijacking of the Lufthansa Jet 
’’Landshut. ” Press and Information Office of the Federal 
Government, (West Germany), First Edition, 2 November, 1977.
324Proceedings Of FBI International Symposium On 
Terrorism. July 6-8. 1978. ’’Remarks By Colonel Ulrich K. 
Wegener, Commander, 9th Border Guard Group, Special, Federal 
Republic of Germany,*' p. 10. See also Peter Koch and Kai 
Hermann, Assault At Mogadishu.
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and office. His kidnappers demanded DM 1.1 million, and the 
release and safe passage of jailed members of the Red Army 
Faction, including Andreas Baader.
Schmidt and his government initially refused to submit to the
demands, but opened a series of negotiations through Denis
Payet, a Swiss lawyer. The negotiations saw the passing of a
series of ultimata and deadlines. The West German
governments strategy was to negotiate to gain time, hoping
to locate Schleyer. To ensure that there would be no
publicity, a news blackout was instituted, denying the
terrorists the media access they sought. This caused the
325terrorists to mount a support operation to put pressure
on Schmidt’s government to submit to their demands. The
leader assigned to this mission was Zuhair Akkasha, also
326known as 'Martyr Mahmoud.1 A PFLP radical, and a student
of Dr. Hadad, he had, on occasion, assisted the
Baader-Meinhof gang. The target for this support mission
operation was a Lufthansa Boeing 737 which was travelling
327between Majorca and Frankfurt. On 13 October, 1977, four
Palestinians, two men and two women, seized this flight and
325"Hijacking of Jet With 91 to Dubai Linked With German 
Kidnapping," The New York Times. 15 October, 1977. See also 
"Hijackers, Holding 92, Back Kidnappers in Schleyer Case,"
The International Herald Tribune, Paris, 15 October, 1977.
326Robert D. McFadden, "German Troops Free Hostages On 
Hijacked Plane In Somalia; 3 Terrorists Reported Killed," The 
New York Times. 18 October, 1977. See also Mickolus, op. 
cit., p. 739.
327 . . . . .Authorities speculated, initially, that this
operation may have been linked to the Japanese Red Army (JRA) 
members who successfully took over a Japanese airliner late 
in September, 1977. In the end, the Japanese government 
agreed to the JRA demands. This included a six million dollar 
ransom and the release from prison of several of their 
members. See Milton R. Benjamin and Paul Martin, "A Detour to 
Dubai," Newsweek. 24 October, 1977, p. 62.
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ordered it to fly to Rome. The hostages numbered 92 
including five crew members.
Italian aviation and police authorities closed the Rome 
airport to all other traffic, and put military and police 
units on standby. When Flight 737 arrived, it was parked in 
a secure area. Martyr Mahmoud then issued his demand that 
his colleagues jailed in West Germany be released.
Anticipating that a military option, in the form of a rescue
operation, might be possible, Werner Maihofer, the West
German Interior Minister, asked the Italian authorities to
delay the aircraft. Lt. Colonel Ulrich Wegener, commander 
328of GSG9 was notified. He placed his unit on alert. As
was the case in the Israeli experience, a crisis management
team was established and remained generally intact throughout
the hijacking and eventual rescue operation. The crisis
management team revolved around Chancellor Schmidt and the
ministers of Foreign Affairs, of the Interior and of Justice
and was empowered by Cabinet to make any required emergency
decisions. Schmidt began seeking international support and
assistance with a telephone call to the Prime Minister of
Great Britain. According to one report:
SCHMIDT WANTED TO COMPARE IDEAS AND DETERMINE 
DEGREE OF SUPPORT INTENNTLY [INTERNATIONALLY] TO 
VARIOUS OPTIONS. CALLAGHAN LATER IN [A] RETURN
328Bundesgrenzschutz gruppe 9 (GSG9) is a specialized 
counter-terrorist commando unit born out of the chaos of the 
1972 MUNICH OLYMPICS. Led by Wegener this unit had intimate 
knowledge of Israeli and British techniques gleaned from 
exchanges with both countries. See Robert Harnischmacher, 
"The Federal Border Guard Group 9 - Special : The German
Response to Terrorism,11 Roval Canadian Mounted Police 
Gazette. 2 November, 1987, pp. 1-5.
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PHONE CALLqADVISED AGAINST GIVING IN TO HIJACKERS 
DEMANDS.
Meanwhile, airport authorities in Rome attempted to stall for
time as requested, but the hijackers threatened to destroy
the aircraft if the Italians refused their demands for fuel.
At 1742 hours, the Lufthansa 737 departed from Rome destined
for Larnaca, Cyprus. Initially, the Cypriot government
refused permission to land. However, upon considering the
possible implications for the safety of the passengers, the
Cypriots allowed the 737 to land. Once in Cyprus, the
terrorists requested more fuel and were put in touch with
Saharia Abdul Rachmin, a Palestinian Liberation Organization
330representative. The hijackers then issued a demand in
addition to those previously made, calling for the release of 
two Palestinians imprisoned in Turkey.
West Germany's reaction to this crisis was rapid. Just hours 
after the first report of the hijacking, an aircraft was 
despatched to Cyprus. In the aircraft were Minister 
Hans-Jurgen Wischnewski, the head of the anti-terror 
department in the Federal Office of Criminal Investigation, a 
commando element, representatives of the German Federal 
Criminal Police, foreign office specialists, anti-terrorist 
experts from the Ministry of the Interior, agents of the 
German internal and external intelligence services,
329"CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN SCHLEYER KIDNAPPING/LUFTHANSA 
HIJACKING CASE SUMMARY." Message traffic. Canadian High 
Commission, London, to Department of External Affairs, 
Ottawa, Canada, 14 November, 1977, p. 2.
330 .University of New Brunswick, Centre for Conflict 
Studies, Special Operations : Military Lessons From Six 
Selected Case Studies, p. 99.
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331representatives of Lufthansa and the GSG9 command group.
The aircraft conveying the West German officials landed at 
332Akrotiri a British airbase, fifty miles from Larnaca. For 
over an hour, both the hijackers and the German rescue team 
were on the island. The Cypriot authorities, however, 
refused a request to attempt a rescue.
Refuelled, the 737 left Larnaca at approximately 2250 hours 
and headed to Beirut where it was refused permission to land. 
It was later likewise refused permission to land at Damascus, 
Amman and Kuwait. Desperate, the hijacked 737 pilot received 
permission to stop temporarily in Bahrain at approximately 
0152 hours on 14 October. During this stopover, the link 
between the Schleyer kidnappers and the hijackers became 
apparent when the latter forwarded their demands through the 
office of Denis Payot, the same intermediary employed by the 
Schleyer abductors. These demands were comparable to those 
issued for the return of Schleyer. The terrorists told 
authorities that if by 0800 GMT, 16 October their demands 
were not met, the hostages, along with Dr. Schleyer, would be 
killed.
The Lufthansa 737 departed from Bahrain at 0324 hours and 
loitered only to touch down at Dubai in the United Arab 
Emirates two and a half hours later. Here the hijackers
331Proceedings Of FBI International Symposium, Wegener, 
op. cit., p. 17.
332 . .Patricia Clough, "Perfect debut for Bonn's 
anti-terror squad," The New York Times. 19 October, 1977.
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demanded a negotiator and food and drink. Here, the Defence
333Minister, Sheik Mohammed bin Rashid al-Maktum, assumed
responsibility as chief negotiator. He requested that the
hostage-takers release the young and the elderly in exchange
for fuel. The hijackers refused. It was at this time that
some important tactical intelligence was revealed. Wegener
stated that when the Lufthansa plane landed:
...we got the first information about the 
terrorists. We got it from the crew. Some months 
ago we had worked out a code with Lufthansa 
personnel which would provide us with some 
information about the hijackers. In Dubai I got a 
coded message from the captain of the hijacked 
aircraft that there were3four terrorists aboard, 
two male and two female.
Photographs were taken of some of the terrorists when the
aircraft's doors were open. It was vital for the GSG9 to
. 335identify the leader, Captain Mahmoud. As luck would have
it a timely breakdown of the power unit provided:
...new information on the terrorists. Because 
of the APU breakdown, the terrorists demanded a 
ground power unit to get to the aircraft? Lufthansa 
personnel took it to the aircraft. They tried to 
get into contact with the crew. When they got 
close to the aircraft, the terrorists found out 
that they were not British and not Arabs because of 
their strong German accent and so Mahmoud fired on 
them. Thank God nobody was hurt. One of the 
Lufthansa captains who took the ground power unit 
to the aircraft was a former military officer and 
he could tell me after he came back, "Well, they 
didn't shoot at me with automatic weapons. They 
used only handguns." That was very 
important ?...
333 .Mickolus, op. cit., p. 736. See also Marvine Howe, 
"Hijackers Leave Dubai," The New York Times. 17 October, 
1977.
334Proceedings Of FBI International Symposium, Wegener, 
op. cit., p. 13-14.
335Ibid., p. 15.
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One writer, Tony Geraghty, notes that a request for British
assistance to GSG9 came soon after the hijack took place.
This request was initially of a diplomatic nature and sought
political assistance in dealing with the local authorities in
Dubai. He states that:
...after it began, a German minister travelled 
to London, accompanied by a member of the GSG-9 
team, to seek British help and, in particular, 
liaison with the authorities of Dubai, where the 
hijacked aircraft was about to land. (A member of 
the United Arab Emirates, Dubai has close links 
with Britain.) Initially, the purpose of the 
Germans* visit was to ask Whitehall to use its good 
offices with the UAE ambassador in London to ensure 
diplomatic clearance for GSG-9 to go into action in 
Dubai. 37
This Anglo-German diplomatic co-operation in the early stages 
of the hijacking would rapidly evolve into military 
assistance as the GSG9 officer accompanying the German 
minister also requested technical assistance. Geraghty 
writes that:
...the GSG-9 representative thought that his SAS 
opposite number might have equipment that could be 
useful in breaking into the aircraft. The Germans 
had not appreciated that the SAS knows the Persian 
Gulf intimately and that, for example Dubai's elite 
presidential guard is trained and led by former SAS 
soldiers. During the London conversations, 
therefore, it became clear to everyone that an SAS 
liaison team on this operation would be a decided 
asset, and such a plan was instantly endorsed by 
the respective premiers, Callaghan and Schmidt.
The two men selected for the job were Major 
Alastair Morrison, OBE, MC, a veteran SAS squadron 
commander, and Sergeant Barry Davies, BEM; with a 
specially crated collection3gf flash-bangs they 
left immediately for Dubai.
337Tony Geraghtv. Inside the SAS. p. 171. According to 
a diplomatic report the British Government "OFFERED DIPLO 
[DIPLOMATIC] HELP IN DEMARCHES TO AUTHORITIES IN DUBAI, UAE 
AND SOMALIA IN SUPPORT OF GERMAN PLAN FOR POLICE OPERATION." 
See CRISIS MANAGEMENT...." Message traffic, op. cit., 14 
November, 1977, p. 2.
338Ibid. Apparently Schmidt and Callaghan "DISCUSSED 
POLICE OPERATION WHICH LED TO BRIT OFFER OF SAS PERS 
[PERSONNEL] AND TECHNICAL HELP IN FORM OF STUN GRENADES. TWO
(Footnote Continued)
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This SAS technical assistance quickly became a diplomatic
asset when, on arrival at Dubai, it became apparent that
Wegener and two of his personnel were 'under escort1 by local
police authorities while the Lufthansa jet containing the
hostages was waiting on the runway. Thanks to Morrison and
Davies, this small diplomatic incident was summarily
addressed as they:
...sorted out this bureaucratic nonsense, and 
then set about training the Dubai Royal Guard in 
the basics of siege-breaking with a view to 
providing a back-up force for GSG-9....
During this period the West German government was under 
pressure to succumb to the demands of the terrorists. 
Schmidt's Cabinet had to weigh the danger posed to the lives 
of 87 hostages and to Dr. Schleyer, against the danger in 
releasing the prisoners as demanded by the terrorists. This 
situation was the same dilemma that had earlier confronted 
the Israeli government: release the terrorists with the
possibility that they could kill again; or keep the 
terrorists in captivity, which would probably result in the 
death of the hostages. In essence Schmidt's decision 
revolved around the fact that:
1) the terrorists held by the West German authorities 
had been accused of murdering 13 people and 
attempting to murder 43 more?
2) the prisoners released in 1975 in exchange for 
Peter Lorez were later charged with murdering four 
and possibly nine others as well as the attempted 
killing of a further six.
3) the possible effect upon the ability, motivation
(Footnote Continued)
SAS MEN ACTUALLY PARTICIPATED IN ASSAULT AND THREW GRENADES. 
(QUOTE YOU COULDNT [SIC] KEEP THEM OUT UNQUOTE)." See 
"CRISIS MANAGEMENT...." Message traffic, op. cit., 14 
November, 1977, p. 2.
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and willingness of security authorities to risk 
their lives while arresting or incarcerating such 
personnel, and,
4) the possibility that the^hijacked passengers might 
not be safely released.
Only after careful assessment of the factors in concert with
other members of government did Schmidt decide to undertake a
rescue operation. As was the case in Israel's operation
341'THUNDERBOLT,'a two-pronged operational strategy was to be 
used. First, all avenues of negotiation were to be employed. 
If these failed, GSG9 would be assigned the 'final option.'
By the morning of 14 October, the Cabinet had decided not to 
release the prisoners as demanded by the terrorists.
However, the government hoped to mislead the hijackers by 
seeming to suggest that Bonn would release the imprisoned 
terrorists in exchange for Schleyer and the hostages. 
Negotiations continued between the hijackers and the UAE 
Foreign Minister. All attempts at releasing the children, 
women and the sick failed.
The situation within the aircraft was appalling as the 
hostages were confined to their seats. The aircraft's 
sanitation facilities no longer worked and many on board had 
diarrhea. This, combined with the heat, a degree of 
psychological tension, and verbal and physical abuse from the 
terrorists, was almost intolerable. Moreover, the
340 .University of New Brunswick, Centre for Conflict 
Studies, Special Operations, op. cit., p. 102.
341AW 163, Bonn : Associated Press (AP), "HIJACK RAID," 
18 October, 1977, "WEST GERMANY'S CRISIS STAFF APPARENTLY 
STARTED PLANNING THE COMMANDO RAID THAT FREED ALL 86 
REMAINING HOSTAGES...ALMOST INSTANTLY AFTER THE BOEING 737 
WAS COMMANDEERED...."
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terrorists1 requests for sanctuary in South Yemen, Somalia or 
Vietnam had all been rejected. The situation was further 
complicated for the West German government when Schleyer's 
son made an unsuccessful attempt to pay the ransom demanded 
by his father’s kidnappers.
The German crisis management group maintained direct
communication with Wischnewski in the Dubai control tower.
Although the relations between Wischnewski and the
representative of the UAE were considered to be 
342'excellent,' they deteriorated somewhat while initial
plans for a rescue attempt were being formulated. Sheik 
Mohammed bin Rashid al-Maktum apparently requested that 
Wegener instruct his military personnel in the assaulting of
an aircraft, so that they could execute the rescue.343
According to one report, Wegener "observed that this squad 
was highly inefficient and that the aircraft they were
experimenting with was an old WWII-vintage fighter
344 . . .bomber." During this time Wegener tried to have the UAE
military cut the source of power to the hijacked aircraft so
that the crew could not start the aircraft. In this
345initiative the UAE personnel were unwilling to co-operate.
342 . .University of New Brunswick, Centre for Conflict 
Studies, Special Operations, op. cit., p. 105.
343Peter Koch and Kai Hermann, Assault At Mogadishu, p. 
108. Wegener apparently trained 20 UAE paratroops for five 
hours in aircraft seizure techniques.
344Canadian Government Memorandum, Canadian Embassy, 
Bonn, to Ottawa, "Hijacking of Lufthansa Aircraft - 13 
October 1977," dated 23 November, 1977, p. 3.
345Ibid., p. 4.
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Operational security was broken when a spokesman for the West 
German government revealed that GSG9 had been sent to Cyprus. 
When the media broadcasted this information (by which time 
the GSG9 teams were in Ankara, Turkey), the hijackers ordered 
that they be returned to West Germany. Bonn immediately 
acquiesced. However, with the assistance of the West German 
news media, the terrorists were deceived into believing that
the GSG9 had returned to Cologne. Instead, the GSG9 had been
346 . .forward-based to Crete with the permission of the Greek
government. Apparently the ’passengers' on this aircraft
bearing the GSG9, were described as 'technical and health
personnel.' The German "OVERFLTS [OVERFLIGHTS] AND STAGINGS
WERE FINESSED BY PASSING OFF AIRCRAFT AS CIVILIAN WITHOUT
347BEING TOO PRECISE ON CONTENTS AND MISSION. This allowed
the Greek government to deny any complicity in the events.
Tensions rose when the power generator on the hijacked plane 
broke down during the night of 15-16 October, blacking out 
the aircraft and causing the hijackers, who feared a rescue 
attempt, to fire upon the ground crew who were approaching 
the aircraft to make repairs. At 0530 hours, 16 October, the 
terrorists demanded that the aircraft be refuelled or else 
the pilot, Captain Juergen Schumann, would be killed. The 
negotiators complied. Meanwhile the leader of the hijackers,
346"Greek praise for firm Bonn stand," The New York 
Times. 19 October, 1977. This article stated that, "Earlier 
Herr Schmidt had sent a message of thanks to Mr. Karamanlis 
for his contribution to the success of the rescue operation. 
The Greek Prime Minister had given consent for the German 
aircraft carrying the anti-terrorist unit to stand by in 
Crete." This assistance in allowing the forward-basing of 
the GSG9 assisted in the overall success of this daring 
rescue.
347 "CRISIS MANAGEMENT...." Message traffic, op. cit., 
14 November, 1977, p. 5.
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Martyr Mahmoud, had become noticeably jumpy and ordered the 
pilot to take off an hour before the deadline. Allowance of 
the sudden departure of the Lufthansa flight from Dubai was a 
political decision made by the government of the UAE.
By this time the SAS were more than just advisors. According
to Geraghty:
...Morrison and Davies had become de facto 
members of Wegenerfs team, and they stayed with him 
when the hunt moved from Aden to Mogadishu, in 
Somalia, where the German commander was joined by 
the main.body of his force after a flight from 
Turkey. 46
After a short flight the 737 approached Aden and was refused
permission to land. The runway was blocked. Short of fuel,
Captain Schumann in desperation made a forced landing on a
rough strip that parallelled the main runway. The aircraft
was immediately surrounded by South Yemeni soldiers, and
Schumann was informed that the aircraft was to refuel, then
depart. Captain Schumann was allowed to deplane to check for
possible damage to the landing gear and while doing so was
detained by Yemeni soldiers. Accused of attempting to escape
while he was outside the aircraft, Schumann was
349fatally shot upon his return. This summary execution
350prepared the fate of the terrorists.
The co-pilot flew the aircraft to Mogadishu airport in 
Somalia. Although the Somalis denied permission to land, they
348Geraghty, op. cit., p. 172.
349Koch and Hermann, op. cit., pp. 121-122.
350McFadden, "German Troops Free Hostages On...," op.
cit.
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did not obstruct the runway. Upon landing, Flight 737 was 
directed to move, for security reasons, to an area 
approximately 300 metres from the terminal itself. This site 
was selected to place the aircraft in full view of the 
control tower. In case of a rescue attempt, it would be 
easily reached as it was close to sand dunes that would cover 
an approach. The Somali government was told that if all 
previous demands were not met, the terrorists would blow up 
the aircraft. Food and drugs were supplied. In turn, the 
Somali government asked that women and children be released. 
This request and a further offer of safe passage out of 
Somalia were both rejected.
Diplomatic initiatives continued in the hope that a
settlement (peaceable or otherwise) could be achieved.
Moreover, diplomats from Britain, the United States, France
as well as others solicited Middle Eastern and African
capitals to back up West German efforts to resolve the 
351hijacking. President Barre of Somalia and Wischnewski met
around noon on 17 October to discuss their options, but no 
decision was made. A major point of contention regarding a 
rescue operation was the extent of Somali assistance. 
Wischnewski, Wegener, Bueden and senior Somali security 
representatives conferred at length. It was partly due to 
the understanding between German and Somali police forces 
that had developed during a history of bilateral police 
exchange programmes that both parties overcame the
351 .University of New Brunswick, Centre for Conflict 
Studies, Special Operations, op. cit., p. 108.
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352operational and political difficulties of this situation.
The solution came about after a meeting was arranged with 
Barre following a call from Schmidt. Barre agreed that GSG9 
could attempt a rescue. This action would be fully supported 
by members of the Somali security forces. The aircraft 
carrying the 60 members of GSG9 received the permission to 
fly to Mogadishu.
Wischnewski maintained close contact with the terrorists 
throughout the day. This was critical, as it was later 
discovered that the hijack leader was demonstrating signs of 
breaking under the prolonged strain. At 1430, Martyr Mahmoud 
contacted Minister Wischnewski and stated that he intended to 
blow up the aircraft at 1500 hours. In preparation, the 
terrorists kept their hostages in their seats, and began
pouring flammable liquids and liquor down the centre
. , 353aisle.
Wegener believed that, to ensure the greatest probability of 
success, the approach, assault and rescue had to be conducted 
under the cover of darkness. Thus it was critical that the 
rescue forces gain more time. At approximately 1500 hours, a 
half-hour delay was given to move the hijacked aircraft away 
from the area. At 1530 Wischnewski gambled and radioed the 
aircraft. He told the terrorist leader that the West German
352Ibid., p. 109. It should be noted that m  the wake 
of Mogadishu," ...the GSG9 has been providing training 
assistance for foreign units subject to approval by [the] 
Ministry of the Interior. The first training 
assistance...was provided to Somalia, as thanks for the 
cooperation in 1977." Tophoven, op. cit., p. 81.
353 . . .Robert R. Ropelewski, "Commandos Thwart Hijackers,"
Aviation Week and Space Technology. 24 October, 1977, p. 15.
- 126 -
government had acceded to all their demands. The bait was 
taken? Martyr Mahmoud, believing Wischnewski, gave a 
seven-hour extension to 0130 hours. This desperate deception 
had worked.3 5 4
The rescue force landed in darkness at 1930 hours (local) in 
Mogadishu. To assist in the secure landing, Somali aid was 
requested:
I [Wegener] talked with the Commander of the Somali 
Air Force about some supporting measures. I asked 
him to employ some of their fighters to let them 
take off and land for the next hours so that we 
could cover the landing of our own ...airplane.355 
That worked out very fine. They did very well.
The Lufthansa 727 landed without incident with only two tail 
lights glowing. After it was in position, the landing lights 
were flashed on and off to signal the control tower of their 
arrival. Before the main force arrived, Wegener, accompanied 
by officers of the Somali Armed Forces, conducted a 
reconnaissance of the area of operation. From 
this Wegener made his appreciation, formulated a plan, and 
briefed his unit upon arrival. In anticipation of any 
possible crisis before the assault, Wegener deployed some of 
his personnel so that an immediate rescue could be executed 
if required. By 2350, all preparations were complete. 
Wischnewski informed Schmidt of the arrival of Wegener*s men
354Henry Tanner, "U.S. Woman Says Ruse Saved the 
Hostages," The New York Times. 20 October, 1977. According 
to this report when "the message arrived that the West German
terrorists had been freed from jail  The leader of the
hijackers ordered the passengers untied and told them: "It
is seven hours flying time from Germany, I give them seven 
hours."
355Proceedings Of FBI International Symposium, Wegener,
op. cit., pp. 19-20.
- 127 -
and the go-ahead was given. This was the last communication 
with Schmidt until the operation was finished.
The operation was nearly scuttled just after GSG9 arrived in
Mogadishu. Radio transmissions from the GSG9 aircraft were
. . . 356apparently overheard by an Israeli journalist, who
immediately sent out a report that anti-terrorist police were
ready for use in a rescue attempt. The report was
357transmitted to the Agence France-Presse (AFP) and Reuters.
The Rescue Plan
The responsibility for the operational command of the rescue 
fell solely upon Wegener. His organization consisted of a 
main headquarters, a communications centre and a first aid 
post situated in the airport control tower. A forward, or 
tactical, communications post would later be positioned near 
the target aircraft. There were about 60 members of the GSG9
356 . . ."Antiguernlla Squad Reported at Airfield,” The New
York Times. 18 October, 1977. See also FBIS 09, ”JERUSALEM 
REPORTS FRG ANTITERROR UNIT IN PERSIAN GULF," 17 October, 
1977.
357 . . . .Ibid. This article incorporated the following
statement," (Moments after transmission of this dispatch, 
Reuters sent a note to editors stating; 'We have just been 
asked by the West German Government spokesman not to report 
anything concerning the movements of antiguerrilla squads for 
use in a possible attempt to storm the hijacked plane.1 It 
added that 'the Government spokesman says that such reports 
could prejudice the safety of the hostages.' Reuters said 
later that it had not retracted its earlier report because 
the news had been released earlier by Agence France-Presse 
and that it would leave up to its clients the question of how 
to deal with the report.)" See also Michael Knipe,
"Broadcast 'put lives in danger,"' The New York Times. 19 
October, 1977.
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assault unit, of which 28 were to assault the aircraft
while another group was to remain as a ready reserve. Somali
police and military personnel provided airport security and
359sealed off the area of operations. Later, Somali forces
provided a diversion at a critical moment. Suprise was 
vital.
The target intelligence available for the operation lacked 
critical detail. Before he was murdered, Captain Schumann 
had made various attempts to pass information, but the 
intelligence planning staff still needed details, 
particularly regarding the level of experience and 
sophistication of the terrorists. It was also critically 
important for the rescue squad to know if the entrance doors 
to the aircraft were secured with explosives.
Orders were issued to the GSG9 troops at about 2245 hours.
Due to the lack of intelligence regarding the situation 
within the hijacked aircraft, Wegener wanted to begin an 
early deployment: "I wanted to put up in a very early stage 
reconnaissance and sniper teams in the hills around the 
aircraft. We would know at every minute what is going on in 
the aircraft.”360
At approximately 0100 hours the plan was to have the assault 
team members place themselves in their attack positions 
beneath the aircraft. The attack was to begin at 0205
358Proceedings Of FBI International Symposium, Wegener, 
op. cit., p. 20.
359ibid.
360Ibid., p. 22.
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361hours. Just after midnight, all sniper and
reconnaissance teams were positioned and the first reports
were being received as to the whereabouts of the terrorists.
Two were sighted in the cockpit and one was walking up and
362down the aisle. At 0100, the assault group, consisting of
the operations team, two detachments of three assault teams,
a reserve team and a combat engineer team began to move into
their assault areas as planned. These groups got to within
100 metres of the aircraft by 0130 hours. Then, Wegener went
to the aircraft with all the detachment leaders, to brief
them on their assault positions and their areas of
responsibility within the aircraft itself. Tony Geraghty has
written that the British participation at this juncture was
far more than just assisting GSG9 with the stun grenades.
Major Alastair Morrison and Sergeant Barry Davies, "were more
than advisers: they led the assault team, to blind and
deafen the terrorists with a 'percussion' grenade devised by 
3 63the SAS." The plan, according to Wegener, was that the
first detachment would attack:
...the tail [entrance] and doors, the right wing 
exit and the other three exits. The cockpit doors 
and the left wing exit were the responsibility of 
the second unit. Their mission, starting now with 
the second unit was to penetrate the cockpit, to 
eliminate the terrorists there, to carry the 
assault into the first class compartment and to 
eliminate the terrorists there. The teams at the 
tail end of the aircraft had to cover and occupy 
the positions from where we could evacuate the364 
hostages right after we got into the aircraft.
361Ibid.
362Ibid.
363Geraghty, op. cit., p. 16. This author also states 
that the SAS assisted in composing the plan of attack. See 
p. 172.
364Proceedings Of FBI International Symposium, Wegener,
op. cit., p. 23.
- 130 -
To assist the assault team, deception measures were included.
o r e
Somali soldiers started a fire, and at the same time, the 
negotiating teams began a new stage of negotiations. The 
reconnaissance party forwarded a second message at 0159 hours 
reporting that two terrorists, one female, were in the 
pilotfs compartment. With this information Wegener "got the 
impression that the two others were in the back of the
366aircraft, but here was a situation that was not clear."
During this same period, the GSG9 members checked the cabin
pressure conditions within the fuselage and discovered that
there was no pressure build-up to assist in opening the
doors. As well, the uneven ground made it difficult for the
assault members to position the ladders against the aircraft,
a small yet crucial problem at this point. On the code
words, "Fuererzauber Go," the assault was launched. The six
teams went through all entrances including the emergency
exits. At the same time three stun grenades were detonated.
According to Wegener, "we planted three flash bombs, which
were given to us by our British friends. But we didn*t
ignite them inside the aircraft? we just threw them outside 
3 67the aircraft." Once the aircraft was entered, team 
leaders ordered the hostages in both English and German,
"Down on the ground? heads down." The GSG9 assault teams 
responsible for the front of the aircraft opened the nose
365"Airport fire started to aid rescue troops," The 
Ottawa Citizen. 24 October, 1977. This article is quoted as 
saying that the "blaze was set some 300 yards in front of the 
plane in order to entice the hijackers into the cockpit."
366Proceedings Of FBI International Symposium, Wegener,
op. cit., p. 23.
36^Ibid., p. 24.
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doors and the action was fast and furious, as Wegener 
recounted:
...we drew fire from the terrorist leader and 
the female terrorist. We drew fire and returned 
fire, and one of my men was hit through the neck. 
(But the GSG9 men can take this, of course. So he 
is back to duty? he was very fortunate, I have to 
say that.) The terrorist leader was hit by five 
.38 bullets, but he could still manage to just jump 
back into the cockpit and grab a hand grenade.
We got^him there by a burst of submachine gun 
fire.
The third hijacker fired upon the teams from the first class
compartment as they were assaulting through the rear section
and in the nose area. The terrorist was killed by a shot in
the head. A fourth terrorist, another female, was found in
one of the front toilets. A team leader shot through the
wall of the door, mortally wounding her. By now, all assault
teams were occupying their pre-planned responsibility areas.
It was at this point that the team leader of the first
assault group noticed grenades in the vicinity of the cockpit
369and requested support from the combat engineers. The
evacuation was started four minutes after the assault began, 
using three major exit points: the left and right tail and 
the emergency exits. Some of the passengers were suffering 
from mild shock. Once out of the aircraft, the hostages were 
immediately escorted by the reserve assault team which was 
under cover about 40 metres from the aircraft site. Here 
they were searched to assure the assault force that they had 
not missed any of the hijackers.
368Ibid., pp. 24-25. 
369Ibid., p. 26.
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At 0212 hours Wegener acknowledged that all terrorists were
disabled. At 0217 the code word 'springtime' (end of
mission) was sent to State Minister Wischnewski. At 0218 the
GSG9 members were assembled and the hostages were dispatched
to the terminal where a medical station was set up. The
hijacked Lufthansa aircraft was turned over to German Federal
Criminal Police officers and their Somali counterparts. At
0500, GSG9 left Somalia. Wegener points out:
...the successful operation against the 
terrorists in Mogadishu demonstrated that the 
training and operational concepts of GSG9 were on
the right line. But I would like to state that
there were some prerequisites required for the 
success of this operation and similar ones in the 
future: the chain of command and control from the
decision makers direct to the technical commander 
on scene; the noninterference of the representative 
of the Crisis Management Staff on the scene, Mr. 
Wischnewski, concerning tactical matters; and the 
agreement of the Somali Government with the 
tactical planning and proposals of the commanding 
officer of GSG9.
As far as the British co-operation was concerned:
Confirmation of the SAS involvement in the 
Mogadishu operation came immediately after the 
rescue from Prime Minister Callaghan, then in Bonn 
with Chancellor Schmidt. In front of television 
cameras, Callaghan told Schmidt: 'It should have
been Dubai.' But even if the venue was changed, 
the event added new lustre to the SAS reputation, 
and it was good for Britain's relations with 
Europe. 1
370Ibid., pp. 27-28.
371Geraghty, op. cit., p. 173, and "Bonn shows gratitude 
to Prime Minister," The New York Times. 19 October, 1977.
Herr Schmidt reportedly thanked Mr. Callaghan "for supporting 
the West Germans' policy of toughness towards the hijackers 
and terrorists and for his 'active help' in sending two 
British anti-terrorist specialists to Mogadishu. His support 
had been 'of enormous value.'" See also, "Terror and Triumph 
at Mogadishu," Time. 31 October, 1977, p. 28. According to 
this article, "the British provided the West Germans with 1) 
special, highly sensitive listening devices for locating the 
terrorists within the plane and 2) a supply of British 'stun 
grenades.'" No further information regarding the listening 
devices has been found in the open sources covered in this 
study.
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In reflection, Mogadishu refined some of the lessons learnt
for rescue operations. Nations not already experienced in
this type of warfare were served notice to take such
eventualities seriously, and prepare for them, as the Germans
did, by establishing a counter-terrorist option similar to
GSG9. Professionally, it is very much to the credit of the
West German government and the leadership of GSG9 that they
sought and welcomed foreign assistance, in this case
acquiring an SAS liaison team and incorporating their
knowledge into their operation.1 As one study noted:
In the war against terrorism, there is no room 
for false pride and misplaced machismo: those in
charge should make use of the best manpower, 
expertise^ equipment and techniques, regardless of 
origin.
As was the case with Kenya*s intimate assistance to the 
Israelis at Entebbe, Somalia should be commended for allowing 
the GSG9 to operate unimpeded under German command and 
control. Furthermore, the Greek government must be praised 
for allowing the GSG9 to be forward-based in Crete during a 
critical phase of the pursuit operation.
In contrast, Dubai's unwillingness to co-operate with the 
GSG9 posed considerable danger to the passengers. In 
particular, Sheik Mohammed bin Rashid al-Muktum's desire to 
have his poorly trained personnel undertake the rescue 
operation, if one was required, would have risked the lives 
of all the hostages. This situation demonstrates how the 
issue of national sovereignty could have jeopardized the 
lives of innocent people. As one study underlined:
372University of New Brunswick, Centre for Conflict 
Studies, Special Operations, op. cit., p. 119.
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Where an appropriate anti-terrorist unit is 
available in the country concerned, the government 
there will almost most certainly insist, 
reasonably, that it be used. But when no 
specialist unit exists, and a foreign one is to 
[sic] at hand (particularly if the victims are from 
that foreign country), it is sensible for the host 
nation to consider setting aside sovereignty issues 
and permit the best unit to deal with the 
crisis.
The Mogadishu operation was conducted after years of 
intensive training by highly professional personnel. It drew 
upon extensive knowledge gleaned from the careful study of 
previous rescue operations, including Entebbe. Beyond the 
fundamental requirements of a specially selected and trained 
hostage-rescue force, it is apparent that a robust and 
effective governmental crisis decision-making body was 
readily available in both Entebbe and Mogadishu. Moreover, 
the value of accurate up-to-the-second intelligence as well 
as the importance of acquiring a forward-base to either 
pursue terrorists or project an attack must be emphasized. 
Further, in both rescues the actual operational leadership 
rested with the commander on the ground. One of the most 
salient lessons to be drawn from Mogadishu and Entebbe, is 
the ability of both the West German and Israeli governments 
to, concurrently, negotiate while preparing to fight.
Rescue missions are daring and sensitive operations which can 
be easily compromised, as shown by the incident of the 
reporter monitoring GSG9 air-to-ground transmissions. Any
373Ibid., p. 119.
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future operations demand fully secure and functional means of
374communications with the appropriate back-up links.
The employment of secure means would help ensure the 
mission’s communication and operational security.
Beyond the 'intimate relationship1 which developed before and 
during the Mogadishu rescue between GSG9 and the SAS, rescue 
forces must be sensitive to the politics of such operations. 
The initial reluctance, demonstrated by the authorities in 
Dubai and in Somalia, to allow GSG9 to operate independently 
on their soil is most significant. In that regard it was 
apparently an international effort to convince the Somali 
government to allow the GSG9 the opportunity to free the 
hostages:
AFTER UNCERTAINTIES IN OR OVER DUBAI, OMAN AND 
PDRY, TURNING POINT OCCURRED IN MOGADISHU.
AIRCRAFT WITH GSG-9 WAS BROUGTH [SIC] FORWARD AFTER 
SCHMIDT AND OTHER HEADS OF OGVT/STATE 
[SIC-GOVT/STATE] CONCERNED CONVINCED SIAD BARRE 
NOT/NOT TO ALLOW HIJACKED AIRCRAFT TO LEAVE AND TO 
GO ALONG WITH ASSAULT OPERATION. SOMALIS DID 
NOT/NOT TAKE A DIRECT PART BUT PLAYED A ROLE IN 
COORDINATED DIVERSIONARY ACTIONS ON RUNWAY AND 
AIRFIELD. BRITS UNDERSTAND THAT GERMANS WERE 
PREPARED TO LET SOMALIS TAKE DIRECT PART IF THIS 
BECAME STICKING POINT IN SOMALI AGREEMENT FOR GSG-9 
OPERATION. D
National prestige and political correctness often prevail 
over common sense. As noted above, the Germans were prepared 
to allow the Somalis to take part in the rescue. In that 
regard, special forces must be able to accommodate, within 
this operational planning, suitable roles for foreign police
374 "CRISIS MANAGEMENT...." Message traffic, op. cit., 
14 November, 1977, p. 5.
375Ibid., pp. 6-7.
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and security forces, if they intend to operate abroad. In 
short:
Specialist units...should build into their 
procedures and their plans appropriate roles which 
can be filled at short notice bv indigenous 
personnel. and they must be prepared to give an 
over-generous share of credit to such participation 
afterwards.
In the end, the international co-operative assistance was
underlined when West German government spokesman Klause
Boelling gave the following statement at the successful
conclusion of the Mogadishu rescue:
WE WEIGHED THE RISK [OF RESCUE] AS CONSCIENTIOUSLY 
AS WE COULD. NEVERTHELESS, A HIGH RISK REMAINED.
WITHOUT THE CONSENT AND AID OF THE SOMALI
GOVERNMENT, WE COULD NOT HAVE UNDERTAKEN THE RESCUE 
OPERATION.
THE GOVERNMENT OF SOMALIA DESERVES GRATITUDE, NOT 
ONLY FROM US GERMANS. ITS DECISION TO PERMIT THE 
OPERATION WAS ESSENTIAL TO AVERTING A CATASTROPHE. 
THE MORAL AND POLITICAL SUPPORT OF MANY OTHER 
STATES FOR OUR EFFORTS TO LIBERATE THE HOSTAGES AND 
CREW MEMBERS FROM THE POWER OF DANGEROUS COMMON 
CRIMINALS HAS MATERIALLY HELPED THE FEDERAL 
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY.
Another indicator of assistance was noted in a report
advising that Helmut Schmidt:
...ALSO SENT TELEGRAMS OF THANKS TO PRESIDENT JIMMY 
CARTER, PREMIER [SIC] JAMES CALLAGHAN, PRESIDENT 
VALERY GISCARD D'ESTAING, GREEK PREMIER 
KONSTANDINOS [SIC] KARAMANLIS AND KING KAHLID OF 
SAUDI ARABIA. THE CHANCELLOR ALSO SENT A TELEGRAM 
OF THANKS TO POPE PAUL, WHO HAD DECLARED HIS 
REAgJgESS TO BE EXCHANGED FOR THE HOSTAGES IF NEED
376University of New Brunswick, Centre for Conflict 
Studies Special Operations, op. cit., p. 121.
377FBIS 09, "FRG SPOKESMAN READS JOINT STATEMENT ON 
HOSTAGES RESCUE OPERATION,” 18 October, 1977.
170
FBIS 10, "FRG CHANCELLOR CABLES THANKS TO SOMALIA'S 
BARRE, OTHERS," 18 October, 1977.
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Both Entebbe and Mogadishu were historically important as 
they illustrate the determined initiatives of governments to 
move towards more closer co-operative efforts, and prove that 
such international assistance and co-operation do have a 
decisive role to play in combatting terrorism.
- 138 -
CHAPTER III
THE ROLE OF ELITE FORCES IN COUNTER-TERRORISM 
AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE 
IN LOW~INTENSITY CONFLICT 
Section I 
An Historical Perspective
Since 1945 Great Britain has been continuously involved in 
what the British Brigadier-General and counter-insurgency
379authority, Frank Kitson, calls 'low intensity operations.1 
The term, 1low-intensity operations' is used to describe 
campaigns short of full-scale conventional war. These 
include aid to the civil power, internal security operations, 
peace-keeping, counter-terrorist and counter-insurgency 
operations. Such operations are characterized by the great 
role played, therein, by political considerations, a role 
whose importance it would be hard to exaggerate.
The political nature of these operations demand that every 
officer and soldier involved is well aware that even the most 
minor action by the military may carry with it major 
political consequences. What these operations have in common 
is close political scrutiny and control and therefore, 
requires intimate civil, military and police co-operation at 
all times. The use of military means —  firepower, mass, 
mobility, speed and initiative —  are subject to the 
political limitations imposed on the conduct of the campaign. 
Due to this, the weapons and tactics employed are 
proportional to the military response and appropriate to the
379See Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: 
Subversion. Insurgency. Peacekeeping.
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political reality. It is because of this, for example, that 
tanks and artillery are not employed in Northern Ireland.
In tandem with the political character of these low-intensity 
operations, military activities have taken on a *policing 
aspect.* As in Northern Ireland, the aim is not so much to 
kill terrorists, Protestant or Catholic, as to capture them 
so that they may undergo appropriate judicial proceedings. In 
such operations the soldier, depending on the military task 
to be performed, may act as a 'peace officer' at a roadblock 
searching cars for objects such as contraband or weapons, and 
later that same day be ordered to set up an ambush.
Obviously, implicit in the term is the fact that, these 
operations are low in the level of intensity. The tone of 
these activities is political; therefore, the level of 
military activity is predicated on the threat. The amount of 
military force used at any one time is carefully measured and 
will vary with the local conditions. Low-intensity conflict 
differs from conventional operations because the enemy 
operates clandestinely amongst the indigenous population for 
the most part, and is organized in secure cells, often in 
geographically inaccessable regions. This, in turn, demands 
efficient intelligence which is vital for success against 
such an enemy.
Psychological operations play an important part in 
low-intensity conflict since the enemy, be they revolutionary 
terrorists or other elements, will attempt to portray a 
strength beyond their real numbers and capabilities. At the 
same time, they may try to provoke the patience of the 
security forces and, in turn, the government, in order to
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tempt them to react harshly. In that regard the military 
must be kept under political control and win the 'hearts and 
minds' campaign, the aim of which is to bring about popular 
support and loyalty of the people for the government in 
power, while at the same time defeating the 'enemy.'
Finally, low-intensity operations involve methods of 
unconventional warfare (UW). Ambush, bombings, kidnapping, 
hostage-taking and hijacking are activities typical of this 
type of warfare and are usually conducted by highly motivated 
and dedicated individuals. The nature of these operations as 
well as their generally protracted nature, elicits a 
different response from the military than its conventional 
approach to warfare. This is illustrated by the British 
Army's experience in Malaya and present security operations 
in Northern Ireland which began in 1969.
This section evaluates the lessons learned from the British 
post-war experience in low-intensity operations, outlines how 
British forces adapted to the requirements imposed by these 
operations and describes the evolution of a British strategy 
for low-intensity operations.
The Iranian Embassy siege in May of 1980 demonstrated very 
clearly many of the lessons learned over the 35 years of 
British military experience in conducting low-intensity 
operations. Although Great Britain has remained at peace 
since the cessation of large-scale wartime hostilities in 
1945, her forces, particularly her army, have been constantly 
committed throughout the world. Henry Stanhope lists some 92
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380operational commitments over this period and David
381Charters has added two more to bring the total to 94.
Many of the concepts involved in low-intensity operations,
particularly the political-military aspects, have only
recently been developed. However, much of the military and
technical expertise used in dealing with insurgents,
saboteurs and terrorists in recent years had already been
part and parcel of the tactics applied in imperial policing.
John Pimlott suggests:
The concept of politico-military insurgency 
may be relatively new, but many of the techniques 
involved, particularly of guerrilla warfare, are 
merely adaptations of traditional rebel tactics 
against which the British had often fought, and it
is surprising how many of the methods used in what
is now known as counter-insurgencVghave their 
origins in such an imperial past.
The nine major British operations in Palestine, Malaya,
Kenya, Cyprus, Borneo, Aden, the Radfan, Northern Ireland and
Oman are particularly significant. The importance of these
actions is not so much tied to the success or failure of the
operations themselves but lies in the lessons learned from
them and the resulting development of a British strategy for
low-intensity operations. This, it should be emphasized, was
not an easy, logical transition and, therefore, as the
380Henry Stanhope, The Soldiers: An Anatomy of the 
British Army, pp. 343-347.
381David A. Charters, "From Palestine To Northern 
Ireland: British Army Adaptation To Low-intensity Conflict,
1945-1980," in David Charters and Maurice Tugwell, Armies in 
Low-Intensitv Conflict: A Comparative Study of Institutional
Adaptation to New Forms of Warfare. Department of National 
Defence, Operational Analysis Establishment, Extra-Mural 
Paper No. 38, (cited as Charters and Tugwell), p. 206.
382John Pimlott, "The British Army: The Dhofar
Campaign, 1970-1975," in Ian F.W. Beckett and John Pimlott, 
(eds), Armed Forces and Modern Counter-Insuraencv. p. 16, 
(cited as Beckett and Pimlott).
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British Army had been essentially an imperial police force it 
had to incorporate the training, structure, skills and 
techniques for low-intensity operations. The difficulties 
were compounded by the fact that after World War II it was a 
continental force established within the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization. Moreover, in the wake of the war much 
of the army's time and resources were consumed, not in 
conventional, but rather in counter-terrorist operations in 
Palestine, which was soon followed by the Malayan Emergency 
and other similar low-intensity operations. Experience from 
these small conflicts were recycled and although the 
circumstances varied a body of corporate experience developed 
producing an adaptable framework from which to work. The 
framework notwithstanding, each new situation demanded that 
the army re-tool so as to appropriately adapt to the 
operational scenario.
David Charters argues that the very nature of low-intensity 
warfare had an effect not only on the evolution of a British 
army doctrine to counter it but also, in a sense, on the 
operational structure of the army as a whole. In the 
following list of characteristics and implications of low- 
intensity warfare, he outlines the salient points to note on 
this matter:
1) Characteristic - the 'political' nature of the
conflicts and operations.
Implications - political control of operations
and limits on the use of force, 
which turned military operations 
into 'policing* tasks and ensured 
that the final outcome would be 
determined by political, not 
military, considerations.
2) Characteristic - the 'low intensity' level of
combat.
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Implications
3) Characteristic 
Implications
4) Characteristic 
Implications
5) Characteristic 
Implications
- small-unit operations with 
relatively low casualties which 
required large numbers of infantry 
to keep the violence from escalating 
beyond politically acceptable 
limits.
- clandestine nature of the enemy.
- considerable emphasis on 
intelligence collection.
- important role of psychological 
warfare.
- scrutiny of the Army's methods
by domestic and foreign critics, and 
Army involvement in psychological 
warfare.
- unconventional methods of warfare.
- need for the Army to acquire the 
patience demanded by protracted 
operations, and to develop 
unconventional, innovative methods 
for bringing the enemy to battle on 
equal terms in extremes of terrain 
and climate.
The apparent characteristics of low-intensity warfare were
not well known in the same form to the British immediately
384after the war in 1945, but have been, through experience 
and study, slowly identified and included into the army's 
institutional memory.385
The British Army of today is a direct descendant of the army 
of the empire whose primary task was to ensure the security 
of British interests throughout a large part of the world. 
Its function was to conduct a seemingly endless series of
383Charters and Tugwell, op. cit., pp. 211-212.
384ibid.
385The institutional memory as embodied in the manual 
produced in Great Britain by the Camberley Staff College, 
entitled Counter-Revolutionary Warfare And Out of Area 
Operations." Camberley, 1988.
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operations in far-away places against less technically
sophisticated enemies. It could be said that any form of
warfare, other than colonial campaigning, was viewed by the
army, as an institution, as outside the norm:
Continental conventional wars, including the two 
world wars of this century, were aberrations —  the 
exception, rather than the rule. From the end of 
the Napoleonic period low-intensity warfare was the 
predominant experience of the British Army. Nor,
... did this pattern change significantly after 
1945.
Such perceptions had much to do with the development of 
Britain*s extraordinary regimental system. It is these 
regiments which make up the fighting elements of Britain's 
army. Due, in part, to the historical experiences of these 
units, they have developed a strong sense of their own 
uniqueness. These experiences "have fostered, even 
encouraged, the individualism that runs through the
387regiments, and through their officers in particular."
The imperial past also strengthened this individualist spirit
particularly as officers and commanders were, due to a lack
of communications and as a result of the distances separating
them from their superiors, given a general mandate to
exercise their authority as they saw fit.
A certain independent habit of mind was both 
required and permitted. This lent itself neatly to 
the individualistic nature of overseas regimental 
life, but also meshed with operational necessity? 
the army was frequently "outnumbered by its enemies 
and... more impoverished than its friends." The Y
need to concentrate on the immediate requirements 
of practical, 'down-to-earth' soldiering in such 
circumstances made the Army a master of 
improvization, flexibility, 'on-the-job' learning
386Charters and Tugwell, pp. 213-214.
387Ibid., p. 215.
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and training-^ making do with what was available 
on the spot.
Much of this British experience was distilled in the text 
entitled Small Wars; Their Principles and Practice, written 
by Colonel C.E. Callwell. In this book, Callwell discusses 
the meaning of the term "small wars," their causes, 
objectives, intelligence requirements, logistics, the 
desirability of maintaining the initiative, tactics, lines of 
communications, as well as guerrilla warfare in general, 
raiding and the importance of surprise, hill and bush
389warfare, security and the necessity for night operations.
In fact, this book continues to be read by present-day 
special forces personnel interested in understanding the 
evolution and nature of contemporary low-intensity warfare.
British experience in low-intensity operations, specifically
guerrilla warfare, can be traced at least as far back as
Wellington. The Great Duke himself depended on guerrilla
assistance in his Spanish campaigns. Jac Weller suggests
that in Spain:
After the dismal defeats of the Spanish regular 
armies, guerrilla bands grew amazingly, but under a 
variety of leaders and in different ways.
Wellington was able to supply clear, simple advice 
which proved effective. He also provided money, 
weapons, ammunition, and critical supplies. He 
soon received better co-operation from guerrilla 
leaders than^he did from the Spanish regular 
commanders.
388Ibid., pp. 215-216.
389Colonel C.E. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles
And Practice. For a more focussed view on the duties of an 
officer see General Sir Andrew Skeen, Passing It On: Short
Talks On Tribal Fighting On The North-West Frontier of India.
390Jac Weller, "Wellington's Use Of Guerrillas," Journal
of the Roval United Services Institution. (May, 1963), p.
154.
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Wellington, mindful of his army's own shortcomings during
this campaign, employed guerrillas "to gain positive
391intelligence for him." Particularly valuable was the
capture of enemy despatches frequently accomplished by the 
392guerrillas. In fact, during the Peninsula campaign,
Wellington's plans for conventional operations were
complemented by his appreciation and partial orchestration of
a concurrent guerrilla effort:
As the war progressed, Wellington was able to 
channel most guerrilla activities away from petty 
local concerns into a co-ordinated plan. This was 
absolutely necessary, for the French had a 
four-to-one superiority in regular soldiers. 
Wellington prevented a French concentration largely 
by keeping the guerrillas in being and active. If
the French came together, the Spanish irregulars
took over all territory vacated. Even more 
important, the guerrillas prevented a really large 
French army from taking sufficient supplies from a 
limited area to feed itself.
Michael Glover's assessment is that Wellington was assisted
by the Spanish guerrillas as they:
...tied down thousands of French troops, made 
permanently insecure the French lines of 
communication and regularly supplied Wellington 
with information about French movements and 
intentions which went far to compensate for 
Wellington's lack of numbers.
Furthermore, Glover notes that Wellington appreciated the
395debt he owed to the Spanish guerrillas.
391ibid.
393Ibid., p. 155.
394Michael Glover, Wellington As Military Commander.
p. 235.
395Ibid., p. 236.
- 147 -
Aae of Empire
Small wars for the most part were part and parcel of the
64-year reign of Queen Victoria, During all these years the
British Army was quite busy operationally:
From 1837 until 1901, in Asia, Africa, Arabia, 
and elsewhere, British troops were engaged in 
almost constant combat. It was the price of 
empire, of world leadership, and of national pride 
—  and it was paid, usually without qualms or 
regrets or very much thought.
Victoria's reign was also a time of a "superabundance of 
397leaders." From these there came the commanders of armies
and navies belonging not only to Britain and its possessions 
but also to other nations such as Egypt, Greece, China and 
Turkey. These were men who were willing to adapt and "did 
not hesitate to exchange their bowlers for turbans, tarbushes 
or mandarin caps if only they were given men whom they could 
lead into battle."398
One of the more prominent figures of this century, Colonel
Thomas Edward Lawrence, was a proponent and philosopher of
guerrilla warfare. It was Lawrence who recognized and broke
down into its varying elements this type of warfare. John
Bay1is writes that:
...Lawrence was the first man to reduce guerrilla 
warfare to a set of principles and to articulate 
clearly the nature of the tactics he used in his 
campaigns. In The Seven Pillars of Wisdom he 
prosaically describes guerrilla warfare in terms of 
"an influence, an idea, a thing intangible, 
invulnerable, without front or back, drifting about 
like a gas." Lawrence saw the problem of his war 
in terms of three categories of related variables, 
"the algebraical element of things, a biological
396Byron Farwell, Queen Victoria's Little Wars, p. 1.
397Ibid., p. 2.
398Ibid., p. 3.
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element of lives, and psychological element of 
ideas.” In so doing he was moving away from the 
traditional notion of guerrilla warfare as a purely 
military phenomenon and, like Clausewitz before 
him, laying more stress on the political dimensions 
of such conflict. To Lawrence only a third of war 
was a military problem and the nature even of this 
"technical" aspect depggded fundamentally on the 
political two-thirds.
As with other leaders who could appreciate the capabilities 
of the Arabs as guerrilla fighters, Lawrence employed both 
their natural fighting skills and their local knowledge in 
the war with the Turks. Most important, Lawrence ensured 
that the Arabs would fight only when they would be 
successful, and on their own terms.
The Irish Rebellion ri919-1921)
The Irish Rebellion witnessed the alienation of the people 
from the government. At the same time the ability of the 
Irish Republican Army (IRA) to persist in its operations 
sapped the will of the British government to continue to 
combat it. The Rebellion could have been a major learning 
campaign for the British Army but this was not the case as 
the campaign was viewed, during the period, and for some time 
after, as an aberration.
Official military thinking even after World War I tended to 
follow traditional lines and, as Charters has stated, "the 
atmosphere prevailing in the inter-war Army mitigated 
against thoughtful inquiry into the crucial
political/military/psychological dimensions of insurgency and
399John Baylis, "Revolutionary Warfare," in John Baylis, 
Ken Booth, et al., Contemporary Strategy: Theories And
Policies, p. 133.
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counter-insurgency.»400 The first real study of low-
intensity operations was written by a former British officer
in 1937, entitled British Rule, and Rebellion. The author,
H.J. Simson, was one of the first to recognize through an
analysis of the Irish Rebellion, that the British Army and
government were unable to deal with the Rebellion largely
because of their failure to win the war in political and
psychological terms. This certainly fits into Charles
Townshend's analysis where he argues:
Despite the successes of spring 1921, the counter­
insurgency failed. Ireland was not pacified. The 
government succeeded neither in restoring order nor 
in implementing the constitutional policy enshrined 
in the Government of Ireland Act. Failure can be 
accurately monitored in the field of publicity and 
propaganda. The government was slower than the 
insurgents to create a publicity organization, and 
the one they created was weaker in performance.
What was probably even more frustrating for the British Army
J A  A
was that militarily, the situation was promising.
Townshend states:
In point of fact the overall situation in 1921 
was not altogether unfavourable to the government: 
the IRA's military position was increasingly 
insecure. Its arms holdings were being eroded, as 
was its ascendancy in the intelligence sphere. Its 
capacity to mount difficult operations had been 
reduced —  attacks on police barracks had for 
instance largely given way to the 'offensive 
against communications,'.... Large parts of the 
nation had ceased to play any visible part in the 
national struggle. Yet the IRA sustained its 
credibility, while th|t of the government was in 
continuous decline.
400Charters and Tugwell, op. cit., p. 231.
401Charles Townshend, Britain's Civil Wars: 
Counterinsuraencv in the twentieth century, p. 66.
402See Brevet Major T.A. Lowe, "Some Reflections Of A 
Junior Commander Upon 'The Campaign' in Ireland 1920 and 
1921," The Armv Quarterly. Vol. V, (October 1922 and January 
1923), pp. 50-58.
403Townshend, op. cit., pp. 66-67.
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More will be said on the Irish experience later on. Over a
decade further into the inter-war period another British
officer, Orde Wingate, partly in the tradition of T.E.
Lawrence, successfully led the nascent Jewish special night
404squads against the Arabs in Palestine. According to an
Israeli analyst it was Wingate who, in part, was responsible
for the development of some of Israel's most famous
commanders. Apparently Wingate:
...gave Yigal Allon, Moshe Dayan and 
other future Israeli army commanders their first 
formal instruction in warfare, particularly 
counter-guerrilla tactics.
Concerned over the possibility that the Arabs might destroy
portions of a major pipeline running through the northern
part of Palestine, the British Army, albeit reluctantly,
permitted Wingate to train the Jewish night squads to fight
Arab terrorists. His tactics were to become a part of
counter-insurgency thinking of leaders into the 1980s.
Accordingly he dominated the night, preached the importance
of night fighting, close combat and ambush tactics, and
ensured the selection and training of the right sort of men
for these missions.406 Wingate was later to help lead a
revolt against the Italians in Abyssinia and was a proponent
of deep penetration operations, an approach he perfected in
raising and leading the Chindits who were famed for their
404Beckett and Pimlott, op. cit., p. 17.
405Zeev Schiff, A History Of The Israeli Armv 
(1870-1974). p. 20.
406ibid.
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daring strikes against Japanese lines of communication in 
Burma.487
World War II and the Evolution of British Special Forces
During World War II a number of special units came into
existence such as the Special Air Service (SAS), the Special
Boat Section (SBS), the Long Range Desert Group (LRDG) and
those under the direction of the Special Operations Executive
(SOE). Such units were used extensively during the war for
both conventional and unconventional operations.408 By the
end of the war the British Army could draw upon a wide body
of historical and operationally current information, from
both officers and men who had gained first-hand experience in
the training, organization and capabilities of special forces
and special operations. This could lead to ironic situations
such as that in Malaya in the latter part of the war. At
that time British troops from Force 136, better known as a
branch of the SOE, assisted in the training of the Malayan
Peoplefs Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA). Later, under 
409 .Chin Peng in 1948, the MPAJA became the Malayan Races 
Liberation Army (MRLA) and conducted a lengthy insurgency
407 . .Michael Calvert, Chmdits; Long Range Penetration.
pp. 10-11; see also Shelford Bidwell, The Chindit War:
Stilwell. Wingate, and the Campaign in Burma; 1944.
408See Philip Warner, The Secret Forces Of World War II. 
William Seymour, British Special Forces, and Julian Thompson, 
Ready for Anything: The Parachute Regiment At War;
1940-1992.
409See "Malayan guerrilla lays down his arms after 
41-year fight," The Toronto Sunday Star. 3 December, 1989. 
Chin Peng signed an agreement on 2 December, 1989, ending the 
armed struggle. According to this article, "The Communists 
agreed to lay down their arms and pledged loyalty to king and 
country. Thailand and Malaysia promised to ensure their fair 
treatment."
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against the British which lasted from 1948 to I960, no doubt
410profiting much from their British wartime instructors.
Men who had served in such special forces added "their 
knowledge of deep-penetration raiding and unconventional 
fighting to produce [within the British Army] a body of
411skills of inestimable value against insurgency groups.”
A detailed historical overview will be incorporated in 
Section II.
The British Armv - Soldiering Afar
The British Army, both in the period between the world wars
and in the post-1945 era, gave much opportunity for officers
to broaden their military experience beyond just regimental
soldiering. Secondments were numerous, and indeed were
considered an avenue to gain active service experience.
Officers on such postings were often attracted by a sense of
romanticism akin to that of Lawrence of Arabia. They longed,
for example, for;
...the long star-lit nights beneath Bedouin tents, 
in which the Englishman pleasantly deluded himself 
that his friendship with the Arab was something 
special, mutual and indestructible, and that there 
existed some affinity of spirit between the desert 
and the shires. The tough cheerful officers of the 
Sultanfs private armies... still purveying the 
Small Arms Manual to illiterate peasants and 
tribesmen, and still managing to mould the most
410Warner, op. cit., pp. 202-203, and John Ellis, A 
Short History of Guerrilla Warfare, p. 178.
411Beckett and Pimlott, op. cit., p. 17. The body of 
skills would include ambush techniques, long-range 
penetration operations, escape and evasion, language skills, 
intelligence gathering techniques, jungle operations and the 
ability to perform high-risk operations as required.
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unlikely-material into fine and faithful fighting 
forces.
Another contemporary romantic soldier Colin Mitchell notes:
Ever since I was a boy I had been fascinated by
stories of soldiering on the frontiers of the
Empire, of the men who carved out careers with 
their own swords, leading Indian soldiers, Sudanese 
levies, Chinese mercenaries or African askari. At 
Foyle's in the Charing Cross Road, before the 
Second World War, you could buy for Is. second-hand 
editions of the biographies of these Victorian 
soldiers —  not so much the great national figures 
such as Gordon, Kitchener and Roberts, but lesser, 
equally exciting men. I was as familiar with Kabul
and the Khyber Pass as I was with Clapham and
Kensington.
Furthermore, secondments brought a promotion in rank with 
commensurate responsibility. This aspect in itself was most 
attractive:
A subaltern who in the Manchesters might expect 
to command no more than a platoon for years on end 
would, as a captain in the Gold Coast Regiment, 
command a company from the moment he reported for 
duty in Accra.
Finally, the most attractive aspect of military life to
professional soldiers is the acquisition of real soldiering
. . .  415experiences, that is, active service. The secondments
brought not only the experience itself but also excitement,
rewards and the possibility of 'making a name.' In many
parts of the Empire there were almost scheduled campaigns
against dissident tribes and peoples. For those attracted by
412James Morris, Sultan in Oman, p. 135. Taken from 
James Lunt, Imperial Sunset: Frontier Soldiering in the 20th
Century, p. xiv.
413 . .Colin Mitchell, Having Been A Soldier, p. 110.
414Lunt, op. cit., p. xvi.
415 . .See Brigadier C.W.B. Purdon, "The Sultan's Armed
Forces," The British Armv Review. August, 1969, pp. 78-79. 
This article advertised that "the fun and excitement has not 
yet gone from soldiering," in an attempt to attract contract 
officers for the Sultan's Forces.
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such an opportunity, "The deadly monotony of peacetime 
soldiering with obsolete equipment and hardly any soldiers 
in, say, Dover, was transformed as soon as an officer arrived 
in Kirkuk."416
This experience must not be underrated. A great number of 
officers who achieved senior rank had acquired, at some time, 
experience in such secondments. Many of Britain's most 
distinguished generals of the last century had served in or 
with colonial forces. For example, Generals Garnet Wolseley 
and Herbert Kitchener served with the Egyptians at the end of
the last century, and more recently Major-General John
417 .Akehurst served as the commander of the multi-national
Dhofar Brigade, and General Sir John Hackett with the
Trans-Jordan Frontier Force. Such experiences gave those who
took the challenge an oppportunity to discover and appreciate
new cultures and languages. It gave them a feel for
differing peoples, their sensitivities and aspirations, an
understanding of the Empire in all its ethnic variety. It
is important to underline here that the Palestine experience
indicated that the British Army were apparently less
sensitive to the plight of the Jewish refugees fleeing from
Europe in the wake of World War II. As well, experience in
Cyprus also denoted a degree of British insensitivity to the
political aspirations of the Greek Cypriots. Nonetheless,
experience gleaned from Malaya, Borneo and the Oman suggests
that to be successful in low-intensity operations the British
Army must also take into account the aspirations and
416Lunt, op. cit., p. xvi.
417See Farwell, op. cit., and John Akehurst, We Won A 
War: The Campaign in Oman 1965-1975.
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interests of the people they were supposedly defending. This 
appreciation would pay dividends in the future as did the 
British ability to adapt to a changing imperial context.
The Post-War British Armv
As Lieutenant General Sir Kenneth Darling stated in an
article based on a presentation given on 4 May, 1964 to the
students of the United States Army Command and General Staff
College, and referring to low-intensity operations:
There is nothing new in these tactics, and we do 
not want to allow ourselves to be persuaded by 
upstarts such as Mao Tse-tung that he has produced 
some original thought in this field. In fact, we 
British in some degree or another have been 
promoting insurgency all around the world for 
centuries.
The end of 1945 saw the British forces, particularly the
army, as organizations with long experience in low-intensity
operations. World War II, however, had changed the army from
its traditional role of an imperial policing body to one
highly experienced, trained and organized for large-scale
conventional operations in Europe and other theatres. The
maintenance of a large conventional occupation army in Europe
placed a drain on the troops available for low-intensity
419operations elsewhere. Furthermore, there were major
420constraints, particularly financial, on the ability to 
maintain the required strategic reserve and some degree of
418 . . . .  Lieutenant General Sir Kenneth Darling, "British
Counterinsurgency Experience,11 Military Review. (January,
1965), p. 9.
419Field Marshal Lord Carver, The Seven Ages of the 
British Armv. pp. 290-292.
420Ibid., p. 301.
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mobility. This meant a down-scaling in forces available for 
low-intensity operations.
Despite the continuation of conscription after the war, the 
regimental system and a strong leadership cadre enabled the 
army to maintain a high professional standard. Operations in 
the post-war era demanded much from junior commanders. This 
went a long way in developing grass-root skills in low- 
intensity warfare, and assisted in the development of the 
soldier, NCO and officer in the years that followed. In 
Borneo:
...it was, for us, very much a platoon commander*s 
war. A subaltern and some thirty Jocks would 
occupy positions around a threatened longhouse —  
slit trenches, weapon pits and dug-outs, surrounded 
by barbed wire, sharpened stakes, mines and trip- 
flares —  and patrol the jungle from there. The 
nearest friendly troops would probably be 
twenty-odd miles away and the only communications 
with the outside world by wireless and helicopter. 
So, if there was an action, a very young officer 
had to accept that it was probably going to be his 
battle. .He would have to fight it and win it 
himself.
For some regiments, experience derived from numerous 
operational tours assisted in producing highly efficient 
soldiers well trained in counter-insurgency. In the Borneo 
campaign, for example, the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders:
...were called upon to serve three full tours, 
each of six months, in the Borneo jungles. This 
experience made them into a skilled and seasoned 
fighting battalion in which the acceptance of 
responsibility became second nature. Junior NCOs 
did the work of officers and platoon commanders 
were given wide geographical areas which in any 
other campaign would have fallen to the lot of a 
battalion commander. It bred self-sufficiency and
421 . .Mitchell, op. cit., p. 127. This type of independant
experience was noted years previously in an article by Major
P.E. Crook, 11A Subaltern's War In Malaya," British Armv
Journal, (January, 1953), pp. 21-24.
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confidence to an astonishing degree2and it soon 
sorted out the men from the boys.
As a future commanding officer, Colin Mitchell appreciated
this extensive experience:
...I was later to have good reason to be grateful 
for the Argylls1 long service in the campaign and 
the hard work put into it by my predecessors in 
command.... It was only a few months after the end 
of the Borneo war that I was to lead the Battalion 
to Aden, knowing that nearly all of my.men were 
already tough, battle-tested soldiers.
The experience of imperial and post-imperial soldiering
sprinkled throughout the regiments produced, amongst the
officers and other ranks, a rugged practical level of
individualism which sought Mflexible solutions to military
424problems at the local level.” Therefore, the demands
placed upon the army forced all ranks to be more adaptable
and sensitive to the situations with which they were
confronted. Moreover, due to high costs and government
fiscal restraint this necessitated a different approach.
Pimlott argues that this 'tradition of flexibility' had much
to do with the British Army's ability to cope with
low-intensity warfare. British troops employed for imperial
policing were spread thinly throughout the Empire. Since the
army was almost always without sufficient financial backing,
it was obliged to be careful in expending its limited
resources. This demanded a different approach to
low-intensity operations:
Once presented with a revolt, therefore, the 
British were more likely to take a 'low profile' 
response, using their forces sparingly and 
searching for solutions which did not necessitate 
large expenditure of men or material; an approach
422Ibid., p. 121.
423Ibid., p. 122.
424Charters and Tugwell, op. cit., p. 229.
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which often made full use of local resources and 
involved close co-operation with existing civil 
authorities. At the same time, the wide range of 
threats to imperial rule —  from the sophisticated 
armies of India to the stone-age tribesmen of parts 
of West Africa —  and the different geographical 
conditions encountered, produced a constant need to 
adapt responses to fit local circumstances and 
avoided the development of a stereotyped 'theory* 
of policing.
Therefore, the British Army by 1945 had "the three important
characteristics of experience, appropriate military skill and 
. . . 426flexibility." This experience did not produce a
formulated, strict doctrine or theory but merely a number of
possible solutions to very different situations:
What emerged was never a theory, elaborately compiled 
and rigidly adhered to in the manner of, say, the French 
guerre revolutionnaire, but a series of responses which, 
when adapted to fit specific conditions, proved 
successful in maintaining at least a measure of 
political stability, even under the pressure of.strident 
nationalism or communist revolutionary warfare.
As noted, the writings of Colonel C.E. Callwell and Colonel
T.E. Lawrence did much to synthesize the army's experiences
in suppressing rebellion and fighting 'small wars.'
Interestingly enough, some authors have argued that the
British Army did not fully understand the complexity of the
conflicts in which they initially became involved during the
post-war years. For example, Charters writes that "the
record suggests that the British Army had some difficulty in
comprehending the nature of the conflicts in which it became
428involved after 1945." Charters may be mixing the problems
of imperial policing with the difficulties of maintaining
425Beckett and Pimlott, op. cit., p. 19.
426ibid.
427ibid.
428Charters and Tugwell, op. cit., p. 230.
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peace during de-colonization. Imperial policing was 
essentially the forceful extension of central government 
authority, if and when needed. In the wake of World War II, 
Great Britain withdrew from the Empire, and this 
de-colonization was for the most part less controlled both in 
political and military terms since the initiative was rarely 
in London's hands.
According to Charters, the post-war British Army thought that
low-intensity operations had to be dealt with on a purely
military basis without reference to the political and
cultural aspects of the situation. Maximum use of military
and police force combined with a quick 'victory' were
considered to be the most effective means of countering any
colonial opposition, essentially the wedding of "'tried and
true' imperial policing methods enhanced by modern 
429technology." This would bring about "successful military
operations [which] were considered to be the Army's best
430propaganda weapon."
If one accepts Charter's argument, this British dependence in 
the post-war era on modern technology parallels American 
fascination with high technology during the Vietnam War.
What is important to realize is that the instruments of 
conventional war —  airpower, armour and manoeuver forces —  
are not appropriate, for the most part, in low-intensity 
operations, as they raise the threshold of violence to be 
used by the government forces. Low-intensity operations are
429Ibid., p. 232
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manpower intensive. It is far more acceptable to the
population to see patrols of four soldiers, as we see in
Northern Ireland, moving down the street than to face the
posting of armoured units equipped with tanks throughout a
city. The use of well-disciplined soldiers imparts a sense
of security and places a human face on this aspect of low-
431intensity operations. By providing a human face, rather 
than an inhuman armoured mask, one underscores the difference 
between a state of emergency and a state of siege. This does 
not discount the value of modern weapons, aircraft, artillery 
and armour in such situations, all of which were successfully 
used to some degree in Malaya and the Omani campaigns. The 
employment of such measures, however, was restricted and
4 ^  A
appropriately applied as the situations dictated.
Therefore, the use of such weapons was the exception rather 
than the rule, predicated upon the isolation of the area of 
operations combined with the positive identification of the 
enemy. In such instances it was thus possible to apply all 
firepower without the risk of excessively alienating the 
populace.
If one accepts Mao Tse Tungfs maxim that the people are the 
ocean in which the guerrilla swims, it is essential that the 
security forces be able to separate the guerrilla from the 
population. This is a most frustrating process, as 
guerrillas and terrorists alike, work largely in a cellular 
structure with few contacts. This maintains the security of
431Interview with a senior British Army officer, Ottawa, 
Ontario, Canada, 12 December, 1988.
432Akehurst, op. cit., p. 106. The author gives a good 
example in his discussion of Operation Himaar where enemy 
fire "was silenced by artillery and the jets."
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the group and, in turn, the cause. It is this particular 
aspect of low-intensity operations that precludes the use of 
unrestricted brute force as both politically and 
psychologically unacceptable to the government and the 
people.
Palestine
The British Army's concepts on the handling of low-intensity
operations through traditional imperial policing methods and
modern technology were finally challenged in Palestine. In
1945, Britain's Middle East Forces were issued a War Office
document produced in preparation for the, by then, inevitable
defeat and occupation of Germany. This study's focus was on
guerrilla warfare and its inherent strengths and 
433weaknesses. The army perceived guerrilla warfare in
purely military terms and the study stated:
...that offensive action by security forces —  
drives against centres of resistance, pursuit of 
sabotage bands, and searches —  was the most 
effective weapon against guerrillas. 
Counter-guerrilla operations were seen as purely 
military.
The political context of the Palestine situation was largely 
ignored? nor did the army attempt to define the threat which 
faced war-weary forces who were more comfortable and 
professionally adept at conducting conventional campaigns
433Charters and Tugwell, op. cit., p. 233. Taken from 
War Office pamphlet entitled, "Guerrilla Warfare", dated
December, 1944, issued to Middle East Forces, 14 March, 1945, 
WO/169/19521.
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435than in searching for Jewish terrorists. According to 
Charters:
There is nothing in the written record to suggest 
that the Army —  not to mention their political 
masters —  ever grasped the nature of the war being 
waged by the Jewish underground.
This lack of an identifiable political aim in Palestine
appears to have been later exacerbated by the conflict
between two major figures of the time. On one hand was Sir
Alan Cunningham, who as last High Commissioner of Palestine,
was cognizant both of his responsibility to "uphold *law and
order* by methods compatible with British political 
437tradition" and of the political context of the Palestinian 
situation. On the other hand was Field Marshal Bernard 
Montgomery, who felt that the British Army was being tied 
down with "defensive tasks rather than being freed for the 
offensive actions which were the only way of gaining the 
initiative.1,438
For the most part, the British appeared to have lost their
sensitivity about the human issues in the Palestinian
dilemma. Bowyer Bell has argued that in regard to:
...Palestine the British simply did not 
understand the impact of the holocaust, the depth 
of Jewish agony? nor could they3gredit the charge 
of genocide made against them.
436Ibid.
437Townshend, op. cit., p. 115.
438 . .Ibid. See also Nigel Hamilton, Montv: The Field
Marshal. 1944-1976. pp. 665 - 667.
439J. Bowyer Bell, "Revolts Against The Crown: The
British Response to Imperial Insurgency,” Parameters. Vol. 4, 
No. 1, (1974), p. 35.
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It was, however, Montgomery's view that prevailed —
offensive action alone would smash Jewish terrorism.
Operation Agatha, a massive cordon, search and seizure
operation took place in June of 1946. This operation was
precipitated, in part, by the destruction of nine bridges
across the Jordan river and the kidnapping of five British 
440officers. Adamant that his policy was correct,
Montgomery, in January of 1947:
...called for intensive searches throughout the 
length and breadth of Palestine, 'turning the place 
upside down', setting aside the cumbersome need for 
direct evidence of local complicity in terrorist 
outrages. He was confident that 'no real harm 
would be done to the population and in time they 
would tire of being upset and.would cooperate in 
putting an end to terrorism.'
Nevertheless, the Jewish terrorists continued to operate
successfully in both the psychological and in the operational
context. For the most part:
Jewish attacks were imaginative and bold, and 
quite unrestrained by conscience or public opinion. 
The IZL [Irqun] and the Stern Gang dealt entirely 
with murder. Shots in the back; electrically 
detonated mines on road-sides; explosive charges in 
various guises, left to explode inside or against 
buildings; raids on isolated posts; the hanging of 
hostages —  these were their methods. Palmach's 
[Haganah] acts of sabotage were designed more to 
impress public opinion —  such as the destruction 
of a number of Halifax aircraft at Qastina airfield 
—  or in support of immigration.
440 .Mitchell, op. cit., p. 62.
441Townshend, op. cit., p. 116. Extracted from Cabinet 
Defence Committee, 19 December, 1946. "Palestine: Use of
the Armed Forces." DO(46)145. F0371 52567. Brief for
Secretary of State, Colonies, on new Directive for HC 
Palestine on Use of Armed Forces. (Cabinet, 15 January,
1947) CO 537 3870.
442G.G. Norton, The Red Devils: The Storv of the
British Airborne Forces, p. 139. There were operational and 
philosophical differences between the Jewish groups. The 
HAGANAH was the title for the self-defence units belonging to 
the Jewish community residing in Palestine during the British
(Footnote Continued)
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According to Townshend, Cunningham attempted to forestall
aggressive military action as he;
...repeatedly vetoed 'vigorous* offensive, 
retaliatory or punitive actions requested by the 
army, on the grounds of the 'major political 
factors involved and the extreme difficulty of 
hitting the section of the community 
responsible'....
The temporary use of martial law during 1947 suggested that
the rule of civil government was ineffective? in short,
bankrupt. It appeared that "The paralysis of the civil
government was obviously so severe as to make it dependent on
444military support." It soon became apparent to Cunningham 
that to succeed in low-intensity operations, conventional 
offensive operations and martial law were useless. He fully 
understood;
...that military action by itself could not
'get at' terrorists. Only the cooperation of the
ordinary people would permit this, and martial law
(Footnote Continued)
mandate and was a defensive military force created to protect 
Jews from Arab insurgents. From the HAGANAH would later 
spring the PALMACH, an independent underground military unit. 
The PALMACH was formed to act either as an independent unit 
or in co-operation with the British forces and did so 
particularly during the August 1941 invasion of Syria and 
Lebanon. The skills learned during the war would prove vital 
in the Jewish fight for a homeland.
Another organization called itself the IRGUN ZVAI LEUMI (IZL) 
better known as the IRGUN. This group had been founded in 
the 1930s by the right-wing Revisionist party and rejected 
the defensive strategy against the Arabs held by the HAGANAH. 
It was the IRGUN's political policy to expel the British from 
Palestine and to create a Jewish state. It was their 
intention to avoid the loss of life if at all possible. The 
third resistance movement was the LOHAMEI HERUT YISRAEL 
(LEHI), better known as the STERN GANG. This formation was 
an off-shoot of the IZL. Their programme was a mixture of 
extreme right-wing and revolutionary elements. In their 
view, the real enemy was British imperialism, and the 
terrorist activities demonstrated that they had no qualms 
about employing political murder.
443Townshend, op. cit., p. 116.
444Ibid., p. 117.
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could only work if it imposed the sort of pressure 
that would elicit such help.
Thie British were, for the most part, mentally still in the
imperial policing era and were not prepared to cope with
fighting organized terrorists. Mitchell argues that:
The laws which the British judiciary enforced in 
Palestine had been designed to hold down primitive 
colonies and not sophisticated Europeans, and 
amongst the penalties imposed upon those convicted 
of helping the terrorists was flogging. This the 
terrorists effectively stopped by kidnapping and 
flogging a British Brigade Major of the Airborne 
Division.
The post-war anti-terrorist fighting in Palestine appears to
have been, for the most part, deleted from the army's memory.
Although the campaign may have been a negative and
frustrating experience, Charters suggests that it was not
totally ignored. He points to the fact that post-war Staff
College courses included study of internal security
447operations, especially Palestine. Notwithstanding, this
short-term interest, it appears that this painful experience
was not noteworthy as no official history was written on the 
448campaign. This may be due to the fact that the British
Army felt uncomfortable in dealing with the highly charged 
. .political and religious aspects of the campaign itself. No
. A
■ ' //fJtrZTj h  &  y  Cr^ P I
' '— ' *
445ibid.
446Mitchell, op. cit., pp. 63-64.
447Charters and Tugwell, op. cit., p. 234. For example, 
the 1947 course employed seven days in studying internal 
security operations and included lectures on Palestine. It 
should be underlined that some aspects of this campaign were 
subjects written for publication by some officers. For 
example see Brigadier R.N. Anderson, "Search Operations In 
Palestine: The Problem Of The Soldier," The Armv Quarterly.
Vol. LV, (October, 1947 and January, 1948), pp. 201-208.
448ibid.
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other satisfactory answer has been found for the lack of the 
army's appreciation for this experience.
Malava - The British Success Story
It is not until Malaya, when communist-inspired violence
broke out in June of 1948, that we finally see military
interest in guerrilla warfare become apparent. This
professional interest slowly developed particularly after the
success of Mao Tse Tung's 1949 Victory campaign in China. In
turn, the Maoist theories of protracted war figured quite
prominently in the internal security manual entitled,
Imperial Policing and Duties in Aid of the Civil Power 1949.
published by the War Office. This document acknowledged that
there was a spectrum of reasons, i.e., religious and racial,
which could spur political unrest and violence. The fact
remained that such dissatisfaction could be provoked and
449motivated by "outside influences." The fact continued to
elude the British Army that "popular support was essential to
450the survival and success of the insurgents." Despite the
extensive experience of inspiring, nurturing and fighting
alongside, not to mention against, numerous guerrilla
movements during the 1939-45 war in Europe and the Far East,
it was only in the initial stages of the campaign in Malaya
that this need for popular support was finally recognized.
Captain B.H. Liddell Hart argues that during World War II:
...guerrilla warfare became so widespread as to 
be an almost universal feature. It developed in 
all the European countries that were occupied by 
the Germans and most of the Far Eastern countries 
occupied by the Japanese.... it became part of
449**yIbid., p. 235
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Churchill’s war policy to utilize guerrilla warfare 
as a counter-weapon. Special branches of Britain's 
planning organization were devoted to the purpose 
of instigating5and fostering 'Resistance' 
movements....
The seemingly logical appreciation of developing and
monitoring a popular support base from which one could
instigate counter-guerrilla warfare appears to have been
ignored. It has been stated that "Once recognized, however,
it became virtually an article of faith within the body of
knowledge which passes for British 'doctrine' of insurgency
452and counter-insurgency." It was the identification of
453this element, the winning of hearts and minds, that became 
the starting point for successful British low-intensity 
operations.
Harold Briggs Sets the British Strategy
The most significant appointment during the initial part of 
the Malayan Campaign, was that of Director of Operations 
given to Lieutenant General Sir Harold Briggs. Just two
451Mao Tse-Tung and Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, p. 
x. For the purpose of this paper guerrilla warfare consists 
of "Military and paramilitary operations conducted in 
enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly 
indigenous forces." Resistance is defined as "An organized 
effort by some portion of the civil population of a country 
or region to resist the legally established government or an 
occupying power, and, at a minimum, to disrupt civil order 
and stability or, as a maximum, overthrow or displace the 
legal authority." See Trevor N. Depuy, Curt Johnson and 
Grace P. Hayes, Dictionary Of Military Terms; A Guide To The
Language Of Warfare And Military Institutions, p. 107 and p.
187 respectively.
452 ,Charters and Tugwell, op. cit., p. 235.
453In the article by Keith Jeffery, "The British Army 
And Internal Security 1919-1939," The Historical Journal.
Vol. 24, No. 2, (1981), p. 387, he writes that the British
Army recognized earlier on that they had to engender a degree
of popularity and support amongst the citizenry and to avoid 
unwarranted force.
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weeks after his arrival in Malaya he produced the Briggs plan 
which outlined four objectives:
a) To dominate the populated areas and to build up
a feeling of complete security, which would in time 
result in a steady and increasing flow of 
information coming from all sources.
b) To break up the Communist organizations within the 
populated areas.
c) To isolate the bandits from their food and supply 
organizations in the populated areas.
d) To destroy the bandits by forcing them to5attack 
the Security Forces on their own ground.
It was this plan that General Sir Gerald Templer nurtured and
brought to fruition when he subsequently was appointed High
Commissioner and Director of Operations early in 1952.
It was this change in British civil, political and military
methodology that unlocked the secret of guerrilla warfare and
in the end produced a well-planned and well-executed
strategy. From the British experience in Malaya and
elsewhere Sir Robert Thompson, an observer on low-intensity
warfare, codified five principles of counter-insurgency:
First Principle. The government must have a clear
political aim: to establish and 
maintain a free, independent and 
united country which is politically 
and economically stable and viable.
Second Principle. The government must function in
accordance with law.
Third Principle. The government must have an overall
plan.
Fourth Principle. The government must give priority to
defeating the political subversion, 
not the guerillas.
Fifth Principle. In the guerilla phase of an
insurgency, a government must 
secure its base areas first.
454Julian Paget, Counter-Insurgency Campaigning, pp. 
56-57.
455Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency; 
The Lessons of Malava and Vietnam, pp. 50-57.
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It is important to note that of the five principles four are 
political in character. It is to these principles that the 
British Army adapted itself during the Malayan campaign. The 
common thread that unites most insurgencies is the desire to 
achieve political power; a goal not to be reached through 
direct military force but through a less violent form of 
seduction;
...a process of gradual subversion, persuading 
(or forcing) the people of a state to support the 
aims of the insurgency or, at least, to stop 
supporting the government. Either way, the centre 
of state power will be progressively isolated, and 
although the Security Forces protecting that centre 
will have to be worn down using guerrilla 
techniques, military actions by the insurgents will 
always remain subordinate to the overriding aim of 
political usurpation.
To counter this strategy all government resources —  civil, 
military and police —  must respond to the strategic designs 
of the insurgents. They must be denied access to the 
population thus depriving them of their support base. This 
must take precedence over any purely military actions aimed 
at a mere armed confrontation with the guerrillas. Pimlott 
argues;
After all, if the threat is political, then the 
long-term solution has also to be political: the
role of the Security Forces should be to create an 
atmosphere in which guerrilla attacks do not 
disrupt_the process of legitimate political 
rule.
In meeting this task the British Army, in concert with the 
police, security and intelligence forces, began to realize 
the importance of the intelligence function in low-intensity 
operations. In addition, it incorporated the requirement for
Beckett and Pimlott, op. cit., pp. 19-20.
457 Ibid., p. 20.
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a decision-making body and advisory group to prepare and 
direct a national plan. In Malaya, Templer combined the 
positions of Commissioner and Director of Operations to 
facilitate the co-ordination of political and military 
operations during the critical period from February, 1952 to 
June, 1954. He emphasized the primacy of civilian control
at all levels, a characteristic soon to dominate British 
counter-insurgency campaigning. This would be assisted, as 
required, through any number of legal powers including a 
declaration of a state of emergency. The British Army view 
was that:
The responsibility for conducting the campaign 
in Malaya rests with the Civil Government. The 
Police Force is the Governments normal instrument 
for the maintenance of Civil Authority but, in the 
current Emergency, the Armed Forces have been 
called in to support the Civil Power in its task of 
seeking out and destroying armed Communist 
terrorism.
Special committees consisting of civil, military and police 
representatives, but under civilian chairmanship extended 
from the pinnacle of the government downwards. These 
committees ensured political primacy throughout the war 
effort and also provided or conducted the appropriate civil, 
military or combined responses at every stage.460
A R flSee John Cloake, Templer: The Tiger of Malava. p.
204. According to John Cloake, Winston Churchill said to 
Templer "You must have power —  absolute power —  civil power 
and military power. I will see that you get it.” See also 
Noel Barber, The War Of The Running Dogs, pp. 147-160, for an 
insight on Templer.
459Special Forces School, United States Army Institute 
for Military Assistance, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, The 
Conduct Of Anti-Terrorist Operations In Malava. Third 
Edition. 1958. Chapter III, p. 1.
460Ibid., Chapter III, pp. 1-4.
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Importance of Intelligence
The Malayan experience once again indicated that accurate and
timely intelligence is a prerequisite in conducting
successful low-intensity operations, particularly as all
co-ordinating bodies constantly need information regarding
the nature of the threat which they face. This aspect was
emphasized and appreciated in Malaya:
Successful operations against the CT [communist 
terrorist] organization depend upon accurate and 
timely intelligence? without it the CTO can never 
be defeated. A first class intelligence 
organization, in which everyone plays their part is 
thus essential. All troops must realise the 
importance of reporting as accurately as possible 
every piece of information which they obtain, both 
about the CT and the topography of the country over 
which they are operating.
Acquiring the intelligence for the authorities to act upon
was no simple matter in this 12-year campaign. There was
also the matter of gaining the confidence of the local
population which was vital to acquiring this information.
Jock Haswell underlines:
At the beginning the intelligence problems were 
mainly organizational and, perhaps even more 
important, the acquisition of information from 
intimidated villagers who, whether they liked it or 
not, were in constant contact with the terrorist 
gangs in the jungle. Many lessons were learned in 
Malaya and by far the most valuable was the need
for an intelligence organization to.embrace all
agencies under centralized control.
It was Templer, upon taking command in Malaya, who completely
re-organized the intelligence system. All intelligence was
to be directed and channelled:
...through the filtering system of intelligence 
committees to and from a single head, the Director 
of Intelligence. Thus intelligence in Malaya 
became a closely integrated and co-ordinated
461Ibid., Chapter XIV, p. 1.
462 . . . .Jock Haswell, British Military Intelligence, p. 216.
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organization? a major-factor in the solution of the 
Malayan problem,...
In the end, British victory over the terrorists depended much
upon accurate and timely intelligence, as well as the failure
of the insurgents to gain the loyalty of the people:
The terrorists were finally defeated because 
they lost the support of the villagers: the troops
who tracked them down knew where their camps were, 
how many men were in the camps, what weapons they 
had and the state of their supplies, health and 
morale. Each success by the security forces led to 
more information and more ‘contacts1 with the 
terrorists until the 'enemy' came out of the jungle 
to give themselves up.
Templer's experience as the Director of Military Intelligence
had a direct influence on him during the Malayan campaign, as
he fully appreciated the importance of intelligence and the
police's special branch. He foresaw the requirement to
re-build the police force and did so by restructuring its
command authorities while at the same time bringing in
experienced personnel. For example:
... in Malaya 500 former members of the Palestine 
Police, already well-versed in counter-insurgency 
techniques, were recruited and placed under the 
comman^6gf Sir Arthur Young from the City of London
The Army's Task in Malava
The army had a responsibility in Malaya to destroy the enemy, 
acquire intelligence, assist in cordon and search operations, 
psychological warfare campaigning and the like.
Nevertheless, the primary objective was to ensure the 
restoration of police control as soon as the law enforcement 
authorities were capable of doing their job. In this British
463Ibid., p. 217.
464Ibid., pp. 218-219.
465Beckett and Pimlott, op. cit., p. 21.
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Army had to realize that its task was political in nature,
essentially, to gain time so the government could:
...restore civilian policing as soon as 
possible, both to improve the flow of intelligence 
and to recreate an air of normality in the 
threatened state.
Once this situation was achieved, the priority initially was
to counter subversive elements and secondly to isolate the
terrorists from the local population. The government then
had to identify and address the core grievances expressed by
the insurgent forces. In this regard the British government
formally promised that independence would take place once the
communists were defeated.
In concert with these goals a programme of civil aid projects 
was instituted bringing roads, education, medical and health 
facilities to the areas that needed them. The aim was "to 
give the people a vested interest in the existing 
administration of the state: in Templer's words, to
A. CL T7
influence their ‘hearts and minds.*" This key factor was
most difficult as the enemy made maximum use of the tools of 
terrorism, coercion, inimidation and inducements.
The Malayan experience provided the British Army with a
framework for the analysis of insurgency and an opportunity
to develop a doctrine of counter-insurgency both well
illustrated in a pyramid diagram entitled 'The Pattern of
468Revolutionary Warfare Sequence of Insurgent Action.1 The
467Ibid., p. 2 2.
4 68Ministry of Defence, Land Operations. Volume III. - 
Counter Revolutionary Operations. Part 1. - Principles And 
General Aspects. 29 August, 1969, p. 118A.
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diagram itself describes the communist revolutionary strategy
and the counter-moves required by the security forces
. . 469confronted with the situation.
The British Armv* s Experience Level
Due to the frequency of British forces involvement in low-
intensity operations, they were able to acquire and maintain
an extraordinarily high level of skill amongst all ranks.
Pimlott writes that:
...by the time of the initial deployment to 
Northern Ireland in 1969, for example, it was not 
unknown for an infantry battalion to contain men 
(particularly senior NCOs) who had already fought 
in three or four different campaigns. This was a 
priceless advantage, for despite occasional 
evidence that each campaign began with a painful 
process of relearning the lessons of its 
predecessors, it created a repository from which to 
draw the strength to carry on.
Moreover, the British Army knew the type of enemy that they
would confront in Northern Ireland. Its accumulation of
operational experience had given it an appreciation of the
type of conflict it was about to enter and the threat posed
by the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA). This was to
be a terrorist war based on a clandestine political-military
group with all actions wedded to propaganda and political
activity. The experiences of the British Army facilitated
4 69Charters and Tugwell, op. cit., p. 236. This 
communist strategy was of course not the only model the 
British were to face in the post-war world but it was 
nonetheless used extensively by British analysts. Charters 
notes that at this time ftthe Army did seize upon the 
communist revolutionary technique —  exemplified mainly by 
Malaya, but latterly by Vietnam —  almost exclusively as the 
'model1 for the organizational, political/military, and 
tactical aspects of the insurgent."
470Beckett and Pimlott, op. cit., p. 24.
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the development of principles for low-intensity operations as 
we shall subsequently explore.
Principles for Low-Intensitv Operations
The British Armyfs experience in low-intensity operations in
the post-war period helped formulate a number of general
principles. Charters states:
...the experience from Palestine forward pointed 
to the need for the Army to develop a body of 
operational principles and tactical skills 
appropriate for the particular political 
circumstances of one conflict, but readily 
transferable and adaptable to another.
Such a body of operational principles and tactical skills had
evolved by the time of the multi-faceted terrorist threats of
the 1970s and 1980s.
Charters notes that the most obvious principle is to have the
government issue a clear political aim from which the
military can, in concert with the civil authority, define its 
472role. This was difficult to do in Palestine and Kenya but
later on in the campaigns in Malaya and in Borneo, an aim was
identified and thereby effective military operations could be
set in motion. The military frustration experienced in
Palestine was that no clear political aim was issued to the
military. It has been stated:
...the political aim was less certain, absent, 
or completely at odds with local aspirations, the 
Army was left 'holding the ring' and the military 
dimension was affected accordingly....the directive 
to 'keep the peace' was enunciated and pursued in a
471 i Charters and Tugwell, op. cit., p. 237.
472 Ibid., p. 238.
policy vacuum, and in the face of violent 
opposition from the Jewish community.
In the Kenyan case, Britain's inability to provide a
political response to the 1952-1956 Mau Mau uprising was also
474a source of frustration, making it difficult for the
475military commander to formulate a plan of action.
Moreover, the British Army was initially unprepared for this
476type of warfare.
In Cyprus, through the absence of a political stance, the
British government was obliged to reverse an initial position
which opposed Cypriot independence. Even today in Ireland
there seems to be no clear political aim behind British
477military operations other than keeping the peace. After
years of low-intensity operational experience British 
governments still lose sight of the foremost principle, the 
need for a clearly defined political aim, without which only 
hampers the army's ability to match a military strategy to 
the announced political objectives. In the case of Northern 
Ireland it is probably impossible to ascertain political 
objectives in the conditions which exist at present there.
The second principle is the complete co-operation between the 
triumvirate of police, military and civil authorities.
General Darling argues:
473ibid.
474Michael Carver, War Since 1945. pp. 32-36 and Ian 
Henderson and Philip Goodhart, Man Hunt In Kenya.
475 Ibid., p. 34.
476Ibid., p. 33.
477 Interview with a senior British Army officer, Ottawa, 
Ontario, Canada, 12 December, 1988, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada.
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...the problem of command is one of welding 
together, from the highest to the lowest level in 
the territory concerned, the civil administration, 
the civil police, and the military forces 
involved.... Whatever organization is required, it 
must ensure intimate cooperation between the 
various4^gvernment departments and the armed
When comparing the British colonial experience in 
low-intensity operations with other major examples in the 
world, outside the British Empire, it is evident that Great 
Britain faced a special situation where this principle is 
concerned. After all, the British government was the 
governing authority in all the areas where British forces 
were involved. This principle is thus part and parcel of the 
British colonial experience itself which gave the British 
authorities ascendancy in a number of ways. In particular, 
they enjoyed a relatively free hand in dealing with any 
situation. The British controlled the police, 
communications, social services and the rest of the 
infrastructure needed to deal effectively with any developing 
situation in a colony. This in turn led to the next step of 
instituting close co-operation between military, civil and 
police with the appointment of a Supremo,* such as Templar, 
who acted as High Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief in 
Malaya for two critically important years of the emergency.
The last principle is the absolutely vital objective of
obtaining the support of the population. The army knows this
479as psychological operations or 'psy ops. 1 Kitson points 
out its value and constraints:
478Darling, op. cit., p. 5.
479 For an insight into fpsy ops' see Noel Barber, The 
War Of The Running Doas. pp. 115-121 .
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...the army can make a contribution before 
the outbreak of violence...in the field of 
psychological operations and propaganda, where the 
government not only has to counter the steps which 
the enemy are taking to get their cause across to 
the population, but also has to.put across its own 
programme in an attractive way.
The army in Malaya, as well as in subsequent campaigns, felt
that psychological operations must also be directed at the
enemy. This would assist in the breaking of the enemy's
spirit in pursuit of his political aims:
Psychological warfare (PW) is directed at the 
Communist Terrorist Organisation with the object of 
bringing home to the terrorists the sense of 
military and political defeat and isolation from 
the people; undermining their confidence in the 
leadership and policy of the Malayan Communist 
Party (MCP)? creating dissension and distrust 
within the CT organisation? turning individual 
terrorists into easier military targets? and 
securing surrenders. It should be noted that the 
object is to cause general demoralisation and is 
much broader than just increasing the rate of 
surrender and.disintegration of the CT 
organisation.
These psychological warfare considerations were further honed 
and developed under the auspices of the SAS in post-war 
campaigns. Special forces have, in particular, pursued this 
last aspect of low-intensity operations? Oman being a case in 
point. As will be seen, however, the other two principles (a 
clear political aim and co-operation amongst all involved 
agencies) are also part of the foundation of special forces 
activities.
480Kitson, op. cit., p. 77.
481Special Forces School, United States Army Institute 
for Military Assistance, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, The 
Conduct of  op. cit., Chapter III, p. 16.
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Section II
Historical Overview of British Special Forces
To appreciate fully the role of Special Forces within
low-intensity operations it is appropriate to reflect upon
the history of the British Army and in turn, the evolution of
Special Forces within that context. Throughout the history
of the British Army there has been a need for specifically
tasked and trained soldiers of many kinds. In 1756, for
example, during the colonial period in America, Roger's
Rangers were raised to undertake raiding and reconnaissance
482duties during the French and Indian wars. These troops
drew much of their tactical success from the fast and violent 
unconventional tactics of the indigenous Indian tribes. 
Although the Rangers were, for the most part, viewed by 
orthodox soldiers with scepticism, they did have some 
considerable impact, particularly in the creation of regular 
light infantry units whose equipment and tactics were 
specifically adapted to skirmishing and forest warfare. Such 
light troops were to form a part of the British forces from 
then on in one form or another.483
It is interesting that Colonel Lawrence, the proponent of 
guerrilla warfare, who assisted in fomenting and leading the 
Arab Revolt in World War I, found that his contribution in 
the desert war did not have much influence in the post-war
482U.S. Army, Ranger Handbook. ST 21-75-2, Ranger 
Department, United States Army Infantry School (October, 
1980), p. i.
483 For a discussion on their evolution and role, see Hew 
Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War, pp. 28-32.
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era of imperial soldiering. For the most part, little
military attention was paid to the documentation or study of
Lawrence*s successes in guerrilla operations:
After World War I British military thought 
(and not only British) was largely conditioned by 
the memory of trench warfare in France, or mountain 
warfare on the North West Frontier of INDIA and the 
unorthodox.operations carried out by LAWRENCE were 
forgotten.
This was based on the fact that the British Army was
principally commanded by officers whose experience was on the
Western Front. The Palestine campaign, as well as the Arab
Revolt, were considered by many as a mere sideshow. Then,
after the disaster of 1940, when Winston Churchill wished to
"set Europe ablaze,” staff officers had to begin from scratch
to create special units for the various tasks at hand. A
number were formed and were very controversial. They
continued, however, to serve in a wide variety of roles for
the remainder of the war and were, for the most part, not
fully appreciated by either the senior commanders or the Army
as a whole. Arguments persist, however, as to their real
485value. Charters writes that two units, the Commandos and
486the Special Air Service:
...like the other special forces, had a mixed 
record of success and were the subjects of 
considerable controversy and criticism relating to 
their operational effectiveness, command and
484 . ."Special Forces In The British Army," Lecture script
in the McLeod Collection, University of London, King*s 
College, Centre for Military Archives. Undated, p. 2.
485 See James Ladd, Commandos and Rangers Of World War
U *
486See "Memorandum By Col. David Stirling, DSO, OBE. On 
The Origins Of The Special Air Service," McLeod Collection, 
University of London, King's College, Centre for Military 
Archives. Undated.
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control, and their relationship to traditional army 
structures.
Moreover, they appear to have rankled senior British
bureaucrats with their sense of operational independence. In
one instance:
A sub-committee of the War Office Directorate 
of Tactical Investigation was critical of the 
tendency of special forces to 'drift away' from the 
normal channels of command, to become private 
armies and a law unto themselves.
The result of this conservatism in the army hierarchy led to
the disbandment of almost all special forces upon the
cessation of hostilities. Nevertheless, a glimmer of hope
did exist, as some in the post-war army appreciated that a
special forces unit could be useful in retaining and
developing the capacity for special operations. In 1947, the
Artists Rifles, a London-based territorial regiment was made
489into a Special Air Service (SAS) unit. Initially, this
unit's role had been a conventional one, and it was not until 
the Malayan emergency that the SAS began to develop their 
special skills and capabilities for low-intensity operations.
Palestine had, however, witnessed special operations of a 
type, but these actions only served to give credence to the 
fears of the more orthodox soldiers as to what special forces 
and special operations were all about. One secret 
organization, led by Bernard Ferguson, an ex-serving British 
officer seconded to the Palestine Police, was formed from 
former special operations soldiers. This unit, made up of
487Charters and Tugwell, op. cit., p. 255.
488ibid.
489Philip Warner, The Special Air Service, p. 184.
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counter-terrorist troops, had some initial successes against
the Jewish terrorists, but was later implicated in a charge
of carrying out alleged atrocities. Roy Farran, a highly
dedicated and decorated SAS officer, was placed on trial but
490later acquitted of a murder charge. It was clear to most
concerned that some type of special force was necessary, but
to be useful it had also to be Expendable* and at the beck
and call of those in government and the army. This would
enable the government and the commander to plead what can be
called 'plausible deniability', which essentially means
having sufficient grounds to deny knowledge of covert
military operations. Charters points out:
...one aspect is clear; the special squads 
operated in a 'gray* legal, moral and political 
environment without clear guidelines as to their 
mission, powers and constraints.
A major landmark in the post-war development of British 
special operations forces came about when Lieutenant-Colonel 
Michael Calvert, a tough and highly experienced officer, was 
tasked by the Commander-in-Chief Far East Land Forces,
General Sir John Harding, to do a study on the Malayan 
problem. Calvert submitted his report in the spring of 1950 
and one of his recommendations was to develop a special force 
unit skilled in deep-penetration operations in the jungle.
It was to be a reconnaissance force, but Calvert believed 
that such an organization should ideally have a wider 
mission. Basically he wanted this unit to be offensively 
oriented, capable of harassing the enemy constantly, giving
See David A. Charters, "Special Operations in . 
Counter-Insurgency: The Farran Case, Palestine 1947," RUSI
Journal. (June, 1979), pp. 56-61.
491Charters and Tugwell, op. cit., p. 256
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him no respite or safe haven. Calvert*s views, in the end,
492brought about the creation of special forces in Malaya.
With the formation of the special force some of the
traditional arguments against such units surfaced again. To
arrest such fears, the army staff wanted to keep the force
small and not to have it draw the best and the brightest from
other regiments and corps. More importantly, the army did
not want the unit viewed as someone's private army, as were
similar predecessor units of World War II. The new unit was
named the Malayan Scouts (SAS) and consisted of 16 officers
and 12 6 other ranks. It was to be commanded by Calvert.
This unit, thanks to an extensive recruiting programme which
took in experienced ex-special forces men, had by late 1951
not only a regimental headquarters and headquarters squadron,
but had expanded into four sabre (operational) squadrons
493consisting of over 900 officers and men. Operationally,
the aim was to seek, find, fix and destroy the Malayan 
terrorists and to prevent any infiltration of these into the 
cleared areas.
The tactics of long-range, extended stay-behind patrols, 
ambush techniques and tracking were honed while the Malayan 
Scouts became accustomed to jungle operations. These skills 
were combined with a food-denial and a civil aid programme 
more widely known as Field Marshal Templer*s 'hearts and 
minds' mission in 1952-53. The food-denial programme
492Tony Geraghty, Inside the SAS. pp. 25-29.
493Charters and Tugwell, op. cit., p. 257.
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attempted to deny guerrillas any access to food and to
494prevent them from cultivating crops of their own The 
'hearts and minds' programme was to assist indigenous tribes 
in protecting themselves and to provide medical, health and 
engineer assistance to establish a bond between them and the 
central government.
The Regiment adapted quickly and brought with it some notable 
skills and innovations. These included such diverse skills 
as tree-jumping (parachuting into heavy jungle), the use of 
inflatable boats for river operations, a variety of 
jungle-fighting techniques, psychological warfare in the 
booby-trapping of terrorist supplies, and most important, an 
appreciation for winning the support of the indigneous 
peoples.
The tactical employment of the Special Air Service did,
however, experience some growing pains and inappropriate
495operational assignments. In March to June of 1951 the
force was used as infantry and then again from October, 1951 
to April, 1952 they were asked to work in concert with Royal 
Marines and police authorities in conventional operations.
494See R.W. Komer, The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: 
Organization of A Successful Counterinsuraencv Effort, pp. 
58-61. According to Komer, "Over time, this complex of food 
and resource controls together with the food denial 
operations seem to have done a great deal to sap insurgent 
strength.", p. 61.
495 , Captain J.M. Woodhouse, "Some Personal Observations
On The Employment Of Special Forces In Malaya," The Armv
Quarterly. Vol. LXVI, (April and July, 1953), p. 72. The
author states that "The S.A.S. were soon used entirely as
infantry, .... This led to some easy successes in killing
terrorists, but the change in tactics necessitated by
different conditions in the jungle fringes meant that the
S.A.S. were losing or never learning the art of small force
operations."
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The Regiment evolved, and the Malayan Scouts (SAS) became the 
22 Special Air Service Regiment. A tour of duty with the 
Regiment was two years for regulars and one for national 
servicemen. To ensure the quality of the soldier, a 
selection course was put in place to weed out unsatisfactory 
candidates and to give the eventual SAS soldier the required
skills in parachuting, navigation, tactics and jungle warfare
• 496techniques necessary for SAS operations in Malaya. The
SAS capabilities were described by the Commander-in-Chief Far
East who sent the following message:
Since your formation in 1951 you have had the 
task of deep jungle reconnaissance and of fighting 
Communist Terrorists in areas inaccessible to other 
forces. You have accounted for 124 Communist 
Terrorists, which is indeed a fine performance, but 
as important as these victories have been your 
achievements in winning over aboriginal tribes to 
our cause has been vital and this will have a 
lasting effect long after the jungle war has been 
forgotten. You have shown by your operations in 
the deep and unknown jungle over periods of three 
months and more at a stretch that the British 
soldier can adapt himself to the most difficult 
conditions and can defeat the most cunning enemy on 
his own ground.
Although the regiment was not on the army's Order of Battle
at this time, the SAS joined the establishment in 1957 when a
committee charged with studying the requirement for special
forces concluded that there was a role for them in a
conventional war scenario. This mission was essentially an
extension of their wartime and Malayan operational tasks of
498long-range and long-term deep-penetration patrols.
496Major C.L.D. Newell, "The Special Air Service," The 
British Armv Review. (September, 1955), pp. 41-42.
497 David Barzilay, The British Armv In Ulster. Vol. 3.
p. 198.
498Geraghty, op. cit., p. 40.
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Victories in Borneo and Elsewhere
The campaigns which were to follow Malaya would afford the
SAS, as well as other regiments in the British Army, an
opportunity to acquire valuable experience and skills in
low-intensity operations. In late 1958, two squadrons of the
SAS were sent from Malaya to Oman. In January, 1959, members
of A Squadron successfully defeated a large guerrilla force
situated on a seemingly impregnable position on a plateau 
499named Sabrina. The action, according to James D. Ladd,
was vitally important for the regiment's future:
The victory was complete, achieved with such an 
economy in the use of forces as to make 22 SAS's 
reputation inviolate in Whitehall's corridors of 
power.
However, due to political and military sensitivity regarding 
this operation, the British public would know little or 
nothing about this feat of arms.
After the Oman campaign, the SAS served with distinction in 
Borneo, Aden and later in the Radfan. These campaigns built 
up a large reservoir of experience in low-intensity 
operations and developed strong tactical and operational 
skills. In Borneo, the SAS were confronted with tough 
Indonesian regulars and became accustomed to employing covert 
cross-border raids penetrating from five to 20 kilometres 
into Indonesian territory. The SAS started a jungle frontier 
intelligence network employing tribesmen who lived near the
499 .Lieutenant Colonel A.J. Deane-Drummond, "Operations 
In The Oman," British Armv Review. (September, 1959), pp. 
7-14. An article from The Times, dated 9 April, 1959, quoted 
in this piece, states that this action was "a brilliant 
example of economy in the use of force.", p. 14.
500James D. Ladd, SAS Operations, p. 152.
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5011000-mile long border. The information that flowed from
these areas enabled the British Army to concentrate its 
efforts and forces, where and when needed, to counter 
Indonesian incursions into the area. As Geraghty notes, 
Borneo was:
...an environment in which as little as five 
miles a day might be an ambitious tactical 
movement.... Basically, therefore, it was the 
mixture as before, in Malaya: the hearts-and-minds
business to yield information; airborne assault 
plusQfamiliarity with the jungle to follow it 
up.
British adaptability, consideration and understanding of
local customs were vital in gaining tribal loyalties. For
example in Borneo:
Styles varied. One of the Gurkha regiments, with 
more men than the SAS, concluded that "the old 
system of giving salt, tobacco, sugar and beads was 
wrong for Borneo. Tact, courtesy and, above all, 
infinite patience and human understanding were 
needed.... Bartering of a minor nature continued 
non-stop .... It was also important to uphold at 
all times the dignity and prestige of the local 
headman. One way of accomplishing this was by 
allowing him to take the salute at ‘Retreat.'" At 
ceremonial dances, some British officers.achieved a 
succ^s d'estime by performing the Twist.
This development of a trusting relationship with the tribes
depended upon patience and cultural understanding as "the SAS
approach was to move into the village, cautiously and
sensitively, and to live there for five months or more."504
Initially the SAS was concerned as to how to approach the
indigenous tribesmen and their villages. This in itself was a
major project requiring much patience.
501For an insight into this campaign see Harold James 
and Denis Sheil-Small, The Undeclared War: The Storv Of The
Indonesian Confrontation 1962-1966.
502Geraghty, op. cit., p. 47.
503
3 Ibid., p. 48.
504ibid.
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The first step towards penetration was to build a 
secret hide in the jungle within walking distance 
of the selected village. Having kept the place 
under observation long enough to ensure that 
neither guerrillas nor Indonesian regulars were 
already established, the soldiers would walk in, 
smile, and make contact. Sometimes conversation 
was possible through the medium of Malay; sometimes 
a basic sign-language evolved. When this failed, 
as one veteran wearily recalls, ‘they would sit and 
look at us, and we would sit and look at them.'
This entertainment was somewhat one-sided, since 
the soldiers were probably the first Europeans most
of the villagers had seen. On a good day, the SAS
patrol would be invited into the animal closeness 
of the collective longhouse and offered rice-wine 
and food, before,-taking their leave to sleep in 
their hide....
Once introduced to the tribesmen the *hearts and minds' 
campaign began. Certain items, used as gifts, such as knives 
and radios along with basic medical assistance helped to 
ensure that the SAS team would become members of the
R fi (\
village. In fact, the SAS patrols became an integral part
of the everyday life of the village, assisting those who
required help, preparing the defences of the village and 
training the indigeneous tribesmen in the military arts. The 
SAS Regimental magazine Mars and Minerva described the daily 
existence:
Four men, living as members of the longhouse 
itself for months at a time, watch, listen, patrol 
and report... Day by day, the sick come for 
treatment, the women bring presents of fruit and 
vegetables, the men to gossip and bring news, the 
children to watch, silent-eyed and the leaders of 
the community to discuss their problems and to ask, 
and offer advice. The patrol slips as easily into 
the primitive rhythm of the day and season as the 
people themselves. Soon the cycle of burning, 
planting, weeding and harvesting becomes part of 
(the soldier's) life itself, and customs, rites and 
celebrations as familiar as the Cup Final or Bank 
Holidays at home....
505Ibid., pp. 48-49.
506Ibid., p. 49.
507Ibid., p. 53.
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Borneo did not stay a quiet counter-insurgency campaign. In 
December of 1963, a force of 128 guerrillas attacked Tawau 
and annihilated a detachment of the Royal Malay Regiment. It 
was later learned that 21 of these 'guerrillas* were 
Indonesian marines. Soon after this incident, the SAS began 
to operate cross-border reconnaissance patrols to locate the 
Indonesian camps and their routes. Such crossings of 
frontiers were dangerous and "ultra-sensitive politically as 
well as militarily, normally requiring approval from the 
Prime Minister in London. In this case, such operations
marked the decisive turning-point of the war in Britain's
~ ..508favor."
A 'shoot-'n-scoot' operational policy, although unpopular,
was in effect. Lieutenant-Colonel John Woodhouse, the
commanding officer, "was not going to allow heavy casualties
to destroy the morale or the credibility of the Regiment in
509London at such a time." This was important as the
prevailing impression was that the SAS was still a private
army. It was essential that Woodhouse and all ranks follow
their orders to the letter for the sake of the SAS and its
future. Woodhouse argued:
There was a tendency in military circles to 
fear that the SAS would suddenly take matters into 
their own hands and that the first news of this to 
reach the top would be that 200 Indonesians had 
been shot up in bed. I used to emphasize that it
e a q
Ibid., p. 54. For further information on these 
little known operations see Raffi Gregorian, "CLARET 
Operations and Confrontation, 1964-1966", Conflict Quarterly. 
Winter, 1991, pp. 46-72.
509ibid.
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was more important, for that sort of reason, that 
we should be seen to obey orders than anyone.
In mid-1964, General Sir Walter Walker initiated 'Claret'
operations using 'killer' groups formed by soldiers taken
from the best infantry battalions and commanded by SAS 
511personnel. These units were to penetrate initially up to 
5,000 yards and later 20,000 yards into Indonesia with the 
objective of disrupting any build-up for an attack and to 
harass the Indonesians forcing them to re-deploy their camps 
from the border.
By 1965 the Indonesian forces had abandoned their border area 
bases and the 'Claret' operations had not been mentioned by 
either the British or the Indonesians. Such operations 
pre-empted any Indonesian attempts at securing a foothold in 
Borneo and at the same time allaying any fears of an 
impending invasion. Concomitantly, these operations enabled 
the British to gather information on Indonesian intentions 
and activities in that region.
The SAS had once again used its special skills in a low- 
intensity operation adding new experience and ideas to its 
knowledge of these types of campaigns. In short, the 
"Confrontation in Borneo had shown the value of SAS in those 
difficult half-wars, when diplomatic constraints preclude
510ibid.
511 Ibid., p. 56? see also E.D. Smith, Counter-Insurcrencv 
Operations: 1 Malava and Borneo, pp. 77-80 and John Strawson, 
A History Of The S.A.S. Regiment, p. 186.
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British forces carrying the fight into the enemy*s 
homeland."512
The victory in Borneo cost Britain a total of 59 killed and
123 wounded of whom Gurkha casualties accounted for 40 dead
and 83 wounded. Indonesian losses, however, numbered 2,000 
513dead.
Oman
Oman became, once again, the area for SAS deployment in 1970.
The Marxist regime in South Yemen had been supporting a
tribal insurgency in the Omani province of Dhofar. The SAS
was assigned to Oman as a BATT (British Army Training Team)
and was responsible for the recruiting, training and command
of 'firqats*. These irregular units were composed of loyal
514tribesmen and recently surrendered enemy personnel (SEP) 
who had pledged allegiance to Sultan Qaboos. These 
irregulars established the foundation from which a 
counter-revolutionary movement gained impetus. The firqats 
provided vital intelligence and were considered to be the 
most important *war-winning* governmental initiative
512Ladd, op. cit., p. 142.
513Geraghty, op. cit., p. 62.
514 .Although written m  the Malayan context, see Colonel
Richard L. Clutterbuck, "The SEP-Guerrilla Intelligence 
Source,” Military Review. (October, 1962), pp. 13-21. The 
article discusses SEP motivations and their employment in the 
campaign in Malaya. See also Penelope Tremayne, "Guevara 
Through the Looking Glass: a View of the Dhofar War,” RUSI,
(September, 1974), pp. 39-43. The author underlines why the 
SEPS changed sides in this conflict: ”Needless to say, 
political theory has little or nothing to do with the 
question? tribal loyalties, and intimidation, have nearly 
everything.” P. 42.
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515created. They assisted m  the defence of local areas
whilst at the same time helping with civil aid projects.
Their most important contribution, however, appears to be in
the provision of information. Tony Jeapes writes:
The firqats provided information on the ground, 
the people and the enemy which could not have been 
obtained in any other way. Mistakes were made of 
course. They could be very good guides and their 
eyesight was sometimes almost incredible —  they 
could often tell whether a man was adoo, [enemy] 
firqat or.civilian from thousands of yards 
away....
In tactical and strategic planning, the staff employed a 
series of assigned lines upon which the Omani government and 
its military could project their forces and in turn develop 
and establish government control and influence. There was 
also a unified system of command, loyal and responsive to the 
political decision makers. Similarly, having an overall 
military commander of the Sultan's Armed Forces (SAF) was 
most useful in pre-empting any inter-service difficulties.
As in other counter-revolutionary operations, the campaign 
was again about hearts and minds. This was emphasized in 
Malaya and again during the Borneo confrontation only to be 
re-emphasized in the Oman. Jeapes writes that:
515 .Colonel Tony Jeapes, SAS: Operation Oman, p. 231.
See also D.L. Price, "Oman": Insurgency and Development,"
Conflict Studies. No. 53, (January, 1975), p. 9. This
article states "Now that PFLO units in east and central
Dhofar are cut off, the SAF role has shifted from
search-and-destroy to one of attrition and civil
development."
516ibid.
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Counter-revolutionary wars are first and last about 
people and throughout the campaign the need to gain the 
support of the people was continually stressed to the 
soldiers. The seizure of ground was important only if 
it allowed Government forces to make contact with the 
people. Without their support guerrillas cannot exist, 
and it was their belief that they had lost this support 
and the consequent fear of betrayal, rather than the 
pressure of Government7military operations, that caused 
the adoo to move....
Dealing with natives, and for that matter irregulars, has
been an integral part of SAS operational experience
throughout its history. It takes, however, a flexible
soldier to deal with irregulars, as T.E. Lawrence seems to
have innately understood. This is particularly true as:
The average regular officer or soldier finds 
dealing with irregulars a frustrating experience 
because they are anathema to all his military 
upbringing. He is taught to honour the military 
virtues of discipline, smartness and 
self-sacrifice. Irregulars are, fpr8the most part, 
undisciplined, untidy and selfish.
It is, moreover, noteworthy that such operational missions
are suited only to highly adaptable troops, even those within
the SAS.
The second most important Omani government initiative was the 
creation of a Civil Aid Department totally involved in long­
term planning, but at the same time ready to respond swiftly 
to requirements as they occurred.
Roads cannot be built nor wells drilled overnight. 
It takes time. But time was something the 
Government did not have. If the people were to 
come across to the Government and give information 
about the adoo, that information was needed 
immediately, not six months later. The Government 
had to be able to demonstrate immediate bounty.
517Ibid.( p. 230.
518Ibid.
519Ibid., p. 232.
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As for psychological operations, an important step was the
development of an information service initially set up by the
BATT. To ensure the correct cultural appeal and
understanding of the message to be offered to the Dhofari
people, Arab advisors were employed from the beginning. As
Jeapes notes, "Only the Arab mind could interpret for the
520Western how Dhofaris might think.” This was a most
important aspect of psychological operations and in winning 
the hearts and minds of the indigenous tribes. In that light 
the level of violence to be employed in this conflict had to 
be measured according to the threat. The concern was the 
possibility of alienating the population through the 
indiscriminate employment of booby traps, massive 
conventional firepower, air power and the like that could 
produce non-combatant casualties. Furthermore, government 
forces wanted to induce the enemy to defect. More simply 
put:
Booby-trapping is a recognized form of warfare but 
it should have no place in a counter-revolutionary 
campaign like the Dhofar War. First, there was 
always the danger that a civilian may suffer 
instead; blowing up Grandma is not a very good way 
of gaining the support of most families. Second, 
the aim was to persuade the adoo to come across to 
the Government.
Defections to the government forces were indicative of 
winning the hearts and minds war. When enemy soldiers 
defected:
...they first came warily into firqat encampments 
...[and] were left by the SAS, unpressured and 
still armed, to talk to erstwhile comrades who had 
changed sides already. The existing firqat 
included brothers, cousins, uncles. Usually, 
within a few days, the converts —  officially,
520Ibid.
521Ibid., p. 233.
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Surrendered Enemy Personnel, or •SEP1 —  were ready 
to tell all they knew to SAS teams attached to the 
firqat or ... a British member of the Sultan's 
Intelligence Service.
Defections continued, brought about by word of mouth and the
visual proof of the Omani government's intention of making
their subjects' lot better. Jeapes recounts a story of one
political commissar of the insurgents who, when asked why he
defected, responded:
"Because you [the SAS] are here —  and you could 
not be here in the West unless the loyal firqats 
were with you. You would not have any firqats 
unless the people supported them and you would only 
have that support if the rumours of progress and 
development I have heard are true. If they are 
true, then the Front has told me lies. If they 
lied on that, they have probably lied on other 
things. Therefore I have surrendered to you."
...He had fought for progress and since progress 
seemed to have arrived^ he could see no point in 
continuing to fight.
The war was not won by high technology, or a 'quick-fix'
strategy. Rather, it was a controlled, time-consuming
government response emphasizing the calculated means and ways
to achieve the sole political aim. In the Oman:
...the most important weapons were those of 
economics and psychology. The government's 
provision of water wells, with drilling equipment 
ordered by the SAS and brought specially from 
Britain, was a seductive currency in the parched 
mountains. The cultivation of religion —  denied 
by the Communists^—  was just as important to many 
devout Muslims.
This strategy was based on obtaining the support of the
population and was part of the overall military aim of
522 . . . .Tony Geraghty, This is the SAS: A pictorial history
of the Special Air Service Regiment, p. 6 8.
523Jeapes, op. cit., pp. 234 - 235.
524 . . . ,Geraghty, This is the SAS: A pictorial....  op.
cit., p. 80.
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providing a secure Dhofar which could then be the beneficiary
525of a major civil development programme. In that regard:
...the SAS acted as the vanguard of civil 
development, bringing government administration to 
the wilderness and earning a great deal of goodwill 
in the process.
The SAS to this day has remained the vanguard of the British 
forces, in this type of low-intensity conflict.
Ireland
The year 1969 saw SAS activities expand closer to home. While
the second campaign in Oman was underway, D Squadron of the
SAS was deployed for a few weeks to Northern Ireland. From
1972 on, some of their officers and men were employed for
various intelligence missions against Irish terrorists.
However, an SAS Squadron was not fully committed there until 
5271976. This was an important time for both the British
Army and the SAS as they had to adapt their experiences in 
low-intensity operations from colonial situations to one much 
closer to home, where every action against IRA activists 
would be closely scrutinized by the government, the legal 
system, and the international media. SAS activities in 
Northern Ireland have been identified as similar to previous 
SAS operations in low-intensity conflicts "mainly in border 
observation, interception and ambushing of Provisional IRA
525 .Major General K. Perkins, "Counter Insurgency and
Internal Security, "British Armv Review". (December, 1981),
30.
526Ibid.
527Geraghty, Inside the SAS. p. 141.
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units.” According to the Ministry of Defence, the
description of likely SAS tasks were and are as follows:
SAS squadrons are particularly suited, 
trained and equipped for counter revolutionary 
operations. Small parties may be infiltrated or 
dropped by parachute, including free fall, to avoid 
a long approach through enemy dominated areas, in 
order to carry out any of the following tasks:
a. The collection of information on the location 
and movement of insurgent forces.
b. The ambush and harassment of insurgents.
c. Infiltration of sabotage, assassination and 
demolition parties into insurgent held areas.
d. Border surveillance.
e. Limited community relations.
f. Liaison with, and organization, training
and control of, friendly guerilla forges 
operating against the common enemy.
By 1977, two squadrons totalling about 160 men were operating
530in the province of Northern Ireland. Furthermore, it has
been reported that at this time "a senior SAS officer was
531attending all major army and security force briefings.”
The official deployment of SAS troops to Northern Ireland by
Prime Minister Harold Wilson*s government was a signal to
Irish terrorists that London would deploy its best and
brightest into Armagh county where 49 British soldiers had
been lost to attacks by the Provisional Irish Republican Army
(PIRA). Some of the patrol tactics were covert and involved
...unmarked cars by teams well armed to meet 
terrorist threats and intended to rout out local 
IRA leaders: within a year, four were killed or 
captured and six had moved south across the
C JQ
Jonathan Bloch and Patrick Fitzgerald, British 
Intelligence and Covert Action, p. 44.
529 .Ministry of Defence, Land Operations. Volume III. 
-Counter Revolutionary Operations. Part I - Principles And 
General Aspects. 29 August, 1969, p. 60.
530Bloch and Fitzgerald, op. cit., pp. 44-45.
531Ibid., p. 45.
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532border.
As in previous campaigns, such successes depended upon
intelligence gathering and the co-ordination of operations,
two areas which the SAS had consistently emphasized and
deeply appreciated. Therefore, in Northern Ireland it was
important that the SAS were 11 in constant touch with all
battalion Commanding Officers and intelligence sections
collating clues and information that might lead to a
533successful ambush.1'
As with any campaign, mishaps were inevitable and it was
reported in May of 1976 by Newsweek that two SAS men had
534"blundered into the arms of an Irish Army patrol." A
further six SAS men were arrested. Although the incident was
blamed on a navigational error, it was later ascertained
"that the eight SAS men had been in hot pursuit of an Irish
Republican Army terrorist band when they were nabbed south of 
535the border." This incident and the ensuing media
coverage brought the Regiment unwelcome publicity and only 
furthered the popular image of "highly professional men 
pursuing enemies of the state by highly uncivilised
532Ladd, op. cit., p. 166.
C o
Barzilay, op. cit., p. 197. See "Commandos kill IRA 
trio", The Globe and Mail. Toronto, 4 June, 1991. The 
article states "The highly trained SAS troops, acting on 
intelligence, had staked out the street ...." The SAS shot 
approximately 200 bullets into the vehicle, which crashed 
bursting into flames killing 3 IRA terrorists. See also Liam 
Clarke and Michael Prescott, "Inside the killing zone," The 
Sunday Times. London, 23 February, 1992. This article 
describes the 16 February, 1992 SAS ambush that took the 
lives of four IRA terrorists including the assassin Kevin 
O'Donnell.
534Kim Willenson with Nicholas Proffitt, "The Tan
Berets," Newsweek. 24 May, 1976, p. 47.
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536means." Compounding the problem, the Regiment's role in
low-intensity operations was not fully appreciated by the
army itself. This was due:
...to a misunderstanding of its role, the SAS was 
misused at first, its special skills wasted because 
ordinary infantry commanders did not know how to 
make best use of them.
For the SAS themselves and for the British Army as a whole,
Northern Ireland was a campaign extensively monitored by the
national and international news media. For the Regiment:
...this conflict was not so much one of 
learning new tactics as adjusting those tactics to 
the peculiarities of the situation. For the first 
time the SAS had to operate in a campaign covered 
extensively by the news media. So when mistakes 
were made, they appeared to gain a significance out 
of all proportionate the circumstances of the 
incident itself.
Moreover, the SAS and the British Army were held legally
accountable for any employment of lethal force. This was
diametrically opposed to any previous SAS covert experiences
in low-intensity warfare. This situation was:
...anathema to a force accustomed to carrying out 
its missions largely without accountability and to 
treating the opposition —  whether in Malaya, Oman, 
Aden or Borneo —  as military co-belligerents 
subject to normal wartime rules of engagement 
rather than to the legal niceties of civilian 
police-type arrest.
Field Marshal Lord Carver, as the Chief of the General Staff 
and later as the Chief of the Defence Staff had some
David A. Charters, "Intelligence and Psychological 
Warfare Operations in Northern Ireland," RUSI Journal. 
(September, 1977), p. 24.
537ibid.
coo
Charters and Tugwell, op. cit., p. 263.
539ibid.
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interesting concerns regarding the deployment and clandestine
operations of the SAS in Northern Ireland:
I had reservations about their employment within 
the United Kingdom, and did not believe that any 
operational advantage that their employment might 
produce would outweigh the possible political and 
public relations difficulties it might cause. My 
experience of clandestine operations.is that they 
seldom remain clandestine for long.
As with commanders of forces of other countries experienced
in low-intensity operations, Field Marshal Lord Carver
likewise did not want British troops and particularly the SAS
involved in any type of operation which could be viewed as
unlawful. Particularly as the IRA were considered to be, and
for that matter still are viewed as, criminals. Therefore,
the emphasis should be, as far as Lord Carver was concerned,
on assisting the police authorities through all lawful
avenues. Illegal acts committed by the armed forces could
jeopardize their credibility in the eyes of the public.
Therefore, the SAS could be seen as conducting their
traditional roles under new constraints. Carver argues:
In the British armed forces, a superior can only 
give a •lawful1 order, that is one that does not 
tell the subordinate to commit an illegal act, to 
obey which would make him liable in law. A British 
serviceman is not obliged to obey an unlawful 
order. Once you take a step down that slippery 
slope, there is a danger that Special Forces may 
begin to take the law into their own hands, as the 
French did in Algeria, and may have done5recently 
in the Greenpeace affair in New Zealand.
Although the British have, as previously cited, employed
counter-terror (Farran in Palestine, Kitson in Kenya) Lord
Carver was concerned that use of such methods:
540Field Marshal Lord Carver; letter to author, dated 24 
December, 1985. See also Mark Urban, "Silent but deadly", GO 
(Gentleman's Quarterly), April, 1992. This article 
underlines some of the concerns regarding the control, 
training and socialization of the SAS of today.
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...not only undermines the legal and moral 
basis of the action of the security forces, but may 
appear to legitimize the claims of the terrorists
to be fighting a war and therefore to enjoy the
status of belligerents.
The Age of Terrorism - The SAS Challenge
As SAS operations continued in the Oman and Northern Ireland,
Great Britain was experiencing the effects of ‘spill-over*
Middle East terrorism. The massacre of Israeli athletes 
during the 1972 Munich Olympics brought home the requirement 
for Great Britain to have a counter-terrorist (CT) capability 
if there should be an aircraft seizure, hostage-taking or 
siege either on British territory or involving British 
citizens.
In this new situation the government decision-makers would 
have to allocate the duties for the employment of legal force 
between executive arms, be they military, para-military or 
police. The British, as well as other Western governments, 
were confronted with the onslaught of a cadre of highly 
determined and skilled terrorists who were more than capable 
of posing a military problem to police and governmental 
authorities. In order to counter this development 
effectively, the army, and in turn the SAS, were the logical 
military organizations to be given this mission known to some 
as ‘surgical small war operations*. As noted, the SAS 
already had extensive experience in low-intensity operations,
542ibid.
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543particularly in Palestine, the 'keeni-meeni* (undercover)
544missions in Aden and from time to time, in bodyguard
545operations at home and abroad.
The SAS Are Given the CT Task
In July 1975 it was reported that plans had been formulated
to enable Whitehall to "react quickly to terrorist threats,
civil emergencies and the effects of industrial disputes."546
Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP) procedures were
established which would come into effect if the police
authorities required assistance in a terrorist situation
where they could call upon the SAS or any other speciality
547units as required.
The Special Air Services [sic] and other units have 
been specially trained along Israeli lines for 
their new role. They have certainly been used on 
one occasion and that was in January when a British 
Airways jet.was hijacked en route from Manchester 
to London.
This initiative was orchestrated by the personal interest of 
Prime Minister Edward Heath who asked the Ministry of Defence 
if they had prepared contingency plans for a terrorist threat
543 . .The term comes from Swahili describing the unseen
movement of a snake in the grass and used to describe 
undercover work in Kenya and Aden.
544 . . .  .For a view of this campaign and some SAS tasks during
this period see Julian Paget, Last Post: Aden 1964-1967.
545"SAS troops guard Queen, paper say," The Ottawa 
Citizen. 10 November, 1984.
c a  /r
"Aid to the Civil Power," The Armv Quarterly and 
Defence Journal. (July, 1975), p. 259.
547Ibid., pp. 259-260.
548Ibid., p. 260.
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similar to that witnessed during the Olympic games in Munich
in 1972. In response to Heath's question, Geraghty writes:
After a hasty search through the files, the SAS 
document was produced with the explanation that it 
had not yet been processed. Heath studied the 
documents and within hours ordered that the SAS CRW 
[Counter-Revolutionary Warfare] wing be developed 
with all speed and whatever budget was required. 
From then on it received sophisticated equipment, 
including electronic devices? greater mobility? new 
weapons more suited for use in a confined space? 
and more manpower.
The British government support for the creation of a
counter-revolutionary warfare wing soon resulted in SAS
squadrons being assigned to undertake counter-terrorist
training on a rotational basis. The training was exceedingly
demanding and included realistic live-fire exercises in
hostage rescue, and siege-breaking techniques. Casualties
would inevitably occur as in January, 1985 when Sergeant
Raymond Abbots was reportedly shot during training on a range 
550at Hereford. One senior SAS officer pointed out that
during this highly realistic CRW training a soldier will
"expend 100,000 9 mm rounds with his pistol...every sixteen
months these troops are returned to CRW...this type of
training keeps people interested, motivated and highly 
551trained."
The SAS counter-terrorist team was present during the 
Balcombe Street siege in December, 1975 where the 
Metropolitan Police trapped a four-man active service unit of
549Geraghty, This is the SAS: A pictorial..... op.
cit., p. 8 6 .
550"SAS man shot dead on range," The Times. London, 17 
January, 1985.
551Interview with a senior SAS officer, London, England, 
2 June, 1986.
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the IRA who were holding, as hostages, a middle-aged couple. 
It was here that the ‘psychological warfare* aspect of 
employing a highly skilled unit known to be experienced in 
precision small unit actions paid off. When the IRA members 
heard during a BBC broadcast that the SAS was preparing to 
storm the flat, they promptly opened negotiations which led 
to their surrender.552
The first documented action of members of the CRW team was
during the Mogadishu crisis when the GSG9 were assisted by
two SAS men. By 1977, as the terrorist situation became more
serious in Europe, it was decided that each SAS squadron
would undergo CRW wing training between operational
assignments. Thanks to the accumulated experience applicable
to their new role the regiment was well prepared for the
553Iranian embassy siege in London in 1980.
552 . .See Ronald Payne and Mervyn Edgecombe, "No mission
impossible for the SAS," Now. 9 May, 1980, p. 43. "Sir
Robert Mark, then Metropolitan Police Commissioner, said
later that he had allowed the IRA men at Balcombe Street to
know that the SAS were ready for action. He believed that
this had alarmed them and had helped to ensure their
surrender."
553Charters and Tugwell, op. cit., p. 264.
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Section III
"Operation NIMROD1 The Iranian Embassy Siege - London 
30 April - 5 Mav. 1980.
To comprehend the operational aspect of this siege one must 
understand the British legal structure which places the 
responsibility for the maintenance of law and order on the 
police. It is the Home Secretary who is responsible for 
police operations and he answers to Parliament on their 
behalf. If the need arises, the Home Secretary may call upon 
other Ministers for any support assistance he may require.
In the case of countering terrorism, the Ministry of Defence 
(MOD) can be of direct assistance. Although the police 
authorities can appeal directly to local military units for 
co-operation, authority must come from the Ministry of 
Defence (MOD) before for troops can be brought into action.
In British operations concerning Military Aid to the Civil 
Power, the law gives no extra protection or powers to 
servicemen in any confrontations with the public. All 
citizens in Great Britain have a responsibility to uphold the 
law, but at the same time they are responsible to the courts 
for any force they may deem necessary. Any force employed, 
therefore, must be acknowledged as being "reasonable in the 
circumstances.* Militarily, if an officer is ordered to 
restore law and order, he must hand back the law enforcement 
responsibility to the police as soon as that aim is achieved. 
During the period of the military restoring law and order, 
the officer or soldier is fully responsible for all actions 
as he is no longer under police command. This format was 
carefully followed in Operation NIMROD.
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To facilitate decision-making during periods of crisis, a
554Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) is put into action. A 
crisis which would activate COBR would be one having an 
international aspect or connotation, would occur within Great 
Britain, and would normally involve some sort of politically 
motivated violence.
In Great Britain, the primary responsibility in a terrorist 
situation belongs to the Chief Constable of the area 
concerned. He must ensure that the police authority can 
respond to 1 criminal' incidents. It is at this level of 
responsibility that it must first be ascertained whether an 
incident is criminal or politically motivated, and if it has 
an international dimension. If, for instance, an incident 
were to involve an embassy but was assessed as criminally 
inspired, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) would be 
merely apprised of the situation. However, if the situation 
involved terrorism and had an international dimension, the 
FCO would become directly involved in the COBR 
decision-making process. In the case of the Iranian incident 
in London, it became clear to the police after about two and
a half hours that there was indeed an international
555 .dimension. The FCO was notified, and COBR came into
action. As the site of the crisis was in Great Britain, the
Home Office became the lead government agency responsible for
554See George Brock, et al., Siege: Six Davs at the
Iranian Embassy, p. 23.
555Robert D. Hershey Jr., "Gunmen Holding Iranian 
Embassy Free 2 Hostages," The New York Times. 4 May, 1980.
In this article it is noted that the British Ambassador to 
Iran, Sir John Graham, returned to London to advise the FCO.
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dealing with the incident. According to one British
government official involved in this incident in:
...daily practice COBR would be convened and 
chaired by a senior Home Office official, as the 
siege itself was extended, other senior officials 
of the Home Office would sit as a substitute for 
the Home Secretary. You must remember COBR was in 
session around the clock. As for the Home 
Secretary, Mr. Whitelaw he attended COBR for about 
one hour periods during the first two days of the 
siege. To monitor events the Minister would appear 
at COBR at agreed times but could be called any 
time when government decisions were required.
The Home Office was assisted by the Ministry of Defence 
(MOD), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the 
British Security Service (BSS). Later the Department of 
Trade was also involved through its responsibility for civil 
aviation for reasons which will be seen later.
The grass-roots handling of the incident rested with the 
London Metropolitan Police. However, COBR provided the 
overall guidelines under which the police operated. In this 
case the police authorities employed the negotiators, 
psychiatrists, trained police marksmen (Dll), Scotland Yard's 
Anti-Terrorist Squad (C13), Explosive Ordnance Disposal Teams 
(EOD), and the mobile police tactical group called the 
Special Patrol Group (SPG). Depending on the language 
situation, the appropriate translators could be drawn from an 
updated police list. The police authorities were responsible 
only as long as they could cope with the situation.
556 .Discussion with a British Government official,
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, 31 March, 1982. See also, Robert
McGowan, et. al., "The Day Of The SAS,” The Daily Express
Special Edition. [magazine], London, May, 1980, p. 16.
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The operations and tactics to be employed during such
situations remain a police responsibility. Notwithstanding,
it is the government who decides if and when to use the SAS.
In this case, Mr. William Whitelaw, the British Home
Secretary, submitted the request to employ SAS troops to the
557Prime Minister Mrs. Margaret Thatcher.
All communications during the operation were recorded in a
558log and on audiotapes. One of the most important tapes 
dealt with the request for military assistance to rescue the 
hostages which came from Scotland Yardfs Commissioner McNee 
and the military response agreeing to the request. These 
tapes were used as evidence during post-incident 
investigation.
During the crisis, Mr. Whitelaw kept Prime Minister Thatcher 
advised, although continuous ministerial involvement remained
limited to three principals, the Home Secretary, and
559 . .representatives from the FCO and MOD. COBR efficiency and
effectiveness has been predicated upon a number of realistic
exercises that were created to mirror such eventualities as
the Iranian siege. In fact the siege "for many participants
C/T A
was hard to distinguish from an exercise." Exercises are 
held twice a year within COBR while the police authorities
557George Brock, et al., op. cit., p. 114.
558Discussion with a British Government official, 
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, 31 March, 1982.
559ibid.
560Ibid.
- 209 -
are known to exercise more often and they in turn ensure the 
participation of the military.561
Well-planned and frequent exercises in crisis management,
police and military preparedness and co-operation are
critical for the success of counter-terrorist operations. It
is an interesting point that just two months before the
Iranian embassy take over, a command post exercise was
conducted by the Home Office which activated COBR and
employed all facets of government crisis management,
negotiation and response and employed government officials,
562the police authorities and the military. In particular, 
"attention was directed towards the elements of 
decision-making involving the resolution of any crisis by 
force.
The Perpetrators: The Political Organization for the Arab
Peoples in Arabistan (POAPA)
The political reasons behind POAPA's seizure of London's 
Iranian embassy are worthwhile exploring. The province of 
Khuzestan (Arabistan) contains the majority of Iran's 
economically vital oil fields and a major refinery. The Arab 
majority in the province have historically believed that they 
were victims of cultural and economic discrimination. The 
POAPA political objectives were to gain guarantees for Arab
561ibid.
562 . . .Joint Special Operations Command, Special Operations
Dominican Republic - Mavaauez - Mogadishu - Kolwezi - Kabul ■
Iranian Embassy. London. The Centre for Conflict Studies,
University of New Brunswick, 1982, pp. 232.
563ibid.
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cultural, political and language rights. In return, the 
province would remain under Iranian government control.
POAPA demands were ignored by the Khomeini government. A few 
months later, POAPA headquarters was raided by members of the 
Islamic Revolutionary Guards. Frustrated by the failure of 
negotiations with the Ayatollah Khomeini regime, POAPA, with 
Iraqi assistance, planned to take over the Iranian embassy in 
London. In doing so, POAPA would be able to publicize the 
Arabistani cause to the global community. The terrorists 
called themselves the Martyr Muhieideen Al-Nassir Group.
The terrorists were originally from the Khuzestan region of
Iran and had subsequently fled to Iraq and were recruited and
trained for the operation, and issued with Iraqi passports.
A few weeks before the attack, they travelled to Great
Britain in two groups. They were accompanied by an Iraqi 
564known as 'SAMI' and upon arrival in London took up 
residence. The night before the attack Sami brought weapons
and ammunition, grenades and a plan of the inside of the
h>
embassy where the Iranian Arabs were staying. Three hours
before they assaulted the embassy Sami gave a final briefing
and emphasized that the attack was not to begin before 1130
hours. Unbeknownst to his comrades 'Sami' then went to
Heathrow and left the country on a Paris-bound aircraft about
565the time the terrorists attacked the embassy.
564 "Iraqi is hunted in London siege," The Globe and 
Mail. Toronto, 15 May, 1980. Subject was identified as Sami 
Mohammed Ali by Scotland Yard.
c c
A detailed examination of the events of the siege is 
included in Appendix 1.
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At The Embassy - 30 April, 1980
Around 1130 in the morning, six terrorists entered the 
Iranian embassy and overpowered Constable Trevor Lock, an 
armed British police officer, a member of the A-ll Diplomatic 
Protection Group, just inside the embassy*s doorway. Moments 
later, after firing a few intimidating shots, the terrorists 
had taken complete control of the embassy and those inside. 
Twenty-six hostages were taken, but, due to a variety of 
reasons, five of the hostages would be released during the 
period of the siege. Fortunately one of the embassy staff 
managed to telephone the police. The London Metropolitan
R
Police units responded, police snipers (Dll) took up
position around the embassy site as did the anti-terrorist 
567squad (C13) and the technical support branch (C7).
The SAS was initially alerted to this situation by an ex-SAS 
NCO who was serving as a dog handler with the London 
Metropolitan Police. On his own initiative he telephoned 
Hereford (22 SAS Regimental Headquarters) and advised them of 
the event. Following the standard operational procedure, the 
stand-by SAS Counter Revolutionary Wing Team, known as the 
'Pagoda Troop', was forward-based in secure accomodations in 
Regent's Park. Initially, the team spent their time carrying 
out reconnaissance of the embassy and constructing a scale 
model of the embassy building itself. In turn, members were 
briefed of the situation and began carrying out practice 
assaults and house-clearing drills on similar facilities.
566Brock, et al., op. cit., p. 21.
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As in any surgical operation, intelligence was vital 
particularly as the embassy had some 50 rooms. Technical 
assistance, in the shape of microphones and surveillance 
devices, was important as this gave the police and the SAS 
valuable information in preparing a 'final option.'
The initial demands of the terrorists were the release of 91 
prisoners held in Iran, the latter's recognition of the 
national rights of Arabistan and the provision of an aircraft 
to fly them and some of their hostages to an undisclosed 
location. Later, their demands included a dialogue with a 
number of Arab ambassadors and they threatened to kill the 
hostages and blow up the embassy if their demands were not 
met by noon on 1 May.
Negotiations began and by the sixth day the situation had 
deteriorated to the point that the terrorists renewed their 
threat to execute their hostages. At 1331 hours on 5 May a 
hostage was shot. At 1850 hours that same day three more 
shots were heard and a dead hostage was pushed out the 
embassy door. At this time, Mr. Whitelaw contacted Prime 
Minister Thatcher and obtained her approval to use the SAS.
At 1923 hours the SAS men got to the first floor balcony from 
the embassy's roof. Another team moved to the ground floor 
terrace at the rear of the embassy. After gaining entry the 
SAS swept through the embassy killing five of the six 
terrorists. One hostage was killed by one of the terrorists. 
One terrorist survived by slipping into a group of hostages 
being moved out of the embassy. The quick evacuation of the 
embassy was managed by the SAS by literally throwing the 
hostages from one SAS member to another. Once all the
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hostages were cleared from the building they could then be 
properly accounted for. The operation took a total of 11 
minutes to complete and by 1940 hours 19 hostages were 
reported safe. The Iranian hostage siege had ended. (For a 
detailed report see Appendix I.)
Iranian Embassy Siege - Summary of Events
By the end of the first day, it was assessed by the police
that the hostage-taking could last a few days particularly as
the terrorists were behaving very calmly. Police authorities
were, as yet, not certain that the terrorists had any type of
explosives or grenades in their possession. In early
discussions between the police and the SAS, the latter did
568not favour an early hostage rescue operation because the
SAS wished to acquire as much information and intelligence on 
the Iranian embassy as possible, including the location of 
terrorists and hostages. As for the hostages, police 
authorities were attempting, with the assistance of two 
Iranians, who fortuitously escaped as the gunmen moved in, to 
learn the identities of the terrorists.
e/rp
Proceedings of the 10th Annual Symposium on the Role 
of Behavioural Science in Physical Security. Outthinkina the 
Terrorist: An International Challenge. 2 3-24 April. 1985.
Springfield, Virginia, article by John A. Dellow, "The London 
Perspective on International Terrorism,” p. 46. According to 
Dellow "the military commander will, with urgency, prepare an 
immediate action plan for use should a sudden demand be made. 
The SAS planning group then, in the light of intelligence and 
the overall police strategy, commences preparing plans that 
will allow them to respond to a whole range of options should 
they be required to do so by the police commander."
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On-Site Command. Control and Communications
It is obvious that the handling of the Iranian embassy 
required intimate co-operation and consultation on site 
between the police, the military and the British Security 
Service and, in turn, with the Home Secretary. This 
co-operation quickly evolved into a morning meeting which 
was chaired by the Metropolitan Police-Incident Commander 
John A. Dellow, with representatives of the various 
departments and police branches involved. Dellow has 
commented:
On the first evening of the siege I obtained 
a blanket authority from Government to commit the 
SAS on my own initiative in the event of a sudden 
deterioration of the situation, when there would be 
no time to request formal second authority. During 
the siege I advised Government on several occasions 
of the criterion that I would apply in requesting 
the commitment of the military, and^pn each 
occasion Government accepted this.
The on site control apparatus consisted of a senior
representative of the Home Office, the SAS commander, a
senior British Security Service (BSS) representative and the
Incident Commander. A field telephone was installed in a
first-floor room of the embassy to allow the police to talk
to the terrorists.
Summary - Dav Two
By the second day of the embassy take over, the first 
operational intelligence requirement was to gather as much 
information as possible on what was going on inside the 
embassy. This was vital, as the BSS were attempting to
569!bid.
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produce an intelligence picture so that the SAS could prepare 
an assault plan. It appears, however, that the police 
authorities (and in turn the Incident Commander) were 
concerned at this time not to risk disturbing the captors.
To monitor all activities around the embassy premises, a 
closed circuit television (CCTV) was installed in such a 
manner to cover all the exits and entrances to the building.
International Co-operation
Police authorities gained access into No. 15 Princes Gate.
However, the other building adjacent to the Iranian embassy,
No. 17 Princes Gate, belonged to the Ethiopian embassy.
After a senior-level government official pleaded for access,
a clearance to use the Ethiopian embassy was granted at
approximately noon on the second day of the hostage 
570taking. The Ethiopian ambassador reflected upon his
decision and argued that his staff occupy the building in 
spite of the ongoing sensitive and potentially dangerous 
situation. This request by the ambassador was rescinded when 
during the second day the terrorists threatened to blow up 
the Iranian embassy if their demands were not met by the 
British authorities. On that notice, the Ethiopian 
ambassador was persuaded to evacuate his embassy's premises 
and grant access to the British police just before midnight. 
While this international negotiation was continuing, plans 
were made for the technical penetrations —  the placing of 
listening and visual devices in the building where the 
hostages were being held. It should be underlined that the
R7 nDiscussion with a British Government official, 
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, 31 March, 1982.
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skills of observation and technical penetration developed by
571the police and the BSS were of great intelligence value.1 
By this time, through the analysis of the sounds and lights 
from within the embassy, it was believed that the hostages 
were concentrated on the second floor. Moreover, movement 
was detected between and on the third and fourth floors and 
from there downstairs to the field telephone on the first 
floor.
An intelligence break came just after noon on the second day
with the release of Christopher Cramer who was suffering from
a stomach ailment. He gave the police detailed information 
572 about the activities within the embassy and said that 
there were five terrorists, although he was not positive that 
he had seen them all as other hostages had mentioned a sixth 
one. His information corroborated the police analysis that 
the hostages and their captors were concentrated on the 
second floor. The male hostages were held in an office on 
the second floor while the women were kept in a small office 
at the top of the stairs. Furthermore, Cramer was able to 
describe some of the weapons carried by the terrorists.
These were two Browning pistols, a revolver and a number of 
grenades.
No. 15 Princes Gate became the base for technical 
penetrations into the Iranian embassy. Listening devices 
were put into place in the early evening of the second day,
571Robert McGowan, et al., "The Day Of The S.A.S.", 
Daily Express Special Edition, p. 8 .
572Chris Cramer and Sim Harris, Hostage, pp. 57 - 62. 
Cramer notes his concerns over his debriefings.
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this was painstaking work because of the interruptions caused 
by the noise level produced by the penetrations themselves.
As noted in the chronology (Appendix I) for the second day 
the deadline passed. However, shortly before midnight a 
terrorist threatened to throw out the field telephone. At 
the same time, two new demands were forwarded to police 
authorities:
1) that a representative of the BBC should
be brought to the embassy to collect the demands of 
the terrorists.
2) that the demands of the terrorists be published.
The negotiators maintained that in return for any concessions 
from the British police the British and female captives must 
be released.
From the counter-terrorist point of view, the SAS were 
prepared to launch an assault on the embassy, if necessary by 
2000 hours. If the assault option was to be taken on Day 
Three, it would have to be after dark, preferably late at 
night in order to catch the captors off guard.
Summary - Dav Three
The complex and time-consuming technical and intelligence 
effort continued from the early morning on. At approximately 
0130 hours Constable Lock was taken to a window at the front 
of the building by one of his captors and told the police 
negotiators that the drilling (technical penetration of the
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walls) must stop or action would be taken against the 
hostages. Some of the female hostages had, apparently, heard 
the noises as they were sitting against a wall and drew it to 
the attention of the terrorists.
The drilling had probably been noticed by the terrorists
because the police had so effectively sealed off the embassy
that there was very little street noise. In order to provide
noise cover, the police arranged for aircraft to fly over
the embassy and left a compressor operating in the street
behind the embassy. These adjustments to the noise level
573were probably noticeable to the terrorists as well. At
approximately 0800 negotiations were reported to be slow to 
start again. OAN, the terrorist leader was reluctant to 
resume talking at first as he was angry over the lack of 
progress by the police in meeting the terrorists' demands. 
When police negotiators began talking of providing a BBC man 
to hear his demands he apparently calmed down somewhat. BBC 
executive Tony Crabb arrived and had a conversation 
with OAN and took down some complaints and made observations, 
some of which were:
1) The terrorists complained that the police
had used psychological aggression. This referred 
to the lack of telephone contact with the outside
573Christopher Dobson, et al., "London Becomes The Arab 
Battlefield," Now. 9 May, 1980, p. 41. It has been reported 
that "For four days before the attack, air traffic control 
officers had, at the request of the police, brought in 
airliners on a flight path directly over the Albert Hall to 
keep up a barrage of noise to disguise the sound of drilling 
and other preparations being made by the SAS teams." See 
also, "SAS really did roar to the rescue," Soldier. 12 
January, 1987, p. 13.
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world. OAN also told of the drilling that they had 
heard during the night hours.
2) Dr. Gholan Ali Alfronz the Iranian Charge
d 1Affaires appeared at the window and through 
talking with Crabb, the latter deduced that a 
fairly comfortable relationship existed between the 
captors and captives.574
3) Drawing from the media reports it would appear 
there were no indications of rescue 
preparations.575
SUMMARY - DAY FOUR
The first successful listening device began picking up 
conversations in both English and Farsi at about 0900 hours. 
Within three more hours a second technical monitoring device 
was in operation. As the information began to flow, the 
Farsi interpreters became inundated and transcribers from 
other government departments were pressed into service.The 
SAS, police and intelligence authorities quickly agreed upon 
the kind of information needed:
1) the aims, intentions and psychological state of the 
terrorists?
2 ) the level of dissension or cohesion amongst the
574
11 As violence erupts near the Embassy.. .USE FORCE SAYS 
IRAN," The Daily Mail. London, 2 May, 1980. According to 
this report the Iranian Government had told the Foreign 
Office "to use force if necessary to end the London Embassy 
seige."
575 . .Norman Webster, "Gunmen let 2 deadlines pass in
London siege," The Globe and Mail. Toronto, 2 May, 1980.
This report states "No rescue attempt seems to be
contemplated as yet. London's police are well-schooled in
the waiting-game approach —  based on two famous six-day
sieges here in 1975 —  and seem to be waiting for time and
exhaustion to do the job."
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terrorists.576
The information draw from the technical penetrations enabled 
the police negotiators to discover that the terrorists had 
psychological and physical dominance over their captives and 
that there were no indications, as yet, of any disunity 
amongst the captors.
By late afternoon it was established that the terrorists and 
hostages were within a well-defined area on the second floor 
of the embassy. An analysis from sound monitoring and other 
means suggested that the hostages were in a general office 
with others in a small adjacent room. The command centre for 
the terrorists appeared to be situated in a small room to the 
front of the embassy.
In return for the release of one of the hostages, Mrs. Kanji, 
the police authorities had the original terrorist statement 
transmitted by the BBC World Service at 2100 hours. In 
response, the terrorists released another hostage just after 
that hour. The two released hostages, Hiyech Sanei Kanji and 
Ali Guil Ghanzafar, were able to provide more information for 
the intelligence picture. Mrs. Kanji gave the police 
detailed descriptions of the six terrorists and emphasized 
that a bond of empathy was developing between the captors and 
captives. Further, she confirmed that the terrorists were 
not professional killers but appeared to be well educated and 
only hoped to put pressure on the Iranian government to 
accept their demands.
576 .Interview with a senior SAS officer, London, England, 
2 June, 1986.
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Indications were that the terrorists took turns on guard duty 
but no specific time pattern was set. According to the 
released hostages, the terrorist guarding the hostages 
carried a pistol, the others patrolled the embassy with 
machine guns and each carried a grenade. There did not 
appear to be any demolitions or gas masks.
At the time of Mrs. Kanji's release, the male hostages were 
located on the second floor of the general office and the 
women in a small adjacent office. They were not being 
restrained. Mrs. Kanji further described how P.C. Lock had 
developed a good rapport with the terrorists and had achieved 
their respect and confidence. It also appeared that the 
terrorists had changes of clothes and occasionally took the 
opportunity to shower. They took turns praying once at night 
in contrast to their captives who prayed all the time and as 
a group.
Summary - Dav Five
In response to the request by the British government for 
Middle-East mediators, the representatives of Kuwait were 
prepared to assist, if Iran was agreeable. The Jordanians 
would lend assistance under certain conditions and the Syrian 
and Algerian ambassadors agreed to help but were disappointed 
that there was no escape route for the terrorists. Although 
the chances of securing an acceptable mediator were not 
great, the British government continued the search for 
suitable alternatives among the Arab community in London.
The next hostage to be released, a journalist, Mustapha 
Karkouti (Day 5 at 2020 hours) told the police that the
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relationship between the captors and captives was becoming 
volatile and that the terrorists were fed up with the 
slowness of negotiations. He said that the terrorists would 
probably surrender if they were guaranteed their safety.
Summary - Dav Six
Technical monitoring had reported that the hostages were 
still situated on the second floor in the same room and that 
the tensions of the previous day appeared to have subsided 
for the moment.
Negotiations went through a particularly tense phase when the 
terrorist leader appeared to lose control for a few moments. 
At approximately 1331 hours, three shots were heard and it 
was believed that a hostage had been killed. After the 
shooting, the terrorists spoke to a senior policeman. A 
deadline of 1700 hours was issued for the Arab ambassadors to 
be brought in, otherwise a hostage would be shot. At 
approximately 1730 hours a technical source reported a 
conversation among the terrorists which underlined the 
possibility of violent action and recorded that the 
terrorists must "do something before sunset," and "Kill two
577
or three or four," and "kill all by 10 p.m."
At approximately 1800 hours the police negotiator was told by 
the terrorist leader that two hostages would be killed every 
45 minutes and their bodies thrown out of the embassy, if
577 "British commandos testify at inquest: Fight for
Iran embassy described," Reuters, London, 4 February, 1981.
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their demands were not met. At 1800 hours, a listening 
device picked up the sound of a shot as well as a terrorist 
harassing the captives. A half hour later, at 1830 hours, 
the deadline was extended, however, approximately 15 minutes 
later, shots were heard and one body was dragged to the front 
door and left on the doorstep.
After the murder of the one captive, (although the 
authorities appear to have believed two were killed), the 
Home Secretary gave permission for the SAS to rescue the 
remaining hostages. At approximately 1909 hours the Incident 
Commander Dellow handed over the task to the Military 
Commander and the assault was mounted. The time between the 
permission to assault the embassy and the attack itself was 
spent on obtaining last-minute tactical intelligence 
pertaining to the locations of the terrorists and their 
hostages.578
Just before the assault began, the terrorist leader was kept 
talking with police negotiators on the telephone. The rescue 
was launched and the remaining hostages were saved in one of 
the most dramatic rescue operations in recent history. Five
terrorists, including their leader, were killed. Fowzi
579 . . .Nejad, , the only surviving terrorist, was later convicted
for the manslaughter of two hostages and sentenced to life
imprisonment. Nine months later the verdict of justifiable
Stephen Handelman "How the SAS fights terror for 
Britain," The Toronto Star. 13 March, 1986. This article 
underlines that the SAS "are careful to emphasize the value 
of careful planning and good intelligence before 
anti-terrorist operations."
579"Killer jailed for life," The Globe and Mail. 
Toronto, 23 January, 1981.
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homicide was returned on the five terrorists killed in the 
580rescue.
Postscript 1Operation NIMROD1 - International Co-operation
As this was a 'home* operation, the requirements for
international co-operation to assist the Special Air Service
in its action appear to have been minimal. Notwithstanding,
Colonel Ulrich Wegener of West Germany's GSG9 was a 'visitor'
at the scene, and as one senior SAS officer commented he
"observed only, as we have a mutual co-operation agreement to
581have exchanges with GIGNE, GSG9." These agreements to have
international observers at such terrorist incidents were
initially unofficial but now have been "officially 
582ratified." The only other indication of international 
tactical co-operation was the access to the Ethiopian 
embassy. The use of this building was vital to the 
development of the intelligence picture inside the Iranian 
embassy. By using the technical means at their disposal, the 
police and later, the SAS, could determine the mental state 
of the terrorists and their positioning while developing 
information for analysis. Moreover, on the intelligence side 
once the "terrorist group had been identified through one,
Stewart Tendler "Verdicts of justifiable homicide on 
terrorists," The Times. London, 5 February, 1981. The report 
stated "The jury took almost an hour to reach its verdicts 
after Dr. Paul Knapman, the coroner, told them they had the 
choice of justifiable homicide, unlawful killing, an open 
verdict or death by misadventure." However, "Verdicts of 
justifiable homicide were returned on the five terrorists 
killed by men of the Special Air Service Regiment at the 
Iranian Embassy siege in London last year."
CQ 1
Interview with a senior SAS officer, London, England, 
2 June, 1986.
582Ibid.
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communiques and two, deductions of possible terrorist groups, 
the BSS forwarded requests to allied agencies requesting 
further data about this group.” As to the responses to 
this British request this study could not ascertain the 
assistance given, if any, by allied intelligence services.
Factors for Success
The success of this operation depended upon the fact that the
police, the BSS and the SAS "had five days to receive and
584g a m  intelligence." As the intelligence was gathered, a 
model of the embassy was made and exercises were conducted.
In the end, the assault has been described by a senior SAS
585officer simply as "a platoon attack in the vertical mode." 
Notwithstanding the above, the same officer remarked that "we
CQg
felt we had a 55 per cent chance of success at the end."
Major General Sir Jeremy Moore suggested that the success of
Princes' Gate was based upon a series of factors:
...intelligence was right, secondly they, the 
military, the police and Home Office, had thought a 
lot about such incidents. To win in war, you must 
think, thinking takes time and in war there is no 
time, therefore you must think before the war.... 
Thirdly, clear direction and statement of the aim 
from above. Fourth* co-operation between police 
and the military.
C Q  ^
Interview with a senior Canadian Security 
Intelligence Service officer, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, 13 
December, 1984.
584ibid.
585 .Interview with a senior SAS officer, London, England,
2 June, 1986.
586Ibid.
con
Interview with Major General Sir Jeremy Moore, 
Bratton, Wiltshire, 6 June, 1986.
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Another senior retired SAS officer echoed the same feelings,
acknowledging that the police, military and ministers
responsible for such incidents are well acquainted with not
only their own areas of purview but with those of everyone
else. In particular, the government Ministers are acutely
aware of their responsibility. This officer stated:
The police are very good at talking the terrorists 
out. Once a shot is heard, however, some grisly 
decisions have to be made. The policeman turns to 
the Minister and says that they cannot control it 
[the situation]. The Minister orders the attack 
and, in turn, accepts full-responsibility. Then 
the SAS does their stuff.
The only formal aspects of international co-operation noted
were the permission given to British authorities by the
589Iranian government "to take all necessary measures" and
the assistance given by Ethiopian representatives in granting
access to their premises. Moral support, however, did
emanate from various countries and in particular "Britain's
allies, including the Americans, West Germany and France, all
590gave their support to COBR's hard-line stance."
The SAS was fortunate that the execution of this operation 
was on British soil. This allowed the assembling of 
intelligence and the CRW Team without interference, and all 
command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) 
requirements were easily concentrated and in close proximity 
to the objective. Unlike the American rescue described in 
the next chapter, the SAS "did not have to assume that the
CQQ
Interview with Colonel the Viscount Slim, London, 
England, 29 May, 1986.
589See "Official Says Iran May Take Action," The New 
York Times. 4 May, 1980.
590McGowan, et al., op. cit., p. 17.
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terrorists could count on the sympathy of the local 
591population.” Furthermore, Operation NIMROD did not appear
to lack any required operational resources and, according to
one analyst, the authorities were prepared to reinforce the
592initial attack if need be.
The outcome of such operations depends upon the ability to 
acquire accurate and timely intelligence. One intelligence 
officer commented on the success of the Iranian embassy 
rescue:
If it wasn’t for the BSS (British Security 
Service) technical penetration capability, coupled 
with their translation and analytical skills the 
police and more importantly the SAS would not have 
been able to carry out theirgfunctions in such a 
highly professional manner.
Much can be written about the effective co-operation between
the police, military and political leadership. Other
countries may possibly extract useful lessons to be
integrated into their national crisis decision-making bodies
and executive arms:
In Great Britain, Chief Officers of Police are 
required to exercise themselves and their forces in 
responding to various forms of terrorist incident. 
This ranges from paper exercises without use of 
personnel, through computer-based exercises for 
command ranks and localized negotiator exercises, 
to full-scale enacted incidents involving all 
appropriate agencies (including senior civil 
servants and members of Government with a 
responsibility in the field, up to and including 
the Secretary of State for Home Affairs).
The army is included in all the large-scale 
exercises and becomes used to deploying with the 
civil police. This practice not only serves to 
acquaint them with their likely role and objectives
591Drew Middleton, "British Raid: The Lessons," The New
York Times. 7 May, 1980.
592Ibid.
593 Interview with a Canadian Security Intelligence 
Service officer, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, 8 February, 1986.
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at times of real commitment, but also allows them 
to become acquainted with the personalities with 
whom they will work and the likely operating 
conditions.
Furthermore, at lower levels directly responsible for 
operations:
...frequent seminars are held at the Headquarters 
of the 22nd Special Air Services Regiment (SAS - 
the British Army unit designated as aid to police 
at terrorist incidents) for Chief Officers and 
Assistant Chief Officers of Police and other 
officers with responsibility in this field. The 
opportunity is taken not only to discuss policy but 
to update police knowledge of SAS capability and 
weaponry and of associated technology used-fey the 
army, police, and other agencies involved.
The appreciation of the police and military responsibilities 
in such situations underscores Britain's success in special 
operations and particularly in counter-terrorism. After the 
Iranian embassy siege, interest in British organizational and 
operational techniques increased dramatically, and British 
SAS personnel were sought after for specialist briefings and 
formalized training. The increased publicity occasioned by 
the rescue did more than perhaps any other single event to 
highlight the advantages which might accrue to other 
countries from co-operation with the British in 
counter-terrorism. On the other side of the Atlantic, 
America's experience before, during and after their rescue 
attempt in Iran was rather less positive.
594Dellow, op. cit., p. 45.
595ibid.
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CHAPTER IV
THE ROLE OF ELITE FORCES IN COUNTER-TERRORISM 
AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 
IN I/)W—INTENSITY CONFLICT 
Section I 
An Historical Perspective
During a conversation between two American officers, one
said, "The reason we lost in Vietnam was because it was not
596the American way of warfare." Although this opinion is 
most controversial, the American predilection for 
conventional warfare, employing massed fire-power and 
manoeuvre elements, remains today. Despite their long 
involvement and experience in 'small wars' and 
counter-guerrilla operations they still use their 
conventional military doctrine in low-intensity conflict, as 
this chapter will show. The United States Army (USA) and the 
United States Marine Corps (USMC) have seen extensive service 
in operations that incorporated all or some of the aspects of 
low-intensity conflict (LIC) so familiar to this generation 
from the Vietnam War. As a military term, LIC has been 
defined as:
The limited use of power for political purposes by 
nations or organizations...to coerce control or defend a 
population, to control or defend a territory or 
establish or defend rights. It includes military 
operations by or against irregular forces, peacekeeping 
operations, terrorism, counter-terrorism, rescue 
operations and military assistance under conditions of 
armed conflict. This form of conflict does not include 
protracted engagements of opposing regular forces.
596Interview with two US Army Special Forces officers, 
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, 13 August, 1986.
597Colonel John D. Waghelstem, "Post-Vietnam 
Counterinsurgency Doctrine," Military Review. (May, 1985), p. 
42.
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If one accepts this definition, American experience in LIC 
could be said to date back to the French and Indian Wars and 
would also include notable examples such as the American 
Revolution, the Seminole War, the Frontier Wars, the Civil 
War, the Spanish-American War, the Philippine campaign, the 
Punitive Expedition into Mexico, the 'Banana Wars' in Haiti, 
the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, selected campaigns and 
operations of World War II, Greece, Korea, Vietnam and El 
Salvador. As a result of this extensive LIC experience the 
US Army and the USMC have adapted, in varying degrees, to 
meet the tactical, strategic and political requirements 
demanded by these situations. A brief tour d'horizon of 
their historical experience will illustrate this.
The American Revolutionary Experience
Colonial experience in fighting North American Indians 
assisted American revolutionaries in their War of 
Independence (1775-83). One American Major General,
Nathanael Greene, developed a strategy of employing both
regular and irregular forces, and refused to engage British
. 598troops m  open battle unless it was on his own conditions.
He also used guerrilla fighters (including the famous
guerrilla leader Francis Marion, better known as the 'Swamp
Fox') who specialized in operations during the night and
early hours of the morning. When these mounted guerrilla
forces were concentrated, their tactics included silently
approaching their enemies before conducting a lightning
frontal assault co-ordinated with violent flanking attacks.
598Major Ray L. Bowers, "The American Revolution," 
Military Review. (July, 1966), p. 71.
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As a guerrilla tactician, Marion depended on mobility for 
survival, keeping his troops constantly on the move in small 
sections of five to eight men. These same groups would seek 
out intelligence, contact sympathizers to the cause, and 
constantly harass the British and their Loyalist supporters 
at every opportunity. Marion used principles later employed 
by guerrilla leaders such as Mao Tse Tung. Whenever, for 
example, Marion's 'safe1 area was threatened he would rapidly 
retreat to another secure base. One writer has said that 
Marion was:
...the scourge of the British. He seemed ubiquitous, 
lurking everywhere: hiding in an unknown rendezvous,
creeping stealthily along on a raid, or leading a 
midnight attack. To add to the enemy's alarm, he kept 
his patrols constantly moving....
The British response to these American guerrillas came in the
form of brutal repression based on terror, the burning of
homes and the destruction of livestock. Such drastic
measures seem only to have spurred recruits to join Marion's
guerrillas.
It appears to have escaped the early practioners of 
counter-guerrilla warfare that the threat of terror, violence 
and reprisals ceases to be effective when the citizens have 
lost their homes and belongings, their means of livelihood, 
and their workplaces. The result is that the supporter 
'alleged or otherwise,' has nothing left to lose. 
Consequently, in an act of vengeance against his oppressor, 
with or without the ideological motivations of the conflict 
itself, he may well join the side of the 'oppressed' as a 
guerrilla.
599Robert D. Bass, Swamp Fox: The Life And Campaigns Of
General Francis Marion, p. 79.
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The political, tactical and strategic similarities of the War 
of Independence to future guerrilla conflicts are striking.
In particular, the avoidance of open and pitched battles has 
been an important element of many subseguent guerrilla 
conflicts. In addition, the strategy of wearing down the 
enemy politically, spiritually and physically is comparable 
to the experience of later American generations in Vietnam 
and elsewhere. Greene was not the only American who felt 
that this strategy for the weak to employ against the strong 
was correct. The young Alexander Hamilton was also an 
adherent of the strategy. He argued that the Americans must 
try to "waste and defeat the enemy by piecemeal.”600 
Furthermore, George Washington acknowledged the fact that 
guerrilla war is waged by the weak against the strong.
Whilst addressing Congress in 1776, he argued that American 
forces "should on all occasions avoid a general action, and 
never be drawn into a necessity to put anything to the 
risk."601
Guerrilla warfare demands that both the guerrillas and their 
leadership retain the initiative and their operational and 
logistical independence to be effective. Such troops must be 
imbued, due to the natural hardships of guerrilla 
campaigning, with a determined commitment to their cause, 
whatever it may be.
Although the war was for 1 national liberation1 from Britainfs 
'shackles,1 it has been argued that the American Revolution
600Eric Robson, The American Revolution: In its
Political and Military Aspects. 1763-1783. p. 161.
601Ibid., p. 97.
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was a political and not a social revolution. John Ellis 
writes:
...Washington and the American leaders were 
exceptionally wary of letting the war become in any 
sense a social revolution. For them the ideal peace 
treaty would guarantee a status quo ante bellura, except 
without the British. Therefore all manifestations of 
grass-roots independencg2by the troops were to be 
vigorously suppressed.
The leaders of the young Continental Army wished to turn such
guerrilla formations into a contemporary, disciplined army of
regulars which could fight and win in decisive pitched
battles with British regulars. In the end:
...the Americans found themselves in the unique 
position of fighting a war according to a guerrilla 
strategy, but with regular troops who were almost 
indistinguishable from the British and Hessian 
opponents.
Thus the United States* own guerrilla traditions, deeply 
reflective of its particular vision of war in a highly 
individualized society where personal initiative was much 
valued, were quickly abandoned and replaced by more standard 
European views on armies and conflict.
The Civil War
Nearly a century later, the American Civil War, although a 
conventional conflict, witnessed guerrilla activities that 
were, for the most part, off-shoots of the campaigns of the 
main forces. One of the most notable guerrilla operations 
was led by the Confederate John Singleton Mosby and sprang 
from a successful cavalry raid in North Virginia led by Major 
General Jeb Stuart. Mosby, who accompanied Stuart, requested
602John Ellis, A Short History Of Guerrilla Warfare, p.
53.
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that he and a handful of troops remain behind to operate 
against federal lines using hit-and-run raiding tactics 
against Union outposts. He stated "In general my purpose was 
to threaten and harass the enemy...and in this way compel him 
to withdraw troops from his front to guard the line of the 
Potomac and Washington."604
By the end of the war, Mosby's guerrillas, better known as 
the Partisan Rangers, numbered 200 cavalry, and throughout 
their campaign from January, 1863 to April, 1865 they lived, 
for the most part, off the land and what they could salvage 
from their enemies. Mosby trained and equipped his troops in 
accordance with the tactics he employed. Ridding his forces 
of their cumbersome and noisy sabres, he armed them with 
revolvers for close-in fighting and carbines for ambushes.
He split his forces into small fighting units and 
concentrated them for a concerted assault on supply trains 
and federal troop formations. Speed and surprise were vital 
elements in Mosbyfs successes against the northern troops.
In Missouri, guerrilla bands similar to Mosby's were formed. 
The troops led by one leader, William Clarke Quantrill, never 
numbered more than twenty but their lack of numbers was 
offset by their high mobility. They used only the best 
horses available and relied upon short-range fire-power in 
the form of the Colt revolver. Some of Quantrill's men 
carried as many as eight revolvers to provide the close-range 
fire-power demanded by their audacious tactics. Quantrill's 
men focussed their tactical endeavours upon ambushes and the
604Charles Wells Russell, (ed), The Memoirs Of Colonel 
John S. Mosbv. pp. 149-150.
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destruction of Federal communications lines and, on occasion, 
raided Missouri and Kansas towns.
These mobile guerrilla operations had a telling effect, 
particularly in the western theatre of the Civil War. By 
1862, the two to three thousand guerrillas operating in this 
region were holding down 60,000 Union troops who could have 
been better employed elsewhere. Despite the guerrilla 
successes, the regulars of both the Confederate and Federal 
armies felt little sympathy for these guerrillas. They were 
considered not real soldiers but highwaymen.
Military measures, such as posting patrols to each town,
could not subdue these raiders. The situation foreshadowed
what American forces would experience a century later in
Vietnam, and what the Russians would experience in
Afghanistan. The following excerpt is from a Kansas
newspaper written in 1864, and could describe the Vietnam or
Afghanistan conflicts:
Outside of the military posts and their immediate 
vicinity, no man of known and open loyalty can safely 
live for a moment. The loyal people are collected in 
the scattered towns and military posts, while to all 
practical intents and purposes the rebels hold 
possession of the country.
The counter-guerrilla forces under command of the Union 
General, John M. Schofield, adopted certain drastic measures, 
some of which were doomed to backfire. In the summer of 
1862, Schofield ordered that:
See Richard S. Brownlee, Grev Ghosts Of The 
Confederacy: Guerrilla Warfare in the West. 1861-1865. p.
112.
606Ibid., pp. 191-192.
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...during active operations in the field in pursuit of 
guerrillas, the troops of this command will not be 
encumbered with transportation of supplies, but will, as 
far as possible, obtain subsistence from the.enemy and 
those who aid and encourage the rebellion.
Such an order, that of forcible requisition of supplies,
could only further alienate the local inhabitants from the
Federal cause. Mass arrests, loyalty oaths, bonds and the
deportation of people to Arkansas followed as the Union Army
desperately sought a solution to its guerrilla problem. What
initially had begun as a nuisance and the pursuit of a few
isolated guerrilla bands had escalated into a war against
large elements of the local population. In the American
experience this would not be the last time that regulars were
confronted with the delicate problem of fighting guerrilla
forces without overly disrupting the indigenous population.
Between the War of Independence and the Civil War, the 
American army had adapted to the European style of warfare. 
Moreover, by the time of the Civil War, the army was not 
tactically or psychologically equipped to wage the 
counter-guerrilla style of warfare during the Seminole Wars 
of the early 19th century. It was only after years of 
campaigning that military operations began to destroy 
Seminole food supplies through the employment of search and 
destroy tactics. Contemporary tactics of the European-style 
of warfare failed in the swamps of Florida. Although the 
Americans had employed guerrilla warfare techniques with 
success during their own revolution, Sam Sarkesian argues 
that the army quickly forgot the lessons of guerrilla and 
counter-guerrilla warfare and presumed that military
607Ibid., p. 85.
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effectiveness rested with European-type formations and a
608professional officer corps. This 'Europeanizing'
continued with the result that after the Second Seminole War,
the United States Army
...was being organized around European-style warfare 
with professional officers, and the U.S. Military 
Academy [werel following the French system of military 
instruction.
The rise of the military professional became readily apparent 
during the American Civil War. The battles of this war 
emphasized the increasing difficulties and complexities of 
waging conflict in an industrialized age. Moreover, the 
counter-guerrilla bias may have become rooted in the US Army 
as a result of these experiences.
The Civil War had a major effect on American military
strategy and the American way of waging war. This had
long-range political, strategic and tactical consequences
when America began pursuing a counter-guerrilla strategy.
Sarkesian argues that:
The professional perspective became well established 
on grand battles of the Civil War. These developments 
were to set the pattern fgrQthe next involvement in 
counterrevolutionary war.
The post-Civil War period saw the US Army involved in making
the American frontier safe. From 1866 to 1890, the army
fought a series of small battles. As Robert M. Utley wrote,
'"the frontier army was a conventional military force trying
to control by conventional military methods, a people that
608Sam C. Sarkesian, America's Forgotten Wars: The
Counterrevolutionary Past and Lessons for the Future, p. 118.
609Ibid., p. 118.
610Ibid.
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did not behave like a conventional enemy, and indeed, quite
611often was not an enemy at all.*11
The effect of Civil War service was readily apparent in the
type of warfare later waged by the army. This was
particularly evident as:
Many veteran officers of the Civil War faced these 
unorthodox operations with the mind set of Civil War 
conventional battles: 'In truth, the Civil War had made
at least one important difference in the Army's handling 
of the Indian Wars? it had accustomed leaders and 
soldiers to conventional war fought according to white 
men's rules*2and readjustment to guerrilla-style war was 
not easy.'
It has been argued that the age of the Frontier War ended in 
1890. By then the western expansion had been completed and 
the embattled Indians placed on reservations.
For the most part the conventional US Army had been fighting,
for over 20 years, an unconventional war. It is, however,
arguable that the Indian was crushed not so much by the
ability of the US Army and its use of enhanced technology in
mobility and fire-power, but rather the overwhelming westward
expansion of American society with all its manifestations:
In the year of Wounded Knee four transcontinental 
railroads spanned the West, where in 1866 there had been 
one. In 1890, 8.5 million settlers occupied the 
Indian's former hunting grounds, where in 1866 there had 
been less that 2 million. The buffalo herds that 
blackened the Great Plains with perhaps 13 million 
animals in 1866 had vanished by 1880 before the rifles 
of professional hide hunters. These figures tell more
611 Ibid., p. 119. Quoted from Robert M. Utley, Frontier 
Regulars: The United States Armv and the Indian. 1866-1891..
p. 411.
612 Ibid. Quoted from Russel F. Weigley, History of the 
United States Armv. p. 268.
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about the means by which the Indian was subjugated than 
do battle statistics.
The Impact of the Frontier Wars
The American military did not dwell on their frontier
experiences but remained as if in a Civil War 'time warp,'
drawing their corporate knowledge mostly from that
nation-forming era. The Civil War experience shaped the
American way in warfare. Despite the local importance of
guerrillas, here was a war dominated, overwhelmingly, by
great battles and massed armies. Thus:
... total victory and the need to commit overwhelming 
force to win became an entrenched view in American 
military thought.
The American military professional's view of war was 
shaped by the great battle concept and the view that 
victory was based on bringing maximum firepower to bear 
at the point of decision. Thus, regardless of the 
experiences in the American Revolution and the frontier 
environment, the pre-Civil War European tradition 
continued in the postwar period with a distinct American 
flavour. This tradition, now well established, stressed 
the need for a disciplined Regular Army as the basis for 
America's defense. This tradition, institutionalized in 
the training and education at West Point, stressed the 
maneuvering of disciplined troops, the use of cavalry 
and artillery, and outmaneuvering and overwhelming the 
enemy with men and firepower.
It appears that the US Army had lost its 'corporate memory'
or at least experienced a selective memory loss. The army
had become 'conventionalized.' The lessons of the Revolution
and the Seminole Wars were forgotten. Before entering the
Spanish-American War of 1898:
Aside from intellectual and strategic weaknesses, the 
Army also suffered from an absence of an historical 
"sense.” With all of its experiences in nonmilitary and 
unconventional operations, the American Army failed to
613Ibid., p. 121. Quoted from Robert Utley, op. cit., 
p. 410.
614Ibid., p. 123.
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incorporate these lessons into its professional and 
institutional structure. The traditional mind set with 
its focus on the conventional and grand battles of the 
Civil War remained the distinguishing military 
characteristic. One hundred years later, with a wealth 
of experience in unconventional operations and 
nontraditional military operations, the U.S. military 
(particularly the Army) retained its traditional and 
conventional characteristics.
In the end, the American army continued to pursue the path of
professionalism as exemplified by the European armies,
particularly in France and Germany, in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. The lessons of the Civil War
combined with the organizational structure of European armies
were the mainstays of American professional military thought.
With few exceptions the American way of warfare evolving from
their victorious civil war experience carried on into their
conflicts of the twentieth century.
Central America and the Caribbean
America became an imperial power at the end of the 19th
century, a status which soon saw it involved in a host of
low-intensity conflicts in Central America and the Caribbean.
The tactical character of this fighting was similar to that
of several past and future conflicts. One observer wrote of
the Nicaraguan interventions during the inter-war years:
Every tree, every thicket, every rock was a possible 
hiding place for a rifleman or a patriot spy. The 
invaders knew it and traveled only on known roads or in 
open fields, pistols or rifles ready to fire... Even so 
they were uneasy, for at any moment, without warning a 
fusilade came from different points...and when the North 
Americans reacted and counter-attacked, the tracks 
disappeared into the jungle where it was even more 
dangerous. After firing and killing their usual
615Ibid., p. 124.
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'tenths* of the gringos, they [the Sandinistas] retired 
in good order as silently as they had come.
During these so-called Banana Wars, the Marines acquired a
617reputation as tough counter-guerrilla fighters. Despite
the disadvantage of being usually viewed as policemen and
618agents of American imperial policy, the troops adapted to 
their surroundings and, in particular, to the vicious rules 
of jungle warfare, becoming particularly skilled at 
patrolling.
Eventually, under such influential officers as 'Chesty'
Puller, William A. Lee, Evans Carlson and others, the
tactics, psychology and logistics of this demanding type of
warfare became understood. The rigours of campaigning taught
the Marines that the ideal patrol numbered about 20 men, and
forced them to travel light with only enough rations for
subsistence. The Nicaraguan campaign, unlike the previous
bandit operations in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, had
especially interesting foretastes of conflicts to come. One
Marine, Robert Hogaboom, argued that Nicaragua was not
winnable because the Sandinista insurgents merely had to
retreat into one of the surrounding countries or into the
hills. Hogaboom also touched upon the fundamental 'hearts
and minds' aspect of counter-guerrilla operations:
You had to occupy the centers, you had to identify 
with the people, you had to make it to their advantage
616Carleton Beals, Great Guerrilla Warriors, p. 95.
617See biography by Burke Davis. Marine: The Life of
Lt. Gen. Lewis B. (Chestv) Puller. USMC fret).
618Lester D. Langley, The Banana Wars: United States
Intervention in the Caribbean 1898-1934. p. 212. See also 
Colonel Robert D. Heinl Jr., Soldiers of the Sea: The U.S.
Marine Corps. 1775-1962. in which he discusses the role of 
the Marines during this period.
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to work with you in that if they workedgwith you they 
could operate their coffee places, etc.
The Guardia Nacional
The Banana Wars, particularly the Nicaraguan campaign, 
offered the USMC and any others who would study the 
operational history, a number of lessons. It was apparent to 
the USMC that in counter-insurgency campaigning they could be 
usefully employed as the main force to engage guerrillas. 
Secondly, the Marines could form a training and leadership 
cadre which would help develop indigenous military or police 
forces. This, however, should not be perceived as employing 
Marines in a merely advisory capacity. Marines took on line, 
command and administrative responsibilities until nationals 
could replace them.620
The Marines appreciated the advantages of having combined 
units comprising Marines and for example, Nicaraguans. These 
units could combine the intimate knowledge of terrain that 
Nicaraguans had with the rigorous discipline and fire-power 
of the USMC. In this way Marine commanders were given an 
opportunity to break down cultural and language barriers 
while developing Marine leaders capable of commanding a 
bi-national force during complex military and civil 
operations. Furthermore, commanders discovered that such 
mixed patrols reinforced the morale of the local citizenry 
while underlining American commitment to the Nicaraguan
619Ibid., p. 211.
62 0Larry E. Cable, Conflict Of Mvths: The Development
of American Counterinsurgencv Doctrine and the Vietnam War, 
p. 107.
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621government. Interestingly, the Marines, as the British
later did in Malaya, argued for the employment of smaller 
tactical units with the emphasis on intelligence gathering 
and the avoidance of large ground-force operations. Larry E. 
Cable writes:
The marines favored small, mobile, independent patrols 
aggressively led and free of logistics constraints which 
could effectively hunt down and fix guerrilla units. In 
Nicaragua, the lack of a sufficient number of such 
patrols was specifically identified as a major reason 
for the failure to suppress Sandino. Even where small 
patrols did not fix and kill large numbers of 
guerrillas, they developed valuable intelligence which 
the marines properly assessed-as the centrality of 
successful counterinsurgency.
These tactics were at variance with army directives which
were derived, for the most part, from its Philippine turn of
the century experiences. Moreover, the Marines appear to
have been psychologically prepared to undertake operations in
the 'long term':
The marines eschewed large search and clear 
operations, noting that large operations invariably 
failed. The marines were psychologically prepared for 
protracted conflict, as such had been the nature of the 
Banana Wars.
Langley notes that although the American forces could adapt
to the demands of terrain and the type of warfare being
waged, they failed politically because they lacked 'cultural
sensibilities'.
They failed not as conquerors...but as rulers of 
conquered places. Striving to teach by example, they 
found it necessary to denigrate the cultural values of 
those whom they had come to save. Determined to implant 
a sense of community in the tropics, they mistakenly 
assumed that community values could be inculcated with 
sanitary measures or vocational education or a reformed 
military where soldiers from humble social origins
621ibid.
622Ibid., p. 108.
623Ibid.
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learned to identify with "nation” instead of prominent 
politicians or families. Their presence, even when it 
meant a peaceful society and material advancement, 
stripped Caribbean peoples of their dignity and 
constituted an unspoken American judgement of Caribbean 
inferiority. Little wonder, then, that the occupied 
were so "ungrateful" for what Americans considered years 
of benign tutelage. But, then, Americans do not have in 
their epigrammatic repertory that old Spanish proverb 
that Mexicans long ago adopted: "The wine is bitter,
but it1s our wine."
The tactical successes by the Marines were over-shadowed by
subsequent low-intensity conflicts where the armyfs
conventional orientation came to the fore and eventually
dominated the fighting.
Greece 1945 - 1949
The first American involvement in post-World War II
insurgencies occurred in Greece. This insurgency evolved
from the guerrilla war waged by the Greek communist
625controlled People's Liberation Army (ELAS) which was 
reputed to be the most effective guerrilla force? formerly 
involved in resisting the German occupation. At war's end, 
the British had failed in their attempt to negotiate and 
enforce a cease-fire between the ELAS and the more right-wing 
guerrilla formations. The communists, upon the withdrawal of 
German forces in 1945, had attempted to grab power and in 
doing so precipitated a civil war. Eventually Britain, 
financially drained and militarily over-stretched, abandoned 
her intervention. The United States, motivated by the Truman 
Doctrine of containment of communism, moved in.
624Langley, op. cit., p. 223.
/roc
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Guerrilla operations consisted of small, hard-hitting attacks 
on undefended villages and isolated police stations to gather 
supplies and weapons. The Greek government appeared to be 
helpless and in disarray. In early 1947, President Truman 
provided 300 million dollars in aid. In anticipation of this 
assistance, the Greek government attempted to secure its 
border by initiating a large sweep operation from central 
Greece to the Yugoslavian and Albanian border areas.
Insurgent units, however, warned by their intelligence 
networks, prevented the Greeks from achieving their tactical 
aims of eliminating guerrilla strongholds and destroying 
units.
After the government offensive, its units withdrew into
static locations and awaited American assistance. To
facilitate the US assistance programme the Joint US Military
and Planning Group (JUSMAPG) was formed. The responsibility
of JUSMAPG included the planning and co-ordination of Greek
operations, training and logistics. The inevitable occurred.
The conduct of Greek military operations became the
responsibility of JUSMAPG, and the American James Van Fleet
assumed command of JUSMAPG in early 1948. He also became the
62 6defacto commander of the Greek National Army. These
American military and political activities were said to have:
...introduced a sense of urgency quite foreign to 
the Greek government, general staff and army. JUSMAPG 
saw the Greek Civil War to be simply a war and, like any 
war, amenable to simple direct military resolution.
626Cable, op. cit. p. 15.
627Ibid.
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The importance of American material assistance soon became 
apparent during the battle of Konzita on 25 December, 1947. 
After a ground assault and an extended artillery attack by 
the guerrillas on government positions, it became apparent 
that no quick relief was to be expected. Five days later, 
relief columns, supported by tactical air and artillery, 
began clearing the surrounding areas of Konzita. The 
employment of tactical air support (tac air) and artillery, 
matched with US-supplied rapid-fire and automatic small arms, 
saved the day. From that point on, the Greeks adopted the 
American tactic of massed fire-power in their 
counter-guerrilla war.
The American planning group also used elite Greek commando
groups known by their Greek initials LOK. Although the
employment of such forces ran against the American
anti-elitist sentiment the LOK were expanded to four commando
groups totalling 2,000 men. In time, JUSMAPG came to realize
that this small force was its most effective combat unit
against the DAS guerrillas. Cable writes that "The LOK
troops engaged in such intense and successful activity that
they rapidly developed a high esprit de corps and offensive 
628spirit." As with most elite units elsewhere, their
effectiveness in combat became well known and in turn, the
force began to be misused and, therefore, had to be preserved
from squandering by conventional commanders. The units were:
Subject to abusive misuse by local commanders who 
wished to employ a certain winner rather than the less 
effective, nonelite GNA units, the LOK commandos 
suffered rapid attrition and JUSMAPG became their 
protector, carefully conserving this effective combat 
force by defining its missions in a limited fashion to
628Ibid., pp. 18-19.
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raiding, deep penetrationgpatrolling and as an air 
mobile strategic reserve.
The spring 1948 government offensive was fairly successful
through the use of air-power and artillery, but it still did
not destroy the guerrilla units in the Grammos mountains. It
became clear that the Greek army did not have the aggressive
professional leadership required to meet the DAS guerrilla
challenge. JUSMAPG was forced to reassess the military
situation. These same problems would come back to haunt the
Americans two decades later in Vietnam: how to rebuild a
field army while at the same time maintaining an offensive
capability against an effective guerrilla force:
The overarching reason for the lack of Greek success 
was simply that it was nearly impossible to equip and 
train in American methods and doctrine an army which was 
simultaneously expected to perform effectively in 
sustained offensive combat against an able and motivated 
adversary. Whether the American error is seen as 
initiating premature offensives or, more charitably, as 
responding in the only way possible to the exigencies of 
the situation, the problem remains at heart the attempt 
to addgggs two incompatible missions with the same small 
force.
It also appears that the officers of JUSMAPG failed to
realize that the American way of warfare was, technically and
fundamentally, foreign to the Greek army, as it was to prove
elsewhere in the years to come:
The American combined arms approach to combat, with its 
mixture of infantry, artillery and mechanized or armored 
formations, constitutes a challenge almost beyond belief 
to an army lacking completely the fundamentals for 
understanding this sophisticated array of 
communications, transportation and weapons 
technology.
629Ibid., p. 19.
630Ibid., p. 22.
631Ibid., p. 23.
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It is worth mentioning that the insurgents were viewed as
Soviet Army auxiliaries by the Americans in Greece, as they
firmly believed that Soviet military intervention was 
632possible. Furthermore, any nation-building programmes of
civic aid and economic assistance were viewed, by the 
Americans, only as minor adjuncts to the overall military 
strategy. This was a partisan war, the solution, as the 
Americans saw it, would have to be found through the force of
The lesson drawn was that the regular Greek Army, trained as
a conventional force, could effectively pursue a partisan war
when given mobility and good tactical air support. In
contrast to the British experience in Malaya, the Americans
believed there was no need for elite units. Despite the LOK
success, it was felt that they were not considered to be
vital in the campaign:
There was no apparent requirement for specific, elite 
antipartisan units. Without high cross-country mobility 
capabilities, LOK and similar commando units had no 
unusual utility in reaction or pursuit roles. Their 
only definite mission, other than morale building, was 
in the long-range, deep penetration rgle. In this, they 
were seen as important but not vital.
Therefore, the tactical doctrine of the US Army was deemed
successful and "final victory could still be gained only by
rather traditional ground operations, and the World War II
632Ibid., p. 26.
633Ibid.
634Ibid., p. 28.
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experience in the European theater, remained a valid basis
635for postwar doctrinal development.”
The erroneous conclusion drawn by the US Army was that its 
doctrine and equipment, applied to a foreign army (a virtual 
'mirror imaging1), produced a general purpose conventional 
formation which could successfully defeat a partisan or 
guerrilla force. It was the 'war winning' combination of 
mobility and massive tactical air and artillery fire-power 
which proved to be, in the minds of US Army officers, the 
panacea to fighting similar conflicts. In short, there was 
no need for changes to doctrine or organization. The 
American way of warfare was understood to be sound and, 
therefore, appropriate for fighting any new variation of 
conflict. It would appear that the utility and success in
employing special forces, such as the LOK, was soon 
forgotten.
Korea 1948 - 1954
The Korean War's seemingly conventional nature was to
reinforce, for military planners, the lessons drawn from the
Greek Civil War. However, guerrilla activities orchestrated
by the North Korean People's Army (NKPA), had been occurring
since at least 1948. The objective of these actions was to
637topple the government of South Korea. In fact by 1950,
635Major Robert A. Doughty, The Evolution of US Armv 
Tactical Doctrine. 1946-76. Combat Studies Institute, p. 2.
636Cable, op. cit., p. 29.
637David Rees (ed), The Korean War: History and
Tactics, p. 11.
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some 7,000 partisans were available to support NKPA forces 
when they invaded South Korea. Their activities forced the 
employment of nearly three Republic of Korea (ROK) divisions 
in counter-guerrilla operations. This left only five ROK 
divisions to meet the NKPA invasion.
The North Korean attack caught the ROK and their American
advisors off guard. Faced with a conventional invasion, the
allies had also to contend with an enemy in their rear. The
guerrillas ambushed supply routes, attacked rear echelons and
collected intelligence. Their importance increased as the
battle lines stabilized. The United Nations Command was
forced to allocate resources, including a number of US Army
638military police battalions, to combat the guerrillas.
Later on, upon the entrance into the war of Communist Chinese
Forces (CCF),639 the South Korean Labour Party (SKLP), a
communist party organization supported by Kim II Sung, soon
evolved into a guerrilla force and was reorganized as the
NKPA's 526th Army Unit (also known as the Partisan Guidance
Bureau). This was a potent force, for their task was:
...to facilitate the southward movement of the 
NKPA/CCF units by agitprop, reconnaissance, sabotage and 
ambush. According to captured documents, the mission 
priorities were to drain ROK military and civilian 
manpower from the front areas concentrating on potential 
porters, great numbers of whom were necessary for 
operations in the rugged Korean interior, to destroy 
arms and equipment, to provide military intelligence 
related information, to cut arteries of communication 
and transportation, to attack rear echelon installations 
and to eliminate ROK local government leaders or opinion 
molders.
638Cable, op. cit., p. 36.
639See Gerald H. Corr, The Chinese Red Armv. p. 6 8.
640Cable, op cit., p. 37.
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To deter these activities, American and ROK troops conducted 
ad hoc operations consisting mostly of conventional patrols. 
These patrolling activities did not have the intelligence 
required or the proper command, control and co-ordination 
necessary to make the operations effective. Consequently in 
January, 1951, the 1st Marine Division was assigned the 
counter-guerrilla role. A combination of normal search-and- 
clear operations enjoyed limited success. Escape-and-evasion 
techniques allowed the local partisan commander to withdraw 
most of his men. Methodical patrolling by the Marines 
cleared the remnants of guerrilla groups.
American experiences in anti-partisan operations in the
Korean War confirmed the lessons of Greece and ensured the
"utility of conventional infantry and combined arms
641techniques in suppressing the guerrilla threat."
Moreover, the Americans involved in counter-guerrilla
operations at this time believed that the lack of
well-trained conventional units and tactical and
reconnaissance aircraft definitely hampered the operations of
anti-partisan forces. The result of NKPA employment of
guerrillas brought about the American consensus which:
...served to establish the true nature of the 
guerrilla threat: not simply adjuncts to a conventional
force but the first sign of attack by a conventional 
force. Thus, the defeat of guerrillas took on a new 
saliency in the minds of American planners but there was 
no perceived need to change the basic operational 
priorities from those of the conventional employment of 
general purpose, high mobility forces in order to meet 
and defeat the hostile guerrillas in the field in 
set-pieg|2battles to those of a more exotic format of 
combat.
641Ibid., p. 40.
642Ibid., p. 41.
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Robert A. Doughty believes that the American army did not see
any necessity for change despite the setbacks of the Korean
War. He writes:
When the Korean War ended in July 1953, the official 
position was that no real changes in doctrine had 
occurred or had been necessary during the war.... One 
of the training bulletins of the Army Field Forces 
concluded, "The mass of material from Korea...reaffirms 
the soundness of US doctrine,-tactics, techniques, 
organization, and equipment.”
This official position is misleading, however, as there were,
in fact, a number of important changes in tactical doctrine
dealing with the emphasis on fire-power and the strategy of
attrition. These were maintained and developed up to and
during Vietnam.
The Army had become accustomed to massive amounts of 
firepower which came at the expense of mobility... 
[furthermore the strategy] focused upon attrition at the 
expense of maneuver and its offensive spirit.
In short, by the wake of the Korean War the Americans 
appeared to have substituted fire-power for strategy.
Post-Korea - Adapting to Nuclear War
Although there was some build up of NATO conventional forces
after the Korean War, the serious expansion of American
ground forces was not started until the 1960s. In the
interim, nuclear weapons conveyed by naval or land based
aircraft were deemed to be key to deterrence. John Foster
Dulles wrote shortly after the Korean War:
The free world must devise a better strategy for its 
defense, based on its own special assets. Its assets 
include, especially, air and naval power and atomic
643Doughty, op. cit., p. 12. Taken from Training 
Bulletin Number 8 , Combat Information. Office, Chief of Army 
Field Forces, Fort Monroe, Va., 16 November, 1951, p. 1.
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weapons which are now available in a wide range, 
suitable not only for strategic bombing but also for 
extensive tactical use. The free world must make 
imaginative use of the deterrent capabilities of these 
new weapons and mobilities and exploit the full 
potential of collective security. Properly used, they 
can produce defensive power able to retaliate at once 
and effectively against any aggression.
Field artillery with atomic capability and new army 
formations designed to operate on nuclear battlefields came 
into being during the decade of the 1950s. The advent of 
nuclear artillery and the portable 'Davy Crocket' tactical 
nuclear missile made the battlefield much more complicated, 
particularly in the area of command and control. The army, 
therefore, began preparing to fight in both conventional and 
nuclear environments. Although it supported the employment 
of nuclear weapons during the 1950s, the doctrinal 
innovations demanded by this type of war proved most 
unwieldly. New tactics required new equipment and more 
manpower. A series of army studies during the latter part of 
the decade provided a conceptual basis for the 
re-introduction of high-performance conventional forces. As 
the strategic direction shifted from nuclear to conventional 
war, the army was tasked to develop responses to a broad 
spectrum of conflicts.
It was this 'flexible response strategy,' the military
"ability to respond to aggression at the appropriate level
through the possession of a wide spectrum of conventional and
646nuclear forces," that was carried into the Vietnam War.
645John Foster Dulles, "Policy For Security And Peace," 
Foreign Affairs. (April, 1954), p. 358.
646John Baylis, et al., Contemporary Strategy: Theories
And Policies, p. 311.
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The American military, and in particular the army, had to be 
prepared to engage in the whole spectrum of nuclear, 
conventional and unconventional conflicts.
Just as the Kennedy Administration was taking office, Nikita
Khruschev gave a major speech, focussing on the legitimacy of
'wars of national liberation.' This openly expressed support
of what were often anti-American liberation movements, was
perceived as an overt challenge to President Kennedy and his
administration. This incident galvanized the Americans into
a closer study of guerrilla and counter-guerrilla warfare and
indeed popularized this type of conflict. The study of:
...guerrilla warfare became a great fad. High officials 
were inveighed to study Mao and Lin Piao. The 
President's personal interest in fighting guerrillas was 
well publicized, and the reading and writing of books on 
antiguerrilla warfare was encouraged....
Halberstam writes that this challenge propelled the US Army
Special Forces into the limelight. The communist instigators
of revolution would be met by the new warriors of the Kennedy
era. They were described as:
...a romantic group indeed, the U.S. Army Special 
Forces. They were all uncommon men, extraordinary 
physical specimens and intellectual Ph.D.s swinging from 
trees, speaking Russian and Chinese, eating snake meat 
and other fauna at night, springing counterambushes on8 
unwary Asian ambushers who had read Mao and Giap....
The weakness of America's flexible response strategy, 
however, was that it was not in keeping with the traditional 
American way of warfare. Critics have said that this 
American:
...strategy was based on incrementalism rather than on 
the proven military axiom of overwhelming firepower and
647David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest, p. 152.
648Ibid., p. 154.
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force at the point of decision. In Vietnam, it was 
argued, American military forces were increased and 
committed only gradually, allowing the enemy to readjust 
and respond at each phase of increased American 
involvement.
Others criticized what was seen to be a faulty understanding
of counter-insurgency operations. In fact, such a role was
not reflected in either the structure or the posture of the
US Army. It has been argued that the military failed to
comprehend the character of guerrilla warfare. Some authors,
such as Cable, felt that the seeds of defeat were sowed long
before the Americans went into Vietnam:
The American Army was the incorrect instrument for 
fighting the conflict which had developed in South 
Vietnam. It was a force configured, equipped and 
trained according to a doctrine suitable for 
conventional warfare, or for warfare in the nuclear 
battlefield of Europe. The mechanical techniques of 
mobility, heavy firepower and sophisticated 
communications did not automatically endow the army with 
the necessary capabilities to successfully counter 
insurgent forces.... The American idea that guerrilla 
wars could be fought successfully by using what were 
essentially conventional forces, tactics and doctrine 
was plainly wrong and^/gs not supportable from the 
historical record....
The American military entered Vietnam armed with the highest 
order of military technology, backed by massive 'all source1 
fire-power and mobility. These advantages combined with
total air and sea control would in the end 'defeat the
enemy,' be he Vietcong or North Vietnamese Regular. For the
most part, professional military men, both officers and
enlisted, believed they would be victorious in their 
counter-insurgency mission. However, the understanding of 
guerrilla warfare appears still to have been sadly lacking 
even though, like President Kennedy, many had read the major
649Sarkesian, op. cit., p. 142.
650Cable, op. cit., pp. 282-283.
- 256 -
works on the subject and even completed courses on
651counter-insurgency. The essential lesson still evaded
them, that such warfare is a political, and not a military
struggle. This vital aspect was not grasped. Two of the
foremost critics of the US Army in Vietnam have cited the
essentially political nature of this type of war and
recognized, in turn, the total political innocence of those
who fought it:
Unconventional warfare demanding exquisite control of 
political warfare, tailored professionally to its 
objects, was clearly beyond the capacity of young 
American unit commanders and their troops rapidly 
rotated in and out of the command structure. Little in 
their military training prepared Americans for this 
challenge. We remained essentially an army of amateurs. 
All levels of the Army in Vietnam were totally 
inexperienced in 'people*s war,' if for no other reason 
than the rotation system which limited the vast bulk of 
the forces to thirteen months in-country with the same 
being true of officers at most levels. Clearly, in so 
short a period no great expertise could be developed in 
guerrilla warfare by either officers or enlisted men, 
however bravely they might fight. Bravery, at best 
could only play a minor role in success? political 
sophistication should have been a major part.
Vietnam
The long involvement of the United States in Vietnam has been
viewed by many as a political and military disaster. One
critic wrote:
Vietnam was the first war America lost. After 200 
years of priding itself as the champion of individualism 
and freedom, this great nation found its match in an 
unexpected adversary: a country of peasants and rice
paddies. A country ravaged by years of continuous 
warfare, the direct result of colonialism. A creation 
of the Cold War divided into a communist North and a
651Sarkesian, op. cit., p. 143.
Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage, Crisis In 
Command: Mismanagement in the Army, p. 80.
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"democratic"6Sguth, struggling for national 
unification.
Today, although much has been written regarding the war since
the fall of Saigon in 1975, the debate remains clouded: was
it a conventional war or an insurgency? The issue continues
to be heatedly argued a quarter-century after United States
Marines first landed in force at Danang. One writer, Peter
M. Dunn, stated that:
In the United States, the Vietnam conflict has been 
variously described as a revolutionary/protracted war, a 
counter-insurgency, a conventional war or a limited war: 
all contain an element of truth, but none on its own 
provides a complete picture. What is apparent is that 
it was never a straightforward process of insurgents 
versus security forces, and this makes any study of 
American counter-insurgency techniques extremely 
difficult.
The war still remains perplexing to the politician, student, 
soldier, policy-maker and citizen. Vietnam could not be 
explained, nor understood, nor fought in a simple 
'conventional1 way and, moreover, the enemy could not be 
defeated with only conventional forces.
The war conducted under the South Vietnamese President Ngo 
Dinh Diem remained an essentially Vietnamese conflict. 
However, after his death and the assassination of President 
John F. Kennedy in 1963, the war became Americanized under 
Lyndon B. Johnson's administration. American forces were 
poured into South Vietnam. US ground forces took the 
offensive, and as the months and years passed, the casualties 
mounted. So did American disillusionment and frustration.
Martin Siberok, "Screening the Past," Montreal 
Mirror. 22 May - 11 June, 1987.
Peter M. Dunn, "The American Army: The Vietnam War,
1965-1973, in Ian F.W. Becket and John Pimlott (eds), Armed 
Forces and Modern Counter-Insuraencv. p. 77.
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The Tet offensive in 1968 and the rise of Richard Nixon to 
the Presidency brought the conflict full circle. Nixon cai 
to power with the promise to reduce the American commitment. 
This promise was predicated on the capacity of the South 
Vietnamese to take over the war. One now spoke of 
'Vietnamizing* the war.
As has been stated, the character of the war in Vietnam was
complex, being an unconventional conflict utilizing
unconventional tactics which was transformed into
conventional war. Observers "were most confused by the
political context of the conflict which included a mix of
communism, nationalism, democracy, religion, personalism,
655colonialism, imperialism, and external forces." This
situation was even more complex as the Americans were often 
seen as "intruders who simply replaced the French colonial
€% R fk
troops." Therefore, although the Americans could operate
militarily, they had insufficient control in the political 
arena where the key to victory lay.
America Enters The Frav
Although involved previously with small advisor groups, by 
1963, 23,000 US personnel were employed as advisors. Then, 
on 2 August, 1964, the destroyer U .S .S . Maddox. on an 
intelligence-gathering patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin, reported 
that she was exchanging fire with three North Vietnamese
655Sarkesian, op. cit., p. 195.
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torpedo boats. Later the Maddox reported that she had
repelled this attack and by 4 August, now joined by the
U .S .S . Turner Jov. she resumed her intelligence-gathering
patrol. A further attack was reported two nights later. In
response, the United States Senate passed the Gulf of Tonkin
657Resolution on 7 August, 1964 empowering President Johnson 
to use American military power against communist aggression 
as he deemed necessary. Attacks on US military personnel and 
installations and later, in 1965, the assault on the American 
base at Pleiku caused a shift in the US role from that of an 
advisor to that of an active participant. Bombing attacks on 
the North and the arrival of 1 expeditionary' forces in that 
year, demonstrated American military and political resolve. 
America's role expanded to encompass 'active ground combat.' 
The inability of the South Vietnamese government to cope with 
the war, as well as its historic political instability, 
brought the US to act decisively. Formally, the Johnson 
administration justified its actions as honouring 
commitments to an ally. It was asserted that the communists
must be halted? the independence of South Vietnam was at
. . 658stake.
On 9 February, 1965, President Johnson committed a two 
battalion strong Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) to Da
657Gabriel Kolko, Anatomy Of a War: Vietnam. The United 
States. And The Modern Historical Experience, pp. 122-125. 
This incident has been 'suspected' of being orchestrated by 
the American authorities who, at this time, were seeking a 
plausible excuse to become more fully involved in this 
conflict.
658Herbert Y. Schandler, "America and Vietnam: The
Failure Of Strategy," in Ronald Haycock, (ed), Regular Armies 
And Insurgency, pp. 84-85.
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Nang. The communists by this time had entered Phase II and
were moving towards Phase III of Mao Tse Tung*s three phase
659strategy on revolution (the destruction of the enemy).
Both the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet Cong (VC) had
expanded from employing sabotage and terrorism to executing
successful attacks on South Vietnamese forces in conventional
battles. Deployment of American ground forces came at a
critical point in the military situation in South Vietnam.
It has been argued:
...that by early 1965 the enemy had reinforced his 
units in Vietnam to the point of being able to move 
almost at will against major population areas. In fact, 
it looked as if the North Vietnamese Army were about to 
cut the country in two, right across the middle. It is 
also well known that^the commitment of U.S. Forces 
stemmed the tide....
As the ground-force build up carried into 1966, American 
forces began extensive conventional combat operations, 
employing brigade or divisional-sized units against the NVA 
and VC. Tactically these operations were aimed at 
discovering where the communists were and inflicting as many 
casualties as possible. In military parlance this was to 
'find, fix and destroy.' This tactic of 'search and 
destroy,' later known more innocuously as 'search and clear,' 
became the principle counter-insurgency tactic. This came 
from the realization that:
With Allied ground forces restricted to the borders
of South Vietnam, the only feasible strategy was to try
659See Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, translated by 
Samuel B. Griffith, p. 19. "Phase I (organization, 
consolidation, and preservation) and Phase II (progressive 
expansion) comes Phase III: decision, or destruction of the
enemy. During this period a significant percentage of the 
active guerrilla force completes its gradual transformation 
into an orthodox establishment capable of engaging the enemy 
in decisive battles."
660Lieutenant General John J. Tolson, Airmobilitv In 
Vietnam: Helicopter Warfare in Southeast Asia, p. 83.
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to kill North Vietnamese and Viet Cong soldiers faster 
than they could be replaced. In Westmoreland1s own 
words, written in August 1966, the conflict in South 
Vietnam had-evolved into f,a protracted war of 
attrition."
William C. Westmoreland predicated this strategy on the
politics of the war. "The U.S. military strategy employed in
Vietnam, dictated by political decisions, was essentially
662that of a war of attrition.11 He continues:
In any case, what alternative was there to a war of 
attrition? A ground invasion of North Vietnam was out, 
for the U.S. national policy was not to conquer North 
Vietnam but to eliminate the insurgency inside South 
Vietnam, and President Johnson had stated publicly that 
he would not "broaden" the war.
President Johnson's objective then was not to 'win' a war in
the traditional sense, but rather a defensive strategy,
leaving the initiative to the North Vietnamese. Schandler
argues that the objective was:
...to convince the North Vietnamese (and their Soviet 
and Chinese sponsors) that the cost of continuing the 
war in South Vietnam would be, over time, prohibitive to 
them and that they could not succeed. In actuality, 
however, there was no clear conception as to when this 
elusive psychological goal would be achieved. The 
President's strategy, then, was defensive in nature and, 
in effect, left the decision aSgto when to end the war 
in the hands of North Vietnam.
This strategy obviously underestimated the will of North
Vietnam's political leaders to pursue their political and
military aims in the long term.
661Dave Richard Palmer, Summons Of The Trumpet: A
History Of The Vietnam War From A Military Man's Viewpoint, 
p. 147.
662General William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports.
p. 198.
663Ibid. See also Chaplain (Col) Cecil B. Currey, 
"Preparing For The Past," Military Review. (January, 1989), 
pp. 2-13.
664Schandler, op. cit., p. 85.
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Notwithstanding the tactics employed, the functional purpose
of the American forces continued to be the destruction of the
enemy. The conducting of pacification operations, developing
the loyalty of the South Vietnamese citizenry towards their
government, and performing civil operations did not receive
the same emphasis as *making contact with the enemy.1 The
one exception was that of the United States Marine Corps
(USMC) which, on arrival, embarked upon a series of
successful pacification measures. Fighting guerrillas was
not new to the corps. They had, much earlier, produced a
Small Wars Manual665 which stated:
In small wars, tolerance, sympathy, and kindness should 
be the keynote of our relationship with the mass of 
population.... The purpose should always be to restore 
normal government.... and to establish peace, order, and 
security....
In Vietnam, the USMC began the integration of a squad of
Marines into a South Vietnamese Popular Forces (PF) platoon
which was then called a 1joint-action company.1 These were
"patterned along the lines of the British companies used in
667Malaya during the 1950s." Westmoreland noted:
In what may be called a pacification approach to 
anti-insurgency warfare, the marines achieved some 
noteworthy results, particularly with one of the more 
ingenious innovations developed in South Vietnam, the 
Combined Action Platoon. Composed of marine volunteers 
and Vietnamese militia, the platoon would move into a 
village and stay, getting to know the people, winning 
their trusty and working closely on civic action 
projects.
665See U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual.
666Ibid., p. 1-32.
667U,S. Government Printing Office, Jack Shulimson and 
Major Charles M. Johnson, U.S. Marines In Vietnam: The 
Landing And The Buildup, pp. 134.
668Westmoreland, op. cit., p. 216. See also Tim Page
(Footnote Continued)
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Not only were the Marines aware of the importance of winning 
hearts and minds but they viewed the war differently from the 
army. In September, 1965, Marine General Victor H. Krulak 
stated, 11'the Marines have never felt that the war stands to 
be won by the grand maneuvers of large forces, by brilliant 
marshalship in the Tannenberg or Chancellorsville image, 1 but 
rather in the villages.1,669
As in other counter-insurgency situations, the effectiveness
of joint-action forces depended upon the tact and
resourcefulness of the Marines themselves. In particular, it
depended upon the young squad leaders who, as the platoon
commanders, had to develop and maintain good personal and
professional relations with the local populace, subordinates
and village chiefs. The tasks of the combined forces lay in
the traditional counter-guerrilla techniques of maintaining
security, developing a counter-intelligence capability while
at all times developing the good will and loyalty of the 
670people. In turn, the Vietnamese taught the young Marines
about their language and local customs. The trust that
developed was soon rewarded by information regarding the VC
67who were operating in the area.
The Marine Corps' experiences and views clashed with those of 
the US Army's, even though the latter also used the buzz word 
counter-insurgency. The US Army continued to be:
(Footnote Continued)
and John Pimlott (eds), Nam: The Vietnam Experience 1965-75.
p. 12.
669Shulimson and Johnson, op. cit., p. 146.
670Ibid., p. 135.
671Ibid.
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...conventionally postured and based on a military 
professionalism resting on a conventional mind set. 
Moreover, the enemy evolved into g7highly mobile, 
well-armed, battle-wise opponent.
In contrast to the Marines, the army felt that large-scale
conventional operations were the key to successful
counter-insurgency. One critic of the US tactical
application of conventional means in this type of conflict
has commented:
Mass application of firepower, as in Korea and World 
War II, was felt to be the most efficient method of 
generating an enemy body count while minimizing U.S. 
casualties. Large search-and-destroy sweeps were 
carried out in an attempt to find the enemy. When 
guerrillas were located, the infantry took cover while 
massive firepower support attempted to destroy the 
insurgents. As General Depuy noted, if 'you just wanted 
to analyze what happened in Vietnam you'd say the 
infantry found the enemy and the artillery and the air 
killed the enemy.' When General Westmoreland was asked 
at a press conference what the answer j^ o insurgency was, 
his reply was one word: 'Firepower.'
The character of the war was different in each of the 
geographical (corps) responsibility areas. In the I Corps 
area south of the de-militarized zone (DMZ) the conflict 
consisted primarily of conventional actions between US forces 
and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) units. Here the NVA operated 
with all supporting arms except air and naval gunfire 
support. This was where the North Vietnamese Regulars fought 
in battalion formations and could quickly withdraw across the 
DMZ. In the II Corps area of Central Vietnam the struggle 
consisted of fighting between NVA and US forces —  but 
oscillated between conventional and unconventional war. In
672 Sarkesian, op. cit., p. 209. See also Charles B. 
MacDonald, "A US strategy to stem the Communist tide," pp. 
96-105, in Ray Bonds, (ed), The Vietnam War: The illustrated 
history of the conflict in Southeast Asia, and Andrew F. 
Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, pp. 172-177.
67 3Krepinevich, op. cit., p. 197.
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the III Corps area, around the capital of Saigon, the war
focussed on the VC and US ground forces and consisted of
674small unit actions; tunnel warfare and ambush tactics. In
the Delta area (IV Corps) the conflict remained 
unconventional in nature. Therefore, in general, 
conventional operations more or less dominated the northern 
areas while traditional insurgency operations were the rule
7 R
in the southern portions of South Vietnam.
The variety of combat situations, as well as the enemy 
forces, encountered from one corps area to another caused 
confusion for those trying to produce a coherent plan to 
achieve victory. There was no panacea. Moreover, the 
experiences of officers fighting the war differed in 
accordance with their personal experiences in their areas of 
operation, which resulted in conflicting views on how to 
fight the war.
674Tom Mangold and John Penycate, The Tunnels of Cu Chi, 
p. 64. According to the authors, "Without air power or 
artillery, upon which the Americans relied, the Viet Cong 
resorted to ambush, hit-and-run attacks, and close-in 
fighting - 'grabbing the enemy by the belt'? fighting close 
to the Americans protected them from air strikes or 
shelling."
675Lieutenant Colonel James R. Ward, "Vietnam:
Insurgency or War," Military Review. (January, 1989), p. 17. 
Ward argues that, "Americans who served in Vietnam with US 
forces that were largely targeted against NVA units never had 
the opportunity to see how powerful and pervasive the 
influence of the Vietcong was in most of the rural areas of 
South Vietnam, particularly prior to Tet of 1968. It was 
easy for them to misinterpret the nature of the war...and to 
underestimate the importance of the Vietcong insurgency in 
Hanoi's strategy. Americans involved in pacification or 
serving in the Delta, on the other hand, saw the widespread 
impact of the Vietcong and little of the threat posed by the 
NVA."
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Tet - The Turning Point
American troop commitments increased during 1967-1968 and
peace initiatives began. The US government and the military
were generally optimistic. The South Vietnamese political
scene seemed to be stabilizing. Military operations
conducted by US and South Vietnamese forces were believed to
be eroding the ability of the VC and NVA to operate
effectively in South Vietnam. The 1968 Tet offensive changed
those perceptions forever. Tet was viewed as the third phase
of Mao Tse Tung's strategy, its objective to destroy the
enemy by all-out attack. Although a military failure, the
communist offensive had a devastating psychological effect on
the Americans. It was a major political and propaganda
victory for the communists. Gabriel Kolko argues:
By 1968 the Vietnam War had become much more difficult 
to analyze, for the very process of protracted conflict 
had made it not only a military struggle but one in 
which the political, economic, and ideological and human 
domains became increasingly crucial. Of all the 
factors, none alone was decisive, but their growing 
interactions were the raw materials that would shape the 
final outcome of the war.
For the United States, Tet was a long-postponed 
confrontation with reality? it had been hypnotized until 
then by its own illusions, desires, and needs. The 
belated realization that it had military tactics and 
technology but no viable military strategy consistent 
with its domestic and international priorities made Tet 
the turning P g i g t  in the administration's 
calculations.
America Frustrated
For all their strength, mobility and fire-power, it was not 
the US forces, but the NVA and VC, who controlled the
676Kolko, op. cit., p. 334. See also Mark Perry, "The 
Impact of Tet," in Page and Pimlott, op. cit., pp. 376-379.
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countryside. The assault on the US Embassy in Saigon during 
Tet brought home to the American people that they had been 
misled. They were shattered and disillusioned to find that 
the extensive American efforts had been for naught.
Tactically, in straight conventional •stand-up* operations,
America would ultimately emerge as the victor of the
engagement. However, unknown to the field soldier or to his
commander was the fact that the endless number of battles
would be only incidental to the outcome. The frustrations
were very real to the combat soldier as Frederick Downs who,
as a platoon commander, commented:
We would fight and bleed to take ground that the dinks 
[VC] would pull away from after they had exacted their 
toll. We always left afterward so they could always 
come back if they liked that particular place.
The American strategy was to draw them into a fight so 
we could use our superior firepower to destroy them. To 
win a battle, we had to kiljL-them. For them to win, all 
they had to do was survive.
The post-Tet period witnessed the emergence of the American
678policy of Vietnamization which was aimed at increasing the 
combat-effectiveness of the South Vietnamese forces. More 
important, it marked the beginning of America's withdrawal 
from ground combat.
677Frederick Downs, The Killing Zone, p. 113. See also 
Robert J. Graham,” Vietnam: An Infantryman's View Of Our 
Failure,” Military Affairs. (July, 1984), pp. 133-139 and 
James Martin Davis, "Vietnam: What It Was Really Like,"
Military Review. (January, 1989), pp. 34-44.
678See Dr. Jeffrey J. Clarke, "Vietnamization: the south 
must save itself," in Bonds, op. cit., pp. 172-181.
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Although there were several types of wars being fought in the 
various areas of South Vietnam, the thrust of the war 
followed the pattern of classical revolutionary warfare. The 
VC continued to function as peasants during the day and 
guerrillas at night. The character of the war remained that 
of raids, selective assassination and, under certain 
conditions, conventionally executed operations by the NVA and 
VC against American and South Vietnamese forces. The tactics 
of hit-and-run were immensely costly and frustrating for the 
Americans, as the enemy would always fade away. In addition 
the Viet Cong completely dominated the countryside at night.
To counter the communists ,the Americans had basically fought 
a conventional war for which it was best trained and 
equipped. In the end, as noted by General George Keegan,
"We trained an army and we trained an air force. Wrong
equipment, wrong tactics, maybe, wrong doctrines but we
679 . .produced an army." American failure was inevitable. The
American victories over VC and NVA units could not be
translated into political gains as the political and military
objectives were pursued on two different planes. As American
forces left a 'cleared* area, the NVA and VC continued to
sustain themselves from rural populations. The objectives of
winning hearts and minds, pacification and internal
development did not receive the needed attention and were not
integrated. American civic aid programmes were fragmented,
679W.Scott Thompson and Donaldson D. Frizzell (eds), The 
Lessons of Vietnam, p. 243.
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lacked effective planning and were, for the most part, poorly 
680carried out. As Henry Kissinger wrote:
We have learned important lessons from the tragedy of 
Indochina —  most importantly that outside effort can 
only supplement, but not create, local efforts and local 
will to resist... And there is no question that popular 
will and social justice are, in the last analysis, the 
essential underpinning of resistance to subversion and 
external challenge.
For those believers in American military superiority, the end
of the war came as a shock. The realization set in that
military power at the exclusion of social and political
considerations lead to tactics that invite eventual defeat.
The conversation between Harry G. Summers and Colonel Tu in
Hanoi on 25 April, 1975, aptly illustrates this fact:
"You know you never defeated us on the battlefield,” 
said the American colonel.
The North Vietnamese colonel pondered this remark a 
moment. "That-may be so,” he replied, "but it is also 
irrelevant."
680Schandler, op. cit., p. 94.
681U.S. Department of State, "Department of State 
Bulletin," Vol. 73, pp. 3-4. Taken from Schandler, op. cit., 
p. 95.
682Harry G. Summers, On Strategy; A Critical Analysis 
Of The Vietnam War, p. 21.
- 270 - 
Section II
Historical Overview of US Special Forces
Francis J. Kelly has argued the following:
An elite group has always appeared within the Army 
during every war in which the United States has been 
engaged. The Minutemen in the Revolution, the Cavalry 
in the Civil War, the Rough Riders in Cuba, the 
Lafayette Escadrille in World War I, the Rangers in 
World War II, and the Helicopter Pioneers in Korea —  
always some group has captured the imagination of the 
American public and has embodied the national ideals of 
the American fighting man.
In Vietnam it was the Special Forces soldier. The official
birth of the US Special Forces, or the 1Green Berets*,
occurred in 1952. However, their lineage goes back to World
War II, where military units functioned with guerrilla
organizations under the auspices of the Office of Strategic
684Services (OSS). The OSS, which lasted from 1942 to 1945,
was headed by General William J. (Wild Bill) Donovan. As 
often happens with specialist organizations, the OSS drew 
strong opposition from the other military services. Had it 
not been for a close friendship between Donovan and President 
Roosevelt, the OSS would probably not have survived. As with 
other intelligence and special operations organizations, the 
OSS attracted a number of eccentrics and adventurers which 
included a spectrum of highly talented individuals. During 
the short life span of the OSS it depended heavily on the 
knowledge of its British counterparts, the Special Operations
683Colonel Francis J. Kelly, U.S. Armv Special Forces. 
1961-1971. Department of the Army, p. 160.
684see Edward Hymoff, The OSS In World War II and 
Bradley F. Smith, The Shadow Warriors: O.S.S. and the Origins 
of the C.I.A.
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Executive (SOE). It is from these first intimate days
that the tasks of the future special forces would evolve.
There were two noteworthy operations which were run jointly 
by the SOE and the OSS in Europe. These were known as the 
'Jedburghs* and the Operational Groups (OGs). A Jedburgh 
team was quintessentially, international, and consisted of 
three personnel? an American or British officer, a Dutch, 
French or Belgian officer and a radio operator. These teams 
were sent to join the underground and provide it with a vital 
link to the Allies. A total of some 87 teams were parachuted 
behind the German lines to co-ordinate airdrops of weapons 
and supplies and provide assistance in the targetting of 
operations while the Allies advanced through Europe.
The Operational Groups (OGs) consisted of approximately 15
members each and were employed for specific direct-action
operations such as reconnaissance, intelligence gathering,
ambushing convoys, destroying bridges and the like. The
effectiveness of the OGs was underlined in a report by
Donovan to the Joint Chiefs of Staff which claimed that only
seven OG members were killed in action and six wounded in
action, while 19 OG teams had killed or wounded a total of 
686928 Germans.
The OSS operations in Europe and in the Far East were partly 
eclipsed by the proportions of a large conventional war. 
Nevertheless, the OSS gained valuable experience in special
685Smith, op. cit., pp. 170-173.
686Charles M. Simpson III, Inside The Green Berets: The
First Thirty Years, p. 12.
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operations, psychological warfare, intelligence gathering, 
and the requirements for dealing with indigenous guerrilla 
and partisan forces. This experience, despite the efforts of 
Donovan to keep the OSS intact in the post-war period, was 
largely lost. For the most part the veterans of the OSS 
returned to civilian life, although over the next few years 
many joined the new Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). With 
the demise of the OSS, a highly talented, somewhat eccentric 
organization left the American forces, taking with them 
extensive experience in guerrilla operations. However, it 
did not take long before this gap would be addressed.
After World War II, there was a massive reduction in army
strength. As usual in a peacetime force, an anti-elitist
sentiment sprung up against special forces of any type. The
small elite units of the OSS had performed remarkably well,
but within the American army, elite units from out of the
mainstream (cavalry, infantry, artillery), were viewed with
suspicion. The combat arms saw themselves as elites and were
not prepared to compete for scarce resources and promotions
with any new classification, branch or corps, particularly
when the army was being reduced in strength. Studies of
unconventional operations "were considered peripheral to the
major thrust of military professionalism. Moreover, career
success was (and is) primarily through the standard command
687and staff ladder." This remains so today. The strategy 
developed after the Korean War relied on nuclear weapons and
687Sam C. Sarkesian, "The American Response To 
Low-Intensity Conflict: The Formative Period," in David
Charters and Maurice Tugwell, Armies in Low-Intensitv 
Conflict: A Comparative Study of Institutional Adaptation to
New Forms of Warfare, p. 37.
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their delivery systems. These weapons, particularly the 
strategic bomber, were viewed as reducing the importance of 
ground forces. The air force bombers and the navy's 
carrier-based aircraft were now the pre-eminent elements in 
the national defence posture.
Due to the persistence of a few unconventional thinkers, some
of the skills and attributes of the OSS were maintained,
albeit at a low level within the very conventionally-minded
halls of the Pentagon establishment. By the late 1940s and
early 1950s, two alarming developments had to be faced by
defence planners. First, was the growing pressure felt by
the newly-formed NATO alliance due to the massive Soviet
military presence in Eastern Europe, which remained intact
after the end of the war. Secondly, the Eisenhower
administration would not accept the apparent lesson of the
Korean War? which underlined that the threat to employ the
atomic bomb appeared to be neither politically or militarily
feasible and that the United States should prepare for
limited conflicts. Instead, the administration maintained
its nuclear deterrence strategy. Korea was, therefore,
generally perceived by American strategists as an anomaly,
due, in part, to the United States' failure to state,
clearly, its intention to defend South Korea with military 
688force. American strategists believed that the US must
make clear, to all concerned, its intention to honour its 
commitments, if necessary, with nuclear force.
688This issue is discussed at several points in Lawrence 
Freedman, The Evolution Of Nuclear Strategy.
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To compound the situation, America's nuclear monopoly had
been broken in 1949 by the Soviet Union, and US conventional
strength seemed also to lag behind that of the Soviet Union,
most particularly in the crucial area of Central Europe.
Furthermore, the strategic and tactical situation became more
acute as intelligence indicators pointed to an imminent
689Soviet attack no later than 1954. US Army planners were
most anxious to find any and all avenues which would give the 
US forces, present in Europe, greater 'combat value.' Some 
planners believed that concepts and methods of guerrilla 
warfare concepts could be a possible 'force equalizer' in the 
conventional equation. As with guerrilla and partisan 
operations executed by the OSS and SOE organizations in World 
War II, "The captive peoples of Eastern Europe were the 
target of American hopes to neutralize at least some of 
Stalin's divisions."690
Korea - A Requirement for an Unconventional Warfare 
Capability
As already mentioned, communist guerrillas harassed American 
and UN forces in Korea. The UN forces wanted to do the same 
against the North Korean invaders, unfortunately the 
Americans had no organized unit available to fulfil the 
guerrilla mission. The OSS had been gone for some years, the 
CIA had no integral capability to perform unconventional 
warfare (UW), and the Special Forces had not yet been
689Simpson, op. cit., p. 15.
690ibid.
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created. To bridge this 'guerrilla gap' it was necessary to 
form ad hoc units to meet UW requirements.
To plan for the behind-the-lines guerrilla missions in North
Korea, a staff officer was required. Russell Volckmann was
selected. Volckmann, as a Lieutenant-Colonel in northern
Luzon during the 1941-1945 war, had equipped, trained and
commanded a force of five regiments of Filipinos against the
Japanese and was well aware of the capability and potential
of guerrilla operations. When Volckmann reached General
MacArthur's Tokyo headquarters he discovered that there were
no plans, no logistical support and no training syllabus. In
short, his task of planning and conducting behind-the-lines
operations in North Korea had to start from nothing. To
complicate matters, the job had only reached the planning
stage when Volckmann was returned to the United States to
recover from an illness. His successors did form a guerrilla
organization, but to this day the designations, number and
combat effectiveness of these units and their operations
remain vague. Some of the better-known designations were the
8240th Army Unit, the 8,157th Special Operations Detachment,
and UNPIK (United Nations Partisan Infantry Korea). The
combat effectiveness of these units were considered
'ineffectual' to 'amateurish' and were noted for their
inadequate planning. The consensus was that the failure to
employ American guerrilla units was "due to [the] lack of
691professional expertise" up and down the troop, command and 
staff chain.
691Ibid.
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To compound this problem in Korea, the recently formed
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) rapidly organized its own
unconventional warfare capability commanded by a military
officer seconded to the agency. The Joint Advisory
Commission Korea (JACK) was to undertake a spectrum of
unconventional warfare activities. Paddock writes that the
CIA activities:
...ran the gamut from covert intelligence to 
unconventional warfare. The CIA placed agents to 
collect intelligence and assist downed pilots in escape 
and evasion. It conducted sabotage and small boat 
patrols for tactical information on both the east and 
west coasts. It organized indigenous forces to remain 
behind for shallow penetration patrolling to augment 
combat patrolling and gain information for large 
tactical operations. It conducted some guerrilla 
warfare. As one might expect, the variety of 
unconventional warfare activities engaged in by both the 
CIA and the services resulted in some conflicting and 
overlapping interests.
To address this operational conflict, and to deal with the 
evident lack of co-ordination between the military and the 
CIA, a new organization entitled Covert, Clandestine and 
Related Activities Korea (CCRAK) was formed in 1951. As 
CCRAK's organization consisted of personnel from the CIA and 
the military, their loyalties remained with their career 
service. Organizationally CCRAK lacked adequate staff 
planning and was deficient in the skills of unconventional 
warfare. Moreover, the CIA elements involved emphasized 
intelligence operations instead of guerrilla action. 
Consequently, the constant bureaucratic infighting appears to 
have destroyed any potential for successful operations behind
Alfred H. Paddock, U.S. Armv Special Warfare: Its 
Origins: Psychological and Unconventional Warfare.
1941-1952. p. 103.
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693enemy lines. There continued to be no effective
organization to correct the duplication of unconventional
warfare initiatives during the Korean War. Even though later
in the conflict, trained special forces personnel arrived,
they were too few to make any operational impact upon the
amateurish level of UW activities. This created little
enthusiasm for having a UW capability and reinforced the
perception that unconventional warfare was just an adjunct of
conventional operations. These early Experiments* did
demonstrate to all those involved in UW and special
operations, except for the conservative and rigidly
conventional military minds, that if a nation wants to
execute successful special operations, the organization,
694people and equipment must be in place prior to war.
It was apparent that unconventional warfare forces needed a 
home, a focus and selected individuals to foster attention to 
this type of warfare. Fortunately, there was such a place and 
it was in the Pentagon. Within the Office of the Chief of 
Psychological Warfare (OCPW), there was a small special 
operations branch commanded by General Robert McClure, an 
expert in psychological operations. In this section, McClure 
brought together a cadre of selected officers who had 
wide-ranging wartime experience in the various aspects of 
guerrilla warfare and special operations.
The group included Volckmann, Wendell Fertig, who had been a 
guerrilla leader in the Philippines? Aaron Bank, who had been
693Ibid., pp. 103-107. 
694Simpson, op. cit., p. 16.
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with the OSS in France and Indochina? Joe Waters, who had
695served with the OSS and in the famous Merrill's Marauders?
696and Robert McDowell, who had OSS experience in Yugoslavia.
The initial bureaucratic successes of the OCPW and its
integral branches were predicated solely upon the experiences
and professionalism of the cadre of officers selected:
Bank also makes clear that he and Volckmann based their 
plans for the Army's unconventional warfare capability 
on their World War II experiences with the Philippine 
guerrillas and OSS, and that Special Forces units were 
developed "in the OSS pattern of tiny units with the 
prime mission of developing, training, and equipping the 
guerrilla potential deep in enemy territory."
The staff studies and organizational and operational
character that evolved were a function of historical research
into resistance movements, as well as the extensive
69 q
operational experience of those on staff.
The Misperception of the SF Role
The Special Forces did not evolve from the Rangers (American 
equivalent of the British Commandos) nor did they stem from 
the combined Canadian-American 1st Special Service Force 
(1SSF). The confusion over the origin of the Special Forces 
has caused continuing problems in the overall formulation of
695Merrill's Marauders —  formally known as the 5307th 
Composite Unit (Provisional). This was a 3,000-man force 
under *the command of Colonel, later Major-General Frank 
Merrill. This force was assigned to Orde Wingate's command
for behind-the-lines operations in Burma. See Charlton
Ogburn, Jr., The Marauders and Shelford Bidwell, The Chindit 
War: Stilwell. Wingate, and the Campaign in Burma; 1944.
pp. 82-86.
696Simpson, op. cit., p. 16.
697Paddock, op. cit., p. 119.
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policy for, and organization of, these troops. This 
evolution deserves further discussion.
During the post-war era, the US Army undertook a number of
analytical studies regarding the establishment of a UW
capability and various aspects of unconventional operations.
These studies covered a broad spectrum of staff options
ranging from that of creating airborne reconnaissance units
(ARU) to incorporating courses on special operations,
espionage and guerrilla warfare into the US Army syllabus.
These initiatives strongly indicated that the army itself was
unsure of differences between the Rangers and the Special
Forces. For the most part the army wanted simply to:
...integrate OSS experience in World War II and 
Ranger/Commando missions. "From an 'OSS point of view,' 
this organizational concept should have been 
unacceptable. It attempted to lump together missions 
and capabilities of Rangers and Commandos with those of 
Special Operations and Operational Group elements of the 
OSS. It combined the tactical with the strategic.”
Upon close examination, these studies revealed a 
misunderstanding of unconventional warfare and 
conceptual confusion over the distinction between Ranger 
and Commando type operations, which were tactical in 
nature —  the quick strike variant, and long-term 
OSS-type activities which had been carried-gyer to the 
post-war era, albeit in a different guise.
Although Volckmann, Banks and other drafters of the UW tasks
were clear on the delineation of roles between the Rangers
(tactical missions) and those of Special Forces (strategic
missions) there is sufficient evidence to show that the
extremely controversial700 concepts for the organization and
role of Special Forces were difficult to formulate and make
concrete. This experience is not unlike the developmental
699Sarkesian, "The American Response to...., op. cit.,
p. 36.
700Paddock, op. cit., p. 119.
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pains of the British Special Air Service in the immediate
post-war years and like the SAS a task was quickly found.
The strategic mission for those involved in the staff
planning of special operations soon became clear:
...to develop a concept and guerrilla warfare plans for 
the expected World War III, which in the immediate 
postwar years seemed all but inevitable. Thus was born, 
among other plans, one dubbed 'Rudolph, the Red-Nosed 
Reindeer,' a concept for guerrilla interdiction of 
Russian_reinforcements moving to the front in central 
Europe.
Although Special Operations had a number of critics, it did
have a few select and influential supporters including the
then Army Chief of Staff, General J. Lawton Collins. At the
same time, General McClure had access to the White House
through a wartime friend, C.D. Johnson, who was a special
advisor to President Eisenhower. Due to these influential
supporters, 2,500 personnel were made available for a UW 
702programme. Although the Special Forces had initially 
survived the bureaucratic infighting within the US Army they 
would still confront serious opposition from the other 
American services and the successor of the OSS, the CIA.
A Home for the Special Forces
The Special Forces had been born and now had a home at Fort 
Bragg, where, in 1952, General McClure estabished a 
Psychological Warfare Centre (PWC). It was here, under the 
PWC, that the Special Forces were first placed, despite the 
objections of such officers as Volckmann who felt:
701Simpson, op. cit., p. 16.
702Ibid.
- 281 -
...there was a stigma connected with Psychological 
Warfare that we didn't care to rub off on Special 
Forces. Behind-the-lines operations and the ‘dirty 
tricks' game had enough opposition amongst conventional 
military minds without adding additional problems.
The pervasive view in the army was that Psychological Warfare
had a legitimate role; the Special Forces, for the most part,
did not.
The Beginning - 10th Special Forces Group - Fort Bragg
In the summer of 1952, the 10th Special Forces Group was 
activated at Fort Bragg under Colonel Aaron Bank. Its 
operational mission was to exploit the resistance potential 
behind the Iron Curtain. Should war start, the Group was 
expected to make clandestine contact with resistance forces. 
Following such contact, Special Forces units would be 
infiltrated to aid the resistance forces, helping organize, 
train, advise and assist the guerrillas. They would also 
attempt to co-ordinate guerrilla activity within the overall 
allied war effort.
The 10th Special Forces Group was organized according to the 
OSS experiences in World War II, from where the operational 
team concept was drawn. The operational A Team (better known 
as FA Team) consisted of two officers and 13 enlisted men and 
reported to an FB Team. The FB Team was ‘task organized' to 
control two 'plus' teams in a particular area of operation. 
The next command layer consisted of an FC Team assigned to 
control two or more teams in a single country. This command 
organization would later be replaced by a Special Forces (SF)
703Ibid., p. 20.
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Company headquarters. Superimposed upon the FC Team, the FD 
Team was responsible for controlling the operations of 
Special Forces teams in two or more countries.
The Special Forces Soldier
From the beginning of the modern Special Forces, each FA Team
member was a highly trained volunteer cross-trained in a
range of military skills. As Bank emphasizes, the training:
...program covered all aspects of unconventional 
warfare. In this spectrum were all the subjects in the 
Jedburgh curriculum: organization of resistance
movements and the operation of their component networks? 
agent training, to include espionage, sabotage 
(railroad, highway, marine, telecommunication) and power 
(electric)? security? escape and evasion? guerrilla 
warfare, which in itself is a comprehensive area, 
including not only organization, tactics, and logistics, 
but specialized demolitions? codes and radio 
communication? survival, the Fairbairn method0of 
hand-to-hand combat? and instinctive firing.
The recruiting pamphlet of this period which describes the
numerous qualities sought in a Special Forces volunteer:
...stipulated the qualifications and standards for 
volunteering. Basically, these were: a minimum age of
twenty-one? rank of sergeant or above? airborne trained 
or volunteer for jump training? language capability 
(European) and/or travel experience in Europe? an 
excellent personnel record? et cetera. All personnel 
had to volunteer to parachute and operate behind the 
lines in uniform and/or in civilian attire.
The intensity and variety of training were clearly designed
to qualify the Special Forces soldier to operate successfully
in small isolated teams, in a foreign country, for extended
periods.
704Colonel Aaron Bank, From OSS To Green Berets: The 
Birth of Special Forces, pp. 175-176.
705Ibid., pp. 168-169.
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By April, 1953 the 'new concept' of operations was developed
and enunciated in the operational training aim for 10th
Special Forces Group:
To infiltrate its component operational detachments 
to designated areas within the enemy's sphere of 
influence and organize the indigenous guerrilla 
potential on a quasimilitary or a military basis for 
tactical and strategic exploitation in conjunction with 
our land, sea and air forces.
The initial operational focus was on conducting guerrilla
warfare. This changed in the late 1950s and early 1960s to
focus on conducting counter-guerrilla warfare and
counter-insurgency operations. This reversal of operational
direction would create a serious doctrinal problem as to the
employment of Special Forces.
Despite this change in direction, confusion over the roles of
the Special Forces continued. Lieutenant General William P.
Yarborough states that it is:
...indicative of the U.S. Army's basic misunderstanding 
of what Special Forces really are, that official lineage 
of Special Forces is traced back to the First Special 
Service Force. The OSS was a much more legitimate 
ancestor of today's Green Berets, but the problem with 
U.S. Army recognition of-that fact is a syndrome that 
has wider implications.
Moreover, when the 10th Special Forces Group was deployed to 
West Germany in November, 1953 it was immediately apparent
706 Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of 
Psychological Warfare, Washington, D.C., Training Circular, 
Special Forces Group (Airborne), 13 May, 1952. Taken from 
Paddock, op. cit., p. 149.
707 Simpson, op. cit., Forward by Lieutenant General 
William P. Yarborough, p. xvi. The First Special Service 
Force was a joint US and Canadian unit formed for winter 
warfare. The unit, however, was used as elite infantry in 
both the Northern Pacific and Mediterranean areas of 
operation. See Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Burhans, The 
First Special Service Force: A War History of The North
Americans. 1942-1944.
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that the operational staff misunderstood the Group's mission,
and attempted to include the Group in the staff's plan for
conventional operations. Simpson states:
...staff officers looked at their plans for World War 
III and asked how many men the 10th Special Forces Group
would put on the line on D day, the day all those*.
Russian mechanized divisions came rumbling west.
The conventional view persisted, but the response to 'how
many men would be placed on the line' was none. The 10th SFG
was to be based in France. It was to land teams by parachute
in Eastern Europe to undertake guerrilla operations against
Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces. However, the conventional
military view, that the war would end before guerrilla
operations could begin, prevailed.
With the Korean conflict over and the 'New Look' strategy
dominant, ground forces in Europe were drastically cut.
Elite forces, being outside the mainstream of conventional
military thought, were an easy target. By the mid-1950s, the
10th SFG was reduced from more than 800 soldiers to fewer 
709than 400.
The possibility of employing SF units within the Soviet Union 
and the Eastern Bloc declined, particularly after the lack of 
Western response to the Hungarian revolution. With the US 
emphasis on maintaining and enhancing a dual strategic and 
conventional war-fighting capability, special operations 
continued to be perceived by the US Army as playing a minor 
and peripheral role. In line with other democratic nations 
such as Great Britain, America found it hard to accept the
708Ibid., p. 48.
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notion that its troops would be employed in military and
political operations aimed at conducting guerrilla warfare
710against, and inciting revolution in, another country.
Although the conventional soldiers tried to comprehend the 
mission and capabilities of the Special Forces, the anti­
elitist sentiment of the US Army remained. This was most 
noticeable when the Special Forces attempted to acquire the 
army's approval for the distinctive Green Beret as an 
official headdress. This 'foreign' order of headdress caused 
many of the US Army's senior officers much concern. Although 
the beret had been worn, unofficially, since 1953, it only 
received the 'presidential' stamp of approval from John F. 
Kennedy when he visited Fort Bragg on 12 October, 1961. 
Kennedy's support of Special Forces parallels that provided 
by President Roosevelt for the OSS. After their deaths, the 
Special Forces which they had backed went into decline.
The advent of the Kennedy administration created a period of 
growth for the Special Forces and resulted in their 
deployment to South Vietnam. However, US Special Forces had 
operated in Vietnam since 1957, when a 58-man South 
Vietnamese contingent was trained by the 1st Special Forces 
Group at the Commando Training Center at Nha Trang. These 
Vietnamese trainees were to be the initial cadre of the South
710Sarkesian, "The American Response..." op. cit., p.
42.
711According to an article entitled "'A Badge of 
Courage, But Not In Regulations," in The Journal of the Armed 
Forces. 16 January, 1965, the beret had yet to be included in 
official Army Regulations.
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712Vietnamese Special Forces - Lac Luong Dac Biet (LLDB). By
May of 1960 there were 30 Special Forces instructors
developing a training programme to enhance the capacity of
the South Vietnamese Army to combat the increasing Viet Cong
activity. On 11 May, 1961 Kennedy took two important
initiatives that would assist the progress of Special Forces.
Kennedy wished:
...to add four hundred Green Berets to the Special 
Forces President Eisenhower had sent in 1957 and to send 
one hundred additional military advisers to Vietnam; 
and, to begin an undercover program of espionage and 
sabotage_bv the South Vietnamese against North 
Vietnam.
On 21 September, 1961 President Kennedy announced a programme
to provide additional military and economic aid to the South
Vietnamese government. The President and his administration
were alarmed by the developing insurgency in South East Asia,
as well as the perceived threat from Castro*s Cuba. To meet
the increased emphasis on Special Forces in Vietnam, the 5th
Special Forces Group (5 SFG) was activated at Fort Bragg.
Kelly writes:
It was at this point, in the fall of 1961, that 
President Kennedy began to display particular interest 
in the Special Forces. His enthusiasm, based on his 
conviction that the Special Forces had great potential 
as a counterinsurgency force, led him to become a very 
powerful advocate for the development of the Special 
Forces program within the Army.
712 Kelly, op. cit., p. 4 For a view of the US military 
advisor's war see Lieutenant Colonel John L. Cook, The 
Advisor: Counter-Terrorism: The War Within The War.
713Loren Baritz, Backfire: A History of How American
Culture Led Us into Vietnam and Made Us Fight the Wav We Did.
p. 91.
714Kelly, op. cit., p. 5.
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Counter-insurgency became the buzz word in the Kennedy
administration. Furthermore, as nothing starts the Pentagon
moving more quickly than does a demonstrated interest from
the Commander-in-Chief, the armed forces took the cue from
the President. All the American services were suddenly aware
of special operations:
Everyone rushed to get into the act. The Navy created 
SEAL (sea, air, land) teams and trained them to 
parachute into the sea wearing scuba gear, at least 
theoretically ready to emerge from the water ready to 
fight. They also converted old Regulus missile-carrying 
submarines to carry troops and miniature four-man 
submarines for sea infiltration of special warfare 
forces. The Air Force came up with Air Commandos, 
decked out in jaunty Australian-style bush hats, and, to 
the utter consternation of the Army staff, ordered 
thousands of rapid-fire Armalite rifles. However, their 
primary weapons were dozens of old T-6s, T-28s, C-47s, 
and old naval Corsairs. They also selected some of the 
hottest pilots in the Air Force and-gut them behind the 
sticks of these old prop antiques.
In concert with the Kennedy emphasis on counter-insurgency,
the military colleges, as well as military and strategic
study centres, began addressing the shortage of American
research in this area of military activity:
The Services rushed new field manuals into print, and 
the commercial publishing market brought out new books 
on resistance, insurgency, and guerrillas. The writings 
of Mao, Chd, and Giap neared best-seller status, 
although it remains doubtful that many of those who 
acquired the books actually read them, or that of those 
who did, many grasped their lessons... If there was a 
surfeit of information about the subject, there was also 
a genuine enthusiasm, one reason for which was that, on 
paper, counterinsurgency seems both logical and 
practical. Practice, of course, was and is something 
else./lb
In the midst of the frantic military re-direction from 
conventional warfare to counter-insurgency, the Special
715Simpson, op. cit., p. 6 6. For a brief overview of 
these special units see Ian Padden, U.S. Navv Seals: From
Bootcamp To The Battle Zones. Ian Padden, U.S. Air Commando: 
The Men. The Machines. The Battles. Ian Padden, U.S. Armv 
Special Forces: From Bootcamp To The Battle Zones.
716Simpson, p. 67.
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Forces found themselves to be the conveyors and practitioners 
of the new type of warfare. Doughty points out that this was 
no simple task, and that redirecting military thought from
conventional to counter-insurgency issues was anything but
717 .easy. Further, Doughty argues that the ‘quick fix'
programmes, aimed to achieve this objective, had an effect on
the political and military objectives:
Unfortunately, the crash nature of the new entry into 
counterinsurgency caused the Army to focus much of its 
initial efforts on tactical methods. The elusive ideal 
of identifying the goals of military action within 
counterinsurgency was thus overwhelmed by the more 
immediate task of developing tactical organizations, 
equipment and doctrine. there should have been
clarity, confusion reigned.
Therefore, the Special Forces were expected to lead the rest
of the army down the rightful path to successful
counter-insurgency operations. To do so, the Special Forces
had to change their operational task from one of abetting
insurgents to that of combatting them:
Ironically, the sudden interest in counterinsurgency 
completely reversed the main function of the Special 
Forces. They reverted from fomenters of rebellion to 
combatants against rebellion. Yet their techniques did 
not drastically change, for they continued to 
concentrate on the-ogganization and employment of 
indigenous forces.
It was vital for President Kennedy to assist in forcing this 
doctrinal change in the US Army, for "otherwise the struggle 
in Vietnam would almost automatically fall into the hands of 
bureaucrats who would convert it into a conventional war of
717Doughty, op. cit., p. 26.
718ibid.
719ibid.
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720bombing, artillery fire, and massed troop engagements."
More importantly, Kennedy was aware that the Pentagon was
dominated by "Conventional military strategists [who] would
make matters worse by their conventional choice of weapons,
721tactics, and strategy." Kennedy believed that the Special 
Forces were going to be the key players as they "could be 
decisive in analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of enemy 
guerrillas.1,722
Special Forces From Guerrilla To Counter-Guerrilla Role
In preparation for their new counter-insurgency (coin)
duties, the Special Forces acted as advisors to army
commanders during counter-insurgency exercises in Germany.
The organization of Special Forces units allowed them to
function in extended operations in remote regions. This made
them more rapidly adaptable than regular conventional units.
More important, the Special Forces personnel were trained to
conduct operations in foreign languages and to operate in
different cultures. As noted previously, the army believed
that the skills that produced guerrilla battalions could now
be employed in producing counter-guerrilla battalions. The
Special Forces were, therefore, perceived as an elite group
of highly motivated professionals who "were not only good,
723but they were ready and available."
720Bantz, op. cit., p. 97.
721Ibid., p. 98.
722 .Simpson, op. cit., p. 67. 
723ibid.
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The major problem evolved from the excessive emphasis on the
military aspects of counter-insurgency operations. The root
political causes of the insurgency were largely ignored.
Hence the Americans attempted to solve a political problem
using purely military means, thereby ignoring, among other
elements of Clausewitzian theory, the ‘centre of gravity*
concept. Sarkesian writes that:
...the centre of gravity of revolution and 
counter-revolution —  the most difficult of 
ity conflicts —  was (and is) the 
social milieu of the indigenous political
This centre of gravity was attacked, to some degree, by the 
Special Forces. Their personnel, as well as a few other 
military men, fully appreciated the political and 
psychological climate required for successful counter­
insurgency operations. This came to public attention in the 
January, 1965 edition of the National Geographic magazine in
a pictorial article entitled, "American Special Forces in
725Action in Vietnam.” This report described some of the
means by which Special Forces personnel acted to defuse a
revolt of mountain tribes while attempting to acquire "the
allegiance of 700,000 tribesmen living athwart the Red
726[communist] infiltration and supply lines.”
It was here among the strategically important Central 
Highlands of South Vietnam that the Special Forces were 
earning their keep, according to Howard Sochurek:
724Sarkesian, "The American Response...,” op. cit., p.
45.
725Howard Sochurek, "American Special Forces in Action 
in Vietnam,” National Geographic. (January, 1965), pp. 38-64. 
For a view of the Special Forces working with the Montagnards 
see Jim Morris, War Storv. also Robin Moore, The Green 
Berets.
low—intens
political^
system.
726Ibid., p. 39.
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The Special Forces have trained and armed almost 10,000 
montagnards. Hardy and independent, these troups harry 
Communist infiltrators traveling [sic] the Ho Chi Minh 
Trail and form the backbone of Vietnamese resistance to 
a Communist take-over of the strategic highlands.
As the war in Vietnam changed, so did the role and missions
of the Special Forces. The most important role, however,
remained the civilian irregular Defence Group (CIDG), a
project that had the seeds of a counter-insurgency success.
This was where the SF soldier demonstrated remarkable skill,
patience and courage. It was in CIDG that one found the
Special Forces involved in:
...every conceivable aspect of counterinsurgency: 
military, economic, psychological, and political. The 
saga of the CIDG program involved thousands of US 
Special Forces soldiers and hundreds of thousands of 
Vietnamese civilians, millions of dollars, and 
approximately 100 camps spread from the Demilitarized 
Zone to the Gulf of Siam....It is a story of teaching 
Vietnamese how to shoot, or build, or farm, or care for 
the sick, or run agent operations, and of dealing with 
the religious and ethnic minorities of Vietnam....
Conceived by the CIA, the CIDG was intended to unite the
diverse political, religious and ethnic strands that make up
South Vietnam, particularly in the mountain areas. These
people, who inhabited the highlands, could provide base camps
and infiltration trails for use by the communists. They
could be a source of recruits, scouts, informers and they
could provide a support infrastructure. If all this could be
denied to the VC, Communist activity in a strategically
important region would cease. In that light, CIDG was
defensive, even preemptive, in nature, assisting the mountain
people in defending themselves but, concomitantly, employing
their knowledge of the area as a source of intelligence on VC
727Ibid., p.42.
728Simpson, op. cit., p. 97.
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activities. This mirrored the Malayan experience of
separating the guerrilla from the people but without
resettlement. A local security force was trained and paid
for by Special Forces, and civic action programmes
instituted. Later, the SF created its own mobile strike
forces, better known as Mike Forces. These units performed
patrols, ran special missions and reinforced CIDG camps in
trouble. Simpson argues that if the SF had constituted
effective Mike Forces in 1964, just as the VC had begun to
take on isolated CIDG camps, the need for intervention by US
729ground forces might have been unnecessary.
Other countries' elite units were also represented. A small 
number of the Australian and New Zealand Special Air Service 
Regiment personnel fought alongside their SF counterparts, 
from 1963, some serving in Mike Forces. According to one
former officer, the British SAS were also involved in the
. . . 730training of jungle trackers for the US Army. Some writers
have stated that:
They [British SAS] also fought in Vietnam where they 
were attached to Australia and New Zealand SAS squads 
despite declared British government policy that no 
British troops would be involved in the Vietnam War.
Some were seconded to Fort Bragg, home of the United 
Statej=f3jpecial forces, and then inducted into the US 
Army •
729/z*Ibid., p. 135.
730 . .Interview with Colonel the Viscount Slim, London,
England, 29 May, 1986.
731Bloch and Fitzgerald, op. cit., p. 44. These 
personnel had to resign from the British SAS and then join 
the Australian and New Zealand forces. Historically this 
co-operative effort is roughly similar to the Canloan plan 
where, due to a lack of British officers, Canadian Army 
officers volunteered to serve in various British regiments 
and corps in the Second World War. See also Colonel Brian W. 
Cloughley "The Australian Special Air Service," TVI Report. 
Vol. 8, No. 2, (1988), pp. 24-27.
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If such allegations are correct, this co-operation, as we 
shall see, continues in various areas to this day.
MACV-SOG
Unconventional operations were also performed by SF personnel 
under the auspices of the Military Assistance Command 
Vietnam-Studies and Observation Group (MACV-SOG). Under a 
MACV staff cover, SF personnel supposedly were to prepare a 
number of studies on the Vietnamese situation. This group 
was, in fact, undertaking extremely sensitive missions in the 
whole of the South-East Asia region and was doing so on a 
joint service and high command basis.
MACV-SOG was activated on 24 January, 1964. It consisted of 
members from the four services? USMC reconnaissance, Seal, 
Special Forces and Special Operations pilots of the 90th 
Special Operations Wing. The operational area for MACV-SOG 
was all of former French Indochina, Burma and the three
732South-Eastern Chinese provinces as well as Hainan Island.
During the MACV-SOG's heyday approximately 2,000 American
personnel were assigned to it, as were 8,000 indigenous 
733personnel. The duties assigned the SOF reflect earlier
OSS operations in that they supported the war effort by
unconventional means:
MACV-SOG's missions included: cross border operations 
into Cambodia, Laos, and North Vietnam to carry out 
intelligence gathering or raiding missions on the 
enemy's 'home ground'? gathering intelligence about POWs 
and carrying out rescue missions when possible? rescuing 
downed aircrews in enemy territory ('Bright Light'
732Shelby L. Stanton, Green Berets at War: U.S. Armv 
Special Forces in Southeast Asia 1956-1975. p. 205.
73 3Leroy Thompson, U.S. Elite Forces —  Vietnam, p. 27.
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missions)? training, inserting, and controlling agents 
in North Vietnam to gather intelligence or form 
resistance groups; carrying out 1black1 Psy Ops such as 
operating fake broadcasting stations inside North 
Vietnam? kidnapping or assassinating key enemy 
personnel? retrieving sensitive documents or equipment 
lost in enemy territory or in enemy hands? and inserting 
rigged mortar rounds or other booby-trapped-ordnance in 
enemy arms caches (Operation Eldest Son).
Although MACV-SOG worked intimately with the Central
Intelligence Agency, command and control was exercised by
MACV which was responsible for supervising all clandestine
activity orchestrated by SOG throughout Southeast Asia. The
controlling agency was the Special Assistant for
Counterinsurgency and Special Activities who in turn answered
73 6
to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
SOG conducted many UW missions under a series of code-names. 
Some of the more noteworthy were the Shining Brass missions. 
These consisted of 12-man teams (three American and nine 
montagnards) which would cross into Laos to locate 
infiltration routes and to identify targets for bombing, or 
for aircraft gunship missions. Simpson states that if an 
SF-led Shining Brass mission found suitable targets "there 
were three battalions of American-led Vietnamese used as a 
reaction force, or to carry out larger combat missions in 
Laos.,|736
However, command and control problems during covert 
operations were soon apparent. In Laos, for instance, if an
734ibid.
735ibid.
736Simpson, op. cit., pp. 148-149. For a personal 
insight into SOG operations see Kent White Jr., Prairie Fire 
and Rod Macron, "Special Operations Group," in Page and 
Pimlott, op. cit., pp. 454-457.
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inserted team found a target or required tactical air-power
they could request it "through a rather elaborate procedure
which included getting the permission on a target-by-target
737basis from the U.S. Ambassador to Laos.” In fact, Simpson
points out that such political considerations "plagued the
successful conduct of the Vietnam War.” Moreover, the US
ambassador to Laos in effect "had complete control over US
military operations in Laos. He exercised it as if he were a
738commander running his own war under CIA jurisdiction.”
This poorly unified operational structure with no central
responsibility, not surprisingly resulted in less than
perfect operations. Moreover, SOG was unable to acquire
operational intelligence from the CIA. Simpson writes, "When
asked for intelligence from the CIA teams in periodic SOG/CIA
739meetings, SOG was given nothing.” In that regard the
problems flowing from a lack of central authority were not to 
be resolved, nor would a central authority for military and
*7  A f\
CIA operations in Southeast Asia be established. Despite
this lack of co-ordinated command and control, the missions
were relatively successful and, in terms of casualties,
remarkably cheap. During the 2,675 cross-border operations
between 1965 and 1972, there were only 103 Special Forces 
741casualties.
737Ibid., p. 149.
738Ibid.
739Ibid.
740Ibid., p. 149-150.
741Thompson, op. cit., p. 27.
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Rescue Missions and Son Tav 1970
It would appear that experience acquired through MACV-SOG1s
missions, particularly the rescuing of downed aircrews
(Bright Light Missions), would fit the SF to undertake rescue
missions such as the raid launched on 21 November, 1970 to
free 70 American POWs apparently held captive at Son Tay.
This raid was only one of a large number of attempts made by
US forces to rescue prisoners in South Vietnam, Laos and 
742Cambodia, between 1966 and 1970 and, according to Richard 
Gabriel:
Of the ninety-one rescue attempts, twenty-six succeeded 
in rescuing either South Vietnamese soldiers or 
civilians. But of the raids to rescue American POWs, 
only one succeeded. On July 10, 1969, one Army enlisted 
man was rescued from a Vietcong prison compound in South 
Vietnam? he later died of wounds received at the hands 
of his captors. With that exception, not a single 
American was_rescued from enemy hands throughout the 
Vietnam war.
The reasons given for such failures have included the belief
that some of these missions were "compromised in advance to
the Vietcong who had successfully penetrated almost all
elements of American military intelligence and 
744operations.11 Another reason given was that the prisoners
were relocated. Whatever the reasons, the results were that 
"After the Son Tay raid, other rescue efforts were launched, 
and they all failed. From 1970 to 1973, at least
742 . . . .Richard A. Gabriel, Military Incompetence: Whv the
American Military Doesnft Win, p. 57.
743Ibid. It should be noted that there were 45-50 raids 
aimed at rescuing American POWs. Of the 91 total, between 
1966-1970, 20 succeeded in freeing 318 South Vietnamese 
soldiers, and a total of 60 civilians. See Benjamin F. 
Schemmer, The Raid, p. 237.
twenty-eight rescue missions were undertaken —  all to no 
avail."745
Son Tay, however, is an important milestone in hostage-rescue 
operations and, therefore, this operation must be placed in 
context with other similar rescue missions, e.g., Entebbe 
(1976) and Iran in 1980. The Son Tay raid began when the 
United States Air Force 1127th Field Activities Group (1127th 
FAG), responsible for acquiring and analysing data regarding 
American POWs in North Vietnam, discovered from high-altitude 
reconnaissance photographs what was thought to be a prison 
holding American POWs. The prison, Son Tay, lay 
approximately 23 miles west of Hanoi. This information was 
forwarded to the US Joint Chiefs of Staff who decided that a 
rescue would be most desirable, not only for the prisoners 
but for the morale of the American home front as well. The 
task was assigned to the Special Assistant for 
Counter-Insurgency and Special Activities (SACSA), 
Brigadier-General Donald Blackburn. To aid in the planning, 
satellites, SR-71s reconnaissance aircraft and Buffalo Hunter 
reconnaissance drones provided additional intelligence and 
site photographs. In early June 1970, the JCS were briefed 
and promptly ordered Blackburn to continue planning the raid. 
On 10 July, the JCS authorized Blackburn to begin the 
implementation of the plan.
The rescue force worked under the cover of the Joint 
Contingency Task Group (JCTG), under the overall direction of 
Major General Leroy J. Manor, commander of the USAF Special
745ibid.
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Operations at Eglin Air Force Base (AFB), Florida. Colonel 
Arthur D. Simons, an experienced MACV-SOG officer, was 
appointed as his deputy and the rescue force commander. The 
rescue itself, code-named 'Ivory Coast,' was set for sometime 
between 20 and 25 October. Weather and moon conditions were 
crucial in the choice of the most suitable night for the 
assault.
Selection of both the ground rescue force and air crews began
in earnest, the former under the supervision of Simons, the
latter under Manor. The ground force personnel consisted of
74615 officers and 82 NCOs drawn from the 6th and 7th Special 
Forces Groups. They were selected on their merit, which was 
established on the basis of motivation, technical competence 
and combat experience.
At the Eglin military base, a mock-up of the Son Tay camp was
^  A *7
created but designed to be quickly dismantled so that 
Soviet spy satellites would not notice any new 'construction' 
and thus jeopardize the operation. Attention to security and 
technical detail was absolutely necessary. Extensive 
rehearsals of all phases of the operation were undertaken.
In equipment and in training no expense was spared to ensure 
success, including the preparation of a table-top model of 
the Son Tay camp at a cost of $60,000.
746Ashley Brown (ed), The Green Beret: U.S. Special 
Forces From Vietnam To Delta Force, p. 61.
747Bombing Operations And The Prisoner-Of-War Rescue 
Mission In North Vietnam. Hearing Before The Committee On 
Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-First 
Congress, Second Session With Hon. Melvin R. Laird, Secretary 
of Defense, 24 November, 1970, p. 10.
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The rescue force was divided into three parts. A 14-man 
assault group would be dropped inside the prison by the 
Controlled crashing* of an HH-3 helicopter. It would be 
assisted by a 20-man command and security group and a further 
support unit of 22-men commanded by the rescue force 
commander. The rescue force began its joint training in late 
September, employing the air force personnel assigned to fly 
the helicopters (five HH-53s and one HH-3) and three C-130s? 
two of the latter aircraft were Combat Talons modified for 
command and control.
Although the initial target dates had passed, President Nixon 
gave his permission for the rescue attempt to proceed. The 
night of 20-21 November was selected, as weather and moon 
conditions would favour the rescue force. On the evening of 
20 November the raiders were moved from the Royal Thai Air 
Force Base (RTAFB) at Takhli to the RTAFB at Udorn. From 
there, the raiders proceeded to Son Tay. To assist in 
infiltrating the rescue force, carrier-based aircraft were 
launched in the early morning of the 21st as a 'deception 
raid1 on Hanoi.748
An Operational Success; an Intelligence Failure
The rescuers arrived at approximately 0218 on 21 November.
The target was illuminated by flares from a C-130. At the 
same time, an HH-53 helicopter destroyed the Son Tay guard 
towers with its mini-guns. Moments later, the assault force 
commanded by Major Dick Meadows (who later achieved notoriety
748Schemmer, op. cit., p. 199.
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in Operation Eagle-Claw) had a successful, controlled crash
landing in an HH-3. Upon landing the assault group laid
suppressing fire and headed towards the prison blocks. The
support unit, commanded by Simons, landed in the wrong area
400 yards off course in what was identified on their maps as
a 'secondary school.' There, the 22-man force found
themselves outside a building housing Chinese or Soviet
advisors to the North Vietnamese Army. Using surprise and
massive small-arms fire this force spread havoc, killing
749between 100 and 200 enemy personnel. This fortunate
mislanding precluded any enemy forces from intervening in the 
rescue. Within minutes the area was cleared. The force 
reboarded the helicopter and flew into the Son Tay prison to 
help the other assault and security members.
Within 30 minutes after the rescue mission began, the Son Tay
rescue forces had searched the prison and were returning to
their base in Thailand. From an operational context the
execution of the raid itself was almost flawless. The
landing of Simon's element at the wrong complex enabled the
rescue force to take out an undetected enemy who could have
posed a serious problem. However, there were no POWs to be
found. The North Vietnamese, realizing after Son Tay that
they were vulnerable to such raids, deployed thousands of
troops within North Vietnam to prevent future rescue
initiatives. More important though was the raid, apparently,
750led to improved treatment of American POWs.
749Ibid., p. 207.
750See Major John C. Sawyer, "Son Tay: Success Or 
Failure?," The American Legion. (December, 1982), p. 45. 
According to Sawyer the raid had a "major positive effect" on
(Footnote Continued)
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The raid, however, was an intelligence failure —  a failure
that underscores the fact that although accurate information
is critical to all special operations, it is particularly
important to rescue operations in hostile territory. As the
Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations said to the
Secretary of Defense, "The point is there were no prisoners 
751there.” They had been moved weeks before the rescue
attempt, but this had not been detected by US intelligence
because no one wanted to risk putting any human sources on
site. There was too much reliance on photographic
intelligence. As Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird
replied to questions about why the Pentagon did not know the
dates when the prisoners were relocated:
...with respect to the dates and the movements of POWs, 
we do not have that kind of intelligence from the 
ground. That capability would be a tremendous asset, 
just as the capability of having a camera that could see 
through the roofs and into the cells would be a terrific 
asset. But we do not have that-in the intelligence 
community at the present time.
The photographic and satellite intelligence initially
indicated that Son Tay was an active POW camp. Intelligence
personnel, using reconnaissance photos, had unravelled a code
used by Son Tay POWs. The POWs had formed a letter "K” on
753the ground. The letter stood for "Come [and] get us."
With this dubious piece of information, plus corroborating 
data from a captured North Vietnamese soldier, the
(Footnote Continued)
the POWs based on the reaction of the North Vietnamese. 
Firstly they consolidated all POWs which was a radical change 
from the isolation experienced by the Americans. Secondly it 
proved to the POWs and the North Vietnamese that they, as 
prisoners, were not forgotten.
751Bombing Operations.... op. cit., p. 7.
752Ibid., p. 22.
753Schemmer, op. cit., p. 34.
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intelligence analysts believed that Son Tay was an
754operational POW camp.
In the end Son Tay stands as an historical anomaly. In the
operational context the mission was successful, specifically
in the almost flawless execution of the plan? the objective,
however, rescuing of the prisoners of war, was not achieved.
The operation demonstrated America's will, and its
operational capability, to initiate successful rescue
operations. At the same time, it underlines an intelligence
failure, as later on it was discovered:
...that Son Tay had been empty of prisoners for four and 
a half months, and that they [American military 
intelligence] had corroboration of th|t information 24 
hours before the raid was launched.
In early November, a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) source
forwarded the information that the POWs at Son Tay had been
756moved to a new camp, confirming earlier intelligence 
reports.
Richard Gabriel believes that, rather than an intelligence
failure, Son Tay was a command failure. He argues that
senior commanders ignored the intelligence forwarded to them
and proceeded on a doomed mission. He lays the blame on "the
refusal of commanders to acknowledge new or existing
information that runs contrary to a course of action to which
757they are already committed.
754ibid.
755Ibid., p. 297.
756Gabriel, op. cit., p. 59.
757Ibid., p. 59.
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With the rise of low-intensity conflict and, in particular, 
state-sponsored terrorist activities in the 1970s and the 
early 1980s, there was a renewed American effort to organize 
special units capable of performing hostage-rescue and 
counter-terrorist operations. Numerous low-intensity 
conflicts, including terrorist activity in Third World 
nations, pressured the United States government, and in turn 
the American military, to give some thought to their 
low-intensity warfare capability.
7 Rft
For an overview of US Army LIC capabilities see David 
C. Isby, "Special Operations Forces Response,” Military 
Intelligence. (January-March, 1985), pp. 24-27 and Captain 
William H. Burgess, "Special Operations Forces and the 
Challenge of Transnational Terrorism,” Military Intelligence. 
(April-June, 1986), pp. 8-15.
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Section III
'Operation EAGLE CLAW1 - Deltafs Raid Into Iran
In preparation for the execution of operations similar to the 
Son Tay raid, the Americans developed 'Delta,' a force 
trained to conduct hostage rescue, counter-terrorist, and 
other highly specialized military operations of national 
importance. Delta had its chance to go into action in 1980, 
in an operation called 'Eagle Claw.' The following narrative 
will illustrate that during critical phases of this 
initiative, international co-operation was offered and 
accepted by the United States. This co-operation and 
assistance was present during the preparation and execution 
phases, as well as in the wake of this ill-fated operation.
On 4 November, 1979, a crowd of Iranian militants stormed the 
US embassy in Tehran and seized the employees as hostages.
The militants demanded that the Shah of Iran be returned for 
trial. Three other American diplomats, who were visiting the 
offices of the Iranian Foreign Ministry during the seizure of 
the embassy were given asylum.
The American government reaction focussed on three levels of 
effort: first, economic sanctions on Iran, second, the 
employment of world public opinion, and, third, international 
law, to pressure the Iranian government to release the 
American hostages. The Americans made numerous attempts at 
acquiring allied support for economic sanctions. These 
attempts to garner support for economic sanctions finally 
succeeded just two days before an ill-fated rescue mission. 
The allies had been given the impression that a concerted
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effort at economic sanctions could delay any precipitious
759American military initiatives particularly as President
Carter had publicly announced peaceful intentions. On 7
December, 1979 he reiterated that ”1 am not going to take any
military action that would cause bloodshed or arouse the
unstable captors of our hostages to attack or punish 
760them.” Despite the Presidents pronouncements, there was
speculation of possible military action. In fact Carter*s
National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski had initiated
the planning for a rescue mission on 4 November, 1979 when he
contacted Harold Brown, the Secretary of Defense, and ordered
761the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare a rescue plan.
Suggesting tacit approval of BrzezinskiS action, Carter
himself began preparing, on 6 November:
...for possible military action, I had satellite 
photographs taken to determine where IranS airplanes 
and other armed forces were located. I wanted to 
prevent the spilling of blood on both sides, but-it 
would be inevitable if the hostages were harmed.
On 8 November, Brzezinski, Brown and the Chairman of the JCS,
General David Jones discussed a plan. The planning and
preparation would continue until 7 April, 1980 when President
Carter finally gave his approval. According to Brzezinski,
759Bernard Gwertzman, "Allies Are Left Smarting By 
Another Carter Surprise," The New York Times. 27 April, 1980.
760Robert D. McFadden, Joseph B. Treaster and Maurice 
Carroll, et al., No Hiding Place, p. 197.
761Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Failed Mission: The Inside
Account of the Attempt to Free the Hostages in Iran," The New 
York Times Magazine. 18 April, 1982, p. 28.
762Jimmy Carter, "444 Days Of Agony," Time. 18 October, 
1982, p. 46.
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763the President said, "We ought to go ahead without delay."
The date for the operation was 24 April.
The Plan: 1OPERATION EAGLE CLAW1
Major General James B. Vaught, a highly decorated US Army
officer newly assigned to the Pentagon, was selected to be
the Task Force Commander. His command post was to be at the
Egyptian airfield at Qena. With the assistance of satellite
communications Vaught would be able to maintain contact with
his subordinate commanders as well as the Pentagon and the
aircraft carrier the USS Nimitz which was assigned to this 
764operation.
From Qena the rescue force would be moved by two C-141 
transport aircraft to the island of Masirah off the east 
coast of Oman in preparation for entering Iran. From Masirah 
a force of six C-130 Hercules, two of which were gunships, 
would fly the rescue force and its equipment, including 
18,000 gallons of aviation fuel, to the landing site called 
•Desert One1 situated in the Dasht-e-Kavir desert 
approximately 265 nautical miles southeast of Tehran.
Once on the ground, a Ranger team would secure the landing 
strip. Two of the 0 1 3  Os would depart from Desert One 
leaving four on site. It was here at 'Desert One1 where the 
rescue force would be joined by eight RH-53D Sea
763Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power And Principle: Memoirs of 
the National Security Adviser 1977-1981. p. 493.
764 .Paul B. Ryan, The Iranian Rescue Mission: Whv It
Failed, p. 19.
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765Stallions, helicopters designed and equipped for
766detonating acoustic and magnetic mines. These
helicopters, flown mostly by Marine Corps officers, with the
exception of two naval aviators and one air force officer,
would leave the USS Nimitz and rendezvous at Desert One.
After refuelling, the helicopters would then fly the 118-man
rescue force from Desert One to Desert Two, a second hidden
site, approximately 50 miles from Tehran. Here the rescue
force would be met by their contact, code-named 1 Esquire.*
767Esquire was Dick Meadows a former Special Forces officer 
who, with a few other military and civilian personnel, had 
been infiltrated into Tehran to gather intelligence, prepare 
a safe-house and acquire transport to carry the rescue force, 
clandestinely, into Tehran from Desert Two.
The helicopters were to leave Desert Two for another selected
768site some 15 miles away and await the order to fly to 
Tehran to extricate the rescue force and hostages. Meanwhile 
the rescue force would enter Tehran in vehicles driven by 
Meadow*s team and begin the assault on the embassy compound 
about 2300 hours. This mission was essentially to neutralize 
any resistance to free the American hostages.
765Ibid., p. 37.
766Ibid., p. 41.
767David C. Martin, "The Point Man in Teheran," Newsweek 
12 July, 1982, p. 21. Meadows, using the cover of an Irish 
businessman in this operation, had extensive experience in 
covert military operations in Vietnam. He had participated 
in forays behind enemy lines as a member of the MACV-SOG and 
had been on the Son Tay raid in 1970.
768Ryan, op. cit., p. 2.
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Ground Force Tactical Plan
The ground force commander, Colonel Charlie Beckwith, divided
his rescue force into three units —  each with a specific
tactical aim. Two of these forty-strong units, designated
Red and Blue elements, were the assault forces. Red element
was responsible for occupying the western portion of the
embassy*s compound, seizing the commissary and staff
residencies, neutralizing Iranian resistance and releasing
any hostages. Blue element was assigned the task of securing
the southern sector of the compound and releasing the
hostages incarcerated in the Chancellery, the Ambassador*s
769residence, and the Deputy Chief of Mission*s residence.
The third unit, consisting of 13 men, known as White element,
was to secure the main road outside the embassy and ensure
that no one interfered with the rescue. It was then to
secure a soccer stadium near the compound where it would
cover the withdrawal and the extraction of the hostages and 
770rescue force. During the main assault on the embassy
compound, a separate 13-man Special Forces team would assault
the Iranian Foreign Ministry and release the three Americans
771that were known to be held there.
Extraction
To ensure the safe release of the rescuers and the hostages, 
two AC-130 Spectre gunships were assigned to fly over Tehran
769Colonel Charlie A. Beckwith and Donald Knox, Delta 
Force, p. 6.
770Ibid., p. 6.
771Ibid., p. 254.
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to "prevent Iranian reinforcements from reaching the embassy
772compound." The helicopters from Desert Two, would 
extricate the rescue force and hostages from the stadium.
Once the rescue was completed, the ground force and hostages 
would be flown to the isolated airfield at Manzariyeh, some 
35 miles south of Tehran. The airfield was to have been 
secured by a separate company-size force of about 80 Rangers 
airlifted from Qena to await the arrival of three C-141 
Starlifter transport jets. Upon the arrival of the 
helicopters, the rescue force and hostages would transfer to 
the C-141s and take off under the cover of a gunship. The 
helicopters were to be destroyed on the departure of the 
rescue force. The rescue force would then return to its 
staging base at Oman*s Masirah Island.
The Operation
Colonel Beckwith*s Delta Force was airlifted from Fort Bragg, 
North Carolina via Frankfurt, West Germany. In Frankfurt, 
Delta was joined by a 13-man group "carefully selected and
trained to take down the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
773building." According to one source, this team came from
Berlin and had been trained at Bad Tolz, West Germany. This
group had previously trained with the GSG9, but it is not
known if they had trained with them, specifically, for this 
774mission.
772Ibid., p. 255.
773Ibid., p. 261.
A
Interview with a US Army Special Forces officer, 
Washington, D.C., 22 January, 1989.
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The Delta Force continued their journey to Qena, Egypt.
Meanwhile a group of 83 US Army Rangers, tasked to supply
security first at Desert One and later at the final
extraction site at Manzariyeh, was also flown to Qena. Here
Delta Force and the Rangers were billeted in a shelter called
Bunker 13. David C. Martin reported that at Qena where:
...400 soldiers and airmen along with their weapons and 
aircraft were based, all activities had to be carefully 
timed around the passage overhead of a Soviet 
reconnaissance satellite. Each time the satellite 
passed over, the_spldiers would take cover in an 
aircraft hangar.
On 24 April, the rescue force boarded two 0141 transports
and flew to the island of Masirah, arriving about 1400 
776hours. At 1630 hours, the rescue force then boarded three
troop-carrying 0130 Hercules aircraft and flew to Desert 
One.
The C—130 carrying the ground force commander, Colonel
Beckwith, the on-site commander at Desert One, Colonel Kyle,
some Delta personnel and a USAF Combat Control Team, arrived 
777at 2200 hours. Upon landing, an accompanying Ranger team 
secured the landing zone and maintained observation on a 
country road that ran nearby.
Helicopter Phase
Eight RH-53 Sea Stallion helicopters lifted off from the deck 
of the USS Nimitz in the Arabian Sea at 1930 hours. The
775David C. Martin, "Inside the Rescue Mission,” 
Newsweek, 12 July, 1982, p. 19.
776Beckwith and Knox, op. cit., p. 265.
777Ryan, op. cit., p. 79.
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helicopter flight assumed a loose cruising formation, and 
began the long flight to Desert One. The helicopters flew 
low, using the mountainous terrain to mask their flight from 
Iranian radar.
Two hours into the journey, one of the helicopters (number 6)
778experienced a warning of a possible rotor blade failure.
The pilot landed. Upon confirming the situation, the crew 
abandoned the aircraft. Another helicopter (number 8) 
recovered the crew and continued on to Desert One. The 
flight was conducted in total radio silence.
The flight then encountered a huge dust storm, known as a
'haboob' in Arabic. Maintaining formation was impossible.
Two helicopters (numbers 1 and 2) landed in hopes that the
storm would pass. An hour later, the helicopters, now well
separated, emerged from the storm. Still later, the
helicopters encountered another dust 'haboob.' As they
fought the storm, another helicopter (number 5) had an alarm
flash. The motor which cooled the aircraft power supply had
failed, causing the "navigation and flight control systems
779[to become] inoperative or erratic." The helicopter 
aborted the mission and headed back to the USS Nimitz. The 
loss of two helicopters reduced the flight to the minimal 
requirements to continue with the hostage rescue. The 
remaining six helicopters, navigating by instruments, finally 
cleared the second storm and pushed on to Desert One. The
778Beckwith and Knox, op. cit., p. 283. See also Donald 
E. Fink, "Rescue Helicopters Drawn From Fleet," Aviation Week 
and Space Technology. 5 May, 1980, p. 25.
779 jRyan, op. cit., p. 73.
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helicopters straggled into Desert One anywhere from 55 to 85 
minutes late.780
Desert One
The landing site at Desert One had been secured by the 
781Rangers, and the USAF Combat Control Team responsible for
controlling air traffic at this site undertook their assigned
responsibilities for the helicopters and aircraft. Just after
the American force arrived at Desert One, a bus containing 44
Iranians was stopped by a Ranger security team and the
782passengers taken into custody. Moments later, a fuel
truck came down the road. The Rangers ordered the truck to 
stop but the driver ignored the soldiers. One Ranger fired 
an anti-tank rocket, destroying the truck and creating a very 
noticeable fire. The driver jumped from the truck and was 
picked up by an Iranian vehicle that followed him, which made 
a U-turn and escaped.
The original two C-130s had, by then, left Desert One. Four 
more C-130s had landed and taxied to a parking area. Three 
of these aircraft contained aviation fuel and were awaiting 
to refuel. The main force was then to board the helicopters 
for Desert Two.
780 .Ibid., p. 80 and p. 83, also Beckwith and Knox, op.
cit., pp. 272-273.
781Beckwith and Knox, op. cit., pp. 268-269.
782 . #U.S. Defense Department, Rescue Mission Report
[Holloway Report], August, 1980, p. 50.
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Refuelling the helicopters was not an easy task as each C-130
and each helicopter kept all engines running, to avoid the
783possibility of engines not restarting. The incredible
noise and turbulence reduced the margin of safety in an
operation where success depended on everything going
perfectly. These difficulties were compounded by the lack of
any easily visible, allocated areas for the ground and Desert
784One commanders. No one knew where the commanders were,
and the commanders could not determine what was happening.
A third helicopter was lost at Desert One. One of the last
two helicopters to arrive (number 2) reported hydraulic
problems. Beckwith was advised that the helicopter
complement was down to five. On this basis, Beckwith decided
786to abort the mission. The Desert One commander Kyle,
passed this decision to General Vaught who used secure means
to advise the Pentagon. The Secretary of Defense, Harold
Brown, advised President Carter of, and approved the decision
787made by Colonel Beckwith.
783Ryan, op. cit., p. 81.
784Rescue Mission Report, op. cit., p. 50.
HOC
Ryan, op. cit., pp. 83-84 and David R. Griffiths, 
"Readiness Rate of RH-53 Key Issue," Aviation Week and Space 
Technology. 5 May, 1980, pp. 25-26.
786Beckwith and Knox, op. cit., pp. 276-277.
787Brzezinski, Power And Principle, op. cit., p. 498.
The Departure
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Colonel Kyle ordered preparations to begin for the departure
of the helicopters and the C-130 transports. On the
recommendation of Lieutenant Colonel Edward R. Seiffert,
USMC, the helicopter flight leader, the helicopters were to
be refuelled and dispatched to the USS Nimitz which was
788waiting on station in the Arabian Sea.
At approximately 0240 hours, during the re-positioning of the
helicopters for fueling, a helicopter (number 3) lifted off
789the ground and collided with a C-130 transport. The
result was a massive fireball. The 39 soldiers on board the
transport escaped through a side door. The five-man C-130
aircrew and the 3-man helicopter crew were killed in the
790blast and fire. Four army personnel were badly burned.
In the end, the order was given to evacuate the Desert One 
site by Colonel Kyle. All helicopters were abandoned. The 
crews and the rescue force boarded the three remaining 
C-130s and returned to the island of Masirah. Those wounded 
in the explosion were transferred to a C-141 transport and 
flown to a medical station in Qena. The remainder of the 
force flew to Egypt, then on to North Carolina. The command 
post at Qena advised the American agents in Tehran, led by 
Dick Meadows, that the mission had been aborted.
788Beckwith and Knox, op. cit., p. 278.
789Ibid., pp. 278-279.
790Rvan, op. cit.. p. 89.
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Aspects of International Co-operation Related to 'Operation 
EAGLE CLAW1 - Possible. Probable and Real
Operation Eagle Claw used two key Middle East bases to launch 
the rescue attempt —  Qena, Egypt, and Masirah Island, Oman. 
But even before the operation began, Delta Force had received 
formal and informal international co-operation.
Colonel Charlie Beckwith, the commander of Delta Force, spent
a year with the British Special Air Service in the early 
7911960s. This early experience, and follow-on visits, with
the SAS prepared him for developing a similar SAS capability
in the Delta Force. Upon completion of Delta*s training, a
number of senior foreign observers participated in an
evaluation of Delta's counter-terrorist capabilities early in
1979. Beckwith writes:
The SAS sent an observer. The West German GSG-9 chief, 
Ulrich Wegener, came himself^.and so did the French 
GIGN's, Christian Prouteau.
These observers offered advice and assistance, regarding all
aspects of counter-terrorist training and operations. This
also opened the door for future consultations and observer
status. For example, Colonel Wegener was a visitor to the
SAS during the Iranian siege and, as has been previously
noted, such consultations and co-operation also occurred in
Mogadishu where two SAS men participated in that rescue.
791Beckwith and Knox, op. cit., pp. 11-37.
792Ibid., p. 182.
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Beckwith*s task was to rescue the American hostages from the
embassy compound in Tehran. His first priority was to
develop an intelligence picture on which he could base the
plan for rescue. Beckwith has underlined the importance of
intelligence in such a rescue mission:
What was needed most was intelligence. Where in the 
embassy compound were the hostages being held? How many 
hostages were being held? At this time, many figures 
were being used and issued to the press - all in an 
attempt to keep the Iranians from deducing that in fact 
six Americans were hiding in the Canadian Embassy.
Delta needed to know the true figure. What did the 
Embassy look like? Were the hostages being held in a 
group or had they been separated? Who was holding them? 
Were they students, militia, or regular army? Were 
there any Palestinians involved in seizing the embassy? 
In guarding the hostages? Precisely how many guards 
were there and how were they armed? What were their 
routines, especially during night hours? Where were 
they posted? Where were the walking guards and where 
were the stationary ones? What kind of reinforcements 
could they summon? To whom coyld we go for information 
about Iran and its geography?
Getting this information was difficult, as there were no US
agents, better known in intelligence parlance as *stay-behind
assets,* in Iran following the takeover of the US embassy.
Some aspects of American intelligence collection, during this
time, remain sensitive today. However, we have learned that
Canada played an important role. The then Canadian
Ambassador to Iran, Kenneth Taylor, stated:
My main effort, and as was the case of a few other of my 
colleagues, was to try to, if not answer the situation 
of the 52, try to at least enhance their position.
The last sentence suggests that Taylor and his staff were
collecting information to abet any rescue attempt. One of
Taylor*s military staff, Sergeant Jimmy Edwards, was tasked
793Ibid., p. 192.
794Canamedia Productions, ”444 Days to Freedom: What 
Really Happened in Iran,” Toronto, Ontario, Canada. 
Transcript, pp. 59-60.
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to collect information for both the US intelligence and the
military. At one point, Edwards was apprehended by Iranian
militants in the US compound while he was attempting to
discover exactly where the American hostages were being held.
Taken to the embassy guard house, he was questioned and
released. Edwards had told the students that he was only
collecting posters and the ones he wanted were on the inside
795of the compound walls.
The information that Taylor and his staff collected was then
sent to the CIA and the State Department. It was also used
796by the Pentagon to help plan the rescue attempt. Taylor 
states that this intelligence collection was in preparation 
for such an event. MWe attempted to gauge whether or not a 
so called commando raid would be plausible. This was a 
collective effort.”797
Considering that there were no Americans on site to gather 
intelligence in the wake of the embassy seizure, Canada 
appears to have played a key role in providing such 
information. Canadian embassy staff kept American government 
departments and agencies aware of activities occurring around 
the embassy compound.
795Ibid., p. 59.
796Ibid., p. 60.
797Ibid.
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West Germany's GSG9 Offers Assistance
Colonel Wegener, the commander of GSG9, who probably
anticipated an American rescue attempt, offered some West
German assistance to help infiltrate American personnel into
Tehran. Beckwith quotes the message and underlines the
American response:
"Charlie, am prepared to put in Teheran German TV crew. 
STOP. Would you like your people on it? STOP." I 
[Beckwith] informed General Vaught of Ulrich's message 
and recommended we pursue9the offer. Somewhere in the 
Pentagon the idea died."
Although this proposal offered an ideal opportunity to
infiltrate American intelligence or military personnel into
Tehran, it was rejected out of hand. According to Beckwith,
"'This [the rescue mission] is too sensitive,' General Vaught
was told to tell me. 'We can't work with a foreign
799government on this,"' This rejection of profferred 
international co-operation ignored the many previously 
successful international co-operative efforts noted earlier 
in this study. Despite General Vaught's views, there were to 
be many more international co-operative aspects during this 
mission.
America's Closest Ally Is Advised
It has been established that the British Prime Minister, 
Margaret Thatcher and the Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, 
were fully briefed on the plan to rescue the hostages. A 
former British officer, employed in Oman, observed the 
arrival of a number of American aircraft carrying supplies
798Beckwith and Knox, op. cit., p. 223.
799ibid.
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and ammunition and reported the movements to the British
Government, concerned that the contents were destined for the
Afghan freedom fighters.800 Obviously the British government
was concerned and queried Washington about this activity. In
response President Carter sent Warren Christopher, the Deputy
Secretary of State, prior to the rescue attempt, to brief
801Thatcher and Carrington about the American rescue plan. 
British Territory Is Used For Modifications
In November, 1979 General Vaught's planning staff moved the
Sea Stallion helicopters and their ground maintenance crews
802by C-5 transport to the British island of Diego Garcia,
where both a British facility and an American military base
are located. The helicopters were later transferred to the
aircraft carrier USS Kittv Hawk and then in January, 1980 to
803the USS Nimitz. At Diego Garcia, it is believed that the
mine-sweeping equipment was removed and long-range fuel tanks 
were installed in preparation for the long flight to Desert 
One. The need for a secure base to hide the preparations for 
such a rescue attempt has been previously documented, 
particularly in the Mogadishu and Entebbe operations. The 
isolation of the island of Diego Garcia provided an ideal and 
secure location for this activity.
800Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs Of A President, 
p. 512.
801ibid.
802„ ..Ryan, op. cit., p. 51.
803Ibid., p. 54.
- 320 -
Egypt Allows American Access to Oena
The planning staff needed to find a secure base which the
rescue force could use as a staging area804 for the
operation, and a command centre to maintain contact with all
elements of the task force, and the Pentagon. President
Anwar Sadat confirmed Egypt's assistance in providing a
staging base and a site for a forward command centre. Sadat
said "I promised the American people I would provide
facilities for the rescue of the hostages."805 Although
Sadat 'apparently' agreed to American access to the Egyptian
airbase, he was probably not told of American intentions,
although he may have surmised what they were. Furthermore,
in the wake of the ill-fated attempt, Sadat declared that
"Egyptian facilities were available if the U.S. wanted to
come to the aid of any Arab state in the Gulf or to rescue
806the hostages in Iran." Considering the failure of
American attempts to secure the peaceful release of the 
hostages and the growing frustration of President Carter and 
the American public, Sadat probably expected a rescue 
attempt. He may also have appreciated the need of the 
Americans for a staging area close enough to project a rescue 
force into Iran.
George C. Wilson, "For Rangers in Egypt, Bunker 13 
Proved a Harbinger of Future," The Washington Post. 25 April, 
1982.
805Irene Beeson, "Egypt's role a mystery," The Guardian. 
London, 28 April, 1980.
806Roger Matthews, "Disasterous raid could rebound on 
Sadat," Financial Times.London. 26 April, 1980.
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Two Iranian Generals Join The Rescue Force
Before the rescue force left the United States, Beckwith met 
with two former Iranian generals who were to accompany the 
rescue force. Both had sought refuge in the United States 
when Khomeini assumed political power in Iran. Had the 
Americans got to Tehran their language capability and local 
knowledge could have been very helpful. Needless to say, 
their language skills and military knowledge were never 
required. Still their purpose and motivation remains 
obscure.807
Iranian informers1
Although it is unlikely that the full story of the on-site
intelligence gathering operation will ever be revealed, there
are indications that Iranians assisted in providing
information from within the American compound. Apparently
808some of the Iranian exiles on Dick Meadows' team may have
been successful in acquiring information.
Iranian infiltrators made contact with the militants 
guarding the hostages through the university and 
obtained detailed information about their relations with 
the police, communications with them and the guards' 
organisations.
It also appears that the Meadows' team may have 'turned' a 
few guards to provide the detailed inside information as to
FBIS 138, KUSAIT [SIC] PAPER: "EGYPTIANS, IRANIANS
TOOK PART IN U.S. OPERATION," 29 April, 1980. This article 
noted that "THE IRANIAN OFFICERS WHO TOOK PART IN THE 
MILITARY MISSION WERE THOSE 'WHO WERE COMMITTED' TO THE 
DEPOSED SHAH, WHO IS CURRENTLY LIVING IN EGYPT, AND THEY TOOK 
PART IN THE OPERATION TO 'PLAY THE ROLE OF REVOLUTIONARY 
(7IRANIAN) OFFICERS'". See also Beckwith and Knox, op. cit., 
p. 260 and p. 271.
888Martin, "Inside the...," op. cit., p. 18.
Clare Hollingworth, "Rescue teams recruited 'moles' 
at embassy," The Daily Telegraph. London, 30 April, 1980.
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the whereabouts and conditions of the hostages. The
Iranian-speaking members of the on-site team supposedly
"persuaded several of the guards to become *moles' inside the
810embassy ready to assist in the escape of the hostages."
Although there is no concrete evidence of this, nor will
there be, it is possible that such an intelligence coup could
811have been prepared.
Turkey —  Rescue Force Escape and Evasion Plans and the Use 
of Turkish Airspace
The forward base at Qena gave Beckwith a final opportunity to
brief his team on the mission plan and provide the latest
intelligence regarding the location of the hostages. At the
base, the officers reviewed the plans for escape and evasion
(E and E) in case the assault failed. According to Ryan:
If the assault failed, the men were to head overland to 
Turkey. To draw the attention of U.S. intelligence 
officers who would be monitoring satellite cameras, the 
escaping soldiers reportedly were to form huge alphabet 
letters with stones or vegetation that would show up on 
the film.
It appears that the American government had some type of 
contingency plan, possibly with the connivance of Turkey, to 
assist stranded task force survivors to cross Iran and enter 
Turkey, should it be necessary. Although it is unlikely that 
Turkey was advised of this E and E contingency plan, it was, 
as an old American ally close to the scene, a logical
810Ibid.
811See Amit Roy, "Iranians Launch Search for 'U.S.
Helpers,"' The Daily Telegraph. London, 1 May, 1980.
812 
op. cit.
. .Ryan, op. cit., p. 67. See also article by Wilson,
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political, military and geographical choice for E and E
purposes. Moreover, Turkey was cited as allowing an American
AWACS command and control aircraft to operate in Turkish air
space during the rescue attempt. An article by a diplomatic
correspondent states that Turkish:
...air space was used by the operations* command 
aircraft. The border of Turkey, a Nato member, is 
between 400 and 500 miles from Teheran.
Its air space was the nearest and safest area from which 
to maintain contact with the airstrip at Posht-e Badam 
near Tabas, and groups in or near Tehran.
The use of Turkish air space would have provided the American
AWACS a degree of security from interception, while taking
advantage of Turkey's proximity to Iran, so as to maintain
communications with the rescue force.
Israeli Reporter Monitors The American Operation
Michael Gurdus, a 35-year-old reporter working for the
official Israeli radio agency, was listening to the American
communications during the rescue attempt. Although he
intercepted the American communications, during the latter
stages of the operation, he did not report it immediately.
According to one article:
Gurdus knew hours before anyone else that the aircraft 
had been destroyed but decided to withhold the 
information from the Israeli radio untilgthe American 
public had been informed of the failure.
One can only suspect that this information was not reported
as the Israeli radio service believed it would jeopardize the
Q 13
David Adamson, "Four Middle East Nations Had Role In 
Rescue Mission," The Daily Telegraph. London, 2 May, 1980.
814 . . .Maier Asher, "U.S. complains about Israeli Radio
‘bug,'" The Daily Telegraph. London, 30 April, 1980.
According to this report the AWACS took off from Turkey.
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lives of Americans still in Iran. This detection by 
monitoring airwaves was not new, Gurdus had also discovered
O l  C
the German intentions during the Mogadishu rescue.
Masirah
On 24 April the Delta team boarded two C-141 Starlifter
transports and flew to the island of Masirah just off the
east coast of Oman, where the C-130 aircraft were being
refuelled. The airbase at Masirah closed the geographical
gap for the flight to Desert One. It has been reported,
however, that the government of Oman "was not told the true
nature of the mission, simply because permission to refuel
816probably would not have been granted.” It would be hard,
however, not to notice two large jet transports and the 
visits of other American aircraft. As previously mentioned, 
a former British officer informed London of this American air 
activity before 24 April. British enquiries brought about 
the briefings of Mrs. Thatcher and Lord Carrington.
One would think that the increased American air traffic at
Masirah may have raised Omani suspicions that an operation of
some kind was to occur. In Colonel Beckwith's book he
described the arrival of Delta:
Delta landed at Masirah about 1400 hours. General Gast 
was there to meet us. Some tents had been put up.
There were soft drinks and water and lots of ice. 
Somebody had gone to a lot of trouble to make Delta 
comfortable.... Most everyone went into the 16-man
815ibid.
816Ryan, op. cit., p. 63. According to an article by 
George C. Wilson, op. cit., "The Sultan of Oman would insist 
he knew nothing about use of his territory by the Americans."
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tents, the canvas walls were rolled up, and got off-- 
their feet. The night was going to be a long one.
Moreover, it would appear somewhat unlikely that a large body
of foreign soldiers would go unnoticed particularly as they
were:
...dressed in nondescript clothes, a ruse that would 
help in their escape from Iran if the operation went 
awry. Untypically, they wore blue jeans, flak vests, 
black army jackets, combat boots, and navy watchcaps (a 
blue-wool toque). Sewn on each jacket sleeve was a 
small U.S. flag covered with tape.
Would not such a group landing from American aircraft with
weapons and packs evoke a degree of * official interest? 1 In
any case, Omani officials may or may not have been apprised
of the rescue mission. Nevertheless, the availability of the
airbase as a staging area for the American rescue forces, was
a co-operative measure in itself.
Possible Israeli Assistance
Israel may have been advised of the rescue, although the 
government denied any knowledge. According to David Adamson, 
some Israeli forces seem to have been employed for 
diversionary purposes. He writes that Israel "staged a 
diversion off Lebanon which effectively masked Soviet
819spyships from monitoring the Cairo end of the operations."
817Beckwith, op. cit., p. 265.
818Ryan, op. cit., p. 65.
819David Adamson, op. cit. This story appears to be 
corroborated in the book by Mario de Arcangelis, Electronic 
Warfare: From the Battle of Tsushima to the Falklands and
Lebanon Conflicts, p. 235. According to this author, 
"confusion was created on the Soviet radar screens by the 
presence of numerous Israeli warships which (perhaps by sheer 
coincidence) had decided to carry out air and naval exercises 
that very night!" Another article offers further 
information, William C. Heine, "Did raid into Iran achieve
(Footnote Continued)
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Although there has been no official statement corroborating 
this report, it is possible that such deceptive measures 
could have taken place at the behest of American government 
officials. However, it is unlikely that such deceptive 
military-intelligence preparations will ever be officially 
revealed to the public. At this point one can only surmise 
that Israeli co-operation may have taken place.
Israeli Reaction to the American Failure
Israel reacted to the rescue failure “with shock and 
820disbelief." Moral support came in the form of a message 
of condolence from Foreign Minister Shamir to the United 
States government and to the families of the eight 
casualties.
More important, however, the Israelis were puzzled by the 
lack of an American desire for a co-operative effort between 
themselves and Tel Aviv. The Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) 
had extensive experience in hostage-rescue operations and 
were particularly familir with the geographical region in 
question. This, in turn, raised questions regarding the 
traditional security arrangements between the two countries.
(Footnote Continued)
its purpose?", London Free Press. London, Ontario, 20 May, 
1980. According to this article "It has been reported in 
Britain and the U.S. that the Israelis attempted to jam the 
electronic systems of Russian spy vessels in the 
Mediterranean, that Egypt did the same to Russian 
surveillance units in Libya, and that the Americans sent at 
least one major decoy fighter mission to confuse Russian 
electronic surveillance."
820"ISRAELI REACTION TO AMERICAN BID TO RESCUE 
HOSTAGES." Message traffic. Canadian Embassy Tel Aviv to 
Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada, 28 April, 
1980, p. 1.
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One diplomatic report noted that:
ISRAELI ANTI-TERRORIST EXPERTS ARE DEEPLY DISTURBED BY 
IMPLICATIONS OF TECHNICAL FAILURE IN OPERATION OF THIS 
KIND AND BY FAILURE OF AMERICANS TO SOLICIT THEIR ADVICE 
OR ASSISTANCE IN MOUNTING RAID.
Further the report underlines the fact that:
ISRAELI AUTHORITIES ARE QUESTIONING WHY, AS RECOGNIZED 
EXPERTS ON COMMANDO OPERATIONS OF THIS KIND, THEY WERE 
NOT/NOT ASKED FOR ADVICE OR ASSISTANCE IN MOUNTING RAID. 
WE HAVE BEEN TOLD ISRAELIS HAVE TESTED 14 SEPARATE 
EXERCISES FOR RESCUING HOSTAGES, 3 OF WHICH RESULTED IN 
SUCCESSFUL RESCUES WITH LESS THAN TEN PERCENT CASUALTY 
RATE.
According to Israeli military analysts there were:
...THREE MAJOR CAUSE [SIC] OF MISSIONS FAILURE : POOR 
PLANNING, IN NOT/NOT USING MORE HELICOPTERS AND FAILING 
TO INCLUDE CREW OF HELICOPTER MECHANICS? POOR 
MAINTENANCE - ISRAELIS ARE SHOCKED THAT 500-MILE TRIP 
SHOULD RESULT IN BREAKDOWN OF THREE HELICOPTERS; AND 
POOR COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY: ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE 
REPORTEDLY WAS ABLE TO TRACK SIGNALS FROM MOMENT 
TRANSPORT PLANES LEFT EGYPT AND THEY ASSUME SO COULD 
RUSSIANS. ONLY AMERICAN ACHIEVEMENT WAS IN EVADING 
IRANIAN ELECTRONIC..DEVICES WHICH AMERICANS THEMSELVES 
HAD CONSTRUCTED.
As previously mentioned, the detection of the American rescue
attempt, due to poor communication security, was revealed
when the American government apparently sent a complaint to
Israel regarding the radio monitoring activities of Michael
Gurdus. According to one report, Gurdus:
...plugged into the American operational communications 
network during the latter stages of the operation....He 
immediately knew what bases and in what countries the 
United States forces had left and was able to hear a
821Ibid.
822Ibid., pp. 2-3.
823Ibid., p. 2. See also Dr. Stefan T. Possony "Lessons 
in Strategic Planning,11 Defence and Foreign Affairs. 6/1980, 
(June), pp. 46-47. This article argues for a helicopter 
force of 18 so as to ensure proper lift capability in 
anticipation of mechanical breakdown. The "Rescue Mission 
Report", p. 33, argues 11-12 helicopters should have been 
employed.
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search in progress for a missing Hercules C-130 aircraft 
which had exploded during a refuelling operation.
Gurdus was also aware of a degree of Turkish involvement in
the operation. He knew that the AWACS command and control
aircraft had lifted off from a Turkish airbase and kept its
monitoring pattern within secure Turkish air space.
Of all the American allies, the Israelis were apparently the 
most shocked by the failure of the rescue attempt. As one 
Israeli analyst argued, "The same people who managed to put a 
man on the moon failed in simple technical matters," Ze'ev 
Schiff, the dean of Israeli military correspondents,
Q  O  C
lamented.... "Clearly this was more than just bad luck."
The same article further suggested that, from a technical 
aspect, the rescue attempt lacked the resources needed for 
success:
Israeli experts are astonished that an operation needing 
six helicopters was furnished with only two reserves. 
Helicopters are notoriously vulnerable to accidents and 
technical faults. The Americans, they maintain, should 
have had at least 50 percent-in hand, a minimum of nine 
or ten helicopters all told.
Israeli experience in heliborne operations could have
assisted American planners in the technical aspects of the
mission, particularly as Israeli experts would have been most
willing to help. For that matter, the British with their
extensive military experience in the Middle East could have
also assisted in the aspect of technical, as well as
operational planning.
824Asher, op. cit.
O O C
Eric Silver, "Israelis stunned by US mistakes," The 
Guardian. London, 28 April, 1980.
826ibid.
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The British government, as requested, kept silent about the
operation, and in America's time of need Mrs. Thatcher
offered the '"greatest admiration' for President Jimmy
Carter's courage in attempting to rescue the hostages and
827sympathised with him over its failure.” Furthermore, Mrs.
Thatcher, like Sadat, condoned the operation. These
sentiments brought down the wrath of the opposition Labour
Party. It was the Thatcher government's "public display of
loyal support, [that] convinced Labour leaders that she had
828been fully informed of the move in advance." To lessen
the degree of public hostility, the British government
insisted on the operation being seen in 'humanitarian terms.'
It was the "Government's view, [that] a clear distinction has
to be drawn between the limited force engaged in the rescue
829attempt and any military action against Iran."
It was such support for the US action which would assist
President Carter, and the American government, to begin the
mending of relations with the European allies and "preserve
830the credibility of the Western alliance." Such support 
for President Carter was vital to maintain the Western
827Philip Rawstorne, "Thatcher praises Carter's 
courage," Financial Times. London, 26 April, 1980.
828Ibid.
829Ibid.
830See "Iran Task Force, Foreign Affairs and National 
Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, "Iran: 
Consequences of the Abortive Attempt to Rescue the American 
Hostages," Conflict. Vol. 3, Number 1, (1981), p. 6 8.
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Alliance and would later assist in acquiring the release of 
hostages.
America Reflects
In the end, Americans were left with doubts that reflected
badly on the competence of their own military forces. They
asked if the Israelis and the West Germans could carry off
rescue operations like Entebbe and Mogadishu, how was it that
the United States could not? Defense Secretary Harold Brown
rather weakly explained "that flying 500 miles straight in
helicopters was extraordinarily difficult, and 'no other
831country could have attempted anything like this.1”
This, however, did not stop the public's questioning of
American military competence. If the rescue had been
successful, concerns would have been minimal and the
Americans would have been the envy of the world? as were the
Israelis, Germans and British following their respective
rescue operations. As the mission failed, the Carter
administration was perceived poorly by many of its allies:
"It's a ghastly business," said a West German official. 
"It's unbelievable that things could go wrong in this 
fashion, and to force abandonment of the mission. With 
these things, you have to be properly prepared.to go 
through with it. Otherwise don't start it."
It has been argued that had the United States military 
requested or accepted assistance from their close allies, 
particularly the British, Israelis or the West Germans during
831David Buchan, "Criticism mounts in Washington over 
rescue plan," Financial Times. London, 28 April, 1980.
832Gwertzman, op. cit.
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the planning, preparation, execution and extraction stages of
833this operation, success might have been achieved.
Moreover, had the American plans been rigourously reviewed by
834an independent, national or possibly an international body 
of rescue * experts* the probability for success may have been 
increased. Whether these arguments are valid or not, it 
appears that from this time onwards the United States 
accepted the importance of greater international co-operation 
in the areas of low intensity operations, counter-terrorist 
actions and intelligence gathering, than ever before.
833see James R. Schlesinger, "Some Lessons Of Iran," The 
New York Times. 6 May, 1980.
834The Rescue Mission Report, op. cit., p. 22.
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CHAPTER V
FINAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Hostage Rescue Actions
This paper has reviewed a number of hostage rescue actions,
i
one of the main missions performed by elite military 
counter-terrorist forces. Within each there was, to one 
degree or another, international co-operation which assisted 
in the rescue operation. As we have seen, hostage rescue 
operations are unique in, when compared with other 
conventional or unconventional operations, they alone are 
embarked upon because of a political decision for purely
Q  O K
political motives. Unlike wartime conditions, the
initiation of this type of action is the sole responsibility 
of the political leadership. Because of the essentially 
political nature of hostage rescue operations, and the high 
military and political stakes involved, they are even further 
separated from the mainstream of conventional or 
unconventional operations.
It has been argued that this uniqueness also resides in the 
exceedingly demanding nature of rescue missions? their 
success is gauged by a number of stringent criteria:
1) that the hostages are rescued without harm and that 
there are minimal or no casualties among the rescue 
force?
2 ) that the hostage-takers are the only casualties?
Q^C
Shlomo Gazit, "Risk, Glory, and the Rescue 
Operation," International Security. Vol. 6 , No. 1, (Summer, 
1981), p. 112.
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3) that the rescue operation itself does not create 
any further military or political problems in the 
wake.836
Shlomo Gazit has further offered that rescue operations must
be considered:
...the climax of a war which must be resolved in a 
single military act. The diplomatic, psychological, and 
military struggles to free the victims —  all bear a 
remarkable microcosmic resemblance to war. And the 
success or failure of such an gp^ration means the 
victory or defeat in that war.
This view is most poignant when one remembers the perceptions
and recriminations that followed on the heels of the United
State's 1980 highly sensitive but ill-fated rescue attempt in
Iran.
The perception of many observers is that counter-terrorist 
operations and, in particular, hostage-rescue actions are 
conducted for the most part on a unilateral basis. The fact 
is that many of these operations are conducted utilizing 
various degrees of international co-operation and assistance. 
This has provided a growing sociology of counter-terrorism 
activity based upon international co-operation.
By taking into account the extremely sensitive nature of 
hostage rescue operations for example, this study illustrates 
a number of areas where international co-operation has 
assisted in the past, and will probably aid in the future. 
These focus on four separate but inter-related areas. They 
include:
836Ibid., p. 112.
837Ibid., p. 113.
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1) the acquisition and passage of timely, accurate, 
strategic and tactical intelligence germane to the 
operation in question?
2) the access to forward bases in allied or 
friendly countries in anticipation of or during a 
rescue mission?
3) secure and rapid communications, and,
4) co-operation between counter-terrorist forces 
particularly in exchanges, attachments and 
training, and also during CT operations themselves.
The following paragraphs examine these four areas of 
international co-operation with a view to discovering what 
might be done to enhance or expand them.
FINAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Intelligence
Timely, accurate intelligence is essential for success in any
military operation, including low-intensity warfare and
838modern counter-terrorism missions. Even beyond the 
Anglo-Saxon experience, intelligence is the sine qua non of
838This truism was recently re-affirmed by the very 
successful 16 February, 1992 ambush sprung upon the IRA which 
killed four terrorists after they attacked a local police 
station in Coalisland. See ”Who is the IRA insider?”, The 
Mail. London, 23 February, 1992.
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victory, particularly at Entebbe and Mogadishu. This is 
perhaps even more strikingly the case with British 
low-intensity operations whose historical and geographical 
range underscores the vital importance of intelligence. 
Colonial regimes could only be maintained if the imperial 
power, and its security forces understood what was happening 
amongst the local inhabitants. Failure to obtain accurate 
intelligence caused major internal security difficulties.
The United States experience, as has been shown, both in 
success and failure, likewise demonstrates the dominant role 
of intelligence in operations at relatively low levels of 
intensity. There can be little surprise at this discovery, 
since the American wars with the Indians and, more recently, 
with Third World peoples display many of the same 
characteristics as those of the colonial wars experienced by 
the British. Both London and Washington give considerable 
priority to the intelligence-gathering and disseminating 
functions even if the application of this priority varies 
from situation to situation.
It has been demonstrated that terrorism, even in its 
19th-century and purely national manifestations, posed 
dramatic difficulties for the security forces faced with 
small groups of highly dedicated, ruthless, individuals in 
the midst of increasingly industrialized, populous and 
complex societies. International terrorism, especially in 
its most modern forms, adds the vast dimension of a 
world-wide struggle in a highly permeable, inter-dependent 
and inter-related society, to the basic difficulties of 
counter-terrorist work.
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The post-World War II world reflects not only nationalistic, 
but also irredentist, minority rights, tribal, and 
ideologically-based stimuli for the growth of terrorism. 
Today, an increasingly pervasive media describes terrorist 
activities to an audience of millions. These activities and 
their attendant publicity when combined with the enhanced 
vulnerabilities of modern society, open the door to the 
recent rapid growth in the phenomenon of terrorism.
The threat of national terrorist movements in the 
19th-century was difficult to combat because of the problems 
posed in the area of intelligence gathering. This is much 
more so the case in today's more complicated and far reaching 
terrorist activity, particularly, as one must take into 
account the level of sophistication of the terrorist groups 
themselves.
Countries with or without experience in this field are often 
stymied in gathering the information needed to combat groups 
and activities that outstrip their own national 
counter-terrorist resources. It is clear that terrorism 
itself has no respect for, and indeed tends to frustrate the 
very concept of, national borders.
Intelligence is the core of a successful counter-terrorist
operation. To counter the modern phenomenon of international
terrorism, one must be able to mount a co-ordinated
839international intelligence response. This lesson has not
839 . .Under ideal circumstances, allied or friendly
countries would be able to count on assistance from foreign
sources as a matter of course.
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been lost on security force commanders who, in all countries 
mentioned in this study, have wished to increase their 
intelligence capabilities. They have also placed emphasis on 
the organization of elite military units able to make maximum 
use of such intelligence. In the British case there is an 
established link between the SAS, and the British 
intelligence services, through which timely intelligence is 
rapidly transformed into a plan. West German and Israeli 
experiences in this field confirm the need for both of these 
elements, effective intelligence and specialized forces, 
capable of incorporating such intelligence into successful 
operations. American difficulties in recent years appear to 
have been caused, mainly by a breakdown in the link between 
these two elements. Given the international nature of 
today's terrorism, acquiring timely, accurate intelligence 
requires international co-operation, with all the political 
complexities implied by such co-operation.
Other trends of a more technical nature are also disquieting 
although international co-operation may help to provide a 
partial solution. The United States, with undoubtedly the 
most ambitious and aggressive national intelligence service, 
is clearly moving towards kinds of intelligence collection 
which may prove to be far from optimal.840 Today the 
American emphasis is on what is termed 'high tech' 
intelligence —  information drawn from communication 
interceptions, satellite photography, electronic monitoring, 
and the like. At the same time there has been a significant 
downplaying of the development of human intelligence
840Simon 0'Dwyer Russell, "CIA network wrecked in Middle 
East," The Sunday Telegraph. London, 22 October, 1989.
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841sources, or 'humint', as a means to provide tactical and
strategic information. This situation has become well known
and much debated in American intelligence circles and clearly
842has international and foreign policy implications.
Beginning in the 1960s, the United States became increasingly
reliant upon acquiring intelligence through 'high tech'
gathering techniques at the expense of covert intelligence
acquisition which was allowed, to some extent, to wither.
This situation is the result of several factors ranging from
budget cuts to plain distrust of covert operations. Some
sources suggest that the number of covert agents has dropped
843as much as 40 percent since the 1950s. However, most
intelligence actually required, particularly for 
counter-terrorist operations, and within that speciality, 
hostage rescue missions, demands the type of information 
which human intelligence alone can provide. As President 
George Bush, himself a former CIA director, has noted, it was 
the lack of human source information which prevented him from 
trying to rescue American citizens held hostage in Beirut, 
Lebanon.®44
The problem appears to reside not in the usual area of 
resources but rather in the perceived need to reduce the risk
841 Bernd Debusmann, "Poor Intelligence Cripples U.S. 
Military Might, Experts Day," Reuters, 4 October, 1989.
843 Peter Cory, et al., "Where spies really matter," U.S. 
News and World Report. (28 August/4 September, 1989), p. 24.
844 .Patrick Worsnip, "Shortage of spies m  Lebanon
hampers efforts to find hostages," The Globe and Mail. 
Toronto, 5 August, 1989.
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of political embarrassment so often associated with covert
operations and especially with failure therein. While there
is no doubt that the potential for such political
embarrassment exists with all kinds of covert operations,
recent experience, especially that of the British, suggests
that the proper management of covert operations can yield 
845 .results m  benefits accruing to the dispatching state 
considerably greater than the costs caused by the occasional 
discovery of a covert activity.
Success in hostage rescue missions depends on the quantity 
and quality of timely information available. Such 
information will likely be given by a human source on the 
ground, someone with "their eyes on the sparrow (target)." 
Rescue operations are tactical by nature and require 
extremely detailed information (see Chapters III and IV).
The following checklist illustrates the nature and detail of 
information required in a rescue mission.
On The Terrorist:
1) How many terrorists?
2) How are they armed?
3) What is their motivation, psychological and
physical condition?
4) What are their initial demands?
5) What is their deployment/position within the 
aircraft, building?
6) What nationalities are the terrorists?
7) Ages, sex, description?
8) Names, nicknames employed in conversation?
9) What terrorist group do they represent?
845 ."U.K. spy agency to take over from police in fighting
IRA", The Toronto Star. 9 May, 1992. As noted in this
article, " 'The purpose of this change is to enable the
security service to use to the full the skills and expertise
which they have developed over the years in their work on
counter-terrorism,' Home Secretary Kenneth Clarke said."
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Methodology?
10) What languages are spoken?
11) What is the intelligence level and vigilance of 
the terrorists?
On the Hostages
1) How many are there?
2) How and where are they being held, i.e., place or
building?
3) Physical and psychological condition of hostages?
4) Are any hostages of particular interest to
terrorists?
5) What are their ages, sex, description?
6) What are their names and particulars?
On The Aircraft
1) Airline, handling agent.
2) Type of aircraft and exact internal layout.
3) Condition of aircraft.
4) Information regarding fuel, range speed and 
flight duration.
5) State of aircrew, names, description.
6) Aircraft call sign and frequencies employed.
7) Situation inside aircraft.
8) Flight manifest.
9) Food and water situation on board.
On the Building
1) Street map, exact position of building.
2) Engineer plans of building.
3) Telephone numbers and where telephones are located.
4) List of all persons occupying building and where
they are positioned.
5) List of all key holders.
6) Alternate exit/entry sites.
7) A comprehensive list of electrical, gas, oil and
water points.
8) Air conditioning plant and duct work.
9) Plans to all adjacent buildings.
10) Sewer outlets nearby.
Much of the data necessary to plan a hostage rescue can only 
be provided by human sources such as witnesses, agents and 
released hostages, although some technical means will be 
used.
There appears to be a danger that the American trend towards 
high technology, instead of human intelligence, may spread to 
other countries. On the other hand, the United States' lack
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of success in a series of recent covert operations,
846particularly in the Middle East, and Latin America, should 
warn other states that human intelligence is far more 
important, especially in operations involving a hostage 
rescue.
International co-operation could improve this situation in 
several ways. First, more experience in working with foreign 
intelligence agencies and military forces may lead to a 
general improvement of national intelligence services. 
Moreover, international co-operation would provide the United 
States with a clearer perception of the many advantages of 
human intelligence, perhaps encouraging the US to return to 
its former high level of interest in the area. These two 
improvements might well dovetail nicely to prove the benefits 
of international co-operation, not only in the military arena 
but also in general national intelligence operations.
Another important consideration is that poorer countries, 
which can rarely afford 'high tech' assets to acquire 
intelligence, are much more likely to be able to afford human 
intelligence sources. They may well find that co-operation 
with wealthier states could lead to valuable, and otherwise 
inaccessible, information being provided to them from high 
tech sources. In return, countries such as the United States 
could discover, on occasion, that some smaller states can 
have access to useful human intelligence sources, and this 
can make those states attractive partners in intelligence
84 6David B. Ottaway and Don Oberforfer, "Administration 
Alters Assassination Ban; In Interview, Webster Reveals 
Interpretation," The Washington Post. 4 November, 1989.
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gathering abroad. In the specific case of hostage rescue 
missions, as has been seen, Third World countries seem, 
somehow, always to be involved. Therefore, the building of 
international intelligence links with Third World countries 
should also provide real benefits.
Forward-Basing
Hostage rescue operations are by their very nature extremely 
sensitive. For a counter-terrorist force to be effective it 
must be able to move quickly to the incident site, or close 
to it, to rescue the hostages. For a number of geographical, 
historical and political reasons getting into range is often 
far from easy. The United States' Delta Force, for example, 
which is currently based at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, would 
normally take about 16 hours to arrive at the scene of a 
Middle East hostage-taking. This delay might limit, or even 
preclude the proper on-site reconnaissance, planning and 
intelligence gathering, all of which are essential for 
success. Although counter-terrorist teams must be ready for 
rapid deployment, the travel time to distant locations can 
reduce the time available to plan the operation and, thereby, 
could seriously hamstring any rescue attempt.
Clearly, the Americans could use a prepared special 
operations base in Great Britain, West Germany or Cyprus 
where facilities could permit a long-term basing of 
specialist counter-terrorist forces who would respond to 
terrorist actions in Europe and the Middle East. Such an 
arrangement would also ensure access, at short notice, to key 
allied counter-terrorist forces and agencies, which could be 
of immediate operational, technical or moral support.
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The lack of a forward-base has already contributed to the
failure of one counter-terrorist mission. Delays in
supporting Egyptian commandos in the 1985 assault on an
aircraft in Malta contributed to the failure of this 
847mission. A closer support base, and better co-operation
may have reduced the confusion and the resulting deaths of 57 
passengers.
The United States has deployed the MH-53J Pave Low III
848(Enhanced) helicopter to the Special Operations Squadron, 
based at Woodbridge in Suffolk. This arrangement is aimed at 
supporting America's Special Forces and to ensure that an 
effective special operations and counter-terrorist aviation 
capability is available should they be required in Europe or 
Great Britain.
For forward-basing to be fully successful, allies in or near 
the region must be prepared to permit the local positioning 
of not only special operations units but also small numbers 
of highly-trained special forces personnel and their support 
personnel. In addition to speeding up the response 
capability of counter-terrorist forces, this would also give 
local police, para-military and military forces, tasked to 
conduct counter-terrorist operations, an opportunity for 
joint training. This would benefit countries whose national 
capabilities for counter-terrorism are slight, and would be 
of value even in states, such as Great Britain and West
847William E. Smith, et al., "Massacre in Malta," Time. 
9 December, 1985, p. 26.
848 "USAF special mission aircraft in close-up," Jane's 
Defence Weekly. 19 August, 1989, p. 306.
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Germany, where exchange training and other co-operative 
initiatives would be useful to all concerned. Forward-basing 
also provides forces of the dispatching state with greater 
exposure to general conditions outside their own homeland. 
More dramatic still might be the benefits for countries, such 
as the United States, in developing pools of selected 
personnel who have proven their capacity to operate with 
foreign forces.
As with intelligence considerations, however, the political 
constraints, particularly for potential receiving states, 
have delayed or halted such deployments.
Communications
Secure, rapid communciations are the foundation for success 
in the increasingly fast, complex military operations 
characteristic of the latter part of this century. 
Counter-terrorist operations, particularly hostage-rescue 
missions, are not exempt from this general rule of modern 
warfare. Communication security is of paramount importance. 
One of the most potentially dangerous events during the 
Mogadishu and 'Eagle Claw' operations occurred when an 
Israeli reporter monitored the radio communications. Such 
incidents could have led to dire results. Although the 
reporter's actions were not considered to have compromised 
the missions, the fact that an 'outsider' was able to monitor 
these activities is a shortcoming which cannot be permitted 
in future operations. Hostage-taking and hijacking are 
politically sensitive and highly volatile acts. The 
discovery of counter-terrorist forces either preparing, or 
conducting, an operation can easily force the terrorist's
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hand. Considering the widespread availability of 
sophisticated off-the-shelf equipment for both communications 
and monitoring, and given the particularly vital requirement 
to maintain the principle of surprise, counter-terrorist 
missions must have rapid and secure communication by both 
voice and paper.
Secure communications must be possible amongst all elements 
of a CT force, conducting hostage-rescue or other 
counter-terrorist activities. Terrorists fully appreciate 
the vulnerability and centrality of communications and it is 
very likely that they will soon be able to not only intercept 
rescue force communications but possibly have the capability 
to disrupt or jam them. In consequence counter-terrorist 
units must possess the best secure communications equipment 
available, as the success of an operation depends on it. 
International co-operation would help in this regard by 
ensuring compatability of equipment types. As well, the 
provision of modern, efficient and compatible communications 
equipment to the counter-terrorist forces of poorer states 
would be a good investment. Communications considerations 
are perhaps the least subject to political concerns, thus 
international co-operation in this area would normally carry 
few risks.
Training Assistance. Attachments and Exchanges
There can be little doubt, after the study of British, 
American, German and Israeli experiences in 
counter-terrorism, that co-operation among the various 
national special forces is essential. Co-operation in 
training, attachments and exchanges, as well as in the actual
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849counter-terrorist operations themselves, will improve the 
professional skills of special forces and the co-ordination 
of more effective responses at a national level. This study 
has shown a wide range of co-operative efforts and the 
benefits they have produced, particularly, in hostage-rescue 
operations. Current emphasis should be on the potential for 
further development and improvement in these areas of joint 
activity.
The benefits of international co-operation in the area of
training, both at the individual and collective levels, are
evident not only for the countries discussed in this paper,
but for countries all over the world, from Canada to Somalia,
850from Dubai to Egypt. Attachments and exchanges have
vastly broadened the experiences of key personnel in national
849 .Such counter-terrorist assistance has recently
expanded to include those nations fighting drug barons. See 
Askold Krushelnycky, "SAS in secret war on cocaine,” Sunday 
Express. London, 31 December, 1989.
850Australian SAS —  Training exchanges or assistance 
with the British and New Zealand SAS*, GSG9, Delta. Canada —  
Training exchanges with the British SAS, GSG9, GIGN and 
Delta. Japan —  Training exchanges with the British SAS,
GSG9, Israel. Singapore —  Training exchanges with the 
British SAS, GSG9, Israel and India. Hong Kong —  Training 
exchanges with the British SAS, SBS, GIGN, GSG9 and Royal 
Dutch Marines. Indonesia —  Training exchanges with the GSG9 
and British SAS. Philippines —  Training exchanges with the 
British and Australian SAS, US and Israel. Pakistan —  
Training exchanges with the British SAS. Sri Lanka —
Training exchanges with the British SAS. Malaysia —
Training exchanges with the British SAS. Honduras —
Training exchanges with the US. Ecuador —  Training 
exchanges with Israel. Chile —  Training exchanges with the 
GSG9, Israel and South Africa. Saudi Arabia —  Training 
exchanges with the GIGN, GSG9 and US. Bahrain —  Training 
exchanges with the British SAS and GSG9• Jordan —  Training 
exchanges with the British SAS. Oman —  Training exchanges 
with the British SAS. Tunisia —  Training exchanges with the 
GIGN and US. Morocco —  Training exchanges with the GIGN and 
British SAS. Sudan —  Training exchanges with the British 
SAS, Egypt and US. Egypt —  Training exchanges or assistance 
with the GSG9, GIGN and US. See Leroy Thompson, The 
Rescuers, op. cit.
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counter-terrorist forces. Such experiences greatly enhanced 
the professional development of both Wegener and Beckwith, 
founders of their countries' counter-terrorist units.
Nowhere has international co-operation been more obvious than 
in the counter-terrorist operations themselves, and most 
emphatically in hostage rescue missions. In the main cases 
studied, which include several of the major hostage rescue 
operations undertaken in recent times, the assistance 
provided to individual national forces by the presence, 
advice, operational and technical support and moral 
reinforcement of other countries has been seen repeatedly.
The appearance of Wegener as an 'observer' with the SAS in 
London, in May, 1980 and the previous assistance given by the 
SAS to GSG9 during the Mogadishu rescue stand out in this 
regard. The question remains: what areas might allow for
further development of training, attachment, exchange and 
operational co-operation and in what ways could such 
development be facilitated?
In exchanges and attachments it seems clear that while 
special forces, responsible for counter-terrorism are 
generally small, their highly specialised skills appear to 
lend great scope for attachments, and perhaps even more for 
exchanges as a means of improving the international response 
to terrorism. Saudi Arabia is currently reaping the benefit 
of West Germany's skills in counter-terrorist operations 
through the secondment of Wegener and a number of his 
officers who are organizing, equipping and training Saudi CT
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851forces. Exchanges are probably more acceptable to lesser
powers, while attachments can be seen as useful at all levels 
as noted, throughout this paper. This subject will be 
covered more thoroughly when political factors are more fully 
discussed before the conclusion of this chapter.
Training would also appear to need improvement. The 
deployment of small numbers of specialists is far less 
expensive than military units such as air force squadrons and 
army battalions. Such training, while not without the 
potential for embarrassment on occasion, has been and could 
continue to be done without great fanfare, and far from the 
public limelight. Greater exposure to other countries and 
their forces, to the personalities involved, their standard 
operational procedures and their equipment, can hardly fail 
to provide the stimulus for more effective operational 
co-operation when, and if, required. Moreover, such training 
should normally lead to greater understanding and sympathy 
among the allied and friendly forces and the individuals who 
comprise them. In the case of sophisticated friendly forces, 
such training could also be an incentive to modify and 
improve the structure and doctrine of counter-terrorist 
forces, as well as the means to compare the advantages of 
various types of weapons, tactics, organization and 
equipment. The benefits are evident in the numerous training
Q Cl
"German Experts To Establish Saudi CT Unit,” Defense 
and Foreign Affairs Daily. 12 May, 1987. This article states 
that Wegener and five other officers will be spending three 
years assisting the Saudis to organize a CT unit similar to 
the GSG9. See also "UN considers its own army to intervene 
early in world crisis," The Toronto Star. 2 February, 1992. 
According to this article there is a little known provision 
in the UN Charter, Article 43, which describes a standing 
army under UN command. This could arguably include an 
international CT, force should the need arise.
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attachments and exchanges between the American Special Forces 
and the SAS, particularly as Beckwith closely followed SAS 
training methodology and organization when he commanded Delta 
Force. In all of these areas, joint training should add to 
that potential international co-operation 'on the day,' if 
and when, increasingly sophisticated international terrorism 
is to elicit an increasingly sophisticated and co-ordinated 
international military response.
The foregoing is not intended to minimize the serious 
obstacles that enhanced co-operation would likely bring to 
the fore, which are largely as a result of political factors. 
However, the fact remains that the most fundamental 
constraints to co-operation among national special forces 
combatting terrorism are political considerations, to which 
this paper will now turn.
Political Considerations
Armed forces, even special elite units, serve political 
masters who have concerns beyond those which are strictly 
related to the employment of effective military force. 
Preparation to combat terrorism, if it occurs at all, does 
not happen against the background of a tabula rasa, but 
rather in the context of a complex national and international 
environment. That environment limits the responses 
governments are willing to make to the international 
terrorist challenge.
As seen in this paper, terrorism is a political act with 
political objectives in mind, even if the exact nature of 
those goals are, at times, unclear. It is not surprising
- 350 -
then that many of the factors affecting responses to 
terrorism are of a political stripe.
Terrorist acts are also usually spectacular, short-lived and 
aimed at quite specific objectives. They attract 
considerable attention at the time of their occurrence after 
which national political life returns to normal. During a 
terrorist incident, governments are forced to focus 
inordinate interest on the event but are, generally, only too 
pleased to be able to return to more routine concerns of 
government when the crisis is over.
In addition, national governments have differing perceptions 
of terrorism: some governments actually support some
terrorist organizations. Most, however, denounce the 
terrorism phenomenon and many of these are, have been, or 
might well become the targets of terrorists. A successfully 
co-ordinated approach to terrorism depends on these states 
agreeing to a concerted response to terrorism. But since the 
states are very divergent, depending on the extent to which 
they feel themselves threatened, they will show varying 
degrees of zeal in attempting to defeat that threat.
The United States is clearly more concerned than the former
Soviet Union on how to deal with terrorism, however, this may
852change in the near future. Likewise, middle powers such
as Great Britain, France and Germany perceive the problem in
852Lardner Jr. George, "Cold War Adversaries Discuss 
Co-operation? International Terrorism Said to Be Most Likely 
Target of Any CIA-KGB Joint Operation," The Washington Post. 
13 November, 1990, see also "Cloak and Flowers," The New York 
Times. 6 October, 1991. This latter article notes that the 
CIA and the KGB "could team up to combat terrorism."
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quite different ways from that of virtually untargetted 
states such as China. The varying degrees of urgency felt by 
other states in the world community range from the deep 
concern of countries in exposed positions, such as Israel, to 
the unruffled calm of countries such as Finland or New 
Zealand.
There are a great many political barriers to obtaining a 
co-operative effort on the issue of terrorism in an 
international state system as complex and varied as it is 
today. A heightened perception of threat will bring strident 
calls from one capital for an international response of great 
sophistication to terrorism. Yet, another capital with no 
perceived terrorist threat will have little interest in the 
problem and will be occupied with quite different priorities 
and concerns. Into this already complex situation comes the 
further obstacle that the Western, often former colonial, 
powers are frequently the major targets of international 
terrorism. Any international co-ordinated response involving 
Third World countries may well involve delicate issues of 
sovereignty with recently independent countries, or those in 
a neo-colonial relationship with a developed nation. Even 
among allied or friendly countries, the differing levels of 
national power may cause governments to be extremely wary of 
unequal relationships which can become, or already are, 
domestic political issues. This potential political quagmire 
lies ready to undermine decisive international co-operation 
in combatting terrorism.
There is another option in dealing with terrorism that 
involves a dramatically different approach from the reactive, 
frequently military and international courses so far
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discussed. Instead of dealing with the symptoms, individual
states, as well as the international community, could
concentrate harder on solving the deep and underlying cause
of terrorism which would undermine the raison d /etre of
terrorist organizations and acts. Unfortunately the present
problems giving rise to terrorism, on the international
scene, are extremely deep rooted and unresponsive to either a
general panacea or to rapid ad hoc solutions. Such problems
resist attempts at easy fixes. The Palestinian situation
bears dramatic witness to this state of affairs on the
international scene, however, recent events indicate a
853glimmer of hope. The national terrorism phenomena in
places such as Northern Ireland, the Basque country, India 
and elsewhere offer continuous proof that the conditions from 
which terrorism thrives are not easily remedied. Hence, it 
seems clear that the international community, as well as 
individual states, will continue to place emphasis on dealing 
with the manifestations of terrorism rather than root causes. 
Most Third World states, often guarding their newly-won 
sovereignty, will probably remain reluctant to enter into 
long-term agreements aimed at combating terrorism, 
particularly where such accords place them in easily 
criticized public postures alongside Western powers. The 
hostage-taking incidents described in this paper have 
elicited some co-operation among both Western and Third World 
states. Although such efforts have resulted in quite close 
and longer lasting co-operation among Western and Western- 
leaning countries in some respect, they have spurred little
853Bob Hepburn, "Mideast peace deal still far off, Baker 
says," The Toronto Star. 19 October, 1991.
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follow up in concrete long-term agreements between the 
Western powers and the Third World states.
This is not to say, however, that no Western-Third World 
co-operation is possible. Terrorism now affects many Third 
World states, a situation that may require these Third World 
nationals to deploy much needed resources in order to 
increase their own security and intelligence capabilities, as 
well as to create counter-terrorist forces by themselves.
Some states already involved in this rather painful process 
have been mentioned in this study, and there is no doubt that 
the costs in terms of lost development opportunities may have 
a negative political spin-off. This is due to the
re-allocation of funds from economic or social development to
security and intelligence agencies, in response to a 
terrorist threat. However, the success of co-operative 
efforts elsewhere may stimulate Third World governments to 
greater interest in international co-operation, as may their 
own domestic, political situations. Co-operation and 
training with highly respected elite military forces from 
other, even Western countries, may provide a much needed 
deterrent against terrorism and outweigh the political costs 
incurred through such co-operation.
Terrorist operations, like most military operations, seek 
objectives which are the weak points in the 'enemy'
structure. Such 'soft targets' are less likely to be found in
states whose special forces are assisted by or include 
members of internationally reputed elite counter-terrorist 
forces from abroad. It is clear that the level of terrorism 
has lessened in those countries whose troops have received 
training from the SAS for example.
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Be that as it may, it is clear that political factors have a 
direct impact on the potential for military co-operation on 
an international level for countering terrorism. Bearing in 
mind the foregoing political considerations, this paper will 
now turn to ascertaining what possible international 
co-operative measures could be implemented in the four areas 
identified earlier in this chapter.
Intelligence
From the Western perspective, there are two tiers where 
co-operation in intelligence is possible. The first is 
inter-allied co-operation, a long-standing arrangement 
generally functioning smoothly, and on an often routine 
basis. The second, much more problematical perspective, 
involves Western relationships in the intelligence area with 
countries of the Third World. The difference between these 
two tiers is naturally enough based upon two factors, the 
perception of the threat, and Western assessments of the 
degree of professionalism and capability present in many 
Third World intelligence services.
Nor is the two-tiered system a straightforward one. Western 
powers have varying levels of links with different parts of 
the world, the United States being particularly strong in 
Latin America, while Great Britain benefits from strong links 
with many Commonwealth and Middle East countries. Even 
within the Western alliances there are somewhat different 
perceptions of threats emanating from various quarters. This 
is of course particularly true between NATO members on the 
one hand, and Third World countries on the other.
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In democratic alliances such as NATO, intelligence 
co-operation with many Third World countries is often 
questioned because of their poor human rights records. The 
resulting criticism from influential Western groups may 
affect both the level of co-operation from Western 
intelligence services and the kind of assistance those 
services may be willing to provide Third World states.
Even among friendly, but not necessarily allied countries, 
there are often political difficulties in the area of 
counter-terrorism intelligence co-operation. Intelligence 
gathering in the Western world has long been perceived as an 
unseemly, if not actually sordid, activity. Espionage, in 
particular, has had negative media coverage although the need 
for it has, in this century, usually been understood by 
governments. Western capitals remain highly sensitive to the 
potential political costs of flawed covert 
intelligence-gathering operations. They are reluctant to 
enter such activities without assurances that such 
embarrassments will be unlikely. Information exchanges, even 
between allies in wartime, have been beset with problems 
which reflect the intensely sensitive nature of intelligence 
gathering and use. In peacetime, it is an even more 
sensitive activity. A shared perception of a threat in an 
alliance can aid immensely in furthering co-operation. Major 
powers, active in intelligence gathering, while reluctant to 
share their information, are still anxious to have alliance 
co-operation in dealing with terrorism. Smaller powers, 
which are less likely to be active in intelligence gathering, 
are also eager to have access to information, the only source 
for which may be a major allied state. Hence co-operation 
may develop, in part, as a result of the confidence gained
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through the exchange of intelligence even though this is 
largely provided by the greater state.
The extremely delicate nature of various responses to 
terrorism further complicates this already complex and 
shifting relationship among allies. States sharing a roughly 
similar view of the balance of power requirements in Europe 
may differ greatly on matters relating to international 
terrorism. Compromise of sources and information, fear of 
third-party links, and the general frustration of highly 
threatened governments, with what they perceive as 
insufficient activity of generally allied but less threatened 
states, all lead to lesser co-operation in counter-terrorism 
than in other spheres.
Highly threatened countries, even when they are not formally 
allied to one another, may still be able and willing to forge 
close links in their counter-terrorist operations. A good 
example is provided by Germany and Italy, who while far from 
being close security allies, as Great Britain and the United 
States, nonetheless co-operate effectively in this field. 
Allied states which lack a common threat perception, may have 
great difficulty in mounting co-operative counter-terrorist 
efforts. Italy and the United States, for example, differ on 
the seriousness and nature and degree of the challenge, which 
cripples their efforts to co-operate.
Forward-Basing
As pointed out in our case studies, the timely arrival of 
counter-terrorist forces is essential for success in 
hostage-rescue missions. Because home-based special forces
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may need lengthy periods of time to deploy to the site of a 
terrorist activity, lives, as well as the potential for 
success, are threatened. In such cases, the threatened 
government will obviously try to gain the use of a deployment 
site as close as is safely possible to the terrorist 
activity. Unfortunately, political and military 
considerations make such arrangements highly difficult to 
bring about,. Western European allies of the United States, 
for example, feel that a visible American anti-terrorist 
presence, or the basing of such units in their national 
territory will more likely result in being targetted 
themselves by terrorist organizations.
Given the high level of terrorist activity related to Middle 
Eastern issues, countries in that region, although generally 
favourable to the United States, nonetheless, believe that 
the political disadvantages of allowing the stationing of 
American military forces, particularly counter-terrorist 
forces, far outweigh any political advantages that they might 
bring. This is true in other parts of the world as well. It 
should be noted that counter-terrorist operations are not the 
only type of military activity at an international level 
similarly stymied. The anti-drug struggle in Colombia, 
Bolivia, Turkey and other parts of the world have experienced 
similar obstacles. These obstacles exist because of the 
commonly held view that such deployments, involving states of 
power, are related to the issue of national sovereignty. All 
countries are jealous of their sovereignty because their 
status, as independent states, could be jeopardized. Raymond 
Aron suggests that no country can be sovereign unless it has 
population, territory, and government control over that
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854population and territory. If any of these three elements 
are missing, the state is not considered sovereign. This is 
due to the fact that should the state not have the power to 
make its writ run throughout its territory, the country in 
question does not have the right to claim equality with other 
sovereign states making up the international system. Since 
international recognition is an essential attribute of 
statehood, its lack can lead to questions of the gravest 
kind. Nowhere is this concern more telling than in those 
countries, either newly independent from colonial rule or 
those that find themselves in relationships with super-powers 
or great powers which threaten their claim to sovereign state 
status.
The inability to defend oneself against internal and external 
threats is the prime example of the sort of issue which 
threatens countries' attempts to assert their sovereignty. A 
country which must appeal to others for help opens itself to 
question. While developed nations with long histories have 
little reason to worry over such matters, the Third World, 
however, abounds with states whose sovereignty is shaky and 
whose regimes are likewise. The insecurity of such 
governments prevents them from entertaining requests for 
forward-basing arrangements from major powers. If one adds 
to this other political factors, such as the possible 
accusation of being the pawn of a greater power, it becomes 
clear that only great benefits, in other areas of national 
concern, can make such agreements palatable. Since such a 
government probably would not perceive the terrorist threat
854See Raymond Aron, Paix et guerre entre les nations.
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with the same concern as does the threatened country seeking 
the forward-basing arrangement, the potential for such 
arrangements is limited.
Conversely, alliances or other arrangements such as the 
Commonwealth, may ease the problem greatly. If defence 
agreements already exist, or if a greater power has forces 
already stationed in a Third World country, the addition of 
small groups of specialist troops, especially where their 
deployment avoids public exposure, may well cause little 
difficulty for a receiving government. Formal alliances have 
long included agreements on stationing of forces which could 
facilitate special deployments. Nonetheless, the negative 
experiences of some governments caused by lack of 
consultation, separate decision-making and flawed operations 
have led to the reluctance of even close allies to accept 
such deployments in their territory.
A number of technical, administrative and operational 
problems exist and, therefore, complicate the political 
dimension. They include the status of specialist forces, 
rotation of personnel, sub-units or units and the security of 
personnel. The greatest risk, however, remains a political 
one. While the US success in deploying Special Forces' 
assets to Great Britain demonstrates that such arrangements 
are possible, Washington's lack of success in the Middle East 
and elsewhere underscores the political difficulties 
involved. The GB-US accord reflects the similarity of these 
two countries' perception of the terrorist threat, as well as 
their shared ideological views.
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Despite the above, it is conceivable that in a number of ways 
a more subtle and flexible type of arrangement might bear 
some fruit. In countries where the dispatching state already 
has facilities, as mentioned before, the stationing of a 
small force might not raise undue alarm. Both states, party 
to the agreement, may have to remain flexible, and may even 
have to turn a blind eye to certain sensitive aspects of such 
a stationing arrangement. Generally though, there is no 
reason why, in some states at least, such teams could be 
deployed under some sort of 'cover' arrangements. An 
additional benefit of such arrangements for the forward-based 
personnel would be the enhanced security provided by an 
appropriate cover story which purports to explain their 
presence.
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CONCLUSION
Terrorism, as it is known today, is the continuation of a 
long historical experience going back many hundreds of years. 
However, modern terrorism appears much more complex and 
certainly more widespread, than any historical example of the 
phenomenon known before our time. Issues likely to cause 
fanaticism have rarely existed in larger numbers than in the 
present era and the increasing ease of communications have 
added to the special nature of the post World War II and post 
colonial world. This has resulted in the internationalizat­
ion of the objectives and the activities of terrorists. Even 
where terrorist objectives remain essentially national in 
scope, there is a tendency for such groups to link themselves 
with their equivalent movements in other countries. In 
addition alliance relationships, inter-dependence, and 
neo-colonial relationships tend to make the terrorists' 
enemies as frequently foreign as home-grown.
Historically, the reactions of governments to terrorism were 
national and involved resources common to the state apparatus 
of most countries. Currently, the interstate nature of 
terrorist activities has called for a growing level of 
co-operation among countries facing this threat. Special 
Forces, whose modern examples grew largely out of the Second 
World War experience were already in place when modern 
international terrorism came to the fore. Such forces 
appeared to governments as the most likely instrument to take 
on the sometimes delicate role needed in counter-terrorist 
operations. Many recent operations have given dramatic 
evidence of both the utility of such forces and the 
difficulties surrounding their use.
- 362 -
This thesis has produced some insights into past, present and 
conceivable future uses to which these forces might be 
employed in a counter-terrorist context. In so doing, this 
paper has focussed on the experiences of Great Britain and 
the United States in this domain. The long discussion of 
British colonial and post-colonial military experience in 
low-intensity operations has demonstrated, not only the 
history and value of special forces, but also the long term 
need for readily available and adequately configured units, 
with good communications, imbued with a co-operative spirit, 
and supported by an effective and rapidly available system of 
gathering and disseminating intelligence.
The United States' experience both at home and abroad in a 
series of small wars, has shown the same. In addition, while 
Washington's efforts in this area have been rather less 
successful historically than that of London, most lessons are 
viewed in, essentially, the same manner on both 
English-speaking sides of the Atlantic. The British, 
however, emphasized the human element in counter-terrorist 
operations, while in contrast the US tendency appears to have 
favoured high technology and sophisticated equipment as the 
key means to success.
The discussions above, as well as the lessons learnt from 
Israeli and West German operations have emphasized repeatedly 
the potential advantages to be gained through co-operative 
international efforts. The analysis of these highly diverse 
experiences tends to point to areas where international
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co-operation can assist counter-terrorist forces, and can be 
especially advantageous during hostage-rescue missions. It 
is concluded, therefore, that intelligence, forward-basing, 
secure communications, and attachment and training assistance 
can provide a significant advantage when terrorist action 
demands an effective counter-terrorist response.
More difficult still, than these more technical 
considerations, have been the political ones. International 
co-operation, while significant, has in some respect remained 
limited in both scope and effectiveness. Such co-operation 
has only come about in the face of considerable pressures.
The most significant pressures against international 
co-operative efforts have been political. From this study 
one thing has come out quite clearly: the greatest progress 
in international co-operation has occurred between countries 
who share similar views of the threat posed by international 
terrorism.
Threat perception is crucial to an understanding of the 
likelihood of future inter-governmental co-operation to 
combat global terrorism. Governments' views on the extent to 
which they should be concerned by the terrorist problem may 
vary greatly, and the countries least likely to be targets 
tend to be the least anxious to assist.
As has been shown, well established networks exist to 
acquire, analyse and share intelligence and there is scope 
for employing and expanding these networks in the context of 
counter-terrorism. A number of allied and friendly 
governments are already involved in forward-basing, and there 
could be some further scope for expansion of such links.
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Suggestions and comments have been made as to the advantages 
of attached and exchanged personnel which, if implemented, 
could assist with the job at hand. Equally important, 
communication problems are far from insurmountable given the 
impetus to overcome them.
Again and again, however, the likelihood of considerably 
enhanced co-operation runs afoul of political constraints and 
reality. International co-operation in the employment of 
elite counter-terrorist forces, particularly in 
hostage-rescue missions, is not and cannot be the complete 
and final answer to the international terrorist dilemma. It 
has, however, already given signs of its efficiency under 
certain circumstances in providing timely interventions to 
combat terrorist activities. It is far from clear whether 
the political will exists, in a sufficient number of 
important countries, to overcome the constraints noted in the 
body of this paper, which act against international 
co-operation in this field. If such a will would become 
manifest, this study would suggest much could be done. If 
not, one will probably continue to merely work around the 
edges.
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APPENDIX I
The Iranian Embassy - 16 Princes1 Gate. London 
(ALL TIMES APPROXIMATE)
Date/Time Terrorist Activity Police, Government,
Military Responses or 
Other Activities
DAY I 
30 April
1130
1135
1142
Iranian Embassy Staff 
and visitors become 
aware of a commotion 
at the entrance of the 
Embassy. Member of the 
Embassy Mr. Moheb 
telephoned the local 
police authorities 
telling them that the 
Embassy was under 
assault. PC Lock taken 
hostage.
2 Iranian employees 
escape from Embassy.
Members of the 
Diplomatic Protection 
Group (All) arrive.
Scotland Yard 
receives a report 
that a police officer 
had been seized by 
gunmen and was being 
held inside and that 
shots had been 
fired.
1209 A total of 26 people 
are taken hostage by 6
Deputy Assistant 
Commissioner John
1
FBIS 42, REUTER: "BRITISH POLICEMAN 'HOSTAGE* IN IRANIAN
EMBASSY," 30 APRIL, 1980, 1146 GMT - First information 
indicated that "A BRITISH POLICEMAN WAS FORCED INSIDE THE 
IRANIAN EMBASSY...BY A MAN ARMED WITH A RIFLE." Further 
information from "A RECEPTIONIST AT THE ROYAL COLLEGE OF 
MEDICAL PRACTITIONERS, NEXT DOOR TO THE EMBASSY, SAID "A 
WINDOW CLEANER BURST IN HERE AND SAID HE HAD HEARD SHOTS 
FIRED FROM INSIDE THE EMBASSY."
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2
terrorists. The 
group called itself 
Martyr Muhieideen 
A1 Nassir. (Named 
after a PFLA leader 
executed in 1962 by 
the Shah's government).
Dellow arrives to 
take charge of the 
incident. Police 
make their first 
contact with the 
gunmen.
Dellow makes an 
initial
reconnaissance and 
receives reports from 
the police officers 
who had taken the 
initial call.
Tactical Command 
Post (Alpha Control) 
is set up 
immediately.
Home Office Crisis 
Centre becomes 
operational. Police 
establish contact 
with terrorists.
1300-1350 Dellow sends informal
request to SAS to 
give advanced warning 
of possible, 
deployment. DII 
(Blue Berets) 
Metropolitan Police 
marksmen arrive and 
take up positions 
around the Embassy.
Surrounding streets 
are cordoned off and 
an immediate Sterile 
Area set up.
1309 Police establish that
Constable Trevor
FBIS 65, "TEHRAN REPORTS IRANIAN EMBASSY STAFF TAKEN 
HOSTAGE IN LONDON," 30 APRIL, 1980, 1230 GMT. This report 
stated that "ABOUT 1 HOUR AGO AN ARMED MAN ENTERED THE 
BUILDING OF THE EMBASSY OF THE IRANIAN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC IN 
LONDON AND AFTER TAKING CONTROL OF IT TOOK THE STAFF AS 
HOSTAGES. SCOTLAND YARD POLICE HAVE GIVEN THE NUMBER OF 
ASSAILANTS [sic] AS THREE."
3
See J.A. Dellow, "The London Perspective on 
International Terrorism," in the Proceedings of the 10th 
Annual Symposium on the Role of Behavioral Science in 
Physical Security. Outhinkina the Terrorist: An
International Challenge. April 23-24, 1985, p. 46.
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Lock, was taken 
hostage while on 
guard at the Embassy 
and is unharmed.
1330
1350
1425
Salem Towfigh better 
known as OAN reads the 
demands to the hostages 
and tells them that they 
are members of the 
Democratic Revolutionary 
Front for the Liberation 
of Arabistan.
The Newspaper "The Guardian" 
makes initial contact with 
the terrorists by telex. 
Dialogue cut short.
Dellow asks formally 
the Home Office5for 
SAS deployment.
Initial British 
Security Service 
appreciation of the 
situation of the 
Embassy seizure 
speculated that an 
Arabistani separatist 
organization-is 
responsible.
Members of C13 Anti 
Terrorist squad and 
the Metropolitan 
Special Patrol Group 
arrives.
1435 Police receive the 
terrorist's demands 
for the release of 91 
prisoners
incarcerated in Iran.
1445 BBC is contacted by 
terrorists to explain that
Cordons begin to be 
put up by police.
William Borders, "3 Gunmen In London Seize Iran's 
Embassy," The New York Times. 1 May, 1980. Although this 
article was published the following day it asserted that the 
terrorists "have the pistol, thought to be a .38-caliber 
revolver, that they took from the captured guard, Constable 
Lock, a member of Scotland Yard's special Diplomatic Patrol 
Group." This was not so as Lock remained armed after only a 
cursory search by terrorists. Information such as this 
getting into the hands of the terrorists could have 
jeopardized the lives of Lock and the hostages.
5Dellow, op. cit., p. 46.
6FBIS 57, REUTER, "FURTHER ON 'HOSTAGE' IN LONDON 
IRANIAN EMBASSY," 30 APRIL, 1980, 1341 GMT. This news piece 
reported "AT LEAST TWO AND POSSIBLY THREE GUNMEN" had forced 
their way into the Iranian Embassy. "SCOTLAND YARD POLICE 
HEADQUARTERS COULD NOT CONFIRM A REPORT THAT THE GUNMEN WERE 
IRAQIS. 'WE HAVE NO INFORMATION ON THEIR NATIONALITIES,' A 
SPOKESMAN SAID."
7REUTER: "SEIZURE CLAIMED BY ARABISTAN IRANIANS," 30 
APRIL, 1980, 1411 GMT. News item reported that "A POLICE 
SPOKESMAN SAID THE PEOPLE HOLDING THE EMBASSY WANTED THE 
WORLD TO KNOW THEY WERE IRANIANS FROM ARABISTAN, SOUTH IRAN. 
THEY DEMANDED THAT THIS POINT BE MADE CLEAR —  THEY WANTED 
THE WORLD TO KNOW."
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they wanted 91 prisoners 
released. One of the 
female hostages Freida 
Mozafarian becomes ill 
and a doctor is requested.
1500
1520/1545
1620 Embassy secretary
Freida Mozafarian released 
from Embassygand rushed 
to hospital.
1730 Embassy hostage Chris
Cramer sends a list of 
terrorist demands via 
telex to the BBC.
1745 Karkouti, a Syrian
journalist telephones BBC.
p
Dellow, op. cit., p. 46. The SAS operations group's 
task is to make contact with the incident commander who in 
turn, if properly prepared, is aware of the CRWT requirements 
and will have taken steps to provide the SAS the necessary 
areas for the SAS planning and intelligence cells and holding 
areas for the CRWT. Dellow has stated that all this was done 
during the seige.
9FBIS 91, LONDON PRESS ASSOCIATION "IRANIAN LONDON 
EMBASSY GUNMEN RELEASE WOMAN HOSTAGE,” 30 APRIL, 1980, 1540 
GMT. This news excerpt said that a "HOSTAGE [was] RELEASED 
BY THE CAPTORS. IT WAS NOT IMMEDIATELY KNOWN WHETHER SHE HAD 
BEEN INJURED DURING HER SHORT IMPRISONMENT. AN AMBULANCE 
SPOKESMAN SAID SHE WAS 'IN A COLLAPSED STATE' AS SHE WAS 
TAKEN TO ST. STEPHEN'S HOSPITAL IN FULHAM.” This same news 
excerpt reported that "AN IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN 
IN TEHRAN ACCUSING IRAQI AGENTS OF TAKING OVER THE EMBASSY.” 
This Iraqi implication continued as "THE SPOKESMAN,
NASSIR-E-SADAT SALAMI, CLAIMED THAT THE THREE GUNMEN HAD 
STORMED THE EMBASSY SAYING THEY WERE ARABS FROM THE SOUTHERN 
IRANIAN OIL-PRODUCING PROVINCE, KHUZESTAN.” He said further 
that "IRAN EXPECTED SUCH ACTIONS AFTER PRO-IRAQI GUNMEN TRIED 
TO ASSASSINATE THE IRANIAN CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN BEIRUT 10 
DAYS AGO.”
10FBIS 94, "LONDON: IRANIAN EMBASSY GUNMEN DEMAND
RELEASE OF 91 ARABS IN IRAN," 30 APRIL, 1980, 1641 GMT.
(Footnote Continued)
Police offer to take 
her for medical 
attention.
SAS operations group 
are noticed on 
site.
Police have a press 
conference and give 
details of the gunmen 
and their hostages.
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1802
1941
2330
Cramer transmits a 
second message to the BBC. 
OAN says if the prisoners 
are not released by 1200 
1 May, embassy and 
hostages will be blown up.
A call is put through 
to Tehran to the 
Iranian Foreign 
Ministry from the 
Iranian hostages 
seeking conciliation.
Police report that 
the terrorists are 
from Khuzestan 
(Arabistan).
Iranian Foreign 
Minister returns 
call and tells 
hostages that they 
will be martyrs if 
they die. SAS CRW 
teams arrrive.
POINTS OF NOTE - DAY I
By the end of the first day, it was assessed by the police 
that the hostage-taking could last a few days particularly as 
the terrorists were behaving very calmly. Police authorities 
were as yet not certain that the terrorists had any type of 
explosives or grenades in their possession.
In early discussions between the police and the SAS, the
11latter did not favour an early rescue operation because the 
SAS wished to acquire as much information and intelligence on 
the Iranian embassy including the location of terrorists and
(Footnote Continued)
According to this report "THE CALL WAS TAKEN BY THE SENIOR 
DUTY EDITOR, MIKE BROWN AT THE WORLD SERVICE HEADQUARTERS IN 
BUSH HOUSE IN THE STRAND." It was further stated that "THE 
CALL WAS MADE BY ONE OF THE HOSTAGES, ...MUSTAFA KARKOUTI," 
according to Brown, "THE GUNMEN HAVE ASKED FOR 91 ARAB 
PRISONERS IN WHAT THEY DESCRIBED AS ARABIC LAND TO BE 
RELEASED FROM JAIL."
11Dellow, op. cit., p. 46. According to Dellow "the 
military commander will, with urgency, prepare an immediate 
action plan for use should a sudden demand be made. The SAS 
planning group then, in the light of intelligence and the 
overall police strategy, commences preparing plans that will 
allow them to respond to a whole range of options should they 
be required to do so by the police commander."
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hostages. As for the hostages, police authorities were 
attempting, with the assistance of two Iranians who 
fortuitously escaped as the gunmen moved in, to learn their 
identities.
ON-SITE COMMAND. CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS
It is obvious that the handling of the seizure of the Iranian
embassy required intimate co-operation and consultation on
site between the police, the military and the British
Security Service and in turn with the Home Secretary. This
co-operation quickly evolved into a morning meeting on site
which was chaired by the Metropolitan Police-Incident
Commander —  John A. Dellow, with representatives of the
various departments and police branches involved. Dellow has
commented that:
On the first evening of the siege I obtained 
a blanket authority from Government to commit the 
SAS on my own initiative in the event of a sudden 
deterioration of the situation, when there would be 
no time to request formal second authority. During 
the siege I advised Government on several occasions 
of the criterion that I would apply in requesting 
the commitment of the military, and-on each 
occasion Government accepted this.
The control apparatus on site consisted of a senior
representative of the Home Office, the SAS commander, a
senior British Security Service representative and the
Incident Commander. A field telephone was installed in a
first-floor room of the embassy to allow the police to talk
to the terrorists.
12Ibid.
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DAY II 
1 Mav
Date/Time Terrorist Activity Police, Government,
Military Responses 
or Other Activities
0620 Karkouti telephones the 
BBC and says that the 
threat of killing 
the Iranian hostages 
remains unchanged. 
Hostage, Chris 
Cramer becomes ill.
1000
1120 Terrorists release 
Cramer.
1145 Access to Ethiopian 
Embassy initially given 
by Ambassador.
Police are advised of 
an SAS contingency 
plan to rescue the 
hostages. In 
preparation for such 
an event all media 
and unauthorized 
persons are evacuated 
from the area behind 
the Embassy.
At the Albert Hall 
Dellow holds a second 
press conference and 
denies SAS presence 
in the vicinity of 
the Embassy.
Police interview 
Cramer and glean 
vitally needed 
intelligence about 
the terrorists* 
numbers, arms and 
whereabouts of the 
hostages.
Police request 
postponement of 
deadline. OAN 
agrees. Police 
release terrorist 
statement to members 
of press corps.
It was the 
intelligence view 
that the terrorists 
and their hostages 
were being kept in
13FBIS 50, 11 IRAN: SITUATION AT IRANIAN EMBASSY IN 
LONDON,” 2 MAY, 1980. This report stated "BBC EMPLOYEE CHRIS 
CRAMER IS RELEASED FROM THE EMBASSY JUST BEFORE THE NOON 
DEADLINE AND A SCOTLAND YARD SPOKESMAN SAYS THIS HAS CREATED 
AN 'ATMOSPHERE OF GOOD WILL."1 Furthermore, "PRESIDENT 
BANI-SADR RECEIVES A MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER THATCHER 
EXPRESSING CONCERN FOR THE HOSTAGES, CALLING THIS 
INFRINGEMENT OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY A 'REPUGNANT ACT' AND 
PLEDING [Sic] TO 'DECISIVELY COUNTER IT.'” See also Tony 
Conyers, "Thatcher gives pledge to Iran Government,” The 
Daily Telegraph. London, 2 MAY, 1980. This report states 
"The text of a personal message from Mrs. Thatcher to 
President Bani Sadr of Iran might have been kept a diplomatic 
secret had they not been released first by the Iranian 
authorities in Teheran.”
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1200 Deadline set by the 
hostage-takers passes.
the Ethiopian 
Embassy side of the 
Iranian Embassy.
Police have control 
of all the Embassy 
communications. 
Messages can only be 
passed on police 
field telephones.
1240 OAN phones in a 
communique giving a 
new deadline of the 
1400 hours 1 May.
1400
1500
2330
Second deadline passes.
Pro-Khomeini demonstration 
occurs - and some 
demonstrators arrested.
Ethiopian Embassy 
evacuated and access 
given to British 
authorities.
Police negotiator 
Superintendent Fred 
Luff passes the 
communique to the 
press. This 
information is 
forwarded from the 
Home Office Crisis 
Centre to the Foreign 
Office to the Iranian 
government with the 
concerns of Prime 
Minister Thatcher.
Police request that 
the media exercise 
discretion i.e. 
self-imposed 
censorship regarding 
police activities.
(This access to both 
buildings enabled the 
BSS and SAS to set up 
technical monitoring 
devices.
POINTS OF NOTE - DAY II
By the second day of the Embassy take-over the first 
operational intelligence requirement was to gather as much 
information as possible on what was going on inside the 
embassy. This was vital as the BSS were attempting to 
produce an intelligence picture so that the SAS could prepare
FBIS 53, 11 LONDON: GUNMEN EXTEND DEADLINE TO 1300
GMT," 1 May, 1980, 1156 GMT. This news report states that 
the terrorists, "EXTENDED THEIR DEADLINE TO KILL THE CAPTIVES 
AND BLOW UP THE BUILDING TO 2 PM." Furthermore the 
statements underlines that, "AFTER 2 PM ALL RESPONSIBILITY 
[SIC] FALLS ON THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT. IF THE IRANIAN 
GOVERNMENT WILL ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THEY ARE NEGOTIATING WITH 
THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, THAT WILL EXTEND THE TIME."
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an assault plan. It appears, however, that the police 
authorities (and in turn the Incident Commander) were 
concerned at this time not to risk disturbing the captors.
To monitor all activities around the embassy premises, a 
closed circuit television (CCTV) was installed in such a 
manner to cover all the exits and entrances to the building.
INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION
Police authorities gained access into No. 15 Princes' Gate. 
However, the other building adjacent to the Iranian embassy, 
No. 17 Princes' Gate, belonged to the Ethiopian embassy.
After a senior level government official pleaded for access,
a clearance to use the Ethiopian embassy was granted at
. 1 5approximately noon on the second day of the hostage taking.
The Ethiopian ambassador reflected upon his decision and
argued that his staff occupy the building in spite of the
ongoing sensitive and potentially dangerous situation. This
request by the ambassador was rescinded when during the
second day the terrorists threatened to blow up the Iranian
embassy if their demands were not met by the British
authorities. On that notice, the Ethiopian ambassador was
persuaded to evacuate his embassy's premises and grant access
to the British police just before midnight. While this
international negotiation was continuing, plans were made for
the technical penetrations —  the placing of listening and
visual devices in the building where the hostages were being
held.
15Discussion with a British Government official, Ottawa, 
Ontario, Canada 31 March, 1982.
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It should be underlined that the skills of observation and
16technical penetration developed by the police and the BSS 
were of great intelligence value. By this time, through the 
analysis of the sounds and lights from within the embassy, it 
was believed that the hostages were concentrated on the 
second floor. However, movement was detected between and on 
the third and fourth floors and from there downstairs to the 
field telephone on the first floor.
An intelligence break came just after noon on the second day
with the release of Christopher Cramer who was suffering from
a stomach ailment. His release gave the police detailed
information about the activities within the embassy and said
that there were five terrorists although he was not positive
that he had seen them all as other hostages had mentioned a
sixth one. His information corroborated the police analysis
that the hostages and their captors were concentrated on the
second floor. Furthermore, Cramer was able to describe some
of the weapons carried by the terrorists. These were two
17Browning pistols, a revolver and a number of grenades. The 
exact whereabouts of the captives also became known. The 
male hostages were held in an office on the second floor 
while the women were kept in a small office at the top of the 
stairs.
No. 15 Princes' Gate became the base for technical 
penetrations into the Iranian embassy. Listening devices
16Robert McGowan, et al., "The Day of the S.A.S.," Daily 
Express Special Edition, p. 8.
17Chris Cramer and Sim Harris, Hostage, pp. 57-62.
Cramer notes his concern over his debriefing by the police.
began in the early evening of the second day, painstaking 
work because of the interruptions caused by the noise level 
produced by the penetrations themselves.
As noted in the chronology for the second day the deadline 
passed. However, shortly before midnight a terrorist 
threatened to throw out the field telephone. At the same 
time, two new demands were forwarded to police authorities:
1) that a representative of the BBC should
be brought to the embassy to collect the demands of 
the terrorists.
2) that the demands of the terrorists be published.
The negotiators maintained that in return for any concessions 
from the British police the British and female captives must 
be released.
The SAS were prepared to launch an assault on the embassy, if 
necessary by 2000 hours. If the assault option was to be 
taken, it would have to be after dark and preferably late at 
night in order to catch the captors off-guard.
Date/Time Terrorist Activity Police, Government,
Military Responses or 
Other Activities
Day III 
2 Mav
0830 Food is sent into 
Embassy.
0900 OAN threatens to shoot 
the hostages. PC Lock 
tells the police that
Police say OAN's 
request to talk to 
the media is
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a shooting will take 
place unless the 
the terrorist leader (OAN) 
is given the opportunity 
to talk to the press.
0930
1250
1500 Tony Crabb arrives. OAN
demands a bus to take his 
men, the hostages and an 
Arab Ambassador to Heathrow. 
Non-Iranian hostages would 
be released. Upon arrival 
at an unspecified country 
in the Middle East the rest 
of the hostages and the 
Ambassador would be 
released. These demands 
were to be negotiated 
by the Ambassadors of 
Iraq, Jordan and 
Algeria, on OAN*s behalf, 
with the British 
government.
POINTS OF NOTE - DAY III
The complex and time-consuming technical and intelligence 
effort continued from the early morning on. At approximately 
0130 in the morning P.O. Lock was taken to a window at the 
front of the building by one of his captors and told the 
police negotiators that the drilling (technical penetration 
of the walls) must cease or action would be taken against the 
hostages. Some of the female hostages had heard noises as 
they were sitting against a wall and drew it to the attention 
of the terrorists.
The drilling had probably been noticed by the terrorists 
because the police had so effectively sealed off the embassy
impossible. OAN then 
demands to speak to 
Tony Crabb of the 
BBC.
Crabb is taken by 
police to talk to 
OAN. On arrival 
Superintendent Ray 
Tucker escorts him to 
the Embassy and talks 
to Sim Harris one of 
the hostages.
Food sent into 
Embassy.
Demands are rejected 
and no public reply 
is issued. British 
government informally 
approaches the 
representatives of 
Syria, Jordan,
Algeria and Kuwait 
to see any 
Ambassadors would 
visit the Iranian 
Embassy to talk to 
the gunmen.
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that there was very little noise. In order to provide noise
cover, the police arranged for aircraft to fly over the
embassy and left a compressor operating in the street behind
the embassy. These adjustments to the noise level were
18probably noticeable to the terrorists as well.
At approximately 0800 negotiations were reported to be slow 
to start again. OAN, was reluctant to resume talking at
first as he was angry over the lack of progress by the police
in meeting the terrorists' demands. When police negotiators 
began talking of providing a BBC man to hear his demands he 
apparently calmed down somewhat.
BBC executive Tony Crabb arrived and had a conversation with 
OAN and took down some complaints and made observations, some 
of which were:
1) The terrorists complained that the police
had used psychological aggression. This referred 
to the lack of telephone contact with the outside
world. OAN also told of the drilling that they had
heard during the night hours.
2) Dr. Gholan Ali Alfronz the Iranian Chargd
d 1Affaires appeared at the window and through 
talking with Crabb, the latter deduced that a
18Christopher Dobson, et al., "London Becomes The Arab 
Battleground," Now. 9 May, 1980, p. 41. It has been reported 
that "For four days before the attack, air traffic control 
officers had, at the request of the police, brought in 
airliners on a flight path directly over the Albert Hall to 
keep up a barrage of noise to disguise the sound of drilling 
and other preparations being made by the SAS teams." See 
also "SAS really did roar to the rescue," Soldier 12 January, 
1987, p. 13.
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fairly comfortable relationship existed between the
19captors and captives.
3) Drawing from the media reports it would appear 
there were no indications of rescue 
preparations.20
Date/Time Terrorist Activity Police, Government,
Military Responses 
or Other Activities
Day IV 
3 Mav
0730 Police contact OAN
and attempt to calm 
him down.
Negotiations carry on 
during the day.
0900 Negotiations
described by police 
as ‘very affable*.
1500 Crabb returns for
another discussion. 
Police bargain for 
release of two of the 
hostages. In return 
police promise to 
broadcast the 
terrorists * 
statement.
19**As violence erupts near the Embassy... USE FORCE SAYS 
IRAN,” The Daily Mail. London, 2 May, 1980. According to 
this report the Iranian Government had told the Foreign 
Office *'to use force if necessary to end the London Embassy 
siege. *'
2 0Norman Webster, "Gunmen let 2 deadlines pass in London 
siege," The Globe and Mail. Toronto, 2 May, 1980. This 
report states "No rescue attempt seems to be contemplated as 
yet. London*s police are well-schooled in the waiting game - 
approach - based on two famous six-day sieges here in 1975 - 
and seem to be waiting for time and exhaustion to do the 
j ob. **
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2020 Terrorists release Mrs.
Kanj i.
2100 BBC receives terrorists
statement and broadcasts it. 
Food is supplied.
2115 Second hostage All Guil
Ghanzafar is released 
from the Embassy.
POINTS OF NOTE - DAY IV
The first successful listening device began picking up 
conversations in both English and Farsi at about 0900.
Within three more hours a second technical monitoring device 
was in operation. As the information began to flow, the 
Farsi interpreters became inundated and transcribers from 
other government departments were pressed into service.
The SAS and police and intelligence authorities quickly 
agreed upon the kind of information needed:
1) the aims, intentions and psychological state of the 
terrorists?
2) the level of dissension or cohesion amongst the 
terrorists.23
The technical penetrations enabled the police negotiators to 
discover that the terrorists had psychological and physical 
dominance over their captives and that there were no 
indications, as yet, of any disunity amongst the captors.
21George Brock, et al., Siege: Six Davs at the Iranian
Embassy, p. 85.
22Ibid, p. 87.
23 . .Interview with a senior SAS officer, London, England,
2 June, 1986.
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By late afternoon it was established that the terrorists and 
hostages were within a well-defined area on the second floor 
of the embassy. An analysis from sound and other means 
suggested that the hostages were in a general office with 
others in a small adjacent room. The command centre for the 
terrorists appeared to be situated in a small room to the 
front of the embassy.
In return for the release of Mrs. Kanji, one of the hostages, 
the police authorities had the original terrorist statement 
transmitted by the BBC World Service at 2100 hours. In 
response the terrorists released another hostage just after 
that hour.
The two hostages Hiyech Sanei Kanji and Ali Guil Ghanzafar 
were able to provide more information for the intelligence 
picture. Mrs. Kanji gave the police detailed descriptions of 
the six terrorists and emphasized that a bond of empathy was 
developing between the captors and captives. Further, she 
confirmed that the terrorists were not professional killers 
but appeared to be well educated and only hoped to put 
pressure on the Iranian government to accept their demands.
Indications were that the terrorists took turns on guard duty 
but no specific time pattern was set. According to the 
released hostages, the terrorist guarding the hostages 
carried a pistol, the others patrolled the embassy with 
machine guns and each carried a grenade. There did not 
appear to be any demolitions or gas masks.
At the time of Mrs. Kanji's release, the male hostages were 
located on the second floor of the general office and the
women in a small adjacent office. They were not being 
restrained. Mrs. Kanji further described how P.C. Lock had 
developed a good rapport with the terrorists and had achieved 
their respect and confidence.
The terrorists apparently had changes of clothes and 
occasionally took the opportunity to shower. They took turns 
praying once at night, in contrast to their captives who 
prayed all the time and as a group.
As far as Mr. Ali Guil Ghanzafar was concerned he was 
reluctant to give details and apparently would not assist the 
police authorities should any prosecution for criminal 
offences be pressed against the terrorists.
Date/Time Terrorist Activity Police, Government
Military Responses 
or Other Activities
Day V 
4 Mav
0400
1000
1530
Relations between 
terrorists and hostages 
becomes hostile.
Negotiations resume 
between police and 
terrorists.
During the afternoon 
the Foreign Office 
meets with Arab 
diplomats from Syria, 
Kuwait, Jordan and 
Algeria. Arabs 
refuse to negotiate 
with terrorists 
unless they can offer 
safe passage. This 
request is refused by 
the British 
government.
2020 A hostage (KARKOUTI) is A total of five
released by OAN hostages released to
date.
POINTS OF NOTE - DAY V
In response to the request by the British government for 
Middle-East mediators the representatives of Kuwait were 
prepared to assist if Iran was agreeable. The Jordanians 
would lend assistance under certain conditions and the Syrian 
and Algerian ambassadors agreed to assist but were 
disappointed that there was no escape route for the 
terrorists. Although chances of securing an acceptable 
mediator were not great, the British government continued the 
search for suitable candidates among the Arab community in 
London.
The next hostage to be released, a Syrian journalist,
Mustapha Karkouti, (Day 5 at 2020 hours) told the police that 
the relationship between the captors and captives was 
volatile and that the terrorists were fed up with the 
slowness of negotiations. He said that the terrorists would 
probably surrender if they were guaranteed their safety.
Date/Time Terrorist Activity Police, Government,
Military Response 
or Other Activities
Day VI 
5 Mav
0105 OAN notices a bulge in
wall of the Embassy. OAN 
relocates hostages and 
terrorists.
OAN is requested by 
hostages Harris and Lock 
for permission to talk to 
the police negotiatiors. 
OAN agrees.
The bulge is caused 
by a fibre optics 
TV operating from 
the building next 
door.
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0140
1205
1245
1305
1331
P.C. Lock appears at a 
window.
One television network 
Independent Television 
News (ITN), breaks police 
request and sites, 
unknown to the police 
authorities, a TV 
camera to cover the 
rear area of the 
Iranian Embassy.
The terrorist leader 
OAN becomes agitated 
and nervous due in part 
to the slow progress of 
the negotiations. In 
talking to the police 
OAN tells them that he 
will kill a hostage in 
forty-five minutes.
An Iranian hostage 
Lavasani is taken to a 
room where OAN, Lock 
and Harris were located.
Shots are fired. 
Terrorists have shot a 
hostage and say they 
will shoot another. 
Deadline increased 
to 1700.
Lock and Harris 
discuss the situation 
with Luff and 
emphasize how 
critical the 
situation is inside 
the Embassy.
BBC reports 
continuing 
discussions between 
the Foreign Office 
and the Arab 
Ambassadors.
Relations between 
hostages and 
terrorists are 
breaking down.
Authorities are 
uncertain if a 
hostage is killed. 
Arab Ambassadors 
are contacted but 
their decisions 
remain unchanged.
SAS CRW team are 
notified and are in 
readiness at the 
scene.
1645
1710 ITN camera is 
fully operational 
overlooking the 
back of the Embassy.
Police negotiate 
for an extension and 
the Commissioner of 
Police is dispatching 
a letter to OAN.
Arab Ambassadors 
suggest a PLO 
representative as 
an intermediary.
24Dellow, op, cit., p. 46. He has stated "I would ask 
to commit his unit [the SAS] only if I considered that 
hostages were gravely at risk and that an assault and rescue 
operation was necessary to save life. As the siege 
progressed, this last matter was defined more specifically to 
indicate my intention to rescue the hostages if I have 
evidence of two hostage deaths or more."
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1800 Terrorist leader OAN 
is infuriated by delays 
and that no Arab 
intermediary was available 
and tells the authorities 
that two hostages will be 
killed in 45 minutes.
FCO rejects the 
suggestion.
Commissioner McNee 
sends a letter to 
OAN pleading for a 
peaceful solution 
to the hostage 
taking.
1820
1850 OAN calls to Alpha 
Control. All that is heard 
is the firing of three 
shots. A dead hostage 
is pushed out of the door. 
The body is that of ABBAS 
LAVASANI.
1909
The police requested 
Said-Dash, the 
Imam of the 
London Central 
Mosque to meet and 
reason with the 
terrorist leader.
The discussion with 
the terrorist was 
emotional and left 
the Imam distraught.
At Home Office Crisis 
Centre Mr*
Whitelaw
contacts the Prime 
Minister and obtains 
her approval. He 
then orders the SAS 
to break the siege by 
force.
Dellow commits the 
SAS and records the 
order in writing and 
hands it to_the SAS 
commander.
1923 SAS CRW team goes 
into the assault. 28
1940 19 hostages are 
reported safe.
One of the hostages 
Samad-Zadeh was
25Brock, op. cit., pp. 113-114.
2 6•'Something for Britain's Pride,'1 The Economist. 10 
May, 1980, p. 41.
27Dellow, op. cit., p. 46.
28Dobson, et al., op. cit., p. 41. Regarding the 
assault it was reported that, "The surprise was total, helped 
by days of careful planning round a scale model of the 
building painstakingly constructed from police photographs 
and information pinpointed by sensitive listening devices." 
See also Clare Hollingworth, "Scale Model Helped SAS Plan 
Rescue," The Daily Telegraph. London, 7 May, 1980.
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killed by the 
terrorists during 
the assault. Police 
authorities 
report ‘Siege ended1 
and recover control 
of the incident.
2025 Home Secretary says
that the SAS 
operation to rescue 
the hostages is a 
success.
POINTS OF NOTE - DAY VI
Technical monitoring had reported that the hostages were 
still situated on the second floor in the same room. The 
tensions of the previous day appeared to have subsided for 
the moment.
Negotiations went through a particularly tense phase when the 
terrorist leader appeared to lose momentary control of his 
fellow terrorists. At approximately 1331, three shots were 
heard and it was believed that a hostage had been killed. 
After the shooting, the terrorists spoke to a senior 
policeman. A deadline of 1700 hours was issued for the Arab 
ambassadors to be brought in or otherwise a hostage would be 
shot. At approximately 1730 hours a technical source 
reported a conversation among the terrorists which underlined 
the possibility of violent action and recorded that the
29Nicholas Hills, "Stunning commando raid ends embassy 
takeover," The Ottawa Citizen. 6 May, 1980. According to 
this report "Ninety minutes after the siege had been lifted, 
Home Secretary William Whitelaw said the operation, "'will 
show that we in Britain are not prepared to tolerate 
terrorism in our capital city. The world must learn this.1"
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terrorists must "do something before sunset," and "Kill two 
or three or four,” and "kill all by 10 p.m."30
At approximately 1800 hours the police negotiator was told by 
the terrorist leader that two hostages would be killed every 
45 minutes and their bodies thrown out of the embassy if 
their demands were not met. At 1800 hours, a listening 
device picked up the sound of a shot as well as a terrorist 
harassing the captives. A half hour later, at 1830 hours, the 
deadline was extended. However, approximately 15 minutes 
later shots are heard and one body was dragged to the front 
door and left on the doorstep.
After the murder of the one captive, (although the 
authorities appear to believe two were killed) the Home 
Secretary gave permission for the SAS to rescue the remaining 
hostages. At approximately 1909 hours the Incident Commander 
Dellow handed over the task to the Military Commander and the 
assault was mounted.
The time between the permission to assault the embassy and
the attack itself was spent on obtaining last-minute tactical
intelligence pertaining to the locations of the terrorists
31and their hostages.
3 0"British commandos testify at inquest: Fight for Iran
embassy described," Reuters, London, 4 February, 1981.
31Stephen Handelman, "How the SAS fights terror for 
Britain," The Toronto Star. 13 March, 1986. This article 
underlines that the SAS "are careful to emphasize the value 
of careful planning and good intelligence before 
anti-terrorist operations."
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As noted in the daily description one television network 
(ITN) broke the police request to maintain a perimeter clear 
from media intrusion. The placing of an ITN team that could 
cover the initial preparations and approach of the SAS to the 
building demonstrated a gross lack of responsibility. Had 
the terrorists been watching a television tuned to ITN they 
may have been tipped off to the assault and began killing the 
hostages. This was truly an important lesson and hence media 
controls have become much more restrictive.
Just before the assault began, the terrorist leader was kept
talking with police negotiators on the telephone. The rescue
was launched and the remaining hostages were saved in one of
the most dramatic rescue operations in recent history. Five
terrorists, including their leader, were killed. Fowzi 
32Nejad, the only surviving terrorist, was later convicted
for the manslaughter of two hostages and sentenced to life
imprisonment. Nine months later the verdict of justifiable
homicide was handed down to the SAS personnel directly
33involved in the killing of the five terrorists.
32"Killer jailed for life,” The Globe and Mail. Toronto, 
23 January, 1981.
3 3Stewart Tendler "Verdicts of justifiable homicide on 
terrorists,” The Times. 5 February, 1981. The report stated 
"The jury took almost an hour to reach its verdicts after Dr. 
Paul Knapman, the coroner told them they had the choice of 
justifiable homicide, unlawful killing, an open verdict or 
death by misadventure."
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daylight.
More ambitious operations by formed units with some perhaps from a neighbouring 
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A whole series of operations ranging up to actions between formed units with a simul­
taneous situation of wide-spread guerilla activity. Areas dominated by guerillas are 
enlarged and may be declared as liberated.
As above, but having escalated to include regular land and perhaps even sea and air forces 
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against the government. Large areas are dominated by the guerillas.
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achieve their aim without further fighting or with the legal government more firmly in control
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simple progression. But in practice the phases all merge, can be altered and may even be reversed. 
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